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INTRODUCTION
It seems to be commonly accepted that Marxism has little to say 
about ecological problems, that its implicit positions far from 
illuminate them, and, what is more, that the Marxist position 
enables, causes or legitimizes harm to the environment. The 
present work proceeds to a thorough reconsideration of any such 
assumptions.
But it also appeals for the obviation of such simplistic ap­
proaches as are typified by a leading Marxist economist, Ernest 
Mandel: "The evil is private property and competition, that is,
the market economy and capitalism. All catastrophes, including the 
irrational and inhuman roads that technology is led down, derive 
from this social base and from it alone." (Mandel 1975:16) In a 
similar vein, albeit more careful, Cohen writes that "whatever the 
size of the problem would otherwise be, it is certain that capita­
lism aggravates it." (Cohen 1978:322)
To understand the meaning of the ecological discourse, it might
be helpful to look back to world-views of the last century. A 
common world view of the 19th century was that the growth of 
scientific knowledge, technological development and economic 
activity, in a word, "industrialism" was an inherently positive 
thing because it served human purposes. The 20th century saw the 
results of this unbounded productivism; it became manifest that 
although mankind succeeded in gaining more wealth, the natural 
environment became more and more debased, which in turn was
detrimental to human well-being. With this observation, it took 
little to conclude that productivism was responsible for this
unpleasant state of affairs. Since human beings prosper at the 
expense of nature, so goes the claim of many environmentalists,
2they do not take into account that this debased nature will not 
allow mankind to prosper or survive in a not so distant future.
But there are also authors, whether Marxist or not, who claim 
that Marxism is of little help in investigating ecological prob­
lems. Anthony Giddens, for example, writes that "[i]n Marx, nature
appears above all as the medium of the realisation of human social
development. The universal history of man is traced through the 
progressive elaboration of the productive forces, maximised in 
capitalism... But Marx's concern with transforming the exploita­
tive human social relations expressed in class systems does not 
extend to the exploitation of nature." (Giddens 1981:59) Giddens 
concludes that this "Promethean attitude" is indefensible in the 
twentieth century since "the expansion of the productive forces 
can no longer be treated unproblematically as conducive to social 
progress." (Giddens 1981:60) But Giddens confuses expansion of 
productive forces "as such" with productive forces which are 
detrimental to the natural environment. This may be a mere verbal 
quarrel. However, it seems that in his terminology, the expansion 
of productive forces leads inevitably to an "exploitation of 
nature". While I think that nothing is wrong with "exploiting 
nature", there is certainly something wrong with nature 
transformations which lead to worse life-conditions of human 
beings. In other words, I think that the "Promethean" attitude is 
not only defensible, but also superior to Giddens' suggestion that 
Marx should have extended his concern to exploitation of nature.
It is true that Marx welcomed the growth of productive forces 
and, what is more, praised even capitalism for developing the 
productive forces in a hitherto unknown way. Thus, at first sight,
industrialism for him was part of the historical tendency of the
productive forces to develop - an indispensable condition for the 
advent of a communist society. This outline has been summarised by 
André Gorz in the following way:
3Until recently most Marxists still thought of 
forces of production - in particular science 
and technology - as ideologically neutral, and 
they considered the development of these 
forces of production to be inherently posi­
tive. They usually held the view that as it 
matured capitalism was producing a material 
base on which socialism could be constructed, 
and it was thought that the more the forces of 
production developed under capitalism the 
easier it would be to build socialism. Such 
productive forces as technology, science, 
human skills and knowledge and abundant dead 
labour (fixed capital) were considered to be 
assets that would greatly facilitate the 
transition to socialism. (Gorz 1976:159)
But Gorz does not share this view; on the contrary he thinks 
that modern science and technology are "ideological" in the sense 
that they are shaped in decisive ways by capitalist interests. 
Indeed, there are several authors who deny that there can exist 
something like "innocent" productive forces. As we shall see, this 
question is a crucial one for Marx's own analysis. This discussion 
will lead to the result that we must be aware of a double meaning 
of the term "growth of productive forces": it can mean (1) in­
creasing mastery over nature and (2) production of wealth (mate­
rial goods) with ever diminishing effort or in increasing abun­
dance. The first meaning is that mankind gains an ever greater 
mastery over nature, in the sense that individuals develop into 
universal human beings, that they expand their control over the 
world around them, that they are able to shape a world according 
to their needs and pleasures. Let us call this the "philosophical 
meaning". The second meaning is primarily economic; a growth in 
this sense can be measured with economic criteria of efficiency. 
Let us call this the "economic meaning".
Both meanings in Marx are linked together. The dignity of human 
beings requires freedom from hunger as much as it does freedom
4from a hostile nature which acts upon them as an alien force. For 
Marx two alternatives are thus excluded: first, to accept modern 
civilization in which detrimental effects stem from man's trans­
formation of nature, and, second, to go back to a state in which 
the well-being of people could not be secured on the material 
level. Marx's position was a plea to expand human power and con­
trol over one's life-conditions to such a degree that the release 
of all human powers would lead only to beneficial consequences.
A critique of Marx can only start at this point. If there is any 
basic flaw in his treatment of productive forces and the domina­
tion of nature it is in the insufficiently clear distinction 
between the growth of productive forces and increasing mastery 
over nature. Marx, at times, seems to assume that the former does 
imply the latter. Against this I argue that there may be produc­
tive forces which do not lead to an increasing mastery over nature 
but, rather, to an increasing uncertainty, risk and uncontrolla­
bility as well as to unnessary oppression in the production pro­
cess. However, we may find in Marx also an implicit distinction 
between these two meanings if we look at his awareness of the 
shortcomings of a purely economic approach. This awareness leads 
him to a radical opposition to the Political Economists who 
thought that capitalist market economies would maximise economic 
efficiency and thus human welfare and happiness. His attack on 
Political Economy thus embraces both elements: it offers arguments 
against the efficiency claim as well as arguments against the 
maximisation of human welfare and happiness, for capitalism is an 
irrational form of enhancing efficiency (crises!) and it decreases 
happiness. It only creates the material preconditions for a real 
human society. If this reasoning is true, Marx does not equate 
increases in economic efficiency with an increase of human mastery 
over nature.
5But some critics of industrialism go one step further: they make 
the basic claim that the development of productive forces per se 
is incompatible with the prospering of nature. From this proposi­
tion they conclude that industrialism should be limited (or even 
abolished) in the interest of nature and mankind.
Although Marx rarely adressed ecological problems, this much is 
clear: he sharply opposed such pessimism. Instead of assuming the 
basic incompatabilty of modern technology with the prospering of 
mankind he assumed - at least in Capital - only the basic 
incompatibility of modern technology under capitalist relations 
with the prospering of mankind. He thus assumed, in contradiction 
to the critics of industrialism, a basic compatibility between 
modern technology and the prospering of mankind. As my analysis 
will show, this judgement by Marx does not stand up to the 
empirical evidence. The 20th century has seen a rapid development 
of productive forces which has been partly enhanced by public 
enterprises or by socialist enterprises (i.e. enterprises in 
socialist countries). In both cases the damaging effects did not 
disappear (as we might expect on the basis of Marx's prediction). 
On the contrary, it seems that socialist countries present an even 
worse ecological record in comparison with capitalist countries.
Does this invalidate Marx's analysis? Are we to abandon his 
framework since the empirical facts have (once more) belied his 
predictions? My answer is no. One reason is that he analysed the 
implications of machine-technology (above all in the recently 
published Manuscripts 1861-3) and was aware that the technological 
structure of capitalism - not only the capitalist use of it - may 
be detrimental for "the good society". Another reason is that 
Marx's prediction, based on the concepts of the critique of Poli­
tical Economy, may have been falsified, though not necessarily 
other parts of his theory. In investigating more deeply the
6philosophical argument, this work is also distinguished from some 
attempts at "reconstructing" a "green” Marx, a procedure which 
usually rests on a compilation of apparently "green" statements by 
Marx (cf. Schmied-Kowarzik 1984). One of them is the famous 
passage from the Paris Manuscripts where Marx spoke of a 
"humanization of nature and naturalizing of man", which is usually 
interpreted as the young Marx's desire to bring about harmony 
between man and nature. In my view, such ad hoc "reconstructions" 
of an "ecological Marx" do not reveal interesting insights. For we 
all know that Marx was no ecologist, even if he could have been 
o n e .
But still, the philosophical Marx may reveal fundamental and 
illuminating insights. Marx's theory, after all, aims at human 
emancipation. If we forget this, Marx was not much different from 
an economist who measures human wealth in terms of prices and per 
capita income. Marx's lifework consisted mainly in showing that 
capitalist economy is a state of affairs in which individuals are 
systematically unable to control the outcomes of their actions. 
Such a critique highlights economic crises, but also "business as 
usual" and its reification of social relations. Crises, alienation 
and fetishism affect all memebers of capitalist society, i.e. 
capitalists, too, are caught in a situation "unworthy of their 
human nature". Post-war prosperity and interventionist techniques 
of the Welfare state in the economy have led many to believe that 
the basis for a socialist critique of capitalism has vanished. Yet 
many Marxists and Marxologists feel that the range of Marx's 
theory is not exhausted by the fact that capitalism has brought 
about considerable economic growth. The decisive reason why Marx's 
theoretical range is wider is because he stresses the need for 
human control over its fate. This is to say that, even granted 
that capitalist economy works smoothly (which may still be doubted 
on good grounds), there may be other respects in which human
7control has not been established. Only if such a control is 
improbable, implausible or even undesirable, we would have reasons 
to oppose the underlying logic of his critique of capitalism.
If we turn away, then, from Marx's political economy, and enter 
his philosophical discourse, we encounter, first, the abstract 
relation between man and nature, as a transhistorical condition, 
and then the specific historical forms which this relation 
assumes. Technologies serve as criteria to distinguish such 
historic formations. Needless to say that in this respect Marx is 
equally concerned about people's ability to understand and control 
the world around them. Certainly, Marx as a writer of the 19th 
century was rather optimistic as regards the possiblities of 
science and technology in this process. But again, although his 
expectations have not been fulfilled, we should not prematurely 
dismiss his theoretical outline. On the contrary, if science and 
technology have not been instruments for mankind to shape a world 
which is intelligible and controllable, we still live in 
conditions which have to be superseded in order to achieve human 
emancipation, a task in which Marx's theory may be of help. 
Whether or not this will yield valid or feasible solutions, it 
will articulate the ecological problems of industrial societies 
from his philosophical framework. This framework is a unique 
combination of various modern philosophies, such as Bacons', 
Kants', Hegel's, Feuerbach's and others. In sharp contrast to 
this, the discourse of fundamentalist environmentalism proposes to 
industrial societies that they adopt "a simpler life" in order to 
safeguard the survival of this planet. If the ecological challenge 
is a challenge to basic assumptions of modern thinking, let us 
see, then, to what use one version of the modern view of nature, 
viz. the theory of Karl Marx, can be put.
8To summarize: two expectations of Marx have been disapproved:
the expectation that science and technology would create an 
intelligible and controllable world as well as the expectation 
that only capitalist relations stand in the way of such a goal. 
3ut equally wrong are the environmentalists who foolheartedly 
believe that the basic fault has to be seen in the attempt to 
harness nature to human purposes or to develop productive forces. 
I argue that some productive forces may run counter to the aim of 
extending human control over nature. This study therefore inves­
tigates the conditions under which modern technology is developed 
and applied (chapter 3). If the growth of the productive forces 
does not lead automatically to an increase in mastery over nature, 
we also have to reconsider basic assumptions of historical 
materialism (chapter 4). A reformulation of basic assumptions of 
historical materialism will inevitably affect our understanding of 
what communism is, or should, be (chapter 5).
Alfred Schmidt in his pioneering study has already remarked that 
we have to collect many scattered remarks from a wide range of 
Marx's theory, since Marx never treated the concept of nature in a 
separate discussion. These scattered remarks, put together, open 
up a complex discourse, since its elements are interwoven in many 
ways. There are many possible connections with other elements of 
his theory or with the theories of others. This could take us to 
philosophy, natural sciences, history, epistemology, political 
economy, sociology, and further afield, where there is conside­
rable danger in being distracted from the centrally important 
discussion. For this reason, I have largely excluded questions of 
epistemology, political economy and history from this study, 
giving preference to an approach which locates Marx in a philoso­
phical tradition and connects his thoughts to contemporary social 
theory and interpretations of his work.
9CHAPTER 1: ESTABLISHING PHENOMENA, CLAIMS AND EXPLANATIONS
Gemäß dec Natur wollt ihr leben?
Leben - ist das nicht gerade ein 
Anders-sein-wollen, als diese 
Natur ist? Ist Leben nicht ab­
schätzen, vorziehen, Ungerecht­
sein, Begrenzt-sein, Differer.t- 
sein-wollen?
Nietzsche
Since the first studies concerning ecological problems have appea­
red1 , the topic has been an ever-present issue in many contempo­
rary debates. These studies were alarmist in tone. They led to a 
debate which altered the political discourse in one important 
respect: the natural environment became an issue for political 
activity, for political parties and for governments. It became an 
issue for social and political sciences, for economics, moral 
philosophy and law. Other parts of society increasingly realised 
that environmental questions were crucial; but just how crucial
1 Carson (1962); Meadows and Meadows (1972). See the criti­
cisms of Heilbronner (1973), Myrdal (1973) and Galtung 
(1973) with respect to the latter.
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turned out to be a topic for many debates. These debates are still 
going on, with the notable change that more recent studies have 
abandoned the alarmist tone and try do distinguish the problems 
more precisely.2
1.1. Phenomena
It is worth noting that the 'early' reports on environmental prob­
lems were stressing the interconnection of several factors which 
would lead to an ecological crisis or collapse. The most important 
of them being exhaustion of resources, population growth and 
pollution. At least in respect of the problem of resources and 
population, recent studies, such as the Commission of the United 
Nations on Environment and Development, are more optimistic.3 
The most recent report of the commission (1987) lists the 
following phenomena:
1 pollution (air, water)
2 depletion of groundwater
3 proliferation of toxic chemicals
4 proliferation of hazardous waste
5 erosion
6 desertification
7 acidification
8 new chemicals (cf. World Commission, 1987:10)
2 To be sure, there is also less need today for alarming the 
public than there was 10 or 20 years ago; Three Mile Island, 
Tschernobyl and Bhopal established an ecological awareness 
which no alarming study could have accomplished.
3 "The commission believes that widespread poverty is no 
longer inevitable" (1987:8) "Global agriculture has the 
potential to grow enough food for all, but food is often not 
available where it is needed." (ibidem:12) "Hunger often 
arises from lack of purchasing power rather than lack of 
available food." (ibidem:13) Note that the depletion of 
natural resources does not figure as a separate theme in the 
report.
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In a quite illuminating but little discussed book, Passmore listed 
the following problems :
(9) pollution
(10) depletion of natural resources
(11) extinction of species
(12) destruction of wilderness
(13) population growth (cf. Passmore 1974:43)
Since 1,3,4,7 and 8 are contained in the more general(9), I 
shall take Passmore's list as basis for further discussion. Since 
(11) and (12) are contained in (10), we have basically pollution, 
depletion of (renewable and non-renewable) resources and popula­
tion growth as ecological problems.4 Population growth can be an 
ecological problem in two senses. First, it can be seen as leading 
to ecological problems such as pollution or depletion of resour­
ces, because an increasing population might require more intense 
exploitation of resources or more technological development with 
pollution as a side-effect. Second, it can be seen as an 
ecological problem per s e , i.e. the increasing number in a speci­
fic place may be detrimental to human well-being. Taken in the 
first sense it is a cause of, taken in the second sense it is an 
instance of, an ecological problem.
The issue has a practical and a theoretical dimension. The 
practical dimension is that almost every country has been affected 
by ecological problems in a more or less significant way; it has 
become one of the central political questions in the course of a 
few years. Social movements have come into being in many countries
4 Erosion and desertification fall out of the list. They are 
natural processes anyway and interesting in our context only 
in so far as they are caused by human intervention. In this 
case we might classify them under (10), distinguishing 
between renewable resources (agriculture) and non-renewable 
resources. Side-effects of chemical substances (such as 
pharmaceutics) would have to be included under pollution.
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industrial societies. Utopian projects have to acknowledge the 
highly complex character of modern technology if they want to 
bring about feasible changes. Marcuse, posing himself this prob­
lem, thought that there could be two types of mastery over nature, 
a repressive one and a liberating one. To this position Habermas 
quite rightly objected
"that modern science can be interpreted as a 
historically unique project only if at least 
one alternative project is thinkable. And, in 
addition, an alternative New Science would 
have to include the definition of a New Tech­
nology. This is a sobering consideration be­
cause technology, if based at all on a pro­
ject, can only be traced back to a 'project' 
of the human species as a whole, and not to 
one that could be historically surpassed."
(Habermas 1971b:87)
Analysing contemporary ecological thought, Oechsle found that a 
common world-view prevalent in it is naturalism. Naturalism, ac­
cording to her, proceeds in the following way. It first juxtaposes 
nature and society; they are seen as standing in contradiction to 
each other. It then tries to solve this contradiction in such a 
way that society adapt its laws to the laws of nature. "Naturalis­
mus meint hier den Versuch, die Gesellschaft von bestimmten 
Gesetzmäßigkeiten der Natur her zu erklären und zu verstehen, 
gesellschaftliche Organisationsprinzipien und Normen des 
Zusammenlebens aus ökologischen Prinzipien abzuleiten und zu 
begründen." (Oechfle 1988:9) Haeckel (who coined the term 
"ecology" as denoting the science which analyses the relationships 
of organisms to their environment) had already claimed that man 
should lead his life in accordance with natural laws. It is 
intriguing to see that this naturalistic world-view is a common 
denominator of all political tendencies in the ecological 
discourse. We find it in conservative authors like Gruhl (Gruhl 
1975:33,345); in communist-stalinist authors like Harich 
(1975:161); in anarchist writers like Bookchin (1977:15), and in 
eco-socialist writers like Lalonde (1978:53). All of them claim 
the authority of nature and her laws to be the foundation stone of
15
a new society which will solve ecological problems. Gruhl and 
Harich are alike in that they stress the iron necessity with which 
nature operates; from this they derive similar tough political 
measures. Bookchin argues that spontaneity in life converges with 
spontaneity in nature (1977:10), and Lalonde stresses the fact 
that nature is and society should be self-organizing. This short 
overview shows that nature seems to be an authority which many 
think to be uncontested; however, as closer analysis shows, each 
version of nature is a construction of their authors. Therefore, 
what the "nature of nature" is, is a matter rather of debate than 
certainty.
This already makes clear that any discourse on nature and 
ecological problems is not without presuppositions; and these 
presuppositions lie within the cultural background of the
participants of the discourse; they are are product of history. A 
definition of "nature" or of ecological problems, therefore,
always relates to an anthropocentric element. Now, how does this 
anthropocentric element relate to the domination of nature? 
Oechsle rightly defends man's special position within nature; and 
she rightly refuses ecological naturalism. However, she does not 
defend it in a straightforward way which she - in my opinion - 
should have done. In my view, man's special position within nature 
is characterized by his dominating of nature. In order to separate 
the question of whether mankind has a special status within nature 
from the question of whether mankind should dominate nature, 
Oechsle (approvingly) cites Mumford, who claimed that within
occidental civilization there have been examples of a "democratic" 
technology. This argument gives her the possibility of defending a 
sort of anthropocentrism without embracing the notion of domina­
tion of nature. However, a distinction between a democratic and an 
authoritarian technology makes sense only with respect to man, not 
with respect to nature. Every technology, even the softest, forms
>4-
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a part of man's domination of nature.6 Oechsle agrees with 
authors like Amery, Bahro and Meyer-Abich (inter alia) that we 
have to research the origins of destroying nature. These are seen 
in the specific occidental human self-understanding and world­
view. As Amery put it:
"Werden die Wurzeln dieser historischen und 
ideellen Haltungen nicht freigelegt, werden 
die notwendigen Vorschläge immer auf 
politischen und gesellschaftlichen Widerstand 
stoßen, und nur wenn man sich klarmacht, wie 
tief diese Wurzeln in unseren kollektiven 
Untergrund hinabreichen, wird der notwendige, 
das heißt der radikale und höchst schmerzvolle 
Prozeß einer planetarischen Revolution ... 
eingeleitet werden können." (Amery 1976, cited 
in Oechsle 1988:96-7)7
Human beings have no fixed place where they have to live; vir­
tually every place on this planet can be inhabitated by them. By 
this they distinguish themselves from most other animals (and, of 
course, plants) who survive only within a limited geographical, 
biological, climatic zone. How are human beings able to survive in 
an "insecure environment"? The answer is: by constructing a second 
"nature" around them.8 This artificial, man-made nature is the 
embodiment of their necessity to fight against nature; it is the 
solution of the apparent paradox that they are in and against 
nature. The solution of the paradox entails a wholly new dimension
6 Oechsle comes close to acknowledging this when she writes 
that even the most "dialogical" approaches towards nature 
(as, for example, proposed by Prigogine) cannot but lead to 
a more perfect domination of nature. In Trepl's words: 
"Ökologische Technik ist der totale Zugriff. Daher steht 
auch die Ökologie nicht außerhalb der Logik des Fort­
schritts, sondern dieser kulminiert in ihr." (Trepl 1983:11)
7 But at the same time Oechsle defends the anthropocentric 
world-view to a certain degree. Man is Natur und Übernatur, 
is part of nature and at the same time "above" or even 
"outside" nature.
8 In comparison, an animal species in an unfavourable environ­
ment will undergo an evolutionary process in order to sur­
vive.
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by which human beings distinguish themselves from animals: it is
the use of tools or technology.
But something further follows from this. Because human beings 
are organizing their life in the described way, they have no
"natural enemies" as almost every other species has though, 
certainly, they have sometimes specific parts of nature in
opposition to them, nature which exerts its resistance upon them.
As James Stuart Mill observed, the powers of nature "are often
towards man in the position of enemies, from which he must wrest,
by force and ingenuity, what little he can for his own use."
(Mill, 1904:15)
This stresses again my objection to the ecological world-view 
which challenges the anthropocentric world-view. Nature, as such, 
is not always beneficial for human beings. It is completely 
mistaken to identify nature with 'good' and technology or human 
culture with 'bad'.9 Moralizing helps rarely, less so with 
respect to nature. As Passmore observed quite rightly, "these 
natural processes may in fact be quite harmful, so that, let us 
say, oysters from granite regions ought to be condemned for human 
consumption. The 'natural' is not necessarily harmless, let alone 
beneficial to man." (Passmore 1974:47)
In exactly the same vein, Adorno, reflecting on the landscape of
the Swiss alps, remarked:
"Both, the scars of civilization and the un­
touched zone beyond the timber line, are con­
trary to the idea that nature is a cheering, 
warming thing, dedicated only to man; it re­
veals how the cosmos looks like. The usual 
imago of nature is limited, bourgeois narrow­
ly, sensitive only to the tiny zone in which 
historically familiar life flourishes; the
9 As Kluge has shown in d e t a i n e d  study, much of the ecologi­
cal rhetoric consists of the juxtaposition of life and death
— where nature stands for the former, industrialism for the
latter (cp. Kluge 1985).
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bridle path is cultural philosophy." (Adorno 
1968:327, my translation, orig. emphasis)
Passmore, in reply to Barry Commoner's "Third law of ecology
nature knows best", pointed out:
"It is true enough... that every human inter­
vention in an ecosystem is likely to disturb 
the workings of that system in a way that is 
detrimental to some number of it. So much is 
true of every change, man-induced or nature- 
induced. But it by no means follows, as his 
'law' might seem to suggest, that every such 
change, or even most such changes, will be 
detrimental to human beings. Unlike the 
watches to which he compares them, ecological 
systems were not designed for man's use. When 
men picked seeds off plants and sowed them on 
cleared ground, they acted in a way that was
detrimental to the organic life which was
accustomed to feed on the fallen seeds. But 
only the most unreconstructed primitivist 
would suggest that the actions of our
agricultaral forefathers were destructive of 
human interests. A nature left entirely alone 
as 'knowing best' would support only the
dreariest and monotonous of lives." (Passmore 
1974:185)
The anthropocentric approach10 has the main virtue of offering a 
reference point from which to evaluate ecological problems. The 
reference point, as we shall see, can be defined in different ways 
(presently living human individuals, society, mankind, future gen­
erations) but no matter how we define it, it firmly establishes a 
clear criterion of how to judge existing ecological phenomena. Any 
'eco-centric' approach, on the other hand, is bound to be
10 To avoid misunderstanding, my use of the term is that which 
is synonymous with 'humanistic'. In so doing, I try to avoid 
any connotation with the Rennaissance-view which saw man at 
the centre of the universe. See Pico della Mirandola for a 
typical formulation of that time. (I am indebted to J.P. 
Cavaille for this reference.)
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inconsistent, unless it adopts a mystical standpoint. It is 
inconsistent because it pretends to define ecological problems 
purely from the standpoint of nature. It starts with assumptions 
about nature and natural laws to which all human action should 
adapt. 11 But it is evident that the definition of nature and an 
ecological balance is a human act, a human definition which sets 
an ecological balance in relation to man's needs, pleasures and 
desires.
Consider now the following claims:
(Cl): Ecological problems are the result of man's domination of 
nature.
Following from this, another model of man's relation to nature 
would eliminate ecological problems. The alternative model would 
be communicative instead of dominating. 'Harmony', 'convivality' 
and 'cooperation' would be the underlying principles (cf. Bloch 
1959; Illich 1973; Bateson 1982). This claim having already been 
criticised above, let us turn to the next one:
(C2): Ecological problems are basically the result of man's 
destruction of nature.
11 Note that the refusal of anthopocentrism is followed by a 
conspicious position which anthropomorphises nature, i.e. it 
projects human standards and inventions into the working of 
nature. But why should nature work in a 'balanced' manner? 
Or why should nature always be beautiful? Is it not man who 
introduces laws of beauty into nature? Cf. Kundera: "Ohne es 
zu wissen, komponiert der Mensch sein Leben nach den Ge­
setzen der Schönheit, sogar in Momenten tiefster Hoffnungs­
losigkeit." (1984:52) and before him Marx in the Par is 
Manuscripts: "Man forms objects in accordance with the laws 
of beauty." (CW 3 :277)
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This definition releases us from the difficulty of alternative 
modes of conceiving and treating nature. (C2) does not necessarily 
refuse the domination of nature; it only opposes some extremely 
negative features ('destruction').
However,this claim is equally misleading because it suggests the 
(false) belief that nature could be destroyed (by human action or 
otherwise). As is clear, this definition leads us immediately to 
metaphysical arguments and to the idealism-materialism opposition. 
Interestingly enough, many of the participants of the ecological 
debate are 'materialists' (virtually all natural scientists) and 
therefore should not believe in the possibility of nature's self- 
destruction, and, in fact, most of them would not subscribe to 
such a position, although many ecologists make use of this 
definition. Scientists, quite explicitly, refer to the "second law 
of thermodynamics" (entropy law) to express their preoccupation in 
this respect (see Georgescu-Roegen 1971; 1973).
But there remains another sense in which (C2) is understood. In 
this version the destruction of nature is not taken in the sense 
of physics but in an evaluative sense. 'Destruction of nature' 
here refers to the disruption of the environment human beings live 
in. This version is usually implied in the following claim:
(C3): Ecological problems result from man's short-sighted
exploitation of nature.
A "short-sighted" exploitation of nature can have two different 
meanings: (a) nature's intrinsic values are violated; (b) negative 
repercussions from exploited nature to man are not taken into 
account. As I shall explain below, only (b) can be used in a 
meaningful way.
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The ecological discourse, however, does not usually speak of 
ecological problems, but of ecological crisis. The notion of 
crisis derives from medicine and has been applied to economy, it 
denotes the turning point of a pathological state (for example 
fever in medicine, depreciation of capital in economy). The notion 
of crisis thus introduces a dramatic dimension into the ecological 
discourse: it suggests that nature is undergoing an 'abnormal' 
development which has to culminate in a crisis which then gives 
way to a new, 'normal' state. 3ut each crisis also can lead to the 
opposite result: in this case the 'infected' system (organism)
will not recover but die.
From this last alternative we get the following prediction:
(C 4 ) Current ecological crises lead necessarily to ecological 
catastrophes (and eventually to the final collapse.)
It goes without saying that much of the dramatic dimension of 
the ecological discourse rests on this element. To subscribe to 
this claim a clear analysis of the present situation and a 
reliable prognosis of the immediate future of the planet earth 
would be required. The following two examples may illustrate this. 
The first example is the problem of CC>2 emissions into the 
atmosphere. One position holds that this process will lead to the 
"greenhouse-effect", that the planet's atmosphere will be heated 
up in such a way that polar ice will melt and consequently many 
big maritime cities will be flooded. The counter-position holds 
that increasing emissions of dust will cause a counter-tendency 
which prevents the heating up and thus prevents the greenhouse- 
ef feet .
The second example is the question of scarcity of natural 
resources. Again, scientists have considerable disagreement; a 
judgement in this case depends on the answer to the question of
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how fast technological progress will be (in order to find 
substitutes for scarce resources). Thus I think that many of the 
'alarmist' statements are the expression of one tendency within a 
variety of competing claims.12 For this reason I shall abandon 
the catastrophic prediction, but also the following claim:
(C5) Ecological problems are only temporal and not very severe; 
they will soon vanish.
which is the symmetrical counter-argument to (C4).
Passmore proposed the following, very broad definition: A
problem is 'ecological' if it arises as a practical consequence of 
man's dealings with nature (cf. Passmore 1974:43). Since this 
definition avoids the problems of (Cl) to (C5), and has the virtue 
of relating it clearly to human action, I shall adopt it as basis 
for the further discussion - with one additional qualification: 
"Practical consequences" means that man's dealings with nature 
retroact upon society in a way which is detrimental to human well­
being.13
M a n ’s dealings with nature are generally characterized by the 
following characteristics. First, man is part of nature, he is 
living in nature; biology defines him as the most highly developed
12 In saying this I do not deny the existence of ecological 
catastrophes (in the sense of Perrows 'normal accidents', 
infra). What I deny is the logical status of these cata­
strophes in the above definition. There, it has the status 
of an instance for a "final crisis".
13 This definition takes into consideration the fact that also 
nature by itself can induce ecological problems. This is the 
case with floods, eruption of volcanos, fall of meteorites 
etc. The important point here is that we are obviously 
interested in ecological problems which are produced by 
society and the solution of which lie within the scope of 
social action.
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mammal. Nature, however, is the realm of competition for survival. 
Thus human beings have to secure their position in nature as do 
other animals. But human beings distinguish themselves from other 
animals in their own particular way of maintaining life.
If we characterize human beings as living in, and dominating 
nature, this does not present two statements which are incompa­
tible with each other. When we say that a problem is ecological 
when it arises as a consequence of man's dealings with nature, 
many might agree. But I think it useful to push the point a bit 
further. It does not mean that the very fact of dealing with 
nature (manipulation, domination, harnessing or seduction) is the 
crucial point, the "cause", so to speak, of ecological problems. 
Ecological problems arise only out of specific ways of dealing 
with nature. To repeat my claim from above: both man's existence 
in nature and his attempt to dominate nature are compatible, human 
beings live in and dominate nature.
Out of a misunderstanding of this relation, both ecologists and 
their declared enemies conclude the mutually-exclusive character 
of the two predicates. Both positions are wrong in that they 
identify the problem of dominating nature as the heart of the 
matter. Consider the following argument. (I take here the "anti­
humanist" approach to extremes, thereby showing its absurdity.)
Recall (C 4) from above. There we saw that a "pathological" state 
was distinguished from a "normal" state of nature. But it is 
difficult to know what is "normal" for nature. Ecologists will 
probably argue that the "normal" state of nature is a balanced 
state of nature. Since I cannot see how this definition can work 
without reference to human interests and definitions, I claim that 
nature is always in "balance with itself". Take the example of a 
river in which, caused by pollution (detergents), no fish survive. 
But instead of fish other animals and plants (e.g.algae) are
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flourishing. The ecologist, confronted with such an argument, 
would probably say that if the river cannot return to the former 
(’normal1) state with its own powers, its ecosystem would have to 
be called 'unbalanced'. But in so arguing, she would only reveal 
her preference for higher living organisms.14
Let us take the argument again a step further and consider the 
example of a river which is drying out. In this case again we have 
'nature': sand, rocks, plants, insects, reptiles, mammals. The 
ecologist would now probably reply that nature's diversity and 
complexity has been destroyed. And here, ironically, we have the 
resurrection (if only implicit) of the anthropocentric view, viz. 
that it is man who has an interest in conserving natural 
complexity. Of course, I do see the possible argument that nature 
'for itself' should be complex. But unless one adopts a mystical 
or religious standpoint, there is always a human interest behind 
the attitude that nature should be left out there "for itself". 
The reasons behind such an human interest are either of an 
aesthetic, or a purely selfish character or spring from man's 
general care about his environment. Mary Douglas' definition still 
provides a good insight into the problem. She claims that 
"uncleanness is matter out of place" (Douglas 1966:40). What makes 
a place wrong is dependent on the cultural value system of a given 
society. With respect to western societies we may say that it 
might be wrong aesthetically, that it is detrimental for health, 
or that it destroys wildlife, plants and animals (cf. Passmore 
1974:45-6). If we do not conceive of the "selfish" character in a 
narrow, economic, short-termed way, all criteria can be reduced to
14 Usually lower animals such as insects and bacteria are 
outside the concern of ecological reasoning. Albert 
Schweitzer tried to be consistent and defended the right of 
living for the tse tse fly and the tubercle. This position, 
radical in ethical and religious respect, makes impossible a 
consistent course of human action. Consider the case of the 
AIDS virus!
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this category.15 My suspicion is that the ecological discourse 
shaped its arguments in a counter-position to economics, and also 
took over a basic flaw of that theory: the identification of short 
term rationality (as expressed in economic behaviour) with 
rationality as such. Out of this identification it is only logical 
to refuse a humanist approach as a guiding line in solving 
ecological problems. Human beings are seen as inherently short­
sighted; it follows that their needs must not count as criteria 
for ecological politics. Doing away with this confusion, the 
anthropocentric standpoint makes perfectly possible a concern 
about the 'flourishing of nature'; it is by no means bound to be 
an accomplice to the tendencies which cause ecological problems. 
Yet, what is more, I claim that this standpoint is the only one 
which can consistently speak in terms like 'flourishing nature' 
and the only one which lays its standard of critique open, thus 
facilitating analyses and solutions for these problems.
One cannot escape the cultural value system of contemporary wes­
tern societies when criticizing it. This is to say that ecological 
fundamentalists are bound to participate in rational debates, to 
presuppose rationality standards, etc. As Krohn put it: "The 
critique of science must take the form of science, in order to be 
effective." (Krohn 1983:128, my translation).16 The results of an
15 Consider the case of a domestic animal which falls ill and 
which would die without medical care. Its "natural" destiny 
would be to die. But, if the owner of the animal so wants, 
he tries to get it cured. This attempt need not be ethical 
because he may try to cure it on purely selfish grounds i.e. 
simply because he would feel bad if the animal died without 
his effort to prevent it from dying.
16 Similarly, Maren-Griesebach wrote: "Ökologie als Grundlage 
für das Handeln, für die Politik. Und da es eine wissen­
schaftliche Grundlage ist, exakt beweisbar, nachprüfbar, 
also genau den Ansprüchen der abendländischen, rationalen 
Wissenschaftlichkeit genügend, dürfte sich niemand drumherum 
drücken." (1981:32, cited in Oechsle 1988:146)
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'ecologically inspired' research (for example, the emerging 
discipline of ecosystems research) may thus, again ironically, 
contribute to a better domination of nature. As van den Daele 
(1987) has shown, "bedeutet also die Ökologie nicht den Übergang 
zu einem nichttechnologischen, vielleicht kontemplativen Konzept 
der Natur, sondern zu einem besseren technologischen Konzept. Die 
Baconische Vision der Herrschaft über die Natur wird nicht etwa 
verlassen, sondern perfektioniert." (van den Daele 1987:414).
Since the mechanism of man's dealings with nature does not 
provide any barrier for a more perfect domination of nature, this 
barrier - if one wants to have one - must be established by m a n . 
The ecologists do establish such a barrier in re-moralizing nature 
and science, thus challenging the famous claim of Bacon who once 
formulated that it is an error to believe that "the inquisition of 
nature is in any part interdicted or forbidden." (1986:20)17 In 
his view nature is "a granary and storehouse of matters, not meant 
to be pleasant to stay or live in, but only to be entered as 
occasion requires, when anything is wanted for the work of the 
Interpreter..." (1986:255, orig. emph.)13
1.3. Causes of ecological problems
17 Cf. also Kant in the Preface to Kritik der reinen V ernunft: 
"Die Vernunft muß mit ihren Prinzipien, nach denen allein 
übereinkommende Erscheinungen für Gesetze gelten können, in 
der einen Hand, und mit dem Experiment, das sie nach jenen 
ausdachte, in der anderen, an die Natur gehen, zwar um von 
ihr belehrt zu werden, aber nicht in der Qualität eines 
Schülers, der sich alles sagen läßt, was der Lehrer will, 
sondern eines bestallten Richters, der die Zeugen nötigt, 
auf die Fragen zu antworten, die er ihnen vorlegt."
18 Marx shared this position, as we shall see in chapter 2.
27
In 1.2. I have sketched some essential human features in their 
relation to nature. From this we can conclude the abstract 
possibility of ecological problems, for it is always possible that 
man acts in a way upon nature which causes changes in nature 
detrimental to his own life.
In what follows I present several approaches which have been 
applied to investigate ecological problems or which can be used 
for this purpose. We may divide them into economic and sociologi­
cal ways of looking at the problem,. The latter will be presented 
in 1.3.2. and 1.3.3., the former in 1.3.4. - 1.3.7. Generally we 
may distinguish between two completely different mechanisms which 
are at work, which 'cause' ecological problems, so to speak. The 
first conceives ecological problems as a result of purely inten­
tional behaviour, whereas the second conceives them as essentially 
by-products of human action, as unintended in character. The first 
mechanism can be expressed in the economists' approach of "exter­
nalities" which are the result of the strategy of an entrepreneur 
to externalize his costs as far as possible. The second mechanism 
has been studied above all by philosophers and has been taken up
1 9by social scientists.x
In determining what counts as 'intended' and 'unintended' the 
time horizon which is presupposed is crucial. Not by chance do the 
economists disregard long-term consequences of economic behaviour; 
they are transformed into 'social costs'. Likewise, although the 
producers and consumers of certain potentially damaging products 
may be aware of the inherent danger, they nevertheless decide to 
produce and use (consume) them. But they at the same time make 
their calculations about future developments. Some think that the
19 To be sure, the two are ideal types which may not exist in 
this pure form. A firm which externalises may not be aware 
of causing a specific type of ecological damage.
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consequences of their behaviour will not react upon them, or will 
occur only in a distant future; others think that they will not be 
alive to witness the catastrophic results (après moi le déluge); 
still others think that no catastrophes in the future will take 
place because of the beneficial technical innovations which reduce 
or abolish the dangerous potential of these products, or, likewise 
reduce or abolish already manifest pathological symptoms.
The unintended character of human action stresses the limits to 
human design. It is thus more pessimistic regarding the possibili­
ties for abolishing ecological problems. Even if it were the case 
that entrepreneurs were not externalizing costs, but ecologically 
aware, even if it were the case that no dangerous products are 
produced deliberately, there may be damages to the environment (if 
only in the long run). The two mechanisms are intertwined if we 
consider long time-spans and take human experience into account. 
Here the actors know that their actions may have detrimental 
effects on the environment, but they 'take the risk', the more so 
the more the consequences of that action will show up only in a 
distant future. Ecological problems are thus no 'information 
problems' in the first place. Even if people are well informed 
about the inherent dangers of some products/actions etc. they are 
not likely to stop it. This mixed form of unintended/intended 
mechanism is thus present in 1.3.3. - 1.3.7. I start out with a 
discussion of technology which seems to be the decisive precondi­
tion for modern ecological problems which should not to be con­
fused with a cause of them.
1.3.1. Technology
Above, I said that ecological problems arise from man's dealings 
with nature. In modern societies these dealings take place on an 
industrial level, and are carried out by technological means. We
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may generally distinguish two possible types of ecological prob­
lem:
a) ecological problems arising out of the "normal" working of 
technology;
b) ecological problems arising out of accidents or catastrophes.
Instances of a) are, among many others, acid rain or toxic sub­
stances in food chains. Instances of b) are accidents like Three 
Mile Island, Tschernobyl, Seveso or Bhopal. While I turn my 
attention to a) throughout the remainder of this section, I shall 
consider b) in 1.3.3.
The report of the United Nations commission attributes to 
technology a prominent place: "Emerging technologies offer the
promise of higher productivity, increased efficiency, and 
decreased pollution, but many bring risks of new toxic chemicals 
and wastes and of major accidents of a type and scale beyond 
present coping mechanisms." (United Nations 1986:16). Commoner 
expressed a similar view: "In modern industrial societies, the
most important link between society and the ecosystem on which it 
depends is technology. There is considerable evidence that many of 
the new technologies which now dominate production in an advanced 
country such as the United States are in conflict with the 
ecosystem. They therefore degrade the environment." (Commoner 
1971:178-9)
A simple consideration makes clear that technology stands at the 
heart of the matter. Mankind in its early stages, with primitive 
technology, could not affect its environment in the same way as 
mankind can today: the axe and fire could not, even under
conditions of most careless use, cause dangers which were in the
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least comparable to present dangers which arise out of the use of 
nuclear or chemical technology. 20
The difference, then, lies, as I said, mainly in the greater 
scope and greater complexity of modern technology in comparison to 
old technology. Greater scope means that a single malfunctioning 
of modern technology may affect regions and people far away from
the event; it may affect a larger number of people and for a
longer time span. Greater complexity means that modern technology 
is a composition of many parts which are embedded to a big degree
in an institutional framework; social institutions and technology
permeate each other. Both are complex in their nature, thus 
increasing complexity. This leads to an ever-decreasing degree of 
transparency (see 5.5.).
This makes it very difficult to determine more precisely
'causes' for ecological problems. It follows that the solution of
ecological problems is equally difficult to achieve. If a chemical 
factory puts hazardous waste on a field, we can identify the cause 
and its solution immediately. As Luhmann pointed out, in such 
cases an adapted police-law would suffice (Luhmann 1986:26). But 
in most cases things are not so easy. As Passmore has put it, "the 
solution of an ecological problem will normally depend on the ...
solution of a sub-set of problems - scientific, technological,
economic, moral, political, administrative - each with its own 
style of solution.” (Passmore 1974:46)
Thus interdisciplinary research is required to render possible a 
scientific understanding of ecological problems. There has been a 
considerable boom of ecological literature in the last few years
20 In some cases the burning of woods has led to the unintended 
consequence of improved soil.
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which does consider itself 'interdisciplinary'. Even the term 'su­
per-science' has been coined for ecology, but a big part of it 
must be characterized as dilettante2 1 . This is because the sub­
ject matter is so complex that no existing single discipline of
science (let alone a single person) can make competent analy-
2 2ses. The emerging 'eco-systems research' and the institutiona­
lizing of 'technological assessment' (see McBrierty 1988; Smits/ 
Leyten 1988; Tuiniga 1988) are steps in the direction of a truer 
interdisciplinary dimension.
1.3.2. Unintended consequences
Suppose now that scientific research has yielded results and we 
are able to understand the working of a particular ecological 
problem. What comes next is (at least in many cases) the develop­
ment of a new technology, a technology which reduces or eradicates 
the undesired outcome of the old technology. 23 Paradoxically, 
here we may enter a vicious circle, because the production or 
operation of the new technology may also produce ecological 
problems. As Passmore said: "Any technological innovation...
involves an element of ecological risk; it is impossible to 
calculate all its consequences in every possible circumstance."
21 As Enzensberger observed, "Ökologe ist im Grenzfall
jedermann." (1973:2)
22 Of course, many biologists have tried to develop solutions
for the social, political, economic or legal sphere, but 
they did not seem to be very appealing to their adressees.
23 I do not consider here such simple cases as the 'adapted
police law' or any other 'simple new law' which is able to
abolish any existing ecological problem in one blow.
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(Passmore 1974:49)24
Modern technology thus exhibits a feature of social life in 
general: human actions and intentions are crossed, mixed and 
annihilated by unintended consequences.
Merton addressed the problem of unintended consequences in the 
following way.25 First he limits a correct anticipation of conse­
quences of action to an existing state of knowledge. Especially in 
situations which demand immediate action of some sort, the proba­
bility is high that we do not act on the basis of scientific know­
ledge but on opinion and estimate. As Merton himself put it:
24 Cf. also Perrow: "It is particularly important to evaluate 
technological fixes in the systems that we cannot or will 
not do without. Fixes, including safety devices, sometimes 
create new accidents, and quite often merely allow those in 
charge to run the system faster, or in worse weather, or 
with bigger explosives. Some technical fixes are excuses for 
poor organisation or an attempt to compensate for poor 
system design." (Perrow 1984:11)
25 He calls them unanticipated consequences and makes clear
that "undesired effects are not always undesirable effects." 
(Merton 1937:895) From this it follows that undesired 
unanticipated consequences can be equated with unintended 
consequences (in the sense I use the term). Note that Merton 
in his later "Manifest and Latent Functions" defines three 
types of unintended consequences (cf. Merton 1968:105): 
functional, dysfunctional and irrelevant consequences. Eco­
logical problems resulting from unintended consequences are 
thus clearly dysfunctional in character; but, as we must 
ask, dysfunctional in regard to what? According to my 
discussion in 1.2. there can be no dysfunctional consequen­
ces for the (natural) environment. But if we look at speci­
fic social systems, dysfunctional consequences may appear 
for parts of the economic system (for example: rise in
prices for raw materials), the health system (increase in 
diseases), in the political system (for example: overburden­
ing with legitimation). Additionally, the latter cannot re­
gulate the problems by law in a simple way, but may instead 
trigger off a vicious circle by its very intervention. I 
shall come back to this point in chapter 2.
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Moreover, even when immediate action is not 
exacted, there is the economic problem of 
distributing our fundamental resources, time 
and energy. Time and energy are scarce means 
and economic behavior is concerned with the 
rational allocation of these means among 
alternative wants, only one of which is the 
anticipation of consequences of action. In our 
present economic order, it is manifestly 
uneconomic behavior to concern ourselves with 
attempts to obtain knowledge for predicting 
the outcomes of action to such an extent that 
we have practically no time or energy for 
other pursuits. (Merton 1937:900)
The second factor is error. This means that actors often assume 
that "actions which have in the past led to the desired outcome 
will continue to do so." (Merton 1937:901) The third factor is 
what has been called "imperious immediacy of interest" and refers 
to instances "where the actor's paramount concern with the 
foreseen immediate consequences excludes the consideration of 
further or other consequences of the same act." (id.) Merton 
further explains that the action may be rational "in the sense
that it is an action which may be expected to lead to the 
attainment of the specific goal; irrational, in the sense that it 
may defeat the pursuit or attainment of other values which are 
not, at the moment, paramount but which nonetheless form an 
integral part of the individual’s scale of values." (ibidem: 902)
This, however, is not only a question of conflicting values, but 
of short term and long term rationalities. Ecological problems
seen in this way would suggest an identification of the paramount
interest with the immediate economic benefits; other values (for 
example, environment) are suppressed and become a long-term 
concern. A similar, but distinct factor concerns the basic values 
involved in the course of human action: "activities oriented
toward certain values release processes which so react as to 
change the very scale of values which precipiated them." 
(ibidem:903) Instances of this are self-defeating processes like
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the rise of protestant ethic which in the end brought about wealth 
and abundance. Viewing ecological and economic values in this 
perspective, one may say that the results of the dominating 
economic value in western societies has contributed to the 
emergence of its 'antagonist': the (fundamentalist) defenders of 
ecological values who express their paramount concern with 
immediate ecological goals, no matter what the result for the 
economy. The fourth and last factor Merton mentions is the 
intriguing fact that successful social prediction and planning is 
often hampered by public predictions of future social developments 
''precisely because the prediction has become a new element in the 
concrete situation, thus tending to change the initial course of 
developments." (ibidem:903-4) Applying this last model again to 
ecological problems, we may for once receive a more optimistic 
picture: we might expect that the apocalyptic tone of the first
world reports on environment have already changed the course of 
development, leading to a decline in pollution and a slower 
depletion of resources. But if we consider Merton's third factor, 
where a basic value becomes self-defeating, then we may get a much 
more pessimistic picture: then, the reduction in ecological damage 
results in the decline of ecological awareness thus allowing a new 
(vicious) cycle.
As we have seen, the feature of unintended consequences makes 
social planning difficult.26 This is basically due to the fact 
that we cannot predict the character of these consequences: they 
may be inherently beneficial or harmful (to all of mankind or to 
parts of it; in respect of short term or long term considera­
tions). Broadly speaking, we can summarize Merton's typology into 
two classes: unintended consequences as resulting from imperfect
26 As Passmore said: "this is not a very encouraging line of 
reasoning... [b]ut it is at least realistic, firmly based on 
human history, ...that the unintended consequences of men's 
action are more important, for the most part, than the 
consequences they intend." (Passmore 1974:83-4)
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knowledge ("error" being part of it) or as resulting from the 
actor's paramount concern with immediate results. In 1.3.3. the 
knowledge aspect plays a crucial role but is also mixed with the 
second aspect whereas in 1.3.6. and 1.3.8. the "imperious imme­
diacy of interest" will be centrally important.
1.3.3. Industrial accidents
I now come to the second possibility (supra): industrial acci­
dents. Up to now we have arrived at the possibility that some 
industries, during their 'normal' working, pollute i.e. produce 
toxic or otherwise dangerous waste. Now I shall consider the 
possibility that some industries (irrespective of whether working 
"cleanly" or not) are likely to produce accidents which set free 
toxic or otherwise dangerous substances.
Charles Perrow has studied high-risk technologies and their 
institutional setting, combining the study of organizations with 
the study of technology. His analysis thus contains two elements: 
technology (see 1.3.1.) and unintended consequences (see 1.3.2.) 
As Perrow pointed out, some characteristics of high-risk technolo­
gies "suggest that no matter how effective conventional safety 
devices are, there is a form of accident that is inevitable." 
(Perrow 1984:3)
This alarming conclusion is derived from the specific features 
of modern technology: "[M]ost high-risk systems have some special 
characteristics, beyond their toxic or explosive or genetic 
dangers, that make accidents in them inevitable, even 'normal'. 
This has to do with the way failures can interact and the way the 
system is tied together." (Perrow 1984:4) This sort of system is
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characterized by 'interactive complexity' and 'tight coupling .
If both taken together will inevitably produce an accident, this 
would be the case for a normaI or systems accident in Perrow s 
definition. As he makes clear, "we have such accidents because we 
have built an industrial society that has some parts, like 
industrial plants or military adventures, that have highly 
interactive and tightly coupled units. Unfortunately, some of 
these have high potential for catastrophic accidents." (Perrow 
1984:8)
A well-known and widespread view blames the operators for 
causing accidents. Perrow, however, shows that "the operator is 
confronted by unexpected and usually mysterious interactions among 
failures." Saying "that he or she should have zigged instead of 
zagged is possible only after the fact. Before the accident no one 
could know what was going on and what should have been done." 
(Perrow 1984:9)
It is complexity and tight coupling which has to be seen as 
cause for a 'normal accident’. These two features make it possible 
that small and trivial beginnings often cause great events. "Where 
chemical reactions, high temperature and pressure, or air, vapor, 
or water turbulence is involved, we cannot see what is going on or 
even, at times, understand the principles. In many transformation 
systems we know what works, but sometimes do not know why. These
27 Perrow employs two variables in his analysis: linear/complex 
systems and loose/tight coupling. Linear processes and loose 
coupling are less prone to system accidents. But note that 
even "the most linear of all systems will have at least one 
source of complex interactions, the environment, since it 
impinges upon many parts or units in the system." (Perrow 
1984:75) "Loosely coupled systems, whether for good or ill, 
can incorporate shocks and failures and pressures for change 
without destabilisation. Tightly coupled systems will 
respond more quickly to these perturbations, but the 
response may be disastrous. Both types of systems have their 
virtues and their vices." (1984:92)
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systems are particularly vulnerable to small failures that 'propa­
gate* unexpectedly, because of complexity and tight coupling." 
(Perrow 1984:10)
Per row's approach must not be confused with the so-called 
"Murphy's Law" (i.e. that everything that can go wrong will go 
wrong). As Perrow himself put it: "The legendary Murphy was wrong. 
His law, that if anything can go wrong it will, is disproved by 
almost all post-accident investigations of large disasters. These 
investigations repeatedly point out that 'it was lucky it wasn't 
worse.'" (Perrow 1984:111)
Not all systems, however, display the characteristics outlined 
above. Systems which are not very complex and are not coupled 
tightly, can still have accidents, as all systems can. "But they 
are more likely to stem from major failures whose dynamics are 
obvious, rather than the trivial ones that are hidden from under­
standing ."(1984:10)28
In conclusion, we might say, then, that there exists something 
which is likely to produce catastrophic accidents: the high-risk- 
systems. Perrow investigated the following technologies: nuclear
28 It is worth noting that on the basis of Perrow's analysis 
the process of specialization alone does not lead to a loss 
of control over technology or to detrimental effects of 
technology on the natural environment or on human well­
being. But this is exactly Tiezzi's claim: "Le technologie, 
si afferma, devono avere un grosso contenuto scientifico, 
perché oggi uno dei parametri fondamentali nel sistema 
produttivo è la complessità. Ma questo comporta aumento di 
specializzazione e, di conseguenza, perdita di controllo e 
di conoscenza della realtà (che è complessa) sia da parte 
della gente che da parte degli specialisti stessi. Più ci si 
specializza,meno siamo in grado di prevedere gli effetti 
della tecnologia sulla natura." (Tiezzi 1984:35) This is a 
rather exaggerated view since the problem is not whether 
technologies can (or should) be controlled by everybody. In 
this respect every specialization erects a barrier to such 
"egalitarian" claims. The problem is rather that complex 
technologies may not even be controllable by specialists.
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energy, petrochemical plants, shipping, air traffic, genetic engi­
neering, space missions, dams, mining and weapon systems. The re­
sult is that the most catastrophic potential resides in nuclear 
weapons and nuclear power; hence they should be abandoned. ¿Marine 
transport and DNA recombination have only little less catastrophic 
potential, hence they should be restricted. The last category are 
chemical, mining, airways, space and dams which, according to
Perrow, should be tolerated and improved, (cf. Perrcw 1984, chap­
ter 9)29
Summarizing 1.3.1. to 1.3.3. we may state that modern industry's 
potential for causing ecological problems is considerable. To
forestall another point of this chapter it must be said that few 
of the outlined characteristics of high-risk systems can be dedu­
ced from the institution of private property.
1.3.4. Economic growth
A further candidate for causing ecological problems is indus­
trial growth. The explanation is straightforward. Low levels of 
industrial production produce low levels of output hence low 
degrees of waste and possible pollutants. High levels of indus­
trial production produce high levels of output hence high levels 
of waste and possible pollutants.30 Regarding the input side, we 
can establish a similar link: low levels of industrial growth re­
quire low amounts of natural resources, high levels of production 
require high amounts of resources (regarding both energy supply
29 "On the whole, we have complex systems because we don't know 
how to produce the output through linear systems. If these 
complex systems also have catastrophic potential then we had 
better consider alternative ways of getting the product, or 
abandoning the product entirely.” (Perrow 1984:89)
30 Some fundamentalist ecologists, such as the German Carl 
Amery, thus demanded production to stop where Dossible (cf. 
Amery 1978:157)
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and raw materials). It is commonly agreed that the period since 
the Second World War has been a period of exceptionally rapid 
economic growth which caused a considerable amount of hitherto 
unknown ecological problems. But even given declining or low 
levels of industrial production, ecological problems are likely to 
survive, given the characteristics of modern technology. As Barry 
Commoner put it: "'Economic growth' is a popular whipping boy in 
certain ecological circles. As indicated earlier, there are good 
theoretical grounds why economic growth can lead to pollution... 
However, this theoretical relationship does not mean that any 
increase in economic activity automatically means more pollution. 
What happens to the environment depends on how the growth is 
achieved." (1971: 141)
Commoner emphasizes the impact of new technologies which have 
been used in the US economy since the Second World War, insisting 
on the point that "the post-war technological transformation of 
the United States economy has produced not only the much-heralded 
126 per cent rise in GNP, but also, at a rate about ten times 
faster than the growth of GNP, the rising levels of environmental 
pollution." (ibidem, 146)
Beckerman, in a straightforward way, defended economic growth in 
the following terms: "For even if there were no growth, and even 
if national product were declining, there would still be a danger, 
in the absence of appropriate policies, that pollution would be 
excessive and that insufficient resources would be devoted to the 
preservation of the environment." (Beckerman 1974:105) This is so 
because pollution reflects a failure of the market rather than 
being a result of economic growth (cf. id.). Thus, if people 
"think that growth must be stopped or slowed down on account of 
excessive pollution" (Beckerman 1974:18), they are completely 
mistaken. Pollution has nothing to do with growth but is a ques­
tion of misallocation of resources (cf. id.;35;104).
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In the following discussion I concentrate on approaches which 
all in one way or another have to do with economic rationality, 
market behaviour, or "western" rationality as such. I start with 
the sort of economic behaviour which is characterized by burdening 
costs to the public ("externalities") and consider then a game- 
theoretic formalization. The difficult question then arises as to 
whether this economic behaviour is typical for market economies 
(such as capitalism) or if it is a more general pattern which 
would also apply to post-capitalist societies. Since we find 
empirical evidence for the latter assumption, we must try to 
explain it.
1.3.5. Market, Externalities, and the Tragedy of the Commons
Pigou, over fifty years ago drew attention to the following fea­
ture of economic behaviour: "fS]moke in large towns inflicts a
heavy uncharged loss on the community, in injury to buildings and 
vegetables, expenses for washing clothes and cleaning rooms, ex­
penses for the provision of extra artificial light, and in many 
other ways." (Pigou 1932:184).
This leads to the tendency of private capital to externalize 
costs. As Passmore points out, the owner of a factory calculates 
"that he will only have to meet such costs as directly arise from 
his particular enterprise, such costs as raw materials, labour, 
machinery, depreciation, taxation, insurance. He does not expect 
to meet the cost of replacing Mrs J o n e s ’ curtains, even if it is 
the smoke from his factory that causes them to rot." (1974:65).
Neoclassical economics would argue that the market principle 
leads to beneficial outcomes in this respect provided that a 
system of property rights is established which includes natural
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resources like air or water.31 Saleable rights would provide the
mechanism for this system. Against this, some authors have argued
that the introduction of market principles into economy was a
decisive factor for the depletion of resources. Before the advent
of the market, traditional mechanisms occupied its place. Often
these were based on tribal or kinship-relations and were nature-
conserving (Victor 1980:205). As Victor, drawing on Polanyi
(1944), maintains, the market principle in fact introduced a
damaging tendency. Under market conditions the earth is no longer
property of the people who live on it, but an exchangeable good.
Under market conditions a company (or any other) may buy a piece
of land and extract resources in order to use them up by producing
a specific good or simply to sell them. When the job is done, the
company moves away and leaves the place. It leaves it to anonymous
future inhabitants. The difference between a society in which the
inhabitants of a certain area are the common owners of the earth,
taking the best care of it, and a society in which land has become
a commodity, then, is that the former seems to be more apt to
avoid ecological problems than the latter. It is assumed that
people who own a certain thing commonly (land in our case) will
take best care of it. This could also be interpreted as an example
of a successful assurance game (1.3.6.). But here neoclassical
economists would argue that it is quite the contrary. They have it
32that the trouble begins with common property:
Picture a pasture open to all. It is to be 
expected that each herdsman will try to keep 
as many cattle as possible on the commons.
Such an arrangement may work reasonably satis­
factorily for centuries because tribal wars, 
poaching, and disease keep the numbers of both 
man and beast well below the carrying capacity 
of the land. Finally, however, comes the day
31 Beckerman (1974) concedes that the market principle fails to 
prevent pollution since nobody has property-rights in 
natural resources like air or water.
32 Actually, Hardin is a biologist but the logic of his argu­
ment is comparable to what neoclassical economists would 
h o l d .
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of reckoning, that is, the day when the long- 
desired goal of social stability becomes a 
reality. At this point, the inherent logic of 
the commons remorselesly generates tragedy."
(Hardin 1980:104)
This is so because as a rational being the herdsman seeks to maxi­
mize his gain. Since he is to get the full amount of increment if 
he adds one animal to his herd and he is only to share a part of 
negative effects of overgrazing he concludes that the best thing 
he can do is add another animal to his herd. Hardin comments: "But 
this is the conclusion reached by each and every rational herdsman 
sharing commons. Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a 
system that compels him to increase his herd without limit - in a 
world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all 
men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that 
believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in the commons 
brings ruin to all." (Hardin 1980:104)
Note that in one case the market is praised to prevent 
ecological problems whereas in the other it is accused of causing 
ecological problems. How can one explain these opposing judgements 
of collective ownership? An answer to this would certainly focus 
on the important role which cultural values play in cases where 
common property exists. If there are cultural patterns which 
prevent the common owners form overfishing, overgrazing etc. there 
need not arise a tragedy of the commons. Only in cases where such 
patterns do not (or no longer) exist can the neoclassical argument 
come in. This has been rightly identified as a strategic point for 
bringing in a sort of "environmentalist ethics" here. Thus Hardin 
writes:
[T]he logic of the commons has been understood 
for a long time, perhaps since the discovery 
of agriculture or the invention of private 
property in real estate (Hardin 1980:105) ...
but the inexorable succession of generations
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requires that the basis for this knowledge be 
constantly refreshed." (Hardin 1980:104)
The logic of the commons is understood mostly only "in special 
cases which are not sufficiently generalized... the oceans of the 
world continue to suffer from the philosophy of the commons. Mari­
time nations still respond automatically to the shibboleth of the 
'freedom of seas'. Professing to believe in the 'inexhaustible 
resources of the oceans', they bring species after species of fish 
and whales closer to extinction." (Hardin 1980:105)
And Victor claims: "These examples from history indicate that
the expansion of the market system created the tragedy of the 
commons by weakening the traditional forms of social relations 
which had hitherto prevailed. It is the reconstruction of social 
structures such as these, combined with the propagation of an 
environmental ethic, that environmentalists argue is an essential 
ingredient in an effective environmental policy." (Victor 
1980:206)
Consider now the case of socialist society. As has been argued, 
countries with state ownership of the means of production are less 
likely to produce ecological problems for two reasons. First, so 
the argument goes, socialist enterprises do not introduce prematu­
rely certain (dangerous) technologies which are introduced prema­
turely in capitalism in order to gain extra profits. Second, 
because of central planning (and the absence of the profit 
principle) individual socialist enterprises can not externalize 
their costs to the environment.
While it may be true that dangerous technologies are introduced 
in capitalism prematurely (in order to make short-term profits), 
it is not necessarily true that socialism does better in this
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respect. In fact, the actual record of socialist countries 
eludicates and confirms this point.33 What can account for this?
My answer here cannot be exhaustive but I think the following 
factors explain a lot. In addition to what has been said above 
with respect to common property, I would add the following. It is 
not true that only private enterprises (profit maximizers) cause 
ecological problems. The same holds true for state enterprises and 
private consumers in capitalism, and for enterprises and consumers 
in socialist countries. One reason, therefore, has been explained 
by Max Weber: it is the expansion of the "rationality-principle" 
in the modern epoch. In capitalist enterprises economic
calculation is carried out mainly by means of money, which is, 
according to Weber, the most rational way of orienting economic
activities (cf. Weber 1978:86). As Weber also makes clear, a
planned economy which is based on the principle of need satis­
faction and on calculations in kind, "would have to determine 
'v a l u e '-indicators of some kind for the individual capital goods 
which could take over the role of the 'prices' used in book
calculation in modern business accounting." (Weber 1978:103) No 
matter how this difficulty is resolved, whether by indicators in 
weight (in fact, some socialist countries use tons as an 
indicator) or in value, socialist countries also try to enhance 
economic efficiency.
But are socialist countries not in a better position in so far, 
as they can anticipate ecological costs, if not ecological 
problems? My answer is that state planning is not sufficient to 
avoid ecological problems. Five reasons oppose such a hope:
a) As already pointed out above, (at least) high-risk systems 
produce ecological problems. Hence no matter what basic property
33 See some recent reports in Rosenbladt (1986).
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relations in a certain society obtain (private ownership or state 
ownership), ’no r m a l ’ or 'systems' accidents are likely to occur. 
Because of their scope and dangerous potential, these complex 
technologies can create ecological problems for a great number of 
people over a long period of time.
b) A second factor which makes central planning problematic as a 
solution to ecological problems is the feature of unintended 
consequences (see 1.3.2.) which, if true, is a general threat to 
"planning the future";
c) Collective ownership (for example of means of production) may 
lead to "the tragedy of the commons". Also in this case we have 
the spectre of externalities (social costs) which we already 
defined as one of the causes of ecological problems. Given certain 
conditions, (see 1.3.6.), the logic of public goods can be applied 
here;
d) As has been pointed out, the price system in countries like
the Soviet Union does not allow for taking into account the
scarcity of resources. This is so because the dominating ideology 
forbids establishing prices which are not the result of labour
time (dogma of the labour theory of value) (cf. Kupilik 1982:169- 
70). Moreover, the specific mechanisms of "success indicators" 
lead to a reward system which "does not provide incentives for 
concern for the environment" (Kupilik 1982:171);
e) Although the Soviet Union is a country with one of the most
ambitious environmental legislations, existing law is not enforced 
(see Goldman 1972, as cited in Kupilik 1982). Firms which are 
found guilty of polluting are punished only with (relatively)
small fines. This leads in effect to the result that firms already
take into account the cost of the fines into their budget (Kupilik 
1982:171).
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Whereas a , b, and c apply to socialist societies in general, d 
and e are historically specific traits of soviet society. We may 
imagine a non-soviet type of socialism which is not committed to 
the labour theory of value and which enforces its environmental 
laws; but even in this case we would have a) to c) as candidates 
for ecological problems. The outcome of this discussion, then, is 
contrary to the intuitions of many, that private property is a 
less probable factor in causing ecological problems and that a 
socialist society is in no structurally better position to avoid 
ecological problems. This is so because there are no mechanisms 
built into socialism which would avoid these problems. Of course 
there are ecological problems in capitalist societies which are 
connected only to short-term profit considerations but these do 
not explain the broader phenomena or their existence in socialist 
countries.
1.3.6. Prisoners’ Dilemma
No matter whether the market combines the private producers and 
consumers in a society or whether forms of common property exist, 
we may try to apply the logic of the 'Isolation game' or 'Priso­
ners' Dilemma' (PD) to ecological problems. This model has been 
developed by game theory (cf. Luce and Raiffa 1957) and introduced 
into the Social sciences by Olson's (1965) influential book. Sen 
presented it in the following way:
"Two prisoners are known to be guilty of a 
very serious crime, but there is not enough 
evidence to convict them. There is, however, 
sufficient evidence to convict them of a minor 
crime. The District Attorney - it is an 
American Story - separates the two and tells 
each that they will be given the option to 
confess if they wish to. If both of them 
confess, they will be convicted of the major 
crime on each other's evidence, but in view of 
the good behaviour shown in squealing, the 
District Attorney will ask for a penalty of 10 
years each rather than the full penalty of 20
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years. If neither confesses, each will be 
convicted only of the minor crime and get 2 
years. If one confesses and the other does 
not, then the one who does confess will go 
free and the other will go to prison for 20 
years." (Sen 1982:62)
The probable outcome is that "each prisoner feels that no matter 
what the other does it is always better for him to confess. So 
both of them do confess guided by rational self-interest, and each 
goes to prison for ten years." (id.:63)
We can take this "game" as 2-person game and apply its logic to
a n-person-game. In a n-person-game the following modification
occurs, as LiFeldman observed: "Unlike the Prisoners' Dilemma,
where all parties must cooperate to achieve the solution, a free
rider case [which is represented in the n-person-game, R . G . ]
allows for some defectors." (LiFeldman 1986:25. Important is
"some" here, for if a considerable number of players defects, we
would be in the logic of a 2-person-game again, where we have the
options of cooperation and a non-cooperation.) Rawls also
referred to a free-rider case when he wrote:
"Where the public is large and includes many 
individuals, there is a temptation for each 
person to try avoid doing his share. This is 
because whatever one man does, his action will 
not significantly affect the amount produced.
He regards the collective action of others as 
already given one way or the other. If the 
public good is produced, his enjoyment of it 
is not decreased by his not making a contribu­
tion. If it is not produced his action would 
not have changed the situation anyway." (Rawls 
1972:267)
In order to apply the logic of public goods to ecological prob­
lems, two conditions must be fulfilled. The first is that ecolo­
gical problems be manifest, the second that their removal create a 
'public good'. The first condition is not always met because many
ecological problems are invisible and accumulate unknown; for a 
long time they do not show up as a problem. Only if an ecological 
problem is obvious (if, for example, polluting is taking place 
before everyone's eyes) and its stopping would generate a public 
good, collective action could lead to the production of that 
public good. Consider the case of some towns which pollute a river 
or a sea. Here we have a n-person game which can be represented as 
follows. Since each actor has to decide his actions vis-a-vis all 
other actors, we may speak of "me" as the actor in isolation from 
the "others".
Figure 1
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All others
Do not cooperate cooperate
Me
Do not cooperate
dirty water 
(no cost to me)
clean water 
(no cost to me) 
1
cooperate dirty water 
(cost to me) 
4
clean water 
(cost to me) 
3
The expected outcome, then, is suboptimal since my preference al­
ways will be not to cooperate, since whatever the others do, that 
will put me in the best position; not cooperating gives me a free 
ride if all others produce the public good and I am not worse off 
in case they do not; then I have not paid any costs (but the water 
stays dirty). Note that even a contractual solution needs enforce­
ment, for "even if a contract is arrived at, it will be in the 
interest of each to break it." (Sen 1984:136).
However, there may be an optimal outcome, if we consider some­
what different preference patterns. As Sen put it, "In the special
case when everyone else [cooperates], the individual now prefers 
[to cooperate] himself." (Sen 1984:137). In this 'Assurance game' 
the PD is most amenable to resolution. "In the assurance game, an 
individual's dominant strategy is no longer non-cooperation. If we 
assume perfect information for the players, then they will all 
choose [cooperating] in the safe expectation that others will too, 
since it will be in everyone's interest to do so." (Shaw 1984:26) 
"Theorists generally concede that the isolation paradox is most
amenable to resolution in relatively small groups..." (Shaw
1984:31)34 "Enlightened egoists can be brought into collusion 
because of their knowledge that the situation will be repeated and 
that reprisals are possible..." (S h a w  1984:27) In this case the 
preference ranking in the above table would be modified: 2 and 3 
are changing places. Apart from enforcing rules there exists the 
possibility that "selective incentives" induce actors to 
cooperate.
1.4. Summary
Summarizing the causes for ecological problems, I should make 
clear that there can be no monocausal explanation. All of the 
factors may be causing an ecological problem under certain 
conditions. These "certain conditions" are partly contained in the 
other factors such as that the combination of two or more factors 
is sufficient to cause an ecological problem.35 Take technology,
for example. It is damaging only if (in the case of pollution)
"ecological costs" can be externalized and no agreement with other 
concerned parties is reached. It is damaging (in the case of 
resources) only if market prices make it profitable to exploit 
these resources and if no laws restrict the exploitation; the
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34 Cf. Luce and Raiffa (1957:97).
35 The only exceptions are high-risk-systems which represent a 
sufficient factor on their own.
"tragedy of commons" is only damaging if cultural values do not 
prevent the damage, etc.
To conclude, the salient points of this chapter are the follo­
wing. (1) I have distinguished the anthropocentric from the 
ecocentric approach showing the former's superiority; (2) In so 
doing, it is possible to derive the criteria for evaluation (they 
are dependent on man's interests, needs, pleasures and desires); 
(3) I have defined what counts as an 'ecological problem' and that 
it results (as an abstract possibility) from man's dealings with 
nature; (4) I have then looked at the causes for the actual 
emergence of ecological problems, using approaches from game 
theory, social and economic theory. The result is that technologi­
cal and institutional complexity constitute a severe barrier for 
conscious human design, hence for a world without ecological 
problems; (5) Private property cannot count as a prime cause of 
ecological problems neither can any other single factor (except 
high-risk systems); (6) The market and systems of common property 
may be equally beneficial or detrimental to the environment, 
depending on the concrete historical and cultural conditions.
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CHAPTER 2: ECOLOGY, THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, AND MARXISM
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Prometheus, der den Menschen den Blitz ausgeliefert, 
aber sie nicht gelehrt hatte, ihn gegen die Götter zu 
gebrauchen, wurde wegen seiner Tat, beziehungsweise 
wegen seiner Unterlassung, im Auftrag der Götter, von 
Hephaistos dem Schmied an den Kaukasus befestigt.
Heiner Müller
The ecological debate only recently became a topic for social 
theory. There have been many works which were directed, instead, 
against some dominant paradigms in economic and social theory, 
like those of Mishan (1967), Meadows (1972), Schumacher (1974), 
Gorz (1977, 1980, 1983). There have been "ecological" analyses
from economists like Georgescu- Rcegen (1971), Daly (1973); works 
from moral philosophers like Feinberg (1974), Passmore (1974); 
works from technic-philosophers like Mumford (1977), Rapp (1978) - 
but no outstanding contribution from sociology "as such". There 
are exceptions represented in works on a meta-theoretical level, 
inspired by the sociology of knowledge, like van den Daele (1987) 
or Oechsle (1988). There are also works from organizational 
sociology, most notably Perrow (1984). The works of Bühl (1981), 
and Luhmann (1986) also have an organizations and systems 
theoretical background.
This situation was reflected in chapter 1 where, apart from 
considering Merton's and Perrow's analyses, I focused mainly on 
approaches which developed within economic theory. Now it has 
often been noted that the economists' and the environmentalists' 
views are inevitably at odds with each other. The first attribute 
no intrinsic value to nature as such and think in short-term 
economic outcomes, as effected by actors' preferences. The latter, 
by contrast, pursue a "deontological" argument and think that
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nature has an intrinsic value which should be respected and 
preserved. Hence their concern about nature is profound and the 
time horizon is rather wide, stretching also to future genera­
tions. The actors' preferences of the economists are criticised as 
a distorted version of "real human needs". In this chapter, I try 
to propound a position which avoids the pitfalls of both 
approaches. Odd though it may seem, I take sides with the 
economists in denying that any intrinsic value in nature exists. 
This instrumentalist view of nature, however, does not squeeze out 
ecological concerns - on the contrary, it does so only if the 
economists' interpretation of "value" is accepted. However, in my 
view, the economists' approach to ecological problems is far too 
narrow. In continuation of my argument in chapter 1, I propose to 
enlarge the instrumentalist view of nature (in adding scientific, 
aesthetic, and ethical elements to it) and subsequently to arrive 
at a position from which it is possible to evaluate ecological 
problems and possible solutions from a human standpoint, taking 
human needs and interests (2.5.) as a starting point, rather than 
narrow, short-sighted economic preferences. In so doing, I take 
sides with the ecologists' concern about our natural environment. 
It seems commonly accepted that the economists' denial of any 
intrinsic value in nature and the environmentalists' affirmation 
of precisely this value are the only possible (extreme) ways to 
conceive of the problem. From this, it is concluded that we face a 
dilemma which we cannot avoid. The only thing we could and must 
do, is to make a choice between these opposing claims: either we 
choose "nature", and "life" or we choose "wealth", and "effi­
ciency". When I claim that we have a third possibility, I try to 
espouse the the environmetalists' concern about the natural 
environment without committing myself to the metaphysical notion 
that nature has an intrinsic value for i t s e l f . In this chapter, I 
want to show how Marx's theory concords with such an approach, 
thus proving its value for investigating ecological problems.
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Especially important is Marx's distinction between "wealth" and 
"value".
The present chapter proceeds as follows. I first try to relate 
the findings of chapter 1 to Marx's theory in a direct way (2.1.) 
and then reconstruct some of Marx's arguments from within his body 
of thought as laid out in 2.3. In 2.4. I will discuss the concept 
of nature in Marx, and in 2.5. Marx's philosophical anthropology.
2.1. How can we relate Marx to ecological problems?
Recall the discussion of 1.2. where I discussed several claims 
with respect to ecological problems. How is it possible to relate 
elements of Marx's theory to them? I think that at least the fol­
lowing three points can be made:
a. Marx's anthropocentrism
I think it is plain that Marx had an anthropocentric world-view 
and did not set up moral barriers to the investigation of nature. 
He clearly was a follower of Enlightenment thinkers like Bacon and 
Descartes. However, both have become the main scapegoats in 
ecological literature. Both are accused for having helped to 
establish a world-view which is in favour of dominating nature. 
But the modern approach towards nature does not amount to a 
"violation" of nature. As 3odei has made clear, it was the ancient 
view of nature which saw in the use of mechanics a violation of 
nature:
"Nel mondo antico proprio la macchina è stata 
spesso concepita come un'alterazione 'contro 
la natura' d e l l ’equilibrio uomo/natura. Del 
resto il termine mechané non significa altro, 
in origine, se non 'astuzia', 'inganno', 
'artificio'. Solo più tardi viene a indicare 
la macchina in genere... La meccanica è quindi 
considerata da Aristotele e da una parta della
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tradizione come un sapere e una tecnica 
contro natura (para ph y s i n ), perché viola le 
leggi naturali, a differenza della medicina, 
ad esempio, che è secondo natura (katà 
physin), in quanto le promuove." (Bodei 
1983:17-8)
This view changes with modernity; nature now is seen as an 
object of utility which fulfills human needs and desires. If 
nature is harnessed in this project, it is not by violating her 
laws, but by obeying them. Marx distinguishes between two general 
forms of mankind's relationship with nature. The first is the form 
where nature was merely "appropriated", i.e. in societies of 
hunters and gatherers. In the second form, nature is not only 
appropriated, but also transformed. In the Grundrisse, he imagines 
a state in which agricultural communities appropriate "ready 
objects prepared by nature itself for consumption" (Grundrisse: 
492) "without any instruments whatever" (id.). A state of nature 
may be imagined in which "the free gifts of nature [were] 
abundant" (Grundrisse:612) and hence there was no need to develop 
technologies. However, Marx calls this appropriation of nature 
production and not consumption, since hunters and gatherers also 
have to develop certain capacities and abilities. But this is not 
the normal state, not even a normal original state, as he assures 
in the same text (cp. G r u ndrisse:492). In C a p i t a l , Marx states 
more explicitly that man can produce nothing without technology
36 A corollary of the ancient view of nature was the fear that 
nature might take her revenge if mankind tried to harness 
her: "Tuttavia, la natura beffata, colta di sorpresa da quei 
sofisti che sono gli uomini, può vendicarsi e punire chi ha 
osato sfidarla, chi ha tentato di infrangere le sue leggi 
eterne." (Bodei 1983:17). We find this thought even in a 
famous passage of Engels's Dialectic of N a t u r e , and in more 
drastic forms from a religious strand of the ecological 
movement: here, nuclear power is simply the work of the 
d e v i l .
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(cp. Capital 1 ;352; in the Paris Manuscripts he had already spoken
of industry "als das aufgeschlagene 3uch der menschlichen
Wesenskrafte” , MEW EB 1:542), and the development of productive
forces as largely dependent on geographical factors:
"Where nature is too lavish, she 'keeps him in 
hand, like a child in leading reins.’ She does 
not impose upon him any necessity to develop 
himself. It is not the tropics with their 
luxuriant vegetation, but the temperate zone, 
that is the mother-country of capital. It 
is... the differentiation .of the soil, the 
variety of its natural products, the changes 
of the seasons, which form the physical basis 
for the social division of labour, and which, 
by changes in the natural surroundings, spur 
man on to the multiplication of his wants, his 
capabilities, his means and modes of labour.
It is the necessity of bringing a natural 
force under the control of society, of 
economizing, of appropriating or subduing it 
on a large scale by the work of man's hand, 
that first plays the decisive part in the 
history of industry." (Capital 1 :481, amended 
translation)
This presupposes some ends which the producers have which trans­
cend the "normal" end of providing food and shelter. In this 
means-ends-relationship, human beings try to get something from 
nature which is not immediately there, or to manipulate and con­
trol natural processes to a certain degree. This higher form of 
Stoffwechsel presupposes the use of specific technologies. To de­
note this specific trait of humans, i.e. to be natural beings 
which are able to "steer" some parts of the rest of nature, Marx 
used the term of "domination of nature". True, the notion of domi­
nation is value-laden, as is the notion of exploitation. However, 
both offer us a possible description of m a n ’s relationship to 
nature; in the first case where natural gifts are abundant, man 
can be conceived of as exploiting (in the sense of "usufructing") 
nature; in the second case where nature is actively transformed, 
it is harnessed or dominated.
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I said above that the concept of "domination" is always linked 
to a concept of the a g e n t s ’ interests. King Midas, by turning 
everything he touched into gold, can hardly be said to have 
"dominated" his citizens, or even his own private life. Marx in 
one passage of the Grundrisse seems to reject the very idea of the 
domination of nature, since it would imply the breaking of a free 
will: "Basically the appropriation of animals, land etc. cannot
take place in a master-servant relation, although the animal 
provides service. The presupposition of the master-servant 
relation is the appropriation of an alien w i l l ." (Grundrisse:500, 
my emphasis).37 But the condition of breaking an alien will is a 
limiting case which is not of very much interest: it does not
matter if domination is achieved by breaking or by respecting (or 
by transforming, influencing, manipulating etc.) an alien will; it 
is only important that the outcome of domination serves the 
interests of the dominator. The question of whether nature 
possesses a will (or a soul) of its own, therefore, is primarily a 
question of religious interest.
As we saw in chapter 1, contemporary debates on ecology seem to 
conceive society's relation to nature either as one of harmony or 
one of conflict. Often the former is seen as the desideratum, 
whereas the latter is seen as the current dreadful state of af­
fairs. For Marx such an opposition makes no sense at all. In the 
German Ideology he emphasizes that mankind is always in unity and 
in struggle with nature:
[The] unity of man with nature has always 
existed in industry and has existed in varying 
forms in every epoch according to the lesser 
or greater development of industry, and so has 
the 'struggle' of man with nature, right up to
37 From this it follows that another version of this model 
(which is usually endorsed by environmentalists) is as 
problematic: the notion of co-operation with nature - one
cannot cooperate with a stone or a cat.
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the development of his productive forces on a 
corresponding basis. (CW 5 :40)
Nature, in Marx, is not anthropomorphous. Nature has no end in
3 8itself, it is man who imposes his ends on it. In order to do 
so, however, he has to respect the laws of nature. Domination does 
not imply violation: as Bacon put it in the Novum O rganon, "nature 
to be commanded must be obeyed... man, being the servant and 
interpreter of Nature, can do and understand so much and so much 
only as he has observed in fact or in thought of the course of 
nature; beyond this he neither knows anything nor can he do 
anything." (Bacon 1986:47) This is to say that man imposes his 
ends on nature, but he cannot harness or manipulate nature in an 
arbitrary way; he cannot make flour out of green wheat.39 An 
ecologist might argue that there exists a natural cycle or natural 
potential for a flower (in our case) to become a fruit and that 
men are bound to respect these cycles.40 3ut nothing in nature 
forbids us (to take another example) from not eating the ripe 
apple, from leaving it on the tree and letting it rot. On the 
other hand, if the apple is picked too early, this is not detri­
mental to nature, but to human nature: an unripe apple causes
stomach-ache.
38 Recall Hegel's famous phrase that the cork tree does not
grow in order to deliver taps for wine bottles; or Vol­
taire's that the melon was not designed to be eaten by a
family.
39 Cf. again Bacon: "Towards the effecting of works, all that
man can do is to put together or to put asunder natural
bodies. The rest is done by nature working within." 
(1986:47)
40 To the question if nature operates in cycles, cf. Reiche 
(1984); Maurer (1973)
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Natural cycles have no teleological structure i.e. no immanent 
purpose, no stage which is the naturally highest. It is rather 
just by chance (as a product of "blind evolution) that apples in a 
ripe state are beneficial to men. But even if we accept the teleo­
logical argument for a moment, its absurdity can be shown when we 
extend its scope and look at other cases. Take the case of rats, 
insects or bacteria which reproduce quickly and are contrary to 
man's well-being: here man intervenes if he has the required
technology to do so. Man's ends are thus intimately related to his 
"human nature", a concept which is, as we shall see, crucial to 
Marx's analysis. But Marx's rejection of a teleological structure 
to nature does not make him blind with respect to ecological 
problems. An ecological concern is contained in his general 
position which views nature as man's inorganic body. This body 
must flourish if man is to flourish. As Marx writes in the Paris 
Manuscripts: "Man lives on nature - [this] means that nature is
his body with which he must remain in continuous interchange if he 
is not to die." (CW 3 :276) Any careless use of resources, any 
pollution of earth, water and air which exceeds a certain degree 
may turn out to be detrimental to the well-being of human beings. 
The disruption of man's environment makes survival for the human 
species difficult, if not impossible. Marx considers the following 
possibilities for such a disturbance:
Capitalist production, by collecting the 
production in great centres, and causing an 
ever-increasing preponderance of town 
population, on the one hand concentrates the 
historical motive power of society; on the 
other hand, it disturbs the circulation of 
matter [Stoffwechsel] between man and the 
soil, i.e. prevents the return to the soil of 
its elements consumed by man in the form of 
food and clothing; it therefore violates the 
conditions necessary to lasting fertility of 
the soil. (Capital 1 :474)
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Marx is aware of the fact that man and soil are essential for a
successful Stoffwechsel; they are the two basic elements of every
labour process in every society:
Wird der Arbeitsprozeß ganz abstrakt betrach­
tet, so kann gesagt werden, daß ursprünglich 
nur zwei Faktoren ins Spiel kommen - der
Mensch und die Natur. (Arbeit und Naturstoff
der Arbeit.) ... So wären Erde und Arbeit die 
ürfaktoren der Production; die zur Arbeit 
bestimmten Producte, producirtes Arbeitsma­
terial, Arbeitsmittel, Lebensmittel - nur ein 
abgeleiteter Faktor. ( M E G A ‘I I .3.1.:87)
Zunächst is der Productionsprozeß des Capitals 
seiner stofflichen Seite nach betrachtet, 
soweit Gebrauchswerte producirt werden - Ar­
beitsprozeß überhaupt und als solcher zeigt er 
die allgemeinen Faktoren, die diesem Prozeß 
zukommen, unter den verschiedensten gesell­
schaftlichen Productionsformen. Diese Faktoren 
sind nämlich bestimmt durch die Natur der 
Arbeit als Arbeit. (MEGA II.3.1.82)
There are two main sources of all wealth, the soil, and labour 
power. If man wants to prosper, these two also have to prosper. 
But capitalist production hampers this condition, it "develops 
technology... only by sapping the original sources of all wealth - 
the soil and the labourer." (Capital 1 :475)
b. Population growth
Sometimes a Malthusian theme reoccurs in the ecological dis­
course; it is the contention that an increasing number of inhabi­
tants of the earth will be left without the means of subsistence 
and/or that this will lead to an ever-greater degree of pollution. 
The first part of the contention is classical Malthusian whereas 
the second part could be called "Neo-Malthusian"; it was expressed 
in the first reports of the Club of Rome, for example (cp. Meadows 
and Meadows 1972). Marx, throughout his work, never stopped
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criticizing Malthus's ideas. Consider the following passage from
the Grundrisse:
"Malthus's theory... is significant in two
respects: (1) because he gives brutal expres­
sion to the brutal viewpoint of capital; (2) 
because he asserted the fact of overpopulation 
in all forms of society. Proved it he has not, 
for there is nothing more uncritical than his 
motley compilations from historians and 
travellers' descriptions. His conception is 
altogether false and childish (1) because he 
regards overpopulation as being of the same 
kind in all the different historic phases of 
economic development; does not understand 
their specific difference, and hence stupidly 
reduces these very complicated and varying 
relations to a single relation, two equations, 
in which the natural reproduction of humanity 
appears on the one side, and the natural
reproduction of edible plants (or means of 
subsistence) on the other, as two natural
series, the former geometric and the latter
arithmetic in progression. In this way he
transforms the historically distinct relations 
into an abstract numerical relation, which he 
has fished purely out of thin air, and which 
rests neither on natural nor on historical 
laws..." (Grundrisse:605-6)
Marx disagreed with Malthus over the alleged different growth 
rates of natural and human population growth. But he could have 
agreed that there might arise such limits, since he said that we 
have to deal with "very complicated and varying relations". True, 
there is a certain hesitation on the side of many Marxists (and on 
the side of liberals, too) in acknowledging population growth as 
problematical since this seems to open the door for dictatorial 
measures of population control or for imperialist treatment of the 
"irresponsibility" of third world populations. However, this 
anxiety seems to me unfounded. If it were true that population 
growth presents severe problems for the prospering of mankind, one 
can imagine that there might be non-compulsory solutions which are
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feasible as well. But not even the results of demographical re­
search seem to suggest that the planet will suffer in the near 
future from overpopulation. After all, this is a relative concept 
which depends on technologies and possibilities to provide the 
means for life. Uptill now, mankind has succeeded in providing 
these means for an increasing number; that many people still die 
from starvation is primarily a result of the present mode of 
distribution of food. Consider now the Neo-Malthusian argument. 
In so far an increasing number leads to ecological problems like 
littering or pollution, the phenomenon can be analysed with the 
logic of public goods (1.3.6.). To repeat: population growth is a 
relative notion. Consider a stagnating world-population but a 
simulataneous concentration of population in certain areas. In 
this case we would not speak of overpopulation of the globe, but 
of problems of a large community which has to find a solution for 
the production of its public goods.
c. Future Generations
The reference to future generations is a comparatively new issue 
in political philosophy. Bacon, writing in the late sixteenth cen­
tury, was still of the old opinion that "men must pursue things 
which are just in [the] present... and leave the future to the 
divine Providence." (The Advancement of Learning, cited in 
Passmore 1974:80) As Passmore pointed out, it was in Kant's 
philosophy that
"the idea of a duty to posterity assumes, 
perhaps for the first time, a central place.
But although he exhorted [zuraten] men to 
sacrifice themselves for a posterity which 
would enjoy the fruits of their toil... Kant 
had too little confidence in man to suggest 
that the future is entirely his making. 
Providence, working through the laws of 
progress, is still for Kant the principal 
historical agent." (Passmore 1974:80)
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World-views of the 20th century, and especially the ecologically 
inspired ones, are often committed to the position that only 
enormous sacrifices could prevent mankind from perishing in a 
nuclear disaster or in an ecological crisis, thus making sacrifi­
ces for posterity inevitable. But if we ask for the arguments 
which would persuade us to make sacrifices for posterity, what can 
we supply?
Passmore has dedicated some attention to this problem. It seems 
that there are 3 possible types of arguments. The first is reli­
gious, the second perfectionist, the third utilitarian. Leaving 
aside the first, I deal with the perfectionist and utilitarian 
approaches. The perfectionist view was endorsed by Kant and Fichte 
who thought that man will always strive towards a better world, 
towards the fulfilment of an ideal society. The utilitarian 
approach is presented in the Bentham, and Sidgwick, version.41
Bentham, and Sidgwick after him, were fully 
prepared to admit that we ought to take into 
account both the probability of the effects of 
our actions and also their remoteness; in ge ­
neral, we should place the greater emphasis on 
effects which are near at hand. Although the 
hereafter as such has the same moral impor­
tance as the n o w , this is not true when a c ­
count is taken of its uncertainty. (Passmore 
1974:84)
Thus the utilitarian view (at least in this version) is not strong 
enough to ensure a concern for posterity, mainly because we are 
not able to calculate the probabilities of eventually detrimental 
actions to future generations. As Passmore concludes: "So even if 
we accept the principle of impartiality and the utilitarian 
framework in which it is embedded, even if we accept the view that
41 Passmore erroneously calls Rawls a utilitarian, see Passmore 
(1974:86-7).
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we ought not so to act as certainly to harm posterity, this does 
not appear to be a principle strong enough to justify the kinds of 
sacrifice some conservationists now call upon us to make." (id.)
Beckerman, a straightforward defender of economic growth and eco­
nomic rationality expresses the myopic view of many economists 
which has come under attack from the environmentalists:
"[I)f it can be said that there is a conflict 
between growth and the environment, it is 
equally true that there is -a conflict between 
growth and food consumption or clothing con­
sumption, or any other ingredient of current 
standards of living. In other words, one does 
not choose between consumption tomorrow and 
environment today; the choice is between con­
sumption tomorrow and consumption today, ir­
respective of how consumption today or tomor­
row is distributed between the environment and 
other uses of output." (Beckerman 1974:29)
This quote makes sufficiently clear how economists, on the basis 
of their utilitarian approach, conceive of ecological problems. If 
something cannot be expressed in terms of monetary value then it 
is not likely to be taken into consideration for the calculation 
of utility or welfare.42 Beckerman asks "[h]ow should society 
choose between consumption today and consumption tomorrow?" 
(Beckerman 1974:27) In his answer, he rather justifies the 
environmentalists' suspicion towards economics. Firstly, 3eckerman 
posits that "[w]here objectives conflict [such as between 
consumption today and tomorrow] some criteria have to be worked 
out for deciding on the optimum compromise between them... 
Economics shows what these criteria must be in general and what 
the empirical counterparts of these criteria are in special
42 In Oscar W i l d e ’s words, a cynic is a person who knows the 
price of everything and the value of nothing. (I thank Paul 
Kearns for this reference).
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cases." (Beckerman 1974:28) Secondly, in giving an example for his 
solution, he states: "If a sacrifice of consumption today of £100 
for purposes of investing in the environment can only yield an 
extra £90-worth of future welfare from the environment then it 
should not be undertaken." (Beckerman 1974:29) The first statement 
is quite imperialist whereas the second lays bare the method of 
that imperialism; it rules out the possibility that there might be 
environmental values which are appreciated "as such” , even if on 
balance there would in fact be such a trade-off as described. The 
problem with Beckerman's account is not, as he sees it, that the 
different preferences might be difficult to measure, but simply 
that he neglects the fact that people might not wish the 
extinction of an animal species even if its financial value were 
negligible. The second statement, therefore, presents in a 
nutshell what is wrong with the economists' approach: their 
framework does not include human needs which cannot be rendered in 
economic terms ("preferences" which lead to a market price).
Joan Robinson in her Economic Philosophy put her own scepticism
about a concern for future generations in this way:
This problem cannot be resolved by any kind of 
calculation based on 'discounting the future', 
for the individuals concerned in the loss are 
different... The benefit from their sacrifices 
will come later and they may not survive to 
see it. The choice must be taken somehow or 
other, but the principles of Welfare Economics 
do not help to settle it. (Robinson 1964:
115)
Consider now the approach of Rawls, who is not concerned with 
maximization of welfare, utility or happiness, but wants to define 
the conditions for a just society. The question of future genera­
tions can also be analysed by this approach. Rawls argues that the 
principle of impartiality is too demanding; there is r.o reasonable 
argument to demand from the present generation that it share the
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available resources with the whole of posterity. But it is quite
reasonable to hand on to our immediate posterity a better
situation than we have ourselves inherited. Rawls writes:
Each generation must not only preserve the 
gains of culture and civilization, and main­
tain intact those just institutions that have 
been established, but it must also put aside 
in each period of time a suitable amount of 
real capital accumulation. (Rawls 1972:285)
The language of economics ("capital accumulation") is a bit tech­
nical here but what is meant is simple: each generation has to 
hand on to the following one technology, investments in science 
and education, agriculture etc. Note, however, that the extraction 
of, say, minerals from the earth is an irreversible act, both as 
regards the 'loss' of the mineral (in its natural form) and also 
as regards an eventually aesthetic damage (as would be the case in 
the destruction of a mountain or a village). In this case all that 
the present generation can do is hand on a compensation for this 
loss; this compensation may take the form of improved technology 
which in turn leads to an increase in productivity which finally 
leads to higher incomes and/or to a decrease of the average 
working day. (3y the way, I think that in this century this is how 
irreversible destruction of natural resources has been 
legitimated). However, I think that Rawls' suggestion is 
misleading, because it overlooks the fact that the interests of 
the immediate and all future generations may not coincide, as a 
simple example can show: there may be a technical solution to
storing nuclear waste for the next generation (or even the next 
two or three generations) but this way of storing may become 
dangerous for the tenth or hundredth generation.
But how does Marx relate to these approaches? At first sight, 
none of the outlined approaches contains Marx's position. Marx did 
not think that any hitherto existing society had or should
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have, made sacrifices for posterity. He thought that capitalism 
anticipated the future in the dreadful way that it wastes human 
resources :
"It is, in fact, only at the greatest waste of 
individual development that the development of 
general men is secured in those epochs of his­
tory which prelude to a socialist constitution 
of mankind." (MEGA II.3.1.:327, English in 
original)
Communist society on the contrary, s_o he thought, would leave the 
planet to future generations in a better state simply as a result 
of its pure modus ope r a n d i . This is not only a matter of predic­
tion and of "historical laws"; Marx himself expounds it as a duty 
to unborn generations when he speaks about the duty of the world
inhabitants to hand it down to future generations in a better
4 3condition:
From the standpoint of a higher economic form 
of society, private ownership of the globe by 
single individuals will appear quite as absurd 
as private ownership of one man by another.
Even a whole society, a nation, or even all 
simultaneously existing societies together, 
are not the owners of the globe. They are only 
its possessors, its usufructuries, and, like 
boni patres familias, they must hand it down 
to succeeding generations in an improved 
condition. (Capital 3 :776)
Hence the passage from Capital 3 does contain a statement about 
facts (and historical prophecy) and an ethical principle. It is 
difficult to speculate exactly about what his position amounted 
to,44 but a probable answer, taking Passmore's scheme for granted
43 It is thus no ethical argument regarding n a t u r e , but an 
ethical argument regarding human beings (unborn genera­
tions ).
44 I shall return to the complex question of communist society 
in chapter 5, below.
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is that he was committed to both a utilitarian and a perfectionist 
view. Since Marx says "future generations", a Rawlsian interpreta­
tion seems to be excluded. However, we must keep in mind that Marx 
did not treat this question in a systematic manner, so he probably 
did not care too much about the formulation.
But Marx also clearly endorsed a perfectionist view. Together 
with Fichte and Kant, he shared the belief that mankind would 
always strive towards greater self-realization, toward the ideal 
society (see his human nature theory, 2.4. below). Together with 
the industrialists of his time, he shared the belief that the 
world is imperfect but can be improved. The good society for Marx 
is a society which enables the release of all human powers, most 
notably their communal and creative powers (cf. 2.5.). Since these 
cannot be defined in advance and once and forall, Marx avoids a
static definition of what human needs are or what the communist
society would exactly look like; but this much seems clear:
communism should be that social form which liberates the human
content. This is an indefinite process which finds in a 
perfectionist view its natural expression. In contrast to Fichte 
and Kant, Marx offered an account which - so he thought - would 
explain why mankind would sooner or later be forced to establish 
that ideal society. This account is contained in his historical 
materialism, to which I shall turn in chapter 4. On the basis of 
his materialist conception of history, Marx avoided the ethical 
tone of Kant and Fichte who could only conceive of a d u t y , a duty 
to strive for a better future.
In conclusion, Marx's imperative in the above passage where he 
conceives of a duty of existing generations to leave the planet in 
an improved situation is rather an exception to his general line 
of thought. True, in his early writings Marx accepted the catego­
rical imperative to "overthrow all relations in which man is a
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debased, enslaved, forsaken, despicable being" (CW 3 ;182) but this 
general principle does not stretch to future generations, once a 
communist society has been established; it would be sufficient to 
leave the planet in the same conditions and to take care that 
mankind will not regress to a state in which man again becomes a 
foresaken and despicable being.
d. Unintended consequences and the "Tragedy of the commons"
As regards unintended consequences, Marx was one of the first 
social scientists who systematically treated this mechanism. He 
employed this kind of analysis himself when he demonstrated both 
on the political and economical level how individual rationality 
can bring about collectively undesirable outcomes. As Elster put 
i t :
The general idea that unintended consequences 
arise when agents entertain beliefs about each 
other that exemplify the fallacy of composi­
tion is an extremely powerful one. In my opi­
nion, it is Marx's central contribution to the 
methodology of social science... (Elster 
1985:48)
Economists are usually interested in positive feed-back loops 
which give rise to their beloved "invisible hand mechanisms". But 
Marx immediately sees the two possibilities contained in this 
mechanism:
The real point is not that each individual's 
pursuit of his private interest promotes the 
totality of private interests, the general 
interest. One could just as well deduce from 
this abstract phrase that each individual 
reciprocally blocks the assertion of the 
others' interest, so that instead of a general 
affirmation, this war of all against all 
produces a general negation. (Gru n d r i s s e :156)
As Elster rightly observed,
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for Marx, counterfinality - the negative 
externalities of the capitalist mode of 
production - was a more interesting phenome­
non. He believed that capitalism systematical­
ly tends to aggravate spontaneously arising 
crises, since each entrepreneur reacts to them 
by behaviour that, even if individually 
rational, is disastrous in the aggregate. The 
main instance of this mechanism Marx found in 
the process that according to him tends to 
generate a fall in the rate of profit. (Elster 
1985:25-6)
Marx also employs the same structure of argument with respect to 
the phenomenon that behind the backs of capitalists a process is 
at work which, through increasing productivity, reduces socially 
necessary labour which turns out to lower effective demand. Marx 
also employs the argument in summarizing the whole capitalist 
business-cycle, i.e. on a meta-level. Here the specific capitalist 
means of increasing productivity leads to economic crises. This is 
one major reason why Marx condemned capitalism: he condemned it as 
a socially-antagonistic form of wealth production. Certainly, 
capitalism develops the productive forces (this is, according to 
Marx, its historical legitimation), but it does so by wasting 
social wealth. Tremenduous amounts of value are depreciated in 
periods of economic crisis, and labourers and soil are exploited 
and degraded during capitalism's "business as usual” .
Another example of the presence of this mechanism in Marx's work
is the "Tragedy of the Commons" which I referred to in 1.3. Marx
comes close to recognizing this mechanism when, in a letter to
Engels, he praises the German agriculturalist Fraas for proving
that climate and flora changed in historic 
times... He maintains that as a result of 
cultivation - in proportion to its degree 
the ''dampness" so very much beloved by the
peasants is lost (hence plants, too, emigrate
from South to North) and eventually the 
formation of steppes begin. The first effect 
of cultivation is useful but is eventually
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devastating on account of deforestation etc...
The sum total is that cultivation - when it 
progresses naturally and is not consciously 
controlled (as a bourgeois, of course, he does 
not arrive at this) - leaves deserts behind 
it, Persia, Mesopotamia, etc. Greece. (Letter 
to Engels, 25.3.1868)
Now this is clearly a different explanation from the one which 
blames market mechanisms (or capitalism) for ecological problems. 
As we have seen in 1.3.5., the market mechanism works in a 
detrimental way above all in the case of non-renewable resources. 
In the case of agriculture it is also counterfinality ("tragedy of 
the commons") which leads to undesired results.
2.2. Marx's motivation for his critique
Fortunately, M a r x ’s approach is far richer in scope than is 
reflected in the all too well-known standard interpretation which 
blames only capitalist relations for all evil. Taking Marx in a 
broader sense seems to me supported by at least two facts.
Firstly, Marx's critique of capitalism was no end in itself, but 
was to serve the establishment of a "true, human society" (see 
chapter 5). Marx criticised capitalism mainly because of its 
'enslaving effects' on human beings. Enslaving effects can express 
themselves in many ways; it may take the form of overt or
covert oppression and it may also take the form of alienation 
which Marx thought was the prevailing form in the capitalist 
system. Alienation, however, presupposes a 'true human' essence 
which will come into being once the conditions of alienation are 
removed; thus communism is the realization of the true human
essence, of true human society. If we take this line of thought as 
a guiding thread, we have a far richer approach for our subject 
than a simple 'capital-criticism' would offer us. Marx criticized 
the social form of capitalism because it alienated men: the
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products of their work appear to them as if they were alien
powers. In the German Ideology he writes thus:
This fixation of social activity, this conso­
lidation of what we ourselves produce into a 
material power above us, growing out of our 
control, thwarting our expectations, bringing 
to naught our calculations, is one of the 
chief factors in historical development up 
till now. The social power... which arises
through the co-operation of different indivi­
duals as it is caused by the division of 
labour, appears to these individuals, since 
their cooperation is not voluntary but has 
come about naturally, not as their own united 
power, but as an alien force existing outside 
them, of the origin and goal of which they are 
ignorant, which they thus are no longer able 
to control, which on the contrary passes
through a peculiar series of phases and stages 
independent of the will and the action of man,
nay even being the prime governor of these.
(German Ideology:47-8)
As Fetscher summarized Marx's concern:
Domination of man over 'social nature' should 
do away with the quasi-natural forces genera­
ted by the capitalist system of production.
Thus the 'free association of producers' is at 
the same time the prolongation and the accom­
plishment of human history as the humanization 
of nature and of the appropriation of truly 
humanized nature by man. (Fetscher 1973:460)
But it is not only capitalism which brings about alienation; 
there are other social forms which display this feature; and it 
seems doubtful to many that alienation can ever be overcome. 
This is in part due to the character of our complex world of 
technology and social institutions. If this is so, might not 
Marx's own approaches give us illuminating insights into this 
field? If so, much of my task would be fulfilled, viz. showing how 
useful Marx can be in analysing ecological problems. Marx treats 
technology as a constituent part of mankind in prominent places
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throughout his work (see chapter 3). He thus offers an analytical 
tool for investigating ecological problems. 45 The other tool 
consists in his social theory which investigates the features of 
social institutions. As we shall see, Marx focused on this subject 
as well in the most prominent places throughout his work and, what 
is more, he combined both aspects in a theoretical framework which 
has been called "historical materialism" (see chapter 4).
Now it would be beside the point to blame a writer for having 
written on problems which were pressing at his time. But, unfortu­
nately, it seems that sometimes contemporary Marxists are unable 
to acknowledge the changed reality in a deep way (of course, even 
the most orthodox Marxist will pay lip-service to the fact that 
reality has changed...) and to build their theory on these changed 
"real" preconditions. Moreover, they have blinded us to an 
approach which is able to deal with contemporary problems (such as 
ecology) in an illuminating way. Thus I plea for a re­
interpretation of Marx in this respect which acknowledges frankly 
Marx's own predominant approach (i.e. blaming capitalism's social 
form) but does not accept it as the main tool in analyzing 
ecological problems. In order to do so, we have to exploit some 
resources in Marx's thought which have not yet been acknowledged 
to the extent they deserve.
45 It is not surprising that he did not consider inherently 
dangerous technology or high-risk systems. For one reason,
he wrote over a hundred years ago and could not witness the
problems of modern technological systems. For the other 
reason, he seemed to have been quite confident regarding the 
possibilities of overcoming technical problems which have 
detrimental effects on human beings. Instead, he insisted
that it was the capitalist use of technology which makes
life unpleasant and risky.
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Moreover, as my analysis will show, Marx himself in his prepara­
tory writings for Capital analysed machine-technology in a way 
which focused on its inherent characteristics, regardless of the 
capitalist context in which it was placed. Orthodox Marxism has 
blinded us to such theoretical possibilities by stressing the 
paramount role of capitalist exploitation and class rule as 
causing all major problems in the Modern World. Such a narrow and, 
confronted with the facts, unrealistic, interpretation of Marx's 
thought may have the advantage of bei.ng in line with the argument 
in C a p i t a l . But in neglecting other most interesting parts of his 
theory, and overlooking ecological problems in socialist coun­
tries, they have done a disservice to Marx's thought, convincing 
many of their opinion that his theory has little to offer in 
respect to contemporary problems.
2.3. Three Marxist approaches
In 2.1. I have tried to relate some of Marx's statements to con­
temporary debates on ecological problems. In what follows, I shall 
present three approaches which are to be found in Marx's writings, 
all of which could be related to ecological problems. The first 
approach blames capitalist production (2.3.1.), and the second 
alienation for ecological problems (2.3.2.). The third approach is 
more general in that it investigates natural and social factors 
without focussing immediately on the capitalist form (2.3.3.). I 
shall claim that this is the most promising approach and I use it 
as the basis for my own argument.
2.3.1. First approach: capitalist production as a cause of
ecological problems
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In its concentration upon capitalist profit-maximizers, Marx's
approach is fairly close to the "externalities approach" (see
1.3.6.) with one difference: Marx's main focus is on capitalists
as externalizers. As we have seen in ch.l, however, the scope of
the phenomenon is much wider: state-enterprises and private
consumers, too, externalize their costs, following general
standards of rationality. The potential of public enterprises for
causing ecological problems is as great as that of private
enterprises, if they employ high-risk technology. The same holds
true for state enterprises in socialist countries. Let us
determine, then, the potential of private consumers for damaging
the natural environment. Imagine the following possibilities:
littering, private cars, and burning. In the case of littering,
most civilized countries employ public services to remove refuse.
The responsibility lies thus with the state (public organs) which
has to provide a solution to the problem (burning waste etc.).
Individual citizens pay a fee for obtaining this service. Marx saw
the possibility of private pollution but tried to tie it to the
capitalist economy, i.e. saw it as being caused by irrational
social principles:
Excretions of consumption are of the greatest
importance for agriculture. So far as their
utilisation is concerned, there is an enormous
waste of them in the capitalist ec o n o m y . In 
London, for instance, they find no better use 
for the excretion of four and a half million 
human beings than to contaminate the Thames 
with it at heavy expense. (Capital 3 :101, my 
emphasis)
Marx assumes that a rational society would find a solution for 
using excrement as a fertilizer for agriculture. Up to now, 
however, there is no solution available in this respect. Human 
excrement is simply not appropriate for fertilizing agricultural 
la n d .
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A widespread view of environmentalists is that private consumers 
ought not to buy potentially damaging goods, such as batteries,
plastics, cars, etc., in order to abolish this kind of refuse and 
to allocate the productive capacities of society to other, less 
damaging, production. This argument forgets the structural aspect 
of the problem: it forgets the 'embeddedness' of virtually every 
consumer in a network of social obligations, technological and 
economic constraints and possibilities, which by and large repro­
duces the present structure of consumer goods. To be sure, the
market mechanism would allow for the substitution of presumably
dangerous materials with less dangerous material, if the new 
material could be produced at competitve prices. But this depends 
on technological possibilities which are economically profitable 
(I leave aside here the political aspect, see chapter 3). The 
environmentalist, confronted with such an argument, would probably 
confess his readiness to pay much more for a certain good, if this 
would protect the environment. This solution, however, again
raises the spectre of the Prisoners' Dilemma. We can regard it as 
a solution only under two premises: (a) that the real income
allows for such choices; (b) that the vast majority of people 
would become what Pizzorno has called "identifiers".46 But note, 
this "solution" only reformulates our problem: for people to
adhere to a "logic of identity" rather than to a "logic of 
utility", they would have to accept some sort of "green" ideology 
and enter a circle of recognition which is constituted by other 
committed environmentalists.
46 Starting from Hirschmann's notions "exit, voice and loya- 
lity", Pizzorno introduces a fourth notion: identification. 
This is supposed to explain behaviour which otherwise could 
not be explained. See Hirschmann (1970) and Pizzorno (1986).
76
In the case of private cars, at least some countries nave intro­
duced technical standards which limit the quantity of toxic gas in 
car exhaust. In countries where no such legislation exists, the 
potential for private pollution is considerable. Take now the 
problem of private burning. Especially in winter time the big 
cities of many countries are covered by an unbreathable air. A 
change in this situation is not very likely since every individual 
consumer seems to prefer breathing bad air to freezing. Even given 
the existence of a new, clean heating technology, this attitude of 
the 'rational consumer' would not change unless special incentives 
are created which 'force' people to change their heating systems. 
But in many towns, heating is provided by public services (central 
heating plants), hence shifting the responsibility again from the 
individual to the social level.
To sum up, then, two things can be said. Firstly, the situation 
of private consumers is sometimes characterized by the fact that 
their environmental responsibilities are taken over by public 
administration. Secondly, the impact of private consumers on the 
environment is of much less importance (with the possible excep­
tion of private cars) than the impact of the other mechanisms
listed in 1.3. This is so because the scope of private pollution
is much more restricted, because the technology at hand is much 
less powerful. In conclusion, we can say that Marx underestimated 
the externalizing potential of public enterprises (and, to a 
lesser extent, of private consumers). Marxists after him have been 
mistaken to underestimate the externalizing potential of socialist 
enterprises.
In the early On the Jewish Question Marx connects the degrada­
tion of nature to the dominion of money:
Money is the jealous God of Israel in face of 
which no other god may exist. Money is the 
universal self-established value of all
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things. It has therefore robbed the whole 
world - both the world of men and nature - of 
its specific value... The view of nature 
attained under the dominion of private 
property and money is a real contempt for and 
practical debasement of nature..." (CW 3 ;172)
As we already saw above, Marx accuses capitalist production for
the interruption of the man-nature metabolism: "... on the other
hand, it [i.e. capitalist agriculture, R.G.] disturbs the
circulation of matter [Stoffwechsel, Jl.G.] between man and the
soil i.e. prevents the return to the soil of its elements consumed
by man in the form of food and clothing; it therefore violates the
conditions necessary to lasting fertility of the soil." (Capital
1^:474) In the following passages Marx demonstrates how he applies
the working of capitalist principles to its own life-conditions,
the soil and the labourer. Here his explanation is clearly one
which rests on the "unintended consequences mechanism", although
Marx himself tries to limit it to the capitalist epoch.
[A ]11 progress in capitalistic agriculture is 
a progress in the art, not only of robbing the 
labourer, but of robbing the soil; all
progress in increasing the fertility of the
soil for a given time, is a progress towards 
ruining the lasting sources of that fertility.
The more a country starts its development on 
the foundation of modern industry, like the
United States, for example, the more rapid is 
the process of destruction. Capitalist produc­
tion, therefore, develops technology, and the 
combining together of various processes into a 
social whole, only by sapping the original 
sources of all wealth - the soil and the
labourer. (Capital 1 :474-5, my emphasis)
In Capital 2 Marx dedicates some attention to the problem of 
timber-growing :
The long production-time (which comprises a 
relatively small period of working time), and 
the great length of the periods of turnover 
entailed, make forestry an industry of little
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attraction to private, and therefore capita­
list, enterprise, the latter being essentially 
private even if the associated capitalist 
takes the place of the individual capitalist.
The development of culture and of industry in 
general has ever evinced itself in such ener­
getic destruction of forests that everything 
done by it conversely for their preservation 
and restoration appears infinitesimal. (Capi­
t a l ^ :  248)
However, as we have seen above, the absence of the profit princi­
ple, and the absence of market competition, does not ensure a 
careful use of natural resources. Marx often seemed to take into 
account this possibility incidentally, without elaborating on it. 
Rather, it came to Marx via the reading of Fraas. As Fetscher has 
observed, Marx was deeply inspired by Fraas whose book Klima und 
Pflanzenwelt in der Zeit, ein Beitrag zur Geschichte beider he 
'discovered' in 1868 and about which he commented to Engels 
enthusiastically, as we have seen above. (Fetscher 1985:124)47 
Therefore, both the problems of fertility and forestry illustrate 
the mechanism of unintended consequences and the "tragedy of the 
commons", rather than capitalist methods. Consider, first, the 
forestry example. Marx's claim is that forests have been destroyed 
throughout history, no matter under which form of property. This 
is to say that not only the market mechanism or capitalist methods 
of production lead to destruction of forests but also collective 
forms of growing timber. Consider, now, the fertility example. 
Here Marx juxtaposes a short-term rationality ("increasing the 
fertility for a given time") to a long-term irrationality 
("ruining the lasting resources of that fertility") where the 
latter is explained by the former. This interpretation is further
47 See, also, his appreciation of Liebig, cf. Capital 1 :475: 
"To have developed from the point of view of natural 
science, the negative, i.e. destructive side of modern 
agriculture, is one of Liebig's immortal merits."
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supported by Marx's general assertion that "the development of 
culture and industry in general" (Letter from 25.3.1868) has led 
to such an energetic destruction of forests.
But let us turn again to the general destruction of soil and
labour as a result of the capitalist mode of production:
Large-scale industry and large-scale
mechanised agriculture work together. If 
originally distinguished by the fact that the 
former lays waste and destroys principally 
labour power, hence the natural force of human 
beings, whereas the latter more directly 
exhausts the natural validity of the soil,
they join hands in the further course of 
development in that the industrial system in 
the country-side also enervates the labourers, 
and industry and commerce, for their part,
supply agriculture with the means of
exhausting the soil. (Capital 3 :813, amended 
translation)
With regard to the destruction of labour we find the following
statements :
Après moi le déluge! is the watchword of every 
capitalist and of every capitalist nation.
Hence capital is reckless of the health or
length of life of the labourer, unless under 
compulsion from society. To the outcry as to
the physical and mental degradation, the
premature death, the torture of over-work, it 
answers: ought these to trouble us since they
increase our profits? (Capital 1 :257)
In illustrating what the consequences of capitalist production
amount to for the worker, he says:
At the same time that factory work exhausts 
the nervous system to the uttermost, it does 
awav with the many-sided play of the muscles, 
and*confiscates every atom of freedom, both in 
bodily and intellectual activity. The lighten­
ing of the labour, even, becomes a sort of 
torture, since the machine does not free the
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worker from work, but deprives the work of all 
interest. (Capital 1 :398)
Two things spring immediately to mind:
(1) Marx concentrates far more on the waste of labour than on 
the waste of the natural environment;
(2) The waste of the natural environment in Marx's view is 
largely limited to the waste of land as a result of capitalist 
agriculture. The last point deserves-a further comment.
Marx is fairly optimistic regarding the possibilities of 
recycling. In Capital 3 , he stresses the fact that capital has an 
interest in consuming the elements of production in an economic 
way:
The general requirements for the re-employment 
of these excretions are: large quantities of 
such waste, such as are available only in 
large-scale production; improved machinery 
whereby materials, formerly useless in their 
prevailing form, are put into a state fit for 
new production; scientific progress, particu­
larly of chemistry, which reveals the useful 
properties of such waste. (Capital 3 :101)
Regarding the chemical industry Marx is completely optimistic. He 
generally states that this industry recycles its own excrement.
The most striking example of utilizing waste 
is furnished by the chemical industry. It 
utilizes not only its own waste for which it 
finds new uses, but also that of many other 
industries. (Capital 3 :102)
The general result of Marx's analysis with regard to "undermining 
the fountains of wealth" is formulated in the fallowing pointed 
m a n n e r :
Capitalist production ... is very economical 
with the materialized labour incorporated in
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commodities. Yet, more than any other mode of 
production, it squanders human lives, or 
living labour, and not only blood and flesh, 
but also nerve and brain. (Capital 3 :88)
See also the 1861-63 Manuscripts:
The capitalistic production is ... most 
economical of realized labour, labour realized 
in commodities. It is a greater spendthrift 
than any other mode of production of man, of
living labour, spendthrift not only of flesh 
and blood and muscles, .but of brains and 
nerves. (MEGA I I .3 .1.:3 2 6 -7 , orig. Engl.)
As we saw above, Marx distinguished between two sources of 
wealth: soil and labour. That Marx's main interest was in the 
waste of human beings is not due solely to his humanist standpoint 
and his political outlook. Undoubtedly it reflects the historical 
situation of his time where the far more pressing problem was the 
direct waste of human beings in the production process. Nowadays, 
human beings are endangered perhaps less within the industrial 
production process than outside it. Marx was preoccupied with the 
life-conditions of the working class resulting from overwork and
bad working conditions. There was a remedy at hand which in fact 
improved the working conditions and the lives of the working class 
and which Marx supported: the labour-legislation which led to the 
shortening of the working day which introduced, inter alia, stan­
dards of job security. What if we apply this by analogy to the 
destruction of the natural environment? Imagine two clear cut 
cases. The first is a production process in which human beings are 
wasted, but which, ecologically, does little damage. The second is 
a production process in which labourers enjoy safe and decent 
working conditions, a short working time, but which harms the 
natural environment. If we take these two cases as ideal cases and 
suppose - for the sake of the argument - that the first obtained
during Marx's time, whereas the second obtains today, we might
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benefit from an explicit application of Marx's approach to the 
natural environment.
Before proceeding any further, we must ask: how exactly does
Marx conceive of the exhaustion of labour power? In the opening
paragraph of section 5, chapter X of C apital, Vol. 1, he writes:
"What is a working-day? What is the length of 
time during which capital may consume the 
labour power whose daily value it buys? How 
far may the working day be .extended beyond the 
working-time necessary for the reproduction of 
labour power itself?" It has been seen that to 
these questions capital replies: the working- 
day contains the full 24 hours, with the 
deduction of the few hours of repose without 
which labour-power absolutely refuses its ser­
vices again. (Capital 1 :252)
Capital does not respect the time necessary for human education, 
intellectual development, fulfilment of social functions, social 
intercourse, the free play of physical and psychical life-powers. 
It does not even respect the holy Sabbath (cf. id.). Following its 
blind instincts, capital overruns not only the moral, but also the 
physical, limits of the working day: all the worker's "disposable 
time is by nature and law labour time" (id., my emphasis)
If we apply this argument to man's dealing with nature, we 
would get the following argument: nature belongs to man "by nature 
and law" in its entirety; man overruns the "moral and physical 
limits" of nature; man often does not permit nature to recover. In 
fact, Marx himself says that "a greedy farmer snatches increased 
produce from the soil by robbing it of its fertility." (Capital 
1:253, my emphasis)
As we have seen, Marx invokes moral and physical limits when 
speaking about the working day and its limits. Does it make sense
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to do the same with respect to nature? As regards the moral dimen­
sion, I think that Marx would have refused. He time and again 
ridiculed all forms of nature worship and sentimentalism. This
becomes clear when we look at his appraisal of capitalism, in so
far as it "creates the bourgeois society, and the universal 
appropriation of nature." (Grundrisse:409)
In a polemic against the "true socialists" (German Ideology)
Marx makes fun of a view which sees harmony essentially in nature:
"'Man' enters the realm of 'free nature' and 
utters, among other things, the following 
tender effusions of a true socialist's heart:
'... Gay flowers ... tall and stately oaks 
[...] forest birds... [...] I see [...] that
these creatures neither know nor desire any
other happiness than that which lies for them 
in the expression and the enjoyment of their 
lives..." (CW 5 :471)
Marx comments:
"'Man' could also observe a great many other 
things in nature, e.g., the bitterest 
competition among plants and animals; ... he 
could further observe that there is open 
warfare between the 'forest birds' and the 
'infinite multitude of tiny creatures'..." (CW 
5:471)
Another example of Marx's fierce rejection of any "nature cult" is 
the following polemic against Daumer. Marx comments on the 
following two passages from Daumer's Die Religion des neuen 
Wel t a l t e r s :
"Nature and woman are really divine, as 
distinct from the human and m a n . .. The 
sacrifice of the human to the natural, of the 
male to the female, is the genuine, the only 
true meekness and self-externalisation, the 
highest, nay, the only virtue and piety." (as 
cited in Marx, CW 1 0 :244)
Daumer then cites Stolberg's poem "An die Natur":
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Nature holy, Mother sweet,
In Thy footsteps place my feet.
My baby hand to Thy hand clings,
Hold me as in leading strings!
and comments: "Such things have gone out of fashion, but not to
the benefit of culture, progress or human felicity." (ibidem) Now
look at Marx's outrage:
Herr Daumer's cult of nature ... is a peculiar 
one. He manages to be reactionary even in com­
parison with Christianity. He tries to restore 
the old pre-Christian natural religion in a 
modernised form... We see that this cult of
nature is limited to the Sunday walks of an
inhabitant of a small provincial town who 
childishly wonders at the cuckoo laying eggs 
in another bird's nest..., at tears being 
designed to keep the surface of the eyes 
moist..., and so on... There is no mention, of 
course, of modern natural science, which, with 
modern industry, has revolutionised the whole 
of nature and put an end to man's childish 
attitude towards nature as well as to other 
forms of childishness. But instead we get 
mysterious hints and astonished philistine 
notions about Nostradamus' prophecies, second 
sight in Scotsmen and animal magnetism. For 
the rest, it would be desirable that Bavaria's 
sluggish peasant economy, the ground on which 
grow priests and Daumers alike, should at last 
be ploughed up by modern cultivation and 
modern machines. (CW 1 0 :245, my emph.)
Instead of this sentimental notion of nature, Marx praises Hobbes
and Hegel for a realistic view of nature:
"Hobbes had much better reasons for invoking 
nature as a proof of his bellum omnium contra 
o m n e s , and Hegel, on whose construction our 
true socialist depends, for perceiving in 
nature this cleavage, the slovenly period of 
the Absolute Idea, and even calling the animal 
the concrete anguish of God." (CW 5 :473)
What is interesting here is that Marx attacks an argument about 
nature which is also present in contemporary ecological discourse.
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The argument is that nature prescribes for society how to live
(see chapter 1). Marx's polemic seems to have been written
directly against someone we know personally:
"The true socialist proceeds from the thought 
that the dichotomy of life and happiness must 
cease. To prove this thesis he summons the aid 
of nature presupposing that this dichotomy 
does not exist in nature and from this he
deduces that since man, too, is a natural body
and has the properties which bodies generally 
possess, this dichotomy ought not to exist for 
him either." (CW 5 :473)
We can think of nature either as having instrumental or intrin­
sic value. As Passmore put it: "On the first view, wilderness and 
species ought to be preserved only if, and in so far as, they are 
useful to man. On the second view, they ought to be preserved even 
if their continued existence were demonstrably harmful to human 
interests." (Passmore 1974:101) He rightly says that "usefulness 
need not to be narrowly interpreted: wilderness and species, it 
might be argued, are valuable not only as economic resources, 
actual and potential, but as providing opportunities for the 
pursuit of science, for recreation and retreat, as sources of 
moral and aesthetic delight." (ibidem,102) It thus seems a 
promising project to develop arguments against the destruction of 
the natural environment on the basis of its instrumental rather 
than its intrinsic values; the more so, since Marx's position 
connects the aspect of domination of nature to human interests.
Marx, drawing an analogy between exhausted working power and 
exhausted soil used an instrumentalist argument in the example of 
the greedy farmer. Yet another observation can be made about this 
example. He did not say that the exhaustion of soil was due only 
to capitalist m e t h o d s , but due also to the greedy behaviour of the 
farmer. Of course, as we have seen above (Capital 1 :474-5; Capital 
3:813), that Marx thinks that capitalist methods accomplish the
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destruction of soil in the most systematic and 'efficient' way.
But his reference to the 'greediness' of the farmer suggests that
it. is a fundamental problem that must be faced by every social
fo r m . In similar fashion, Marx analyses the labour process in its
material content ('as such') before he dedicates his attention to
the specific social forms (above all, the capitalist one).
"Zunächst is der Productionsprozeß des Capi­
tals - seiner stofflichen Seite nach betrach­
tet, soweit Gebrauchswerte producirt werden 
Arbeitsprozeß überhaupt und als solcher zeigt 
er die allgemeinen Faktoren, die diesem Prozeß 
zukommen, unter den verschiedensten gesell­
schaftlichen Productionsformen. Diese Faktoren 
sind nämlich bestimmt durch die Natur der A r ­
beit als Arbeit." (MEGA II.3.1.82)
With such an approach one does not say that capitalism exhausts 
nature just like it exhausts labour power, but that human beings 
(sometimes) exhaust nature just like the capitalist exhausts 
labour power. In both cases the exploiter has to face negative 
consequences if he is too ruthless. During Marx's time capitalists 
resolved the problem of a perishing labour force by importing new 
labour (of course, labour legislation put an end to this, see 
Capital 1 ). In the case of man's exploitation of nature we can 
distinguish two cases, recalling the distinction between the 
"Prisoners' Dilemma" and the "Assurance Game" in chapter 1. The 
point of the PD is the following: If the assurance mechanism does 
not work, optimal outcomes are only obtained by superior force 
i.e. when all actors are "forced" to contribute to the public 
good either in a direct way (penal law) or in an indirect way 
(selective incentives). Before considering this possibility, let 
us look briefly at the possibilities for cooperation. As Shaw 
(1984) has pointed out, the number of the actors must be limited 
and the game must be repeated. Taking a limited numbers of actors 
for granted, the repetition of the game does not necessarily give 
an incentive to contribute to the public good: if an actor is
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better off by polluting and can off-load the costs onto "the 
public", then he will not cooperate. In this case, the future is 
likely to become the "junkyard of the present" (Miillhalde der 
Gegenwart) as Preuss (1981) aptly remarked. If, however, the 
future "retroacts" even now, and if it can be anticipated in some 
way, actors may have an incentive to cooperate. But note that it 
is only in the case of this feed-back loop where detrimental 
consequences become felt, that a further discounting of the future
4  Qis likely to be avoided.
In conclusion, then, there is no mechanism which automatically 
secures an optimal outcome. Let us therefore discuss an alterna­
tive: law coerces actors to cooperate. Can law provide the key to 
the solution of ecological problems? I am aware that the existence 
of a law does not in principle alter anything with respect to the 
behaviour of rational actors; the problem would be restated in the 
form that it might be rational for the actors to break the law. 
Here I simply assume that negative incentives (threat of 
sanctions) are at work which prevent actors from doing so.
For the purpose of exposition we may take D workin’s (1978:171) 
distinction between three approaches of modern law: rights-based
theories, duty-based theories49 and goal-based theories. The 
first and second are mainly concerned with individual interests;
48 As Ch. Perrow pointed out to me, it is essentially human to 
act within short time-spans and to consider only short-term 
consequences of that action. But the present time with its 
immense and fast information- and communication-systems may 
allow for a readiness to think in longer time-spans, a 
readiness which has never existed before.
49 Hart (1968) claimed that the duty-based approaches often 
turn out to be utilitarian, i.e. goal-based (personal 
communication with Sean S m i t h ) .
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the third concerns the community as a whole (cf. also Waldron 
1984:12-4). In elaborating the first approach, there have been 
contemporary efforts to extend the concept of rights to 
animals5 0 , to material objects in nature51 , to artistic 
creations and to foetuses5 2 .
It seems pretty clear that Marx would have ridiculed the rights- 
based theories. From what we know, he was already opposed even to 
the rather limited concept of rights in his own time (see his On 
the Jewish Question; see also Campbell 1983 and Lukes 1985 for an 
evaluation). With respect to a duty-based theory, Marx, at least 
in his early Hegel-critique, inspired by Kant's categorical 
imperative (which is taken as a basis in many contemporary duty- 
based theories) , formulated his own categorical imperative: "The 
criticism of religion ends with the teaching that man is the 
highest being for man, hence with the categorical imperative to 
overthrow all relations in which man is a debased, enslaved, 
forsaken, despicable being..." (CW 3 :182; cf. also ibid.:187) As 
we shall see in the next section on Marx's philosophical anthropo­
logy, Marx in fact did endorse some ethical values which he 
thought to be universally human and which an ideal form of society 
should set into practice. The problem for him was thus not to 
attribute rights but to establish the conditions under which the 
man's species power could be released. In Lukes's formulation: 
Marx opposed the morals of "Recht", but endorsed the morals of 
emancipation.
50 T. Regan and P. Singer (1980); the first attempt was
formulated in 1892 by Salt (cf. Passmore 1974:115)
51 Stone (1974). I am indebted to Andrew Clapham for these
references.
52 Feinberg (1974).
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But what about the third possibility of a "goal-based theory"? 
This approach, which dates back to Bentham, is essentially based 
on utilitarian premises. Since we know how much Marx ridiculed 
Bentham ("Genie in der bürgerlichen Dummheit") and his "utility- 
principle" ("freedom, equality, property and Bentham!") it seems 
unlikely that he would have allowed his cwn theory to be charac­
terized in goal-based terms. And yet, there is something there
which comes very close to an utilitarian approach. I made the 
distinction above between nature's, instrumental and intrinsic 
values of nature. Marx, so I claimed, adhered to the instrumental 
view (and was right to do so). But what label other than 
utilitarian (if only in the broadest sense of its meaning) could 
be given to this approach?53
Let me return to the question of law. In the previous paragraphs 
I have dealt with a possible Marxist position regarding law's 
capacity to deal with ecological problems. The result was that 
Marx probably would have endorsed a goal based and a duty based 
approach. Consider, for example, his advocacy of labour legisla­
tion. At face value his argument is purely goal based (the working 
class is the universal class which leads mankind into communism). 
But since Marx thinks that letting people work to death is simply 
inhuman, he also endorsed a duty based theory. In what follows I 
shall concentrate upon the feasibility of the goal based approach.
Recent research suggests that the complexity of many problems
makes it extremely difficult for law to achieve the intended
results: law can rarely anticipate the development of science and
53 See Lukes (1985) for some similarities between Marx's and 
utilitarian approaches.
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technology, which would be necessary for it to intervene success­
fully; moreover, legal interventions may produce unintended 
consequences which also harm nature (see chapter 5).
As Teubner and Willke have pointed out, traditional law was apt
to regulate simple, bi-polar conflicts (cf. Teuber/Willke
1984). These conflicts presupposed a world of simple connections.
In a stratified society, this condition did in fact obtain (at
least to a much greater degree than under present societal forms).
Teubner and Willke assume that the structural principle of modern
societies is no longer in stratified or class-based society, but a
functionally differentiated one.
Diese 'große Transformation' (Polanyi) und der 
ihr zugrundeliegende Prozeß der 'Rationali­
sierung' (Weber) führte zu einem Grad an
interner Komplexität moderner Gesellschaften,
welcher die Bedingungen und Folgen sozietaler 
Entwicklung und Steuerung grundlegend verän­
derte." (Teubner/Willke 1984:9)
Law is confronted with a functionally differentiated, complex 
society; it follows that it cannot intervene in the traditional 
way, it cannot 'plan' society. This is not possible, because the 
social sub-systems have gained an autonomy and degree of differen­
tiation which makes it impossible for law to bring about only 
intended consequences. There is the ever present danger that
interventions in one sub-system have detrimental effects on other 
sub-systems. Hence the slogan 'more l a w ! ' may backfire. But
neither does the opposite possibility seem feasible, because the 
mere autonomy ("Selbstlauf") of sub-systems produces ecological 
risks and damage.54
54 In chapter 1, we encountered Merton's statement that there 
are three main types of unintended consequences: functional, 
dysfunctional and irrelevant. Teubner's "regulatory trilem­
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Given these difficulties the (n e o - )liberal solution comes up 
with a comparatively simple solution: it assumes that the market 
leads to beneficial results for nature as well as for society. 
Marx employed such a solution only in his analysis of the waste of 
resources (see above). However, many still regard it as a mecha­
nism which is generally valid.55 As we have seen in chapter 1, 
the waste of resources is not the most urgent problem for modern 
societies, and this may indeed be due to the working of the 
market. But Marx was already well aware that the working of the 
market offers no beneficial solution for the problems of agricul­
ture and human labour-power. Recalling the discussion in chapter
1, we can conclude that every naive reliance on the market is com­
pletely fallacious.55 Summarizing the discussion of goal-based 
theories in law, we can say that this approach is linked to the 
problem of 'steering society' (with all its inherent difficul­
ties). Since a successfully-planned society was Marx's final aim, 
I shall return to this question in chapter 5.
2.3.2. Second approach: Alienation
ma" has it that law as a social system may (1) cause dys­
functional effects in other social systems, (2) remain irre­
levant and (3) cause detrimental effects for itself (see 
T eu b n e r , 1987).
55 See Hayek (1973-79) as the most prominent defender of this 
position.
56 Note that the dogmatic Marxist and the neo-liberal views are
symmetrical, but equally mistaken: the one blames the market
as one cause of ecological problems, the other praises the
market for being the most efficient remedy.
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In 2.3.1. I concentrated on detrimental effects stemming from
capitalist production, especially from its profit principle. I
dismissed that principle as too narrow to be able to account for
ecological problems. Next, I evaluated the question of private
consumers as "externalizers", i.e. as responsible for ecological
problems and arrived at a similar result. Another prominent
feature of capitalism which Marx holds responsible for many
pathological phenomena of modern society is alienation. Might it
not be that under conditions of alienation a careless use of
technology and resources takes place which leads to ecological
problems? Marx does not elaborate upon this line of thought in a
systematic way. However, in Capital 3 , in the chapter entitled
"Economy in the Use of Constant Capital", he states:
Finally, we have seen earlier that, in fact, 
the labourer locks at the social nature of his 
labour, at its combination with the labour of 
others for a common purpose, as he would at an 
alien power; the condition of realizing this 
combination is alien property, whose dissipa­
tion would be totally indifferent to him if he 
were not compelled to economise with it. The 
situation is quite different in factories 
owned by the labourers themselves, as in Roch­
dale, for instance. (Capital 3 :85, my empha­
sis)
With the idea of being "compelled", Marx has in mind the
institution of piece-work (Stücklohn) as the following passage
makes clear:
The capitalist's fanatical insistence on eco­
nomy in means of production is therefore quite 
understandable. That nothing is lost or wasted 
and the means of production are consumed only 
in the manner required by production itself, 
depends partly on the skill and intelligence 
of the labourers and partly on the discipline 
enforced by the capitalist for the combined 
labour. This discipline will become super­
fluous under a social system in which the la­
bourers work for their own account, as it has
already become practically superfluous in °3q q
piece-work. (Capital 3 :83)
Note that communist society and capitalist piece-work are suppo­
sed, here, to be similar in their results: both tend to economise 
on resources. In both cases, the worker has no interest in wasting 
resources. The principle of piece-work is said to bring about this 
result because the worker gets paid for the fruit of his labour 
according to their quantity and quality. Thus it lies in the 
worker's interest to produce a maximum output in a certain time 
period. Capitalists' supervision can therefore be minimized. But 
here Marx seems to overlook a crucial fact. Since the worker gets 
paid for the final product, he has no incentive to use resources 
sparingly. If he squanders resources this need not have negative 
consequences for his wage. His wage could, however, be related to 
his use of resources in the following two ways: either the worker 
has to pay for wasted raw material, semi-products or damage to the 
machine (as can easily be done in the case of house work), or 
supervision and control are maintained. A communist society, 
therefore, is not free from this problem either (see 1.3.5.). The 
possibility of alienation arises as soon as we admit that singular 
interests are not identical to general interests5 7 , a possibility 
which Marx excluded. I return to this problem in chapter 5 again.
2.3.3. Third approach: Ma.n-nature-metabolism
In 2.3.1., I introduced industry and technology as decisive 
factors with respect to ecological problems. "Production" thus 
seems to be the central category for the analysis of our problem. 
We are confirmed in this view by a statement from a radical
57 A further cause of ecological problems has been called 
"technological alienation" and will be discussed in chapter 
3.
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ecologist who said: "For the sake of nature, no production would 
be the best production.” (Amery 1978:167, my translation). This 
position, however, leads to absurdity. Human beings would no 
longer exist if they stopped producing their life-conditions
egwithin nature. Marx's approach is far from such absurdity. He
recognizes that human beings are part of nature, the most
developed species of animals. They are thus dependent on nature,
and have to organize their "interchange" (Stoffwechsel) with
nature in order to survive. Furthermore, they employ tools,
instruments, knowledge and skills during their interaction with
nature. Let us call this "technology" for short. He locates
technology in the middle between man and nature: it is the
necessary condition for man's Stoffwechsel with nature; man
transforms nature only by using means, tools, technology.
"Technology discloses man's mode of dealing 
with nature." (Capital 1 :352) "But just as man 
requires lungs to breathe with, so he requires 
something that is work of man's hand, in order 
to consume physical forces productively."
(Capital 1:365)
Fig. 2
M an----------------Technology -----------------^  Nature
f__________________________________________
58 And yet, even on this level, the argument has been put 
forward that, if mankind inevitably damages nature in 
securing its means for life, it would be better that it 
perish (cf. Birch 1982:48-9).
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Technology is the mediating instance without which man could not
secure his interchange with nature. Marx's approach is essentially
based on Hegel:
As soon as he has to produce, man possesses 
the resolve to use a part of the available 
natural objects directly as means of labour, 
and, as Hegel correctly said it, subsumes them 
under his activity without further process of 
mediation." (Grundrisse:734) And: "Nature
builds no machines, no locomotives, railways, 
electric telegraphs, self-acting mules etc.
These are products of human industry; natural 
material transformed into organs of the human 
will over nature. They are organs of the human 
brain, created by the human hand; the power of 
knowledge, objectified." (Grundrisse:706)3
There are several questions then which need examination before 
we can address Marx's position in its full scope. The first is the 
question of nature, to which I turn in the next section (2.4.); 
the second is the question of huuman nature (2.5.) Finally, the 
question of technology will be addressed in chapter 3. After this 
discussion, we will be in a better position to examine Marx's 
thought with respect to ecological problems; I shall then take up 
again the threads of nature, technology and society and discuss 
them as they are brought together in Marx's historical materialism 
(chapter 4).
2.4. The concept of nature
59 Cf. Hegel: "Der Mensch hat Ursache, auf seine Werkzeuge 
stolz zu sein, denn die Vernünftigkeit ist darin ausge­
drückt. Das Werkzeug bildet den medius terminus, wodurch die 
Tätigkeit des Menschen mit der äußern Natur vermittelt wird. 
Es ist dies der Geist der Vernunft, daß der Mensch, indem er 
ein anderes nach außen kehrt und abreiben läßt, sich selbst 
erhält." (Hegel 1983a:159)
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In this section I claim that Marx's concept of nature belongs to a 
discourse which dates back to Bacon and which includes such thin­
kers as Hegel and Nietzsche.60 It is this modern view of nature 
which has structured philosophical reasoning and which has re­
cently come under attack. As we shall see, Marx did not merely 
follow Bacon or Hegel, but developed a quite unique position, 
however much the "modern" concept of nature is at its basis. 
Therefore, in discussing Marx's approach, the whole modern concept 
of nature is involved.61 A position such as the fundamentalist 
ecological position which refutes the Marxian position is thus
60 From Bacon ("nature is a storehouse of matter"), Hegel 
("nature has no immanent purpose"), Marx ("nature ceases to 
be recognized as a power for itself") there is a direct line 
to Nietzsche ("will to power"). For an exposition of this 
discourse and its historical emergence, see Leiss (1972). 
3ut Marx is also different from these writers who propound 
that man should make an impact on the world: for Marx this 
goal is related to the goal of controlling all natural and 
social processes (see ch.5).
61 Cf. Heidegger (1961): "Das Zeitalter, das wir die Neuzeit
nennen, ... bestimmt sich dadurch, daß der Mensch Maß und 
Mitte des Seienden wird. Der Mensch ist das allem Seienden,
d.h. neuzeitlich aller Vergegenständlichung und Vorstell­
barkeit zugrundeliegende, das subiectum." (Cited in Habermas 
1985:160) It is also Heidegger who challenges the modern 
concept of nature as a "storehouse of matter and energy"
(cf. Heidegger 1978:296-9). Modern science, like modern
technology, entraps and enframes nature. The alternative is 
to hope that another form of poiesis will "bring forth and 
reveal": art. Heidegger's vision lies in "this other possi­
bility: that the frenziednes3 of technology may entrench
itself everywhere to such an extent that someday, throughout 
everything technological, the essence of technology may come 
to presence in the coming-to-pass of truth. Because the
essence of technology is nothing technological, essential
reflection upon technology and decisive confrontation with 
it must happen in a realm that is, on the one hand, akin to
the essence of technology, and on the other, fundametally
different from it. Such a realm is art." (Heidegger 1978: 
316-7)
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challenging the whole modern discourse of nature. One can regard 
Marx's position as a test case for the feasibility of the modern 
discourse on nature. This is all the more interesting since Marx, 
in my view, has given the concept "domination of nature" the most 
compelling formulation. Two things need mentioning here which I 
take up again later:
1. The concept of domination makes sense for Marx only with re­
spect to interests and needs. Recall the example of King Midas who 
had the power to turn everything he touched into gold. Now this is 
clearly a self-defeating power which we would hardly include in a 
reasonable concept of domination. Likewise, a society which does 
not take into account the repercussions of its transformation of 
nature, can hardly be said to dominate nature at all. In this ver­
sion the usual meaning of "domination of nature" is reversed. In 
the usual meaning, ecological crises are seen as a result of this 
very domination of nature. But here they are seen as the absence 
of domination of nature.
2. Marx links the concept of domination of nature to his communist 
project: for him cornmunism is a state of affairs in which human 
beings are capable (for the first time) of full self-realization. 
All naturally evolved natural and social conditions are the 
products of their common conscious control. Communism, therefore, 
is the culmination of a process of increasing mastery over nature.
Alfred Schmidt (1971) maintains that Marx employed a double con­
cept of nature. On the one hand nature was for Marx the totality 
of all existing "reality", "Gesamtwirklichkeit", comprising human 
beings and "external" nature (see Schmidt 1971:20,22). On the 
other hand, nature is only there for human beings if they enter 
into a practical relationship with it; they are in relation with 
nature only when transforming it. Marx puts it in the extreme
98
formula: "But nature too, taken abstractly, for itself, - nature 
fixed in isolation from man - is nothing for man." (CW 3 :345)62
But, on the other hand, Marx is aware that man can produce 
nothing without the help of nature (CW 3 :273). In the Critique of 
the Gotha Programme he stresses that labour alone does not create 
wealth. Here he insists that nature too produces use-values which 
are the material precondition for all production. However, the 
Grundrisse view that only labour can create value (Grundrisse: 
366) is not revoked. Against the physiocrats, Marx holds that it 
is important to analyse the social forms in which value is 
produced; value - in contrast to wealth - is not immediately given 
or transhistorical, it is the economic form which material wealth 
takes under specific conditions (most typically under capitalism). 
In other words, the above quote from the Grundrisse neither ex­
presses nor implies that Marx disregarded nature in the sense that 
he undervalued natural preconditions for human production. Quite 
the contrary is true. However, there is a certain disregard for 
nature, albeit in a completely different sense. This apparent 
paradox can be solved in looking at Hegel's distinction between 
first and second nature.
Hegel distinguished between a first and second nature. As he put
it in the Philosophy of R i g h t , para. 4:
"The basis of right is, in general, mind; its 
precise place and point of origin is the will.
The will is free, so that freedom is both the 
substance of right and its goal, while the 
system of right is the realm of freedom
62 This passage from the Paris Manuscripts indicates that there 
is no discrepancy between an "ecologist" young Marx and an 
"economist" later Marx.
63 Compare Marx, Capital 3 :820, where he refers to the "realm 
of freedom", see also chapter 5.
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made actual, the world of mind brought forth 
out of itself like a second nature. " (Hegel 
1953, transl. Knox, my emphasis)
Marx takes this outline as a model for a society in which human 
beings are no longer dominated by alien powers.65 As Schmidt 
rightly comments, Marx disagreed with Hegel on the point of 
whether existing society, law and state were manifestations of 
"reason". Marx objected to this Hegelian view for two reasons.
Firstly, he maintained that under given circumstances human beings 
still experience their own creations as alien powers. In this 
sense history is still to be characterized as pre-history (1859 
Preface). It follows that 2nd nature is still first nature in the 
sense that it imposes its blind forces on man in a natural way 
("blind wirkende Naturgesetze"). It is intriguing to extricate 
this line of thought from Marx. As Marx indicated in a footnote in 
Capital 1 , he agreed with Vico that man can understand the world 
which is his own product much better than the world of nature 
(which is, according to Vico, the product of God)°6
64 In the German original: "Der Boden des Rechts ist überhaupt 
das Geistige und seine nähere Stelle und Ausgangspunkt der 
Wille, welcher frei ist, so da3 die Freiheit seine Substanz 
und Bestimmung ausmacht und das Rechtssystem das Reich der 
verwirklichten Freiheit, die Welt des Geistes aus ihm selbst 
hervorgebracht als eine zweite Natur ist."
65 Fetscher is right when he emphasizes that Marx's point "is
that men should be able to consciously control their own
form of association (division and combination of labour
etc.) instead of being dominated by autonomous structural 
forces. What the free association of producers has to 
achieve is the completion of the process of humanization 
that started with the first conscious transformation of 
nature by men." (Fetscher 1973:459)
66 As we shall see in chapter 5, Vico's argument needs to be 
reconsidered.
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Does not the history of the productive organs 
of man, of organs that are the material basis 
of all social organization, deserve equal at­
tention? And would not such a history be ea­
sier to compile, since, as Vico says, human 
history differs from natural history in this, 
that we have made the former, but not the lat­
ter? (Capital 1 ;352)
Let us call the nature before human's transformation N a t u r e ^  and 
the transformed nature Nature2 . The latter comprises ail products 
of the human will, all objectifications. We can conceive of cul­
ture, history and society as second nature. Now, Marx thought that 
the more man transforms nature, the more he understands its prin­
ciples and laws. In this process nature^^ becomes nature2 . Marx saw 
the natural sciences as having made great progress in this respect 
whereas the social realm was still awaiting its revolution. "Re­
volution" here is to be taken literally, for Marx thought that a 
social revolution was necessary to establish nature2 properly.67 
To repeat: Hegel maintained that the existing forms of nature2 
(law, state, society) were the manifestation of reason; Marx, on 
the contrary, maintained that, since nature2 acts upon man in a 
"natural" way , in a way which is not understood ("blind wirkende 
Naturgesetze"), it cannot be the manifestation of man's reason, 
but only a distorted version of it.
This leads me to Marx's second objection to Hegel. Marx substi­
tuted the notion of "reason" for the notion of man as a "real 
human being" who has needs, desires and consciousness. He derived 
this line of thought from Feuerbach's critique of Hegel, as the 
Paris Manuscripts show (see 2.5.). But what is most important here
67 After the social revolution, therefore, no social science 
will be needed any more, see 5.5. and 5.6.
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is the implication of this theoretical shift for man's relation­
ship with nature. When I said above that Marx adopts from Hegel 
his disregard of nature^, this is not to say that his position is 
condemned as blind to ecological problems. The introduction of the
c oFeuerbachian "real sensuous being" *,as a human living organism, 
reveals the distinction here. Marx conceives of human beings 
primarily as 'real bodily entities' (which, of course, also have a 
brain and "reason") which relate to the rest of nature as their 
extended body. Marx in his early Paris Manuscripts praises Hegel 
for having conceived of man as producing himself through
6 9labour. This "greatness" of Hegel, however, did not blind Marx
to the fact that this Hegelian being was still an essentially
spiritual being, a limitation which Marx exposed. But whether we
see labour as "spiritual" or "practical", it is not the only
source of wealth. In 1875, attacking the Programme of the German
Social Democratic Party which declared exactly that "labour is the
source of all wealth and of all civilization", Marx wrote:
Labour is not the source of all wealth. Nature 
is just as much the source of use values (and 
it is surely of such that material wealth 
consists!) as labour, which itself is only the 
manifestation of a force of nature, human 
labour power. The above phrase is to be found 
in all children's primers and is correct in so 
far as it is implied that labour is performed 
with the appurtenant subjects and instruments.
68 As Marx put it in the Paris Manuscripts: "... he is a suf­
fering, conditioned and limited creature, like animals and 
plants." (cited in Fetscher 1973:451)
69 "The outstanding achievement of Hegel's Phanomer.logie and of 
its final outcome... is thus first that Hegel conceives the 
self-creation of man as a process, conceives objectification 
as loss of the object, as alienation and as transcendence of 
this alienation, thus grasping the essence of labour and 
comprehending objective man - true, because real man - as 
the outcome of man's own labour." (CW 3 :332-3, amended 
translation)
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But a socialist program cannot allow such 
bourgeois phrases to pass over in silence the 
conditions that alone give them meaning. (SW 
3:17)
In Capital 1 Marx affirms the same: "We see, then, that labour 
is not the only source of material wealth, of use-values produced 
by labour." (Capital 1 :50)
To conclude, then, Marx's perspective was that only communist 
society would merge nature^ and nature2 , humanizing nature and 
naturalizing man (to paraphrase a passage from the Paris Manus­
cripts ).70 In this transformation process two main factors 
participate: man and nature. Both have physical properties and 
limits which must be respected if the transformation process is to 
be continued. So far, the ecologists' attack on Marx is in vain. 
But they might now argue that Marxism does not take into conside­
ration these parts of nature which are not needed for material 
production. As I shall show, this claim is not true either. It 
would be true if consistent ecological politics required a 
deontological "respect for nature" as a starting point, if an 
ethical attitude towards nature were the sine qua non for 
ecological concerns. As we have seen above (2.4.1.), Marx did not 
attribute an intrinsic, but an instrumental value to nature. 
However, it is possible to derive an ecological awareness from 
such a premise if we understand the instrumental value as 
including other elements (such as aesthetical and recreatio­
70 Thus he writes in the Grundrisse: "Universally developed
individuals ... are no product of nature, but of history." 
(Grundrisse:162)
103
nal.)71 And, what is more, this premise is more likely to help 
construct criteria for an ecological position which starts from 
premises of modern reality and tries to develop an ecological
7 2critique on the basis of scientific findings.
Still, one might insist that Marx in priviledging second nature, 
pays too little attention to first nature. It is perhaps helpful 
to discuss E l s t e r ’s critique of Marx here. Elster calls M a r x ’s 
concept of nature "extreme and exaggerated" (1985:56), "exagge­
rated and pointless" (id.:57). I agree with him when he claims 
that Marx's concept of nature does not hold true for "the millions 
of solar systems outside the reach of man." (1985:57) But I think 
Elster himself underestimates the degree to which nature has been 
transformed by man. There are two important points which must be 
made against Elster here. The first is that we usually underesti­
mate the degree to which nature has already been touched and 
transformed by man. Many landscapes, apart from their geomorpholo- 
gical and topograhical elements, also contain a cultural element 
in that they have been created by man - they are "landscaped". The 
most important factor in this process has been the development of
71 It may also include a cultural and moral element, as the
case of cruelty to animals makes clear. But as I have argued
in chapter 1, this moral standard is derived from human 
needs and purposes.
72 Interestingly, much of the current ecological criticism was
suggested by critical scientists. The emerging ecological
movement took it up but gave it a - partly - anti-modern
direction. One important reason for this seems to be that
many environmentalists do not trust the present systems to
be able to resolve these problems. On the contrary, they 
seem to believe that further research and further develop­
ment of technologies would rather worsen the situation than 
improve it. However, also ecological policy making needs 
concrete technologies which are economically feasible.
Ecosystems-research is of utmost importance here.
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agriculture. With agriculture, natural landscapes develop into 
"cultivated” ones. Batzing (1984) has shown how this process 
transformed the Alps. As Passmore put it: " [T]he landscapes we now 
so greatly admire - the landscapes of Tuscany or of England or of 
Kyushu - are largely the creation of human enterprise, of human 
struggles." (Passmore 1974:179)73 The second point is that this 
is not only a question of degree, of "how much" nature has been 
transformed, rather, it is a cognitive point. Elster seems not to 
be aware of the crucial importance of this point for Marx's whole 
project; for if this point is wrong, his whole project fails. It 
is therefore not sufficient to call his view "extreme and 
pointless" (Elster 1985:57). If Marx is wrong in his exaggerated 
view, his whole project fails, because this view is one of the 
cornerstones of a true, human society: from this view derives
M a r x ’s optimism, together with the belief that a rational society 
(human society, communist society) presupposes the human 
understanding of the processes at work (in nature and society.) 
Admittedly, Elster himself associates this Marxian viewpoint to 
Marx's theory of the good society (cf. ibidem), without paying 
more attention to its cognitive implications. The more human 
beings have transformed nature^ into nature2 - so goes Marx's 
claim - the more they are able to understand the world, the more 
they are able to avoid "enslaving effects" which stem from natural 
or social processes. We must not forget that Marx saw his project 
as the continuation of a critique of religion; his concern was to 
abolish man's (unfounded) beliefs in natural or mystical powers. 
Taken in this sense, even the solar systems (at least those within 
the reach of telescopes) have been "transformed" by man even
73 See also Marx on Feuerbach: "(T]he nature that preceded
human history is not by any means the nature in which 
Feuerbach lives, it is nature which today no longer exists 
anywhere (except perhaps on a few Australian coral islands 
of recent origin) ... (CW 5 :40))
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without putting hand on them; their movements are understood. It 
was no accident that the phrase of "copernican revolution" was 
coined for its new conception of man's position in the cosmos. 
Similarly, it could be argued that we now know what oxygen is, 
i.e. we know its 'secrets'. In this sense it is transformed, since 
it represents something other to man than it did before.'4 These 
remarks should have made clear that Marx's contention is necessary 
for his theory and that it does indeed make sense.
2.5. Philosophical anthropology
As Schmidt (1971) has shown, Marx, analysing the man-nature 
relation, followed a methodological approach which was substan­
tially the same throughout his writings. Its first element is, as 
we have seen, the double characterization of man as both natural 
and social being, a definition in which we can detect Feuerbach's 
influence (man is both "Natur-Mensch" and "Menschen- Mensch").'5
2.5.1. Man as both a natural and social being
The 'natural' and social dimension are intertwined. When Marx 
uses the metaphor of nature as man's inorganic body, and refers to 
this relation as Stoffwechsel, the natural dimension is obvious: 
man as part of nature acts upon nature, just like any other natu­
ral element may have an impact on another. In this respect, man is
74 Note that I remain on a "realist" epistemological level 
which is sufficient to understand how Marx discussed the 
achievements of the natural sciences. All attempts to impute 
a Kuhnian notion of science to Marx are beside the point. 
See also Cohen (1978).
75 See Feuerbach (1959, 1960, 1973).
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a biological being with physical needs; a being who, like all
other living beings, can only exist within a natural environment.
Marx expressed this view in his early Paris Manuscripts with the
metaphor of nature being man's "inorganic body"; in Capital he
used the language of "metabolism", or "interchange with nature"
(as the German "Stoffwechsel" is rendered in English). But this
Stoffwechsel takes place in community with others. Thus human
beings are also social beings. As Marx states in the Introduction
to the Grundrisse:
The human being is in the most literal sense, 
a zoon politikon, not merely a gregarious ani­
mal, but an animal which can individuate it­
self only in the midst of society. Production 
by an isolated individual outside society - a 
rare exception which may well occur when a 
civilised person in whom the social forces are 
already dynamically present, is cast by acci­
dent into the wilderness - is as much an ab­
surdity as is the development of language 
without individuals living together and tal­
king to each other. (Grundrisse:84)
Marx stresses this double relation of man to his fellowmen and
to nature throughout his work. As a result of both their natural
(brain) and social character (common goals, tradition of know-how,
skills) human beings are able to harness nature, to make it work
for them. As Marx remarks in the Grundrisse:
Nature becomes purely an object for humankind, 
purely a matter of utility; ceases to be re­
cognised as a power for itself; and the theo­
retical discovery of its autonomous laws 
appears merely as the ruse to subjugate it 
under human needs, whether as an object of 
consumption or a means of production. (Grund­
risse: 410, amended translation)
And in Capital 1 :
An instrument of labour is a thing, or a com­
plex of things, which the labourer interposes 
between himself and the subject of his labour,
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and which serves as the conductor of his acti­
vity. He makes use of the mechanical, physi­
cal, and chemical properties of some substan­
ces in order to make other substances subser­
vient to his aims. (Capital 1 :174-5)
In a footnote to this passage Marx refers to Hegel, whom he cites 
approvingly:
Reason is just as cunning as she is powerful.
Her cunning consists principally in her 
mediating activity, which, by causing objects 
to act and re-act on each other in accordance 
with their own nature, in this way, without 
any interference in the process, carries out 
reason's intentions. (Cited in ibidem; German 
original in Hegel 1970a:365)
The main feature of men thus is not so much that they are tool-
making77 but that they are "intelligent" in that they can
anticipate outcomes of their action upon nature. Human beings are
able to project outcomes of natural processes and outcomes of
their own work. To illustrate this, Marx compared human activity
with that of a spider and a bee:
A spider conducts operations that resemble 
those of a weaver, and a bee puts to shame 
many an architect in the construction of her 
cells. But what distinguishes the worst
76 In his Naturphilosophie Hegel makes a more elaborate state­
ment: "Das praktische Verhalten zur Natur ist durch die 
3egierde, welche selbstsüchtig ist, überhaupt bestimmt; das 
Bedürfnis geht darauf, die Natur zu unserem Nutzen zu ver­
wenden, sie abzureiben, aufzureiben, kurz, sie zu vernich­
ten... Die Not und der Witz des Menschen hat unendlich 
mannigfaltige Weisen der Verwendung und Begeisterung der 
Natur erfunden... und zwar nimmt er ... Mittel aus ihr [und 
] gebraucht sie gegen sie selbst; und die List seiner Ver­
nunft gewährt, daß er gegen die natürlichen Mächte andere 
natürliche Dinge vorschiebt, diese jenen zum Angreifen gibt 
und sich dahinter bewährt und erhält." (Hegel 1970b:13 f.)
77 See Elster (1985) for a distinction between tool-making and 
tool-using
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architect from the best of bees is this, that 
the architect raises his structure in 
imagination before he erects it in reality.
(Capital 1 :174)
This projective consciousness is the decisive difference between 
human beings and animals. Human beings can decide how to build 
their houses. They do not have a 'natural' place in the ecosystem 
but they are able to adapt to many environments. Again, as 
distinct from animals, men do not change their species character 
in this process of adaptation, but on the contrary, they exercise 
it.78 Human beings have been described as "Mangelwesen" (Geh- 
len), beings of shortcomings and deficiencies. "But", as Fetscher 
rightly comments, "man's biological disadvantage is at the same 
time the basis for his superiority over animals." (Fetscher 1973: 
444) Hence Marx's definition fits well with the definition in 1.2. 
where the relation between man and nature was defined as: man
being (1) in and (2) against (dominating) nature.
2.5.2. Human needs
A decisive feature of man is that he produces and develops his
productive capacities. But where does this drive come from? Marx's
answer is simple: from human needs. We can derive two sorts of
human needs according to my distinction between natural and social
characteristics of human beings. As Elster put it:
"The concept of human needs is fundamental in 
Marx's theory of human nature. The good so­
ciety, for Marx, is one in which people are
78 Strictly speaking the notion of species-essence is not 
compatible with the Darwinian notion of s pecies. The 
latter's main characteristic is in fact that it changes, cf. 
Gellner (1987:50) In fact, as we shall see later when 
discussing evolutionary models, it does not make very much 
sense to take "mankind" or "society" as species in the 
Darwinian sense.
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rich in needs and rich in need satisfaction. 
Conversely, capitalism is defective both be­
cause people have few needs and because the 
needs they do have are not satisfied." (Elster 
1985:68)
The concept of needs is important also in another sense. We saw 
that the notion of domination (in general, and in respect to 
nature) is meaningful only if linked to a notion of interests.79 
Now, how can we establish this link? Elster, drawing on Heller 
(1976), constructed the following typology of needs in Marx. It 
includes
(1) Physical needs which are needs for physical or biological 
necessities;
(2) Necessary needs which correspond to the conventional and 
accepted standards of living of a particular group of people at a 
particular time and place;
(3) Luxury needs are needs which exceed (2);
(4) Social needs are needs which (i) are social in origin, (i i ) 
are social in content or (iii) can be satisfied only communally 
(cf. Elster 1985:69) .
Obviously, each point in this typology can be related to the 
ecological problematic in one way or another. To be more specific, 
I shall qualify the relations in the following way.
(1) Physical needs: it is immediately clear that a debased
environment may not permit of need satisfaction. This is the case 
for inhabitants of an extremely polluted area who can no longer 
have these needs (like food) satisfied in that area;
79 For reasons of simplicity I take the two as synonymous here. 
See, however, the treatent in Heller (1976).
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(2) Necessary needs: standard goods of consumption (like water) 
which have such a low price (if any) that it can be neglected when 
calculating standard of living, may increase in their prices 
because it becomes more and more costly to keep water, for 
example, clean. As a result, the historical and moral elements 
which enter this category, will change;
(3) Luxury goods: it is a cultural and political question to de­
fine the distinguishing line between (2) and (3). Some orthodox 
Marxists and some committed "workerists" have contended that the 
perception of environmental problems, as it occurred in the early 
1970s, was an expression of the privileged status of the middle 
and upper classes. Workers, on the contrary (so went the claim), 
have always faced these problems at their workplaces and tried to 
improve their situation. In some extreme versions of this 
"workerism", it is claimed that workers should not bother about 
these problems but instead pursue their "real" class interests;
(4) Social needs: Zlster gave an example for a social need which
can be satisfied only communally: the need for education.
Education can be seen as a public good which is usually provided 
by the state. By analogy, we can apply the logic of collective 
goods to many ecological problems. Clean air and clean water may 
serve as examples here. All environmental problems are social in 
origin in that they are produced socially; to overcome them is 
both a social concern and a social need.
2.5.3. Human nature essential to Marx
80To define human beings as communal and creative justifies 
coining the term theory of human nat u r e . Man as a "toolmaking
80 For obvious reasons, I take "creative" here to mean both 
constructive and destructive. In any case, what counts as 
constructive or destructive, is observer-dependent.
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animal" can be seen as part of the creative dimension. As Norman 
Geras, in a most detailled and convincing study, has shown, 
throughout his writings Marx adhered to something we could 
describe as "human nature". To support this claim, he makes over a 
hundred references to Marx's works. Let me repeat some of them.
In the Holy Family of 1844, Marx accuses Bruno Bauer of sublima­
ting "all that affirms a finite material existence outside self- 
consciousness. What he combats ... is ... nature; nature both as 
it exists outside man and as man's nature." (CW 4 : 141)
In the German Ideology of 1845, Marx criticises Christianity: 
"The only reason why Christianity wanted to free us from the 
domination of the flesh and 'desires as a driving force' was 
because it regarded our flesh, our desires, as something foreign 
to us; it wanted to free us from determination by nature only 
because it regarded our own nature as not belonging to us." (CW 5 : 
62)
In the Grundrisse of 1857, he speaks of wealth, stripped of its 
bourgeois form, as the "full development of human mastery over the 
forces of nature, those of so-called nature as well as of huma­
nity's own nature". And he links this to "the absolute working-out 
of [man's] creative potentialities", which "makes this totality of 
development, i.e. the development of all human powers, as such, 
the end in itself." (Grundrisse:488)81
81 Cf. also the following passage: "The basis as the possibili­
ty of the universal development of the individual, and the 
real development of the individuals from this basis as a 
constant suspension of its barrier... Not an ideal or imagi­
ned universality of the individual, but the universality of 
his real and ideal relations." (Grundrisse:542)
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In Capital 1 he polemicizes against Bentham and his principle of 
utility, and concludes: "... he that would judge all human acts, 
movements, relations, etc. according to the principle of utility 
would first have to deal with human nature in general, and then 
with human nature as historically modified in each epoch. Bentham 
does not trouble himself with this. With the driest naivete, he 
assumes that the modern petty bourgeois, especially the English 
petty bourgeois, is the normal man." (Capital 1 :571)
Finally, in Capital 3 Marx, distinguishing the realm of freedom 
from that of necessity, writes: "Freedom in this field [the field 
of material production, R.G.] can only consist in socialized man, 
the associated producers, rationally regulating their interchange 
with nature, bringing it under their common control instead of 
being ruled by it as by the blind forces of nature; and achieving 
this with the least expenditure of energy and under conditions 
most favourable to, and worthy of, their human nature." (Capital 
3:820)
The evidence that Marx holds a specific view of human nature 
seems clear and abundant. And yet, one interpretation of Marx, 
namely the one of Althusser and his followers, has denied preci­
sely this. What is taken as evidence that there was no 'huma­
nistic' element in Marx is the sixth Thesis on Feuerbach, the 
second and third sentences of which read as follows: "But the
essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each single
individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of the social
relations." (CW 5 :4) As regards the exegetical level, Geras shows 
that the 6th thesis can by no means be taken as support for the 
'anti-humanist' interpretation of Marx (see Geras 1983a: 27-87). 
With regard to the substantial level, I would like to add the 
following. When Marx speaks of human nature, and in the sixth 
thesis apparently denies such human essence, this should be
explained in the following way. What the human essence is, can
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only be grasped from its emanations, from its objectifications. 
This combines the Hegelian idea (that the real is the rational) 
with the "positivist" idea that only real, observable entitities 
form the object of scientific investigation. Marx, most explicitly 
in the German Ideology, conceives of human characteristics such as 
creativity and communality as empirically-given facts which can be 
observed and analysed. Modern Industry is a product of this "inner 
essence", a thought which already appeared in the Paris 
Manuscripts♦ There might be many other human traits which have 
manifested or which will manifest themselves; what Marx is 
interested in is the significance of these traits. How does he 
define what is significant and what is not? According to him, the 
(self-) production of the conditions of human life is the most 
significant character of humans, which leads him to attribute to 
the development of the productive forces, and the relations of 
production, a prominent place. Certainly, Marx is equally aware of 
the importance of language or power but he attributes only a 
secondary role to them. This is because he takes pains to avoid 
what we may call "Don Quixotism", i.e. the attempt to bring about 
something for which the preconditions are missing. Such attempts 
sometimes look funny, sometimes dreadful, and Marx scorned many of 
his contemporaries for this reason (most notably the Utopian 
Socialists). Consider how Marx relates class-struggle (power) to 
the development of the productive forces. According to him, class 
struggle can only play the role of a midwife, a metaphor which 
Marx used several times. The analogy is obvious: as in biology, in 
social life, the objective preconditions must be given in order 
that a midwife can take up her job. This takes me to another set 
of arguments.
Up to now we have listed a number of statements on human nature 
which are explanatory in character. Additionally, Marx employs the 
concept in a normative sense. He not only holds that there exists 
something like a human nature, but, moreover, he qualifies this.
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The substantial part of his concept of human nature is contained
in his notion of labour as free, creative activity. In the Paris
Manuscripts he distinguishes men from animals by defining their
species character:
Free conscious activity is man's species 
character... The animal is immediately
identical with its life-activity... Man makes 
his life-activity itself the object of his 
will and consciousness... Conscious life- 
activity directly distinguishes man from ani­
mal life-activity...Admittedly animals also
produce. They build themselves nests, dwel­
lings... But man in the working up of the
objective world... duplicates himself not
only, as in consciousness, intellectually but 
also actively, in reality, and therefore he
contemplates himself in a world he has
created. (CW 3 : 275-7)
But human beings are not only creative, but also communal, even 
in cases where they are not directly cooperating, in actions like 
composing, writing, thinking. "The individual is the social being. 
His manifestations of life - even if they may not appear in the 
direct form of communal manifestations of life carried out in 
association with others - are therefore an expression and confir­
mation of social life." (CW 3 :299)
Marx saw clearly that the present conditions of production 
(capitalist relations) impinge upon the full realization of these 
human characteristics. The abolition of these conditions would 
thus give rise to the realization of all human powers.
This "expressivist" notion of labour (Ch. Taylor 1975) is 
present in all stages of Marx's theoretical development.82 Just
82 Marx's normative level has been discussed under the label of 
"humanism". For the normative dimension of the younger Marx 
there already exists a vast literature, cf. von Magnis 
(1975). That a normative dimension is also present in the
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as German Idealism saw the formation of spirit as self-conscious­
ness, Marx as a materialist "praxis-philosopher" sees the forma­
tion of human species as self-creation: externalisation, objecti­
fication and appropriation are the three aspects of this
8 3circle. In this context, we have the human labour on one side 
and the objectified, dead labour on the other. The latter is the 
crystallized result of man's interchange with nature. 'Dead 
labour', therefore, is many things: technology, buildings, but 
also culture, institutions; it is man's second nature.
My insistence on 'human nature' in Marx may be anomalous to many 
Marxists.34 As G.A. Cohen has correctly pointed out, ” [i]t is a
work of the late Marx could even be accepted by the "anti­
humanist" interpretation; but it cannot accept the claim 
that this humanist dimension is basic to Marx's criticism.
83 Habermas (1985:80). There are a number of scholars who
interpret Marx as transposing Hegel's model to his anthropo- 
centric approach, substituting "Spirit" with "mankind". Cf. 
Kolakowski (1978), Habermas (1980), Theunissen (1978), 
Benhabib (1987). They all point out that Marx also inherits 
the fundamental difficulties of that theoretical model. In 
my view, the heritage of subject philosophy must be regarded 
as part of the normative orientation of Marx, of his 
insistence that the subject will be able to reappropriate 
its own creations. Since there is no theoretical proof for 
this outline, we shall see later at which conclusions we 
arrive on the basis of a more sober argumentation (chapter 
5).
84 See, for example, Alfred Schmidt who claims that Marx,
regarding human nature, does not know any fixed facts, be 
they of an intellectual or a biological nature. (1971:42) 
Schmidt is an exceptional case of an ambivalent position in 
this respect. Belonging to the 'humanist' tradition in 
Marxism ("Frankfurt School"), he nonetheless denies a theory 
of human nature in Marx. He shares the Althusserian argument 
that Marx, above all in the sixth Thesis on Feuerbach, 
turned away from the concept of Gattungswesen, human essence 
etc. But Schmidt has difficulties explaining why Marx in
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marxist tradition to deny that there exists an historical inva­
riant human nature. The point is made against conservatives who 
fix- on some historically virulent behaviour pattern (usually an 
unpleasant one), assign it to human nature, and conclude that the 
pattern will appear in every society, or be eliminated only by 
extreme tyranny." (Cohen 1978:151) But this marxist tradition is 
mistaken, for "it is not necessary to claim, in response [to the 
conservatives'], that there are no quite permanent facts of human 
nature. All that need be denied is that the particular feature the 
conservative emphasizes is one of them." (ibidem)
To summarize: Marx held the view that there are enduring facts
of human nature. These enduring facts contain a biological- 
physical and social element. The biological element is that man is 
a mammal with a definite biological constitution. Part of this 
constitution is an excellent brain which enables him to 'step 
outside of nature' to a certain degree. This 'stepping out' 
consists in the ability to develop and use technologies in order 
to transform nature. Unlike other animals, human beings not only 
use their organs in order to relate to nature, but they also use 
instruments, artificial organs and natural processes to transform 
nature. In this sense, man can be described as a 'toolmaking 
an i m a l '.
Turning to the social element, the decisive features which need 
mentioning are the creative and communal elements. Men are 
creative in that they project and produce new and contingent (i.e. 
not pre-determined by nature) things. In so doing they also
• • •
Capital again endorses the notion of 'man'. See Schmidt 
(1973:21 fn31; 25 fn42). It seems that he confuses the
concept of human nature with a static view about human 
n e e d s , see Schmidt (1971:82 ff.).
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develop a theoretical relation to nature, as expressed, for
example, in science. They are communal in that they always
organize their life together with others. They cooperate and
develop a language. To both elements corresponds a specific 
consciousness. In the first case, it is a projective conscious­
ness: man anticipates in his brain the outcome of his activity. In 
the second case, the consciousness is a social consciousness: man 
shares the outcome of the several activities and reflects with 
others upon them.
These three features taken together make culture and history. 
There may be animals which display some of these features to a
certain degree, but they certainly do not possess all of them in 
the full sense. A further argument for human nature is as follows. 
Human nature also means that human beings' well-being depends on 
their engaging in activities of these three kinds. If they are 
prevented from doing so they (generally) do not feel well. In this 
case they are (generally) in a pathological state of existence. 
Human beings need the 'working out* of their abilities and 
potentialities, the reflection on the result of these activities, 
the communication with others and the imagination of other 
possible worlds.
2.5.4. Criticisms
In what follows, I present three criticisms of Marx's human nature 
theory which focus on different parts of that theory. Elster 
questions a factual claim whereas Fetscher and Cohen are sceptical 
about what they see as some of its normative implications.
a. E l s t e r ’s criticism
I start with a critique of Marx's concept of human nature which 
has been put forward by Jon Elster. He doubts Marx's criteria for
118
distinguishing men from animals. Both as regards tools and projec­
tive consciousness, Elster believes that some animals display the 
same features as men? it follows that Marx's account is not in 
accordance with recent biological research. I think that Elster's 
criticism rests on a misunderstanding. He does not evaluate the 
importance of the social dimension to human nature. By this Marx 
not only means that men interact with each other but also that 
they share knowledge and skills with other generations before and 
after them (virtually with the whole of mankind). It is only by
giving a distorted view of the social dimension (is this the
pitfall of methodological individualism?) that Elster can suggest 
a behaviour of certain animals which is essentially similar to 
that of men. That animals, too, are tool-using or even "labouring" 
does not invalidate Marx's claim. To repeat: human beings pass on 
their technology, knowledge, skills to future generations, and 
they also acquire them from former generations. In the course of 
the history of mankind we thus observe an accumulation of tools, 
skills and knowledge. The social dimension of M a r x ’s human nature 
theory is thus not confined to an empirically-given set of
individuals. Only if Elster could show that animals, too, learn 
from former generations and remember what has been known hundreds 
of years ago, can decipher relics of former epochs, would his
point present a strong objection to Marx's claim. As shall become 
clear later, the specific human action upon nature results in an 
acceleration of social evolution which at the same time makes a 
difference to the animal world.
b. Fetscher's criticism
Fetscher interprets Marx as employing two views of man. One is the 
definition in Capital, where Marx defines man with Franklin as a 
toolmaking a n i m a l . For Fetscher, this "truncated view of man" is 
"the source of most errors in traditional socialism..." (Fetscher 
1980:56) However, so the claim goes, in his early works Marx did
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not reduce man to a toolmaking animal, "rather he understood him
as a subject who realizes his own essence through the objecti-
vation of his activities." (Fetscher 1980:56) But, in so doing,
Fetscher claims that Marx idealizes man and burdens him with
exorbitant demands. Fetscher, similarly to Cohen, argues that
Marxists should take the emotional needs of men more seriously;
they should take account of their need for self-consciousness and
self-assurance. He further points out:
In this respect it is not sufficient that each 
world citizen or world comrade is recognized 
as such by all others; for such recognition, 
which can be imagined only in the abstract, 
would not yield emotional satisfaction. People 
need recognition by their immediate peers and 
neighbors. This confirming recognition (empha­
tically also called love) can neither be
ordered nor introduced through intellectual 
arguments. It blooms only on the basis of an 
upbringing that strengthens the ego and avoids 
repression. Many Marxists, however, hold on to 
the illusion that the establishment of socie­
tal property would automatically result in the
emergence of a new man. (Fetscher 1980:58)
A n d :
certain emotions such as jealousy, hate, dis­
trust may disappear when those orders disap­
pear, though this may take a long time. Other 
emotions, which result from man's biological 
nature, from his helplessness as a small 
child, from his being thrown into the world, 
will continue to belong to man's make-up.
(Fetscher 1980:57)
I think this criticism points to an important problem in Marx's
thought which has to do with his over-emphasis on capitalist 
relations as the main evil. 3ut is not true that Marx reduces man
to a "toolmaking animal", as I have shown above. Moreover, the 
emotional satisfaction which Fetscher stresses is contained in
Marx's theory of human nature: humans recognize themselves in
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their products.85 Finally, the fact that man is thrown into the 
world is recognised by Marx in the 18. Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte 
where he says that men make their history but "they do not make it 
under circumstances chosen by themselves. Instead, they make it 
under circumstances directly encountered, given, and transmitted 
from the past." (CW 1 1 ;103) . This holds true even for communist 
society: in communism, too, for example, each child will be in 
need of socialisation. The point is that communism will have 
reduced to a minimum the difficulties for a new generation.
But there is indeed a point which probably does not fit into 
Marx's theory of human nature. This is his normative claim that 
egoism is a product of bourgeois society. In the Paris Manuscripts 
he criticises the one-sided anthropology of Political Economists
who see only greed as the driving force in society (cf. CW 3 :271)
But it would be equally wrong to assume universal altruism - a 
mistake which Marx never made. Marx seemed to assume that a
division of labour will be possible under communism which
distributes and combines the different needs and interests of the 
individuals and groups of individuals to the overall and 
individual benefit. I return in chapter 5 to this topic.
c. Cohen's criticism
G.A. Cohen questions both the possibility and the desirability 
of Marx's "total individuals". Starting from a comparison between 
Hegel and Marx he charges Marx with having abandoned a most 
valuable element of Hegel: humans' need for self-definition, for
85 However, this may be a problematical, if not unrealistic, 
assumption. As Elster pointed out, people in communism would 
compete to deliver to society as much as they can since they 
would enjoy both this activity and the benefit they would 
have from the contributions of others. Elster calls this the 
model of a "scholarly community" and pleas for it to be 
abandoned.
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identity. From this basic flaw follows Marx's blindness with 
respect to national, racial or religious conflicts which
"generate, or at least sustain, ethnic and other bonds whose 
strength Marxists systematically undervalue, because they neglect 
the need for self identity underlying them." (Cohen 1983:235) This 
undervaluation of self-definition can also be located in Marx's 
ideal of work as the release of all powers inherent in man, thus 
escaping location within a social role. As Marx said in the German 
Ideology: "In a communist society.there are no painters but at
most people who engage in painting among other activities." (CW 5 :
394) Cohen comments: "A society in which everyone is free to
develop in any direction is not the same as a society in which
anyone is able to develop in every direction: that kind of society 
will never be, because there will never be people with that order 
of ability.” (Cohen 1983:237)8 6 . Cohen overlooks that Marx holds 
social functions to be indispensable to communist society, both in 
the early German Ideology and the later Critique of the Gotha 
Program (see CW 5 :47 and SW 3 :26). Thus, when Marx speaks of the 
"development of all human powers", the "absolute working out of 
his creative potentialities" (Grundrisse:488), he does not deny 
that individuals adapt to certain roles for a certain period in 
their life, and he does not say that each and every individual 
will be able to work out all of his creative potentialities, nor 
that he should. Marx's main concern was to explore the possibili­
ties for an abolition of the fragmenting effects of the division 
of labour? he consequently advocates the free development of 
individualities which is the condition for abolishing the "corre­
lation" between social functions and technical roles on the one
86 Or, in Selucky's words: "One can hardly invent computers in 
the morning, perform neurosurgery in the afternoon, repair a 
jet in the evening and conduct a symphonic orchestra after 
dinner without becoming respectively computer engineer, 
neurosurgeon, jet-mechanic and conductor." (1979:10-1) But 
everyone can, according to Andy Warhol, become famous for 15 
minutes in his life.
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hand and class positions on the other. As Fetscher noted, Marx in 
his mature works "no longer pretends that the division of labour 
will altogether disappear. Certainly there will be different 
social functions and people to fill them...1' (Fetscher 1973:461). 
And on the other hand, so Fetscher continues, "the very nature of 
modern industrial production and the rapid change of its 
technology will demand many more many-sided individuals.” (id.) 
Marx thought that the development of modern industry and the
development of human needs and capacities would go together. This 
connection is established in the German Ideology: "(P)rivate
property can be abolished only on condition of an all-round
development of individuals, precisely because the existing form of 
intercourse and their existing productive forces are all-embracing 
and only individuals that are developing in an all-round fashion 
can appropriate them i.e. can turn them into free manifestations 
of their lives" (CW 5 :439; see also CW 5 :86f f .). In Capital 1 ,
Marx similarly points out that "modern industry through its catas­
trophes imposes the necessity of recognizing, as a fundamental law 
of production, variation of work, consequently fitness of the 
labourer for varied work, consequently the greatest possible 
development of his varied aptitudes." (Capital 1 :458). Marx 
employs a functional explanation in the sense that human abilities 
have to adapt to productive necessities. This argument, however, 
presupposes a gap between the development of productive forces and 
individual abilities. Thus, Marx tacitly assumes that mankind's 
collective objectifications (such as technology) evolve at a 
different speed or rhythm from individual capacities; since both 
are tied together by functional requirements (a technology which 
cannot be mastered will disappear or lead to catastrophes), they 
co-evolve. This leads Marx to the enigmatic statement that mankind 
sets itself only tasks which it is able to fulfil (1859 P r e f a c e ).
CHAPTER 3: TECHNOLOGY
123
It is not the articles made, 
but how they are made, and by 
what instruments, that enable 
us to distinguish different 
economic epochs.
Karl Marx
So far I have discussed the concept of nature and human nature in 
Marx and some implications for the ecological problematic. Now I 
turn to the topic of technology. Apart from the importance this 
subject has for my discussion of Marx, it additionally provides 
the opportunity to investigate a subject which has been largely 
neglected by political and social theory as well as by philosophy.
For the sake of conceptual clarity, the following remarks are in
order. The English notion "technology" is equivalent to the German
"Technik" which derives from Greek "techné" and means intentional,
goal-directed change of things. The International Encyclopedia of
the Social Sciences gives a useful definition:
[In] its broad meaning it connotes the 
practical arts. These arts range from hunting, 
fishing, gathering, agriculture, animal hus­
bandry, and mining through manufacturing, 
construction, transportation, provision of 
food, power, heat, light, etc., to means of 
communication, medicine and military technolo­
gy. Technologies are bodies of skills, know­
ledge, and procedures for making, using-, and 
doing useful things." (Merrill 1968:576)
In order to identify these "useful things" more precisely, Merrill 
adds that the concept of technology "centers on processes that are 
primarily biological and physical rather than on psychological or
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social processes." (ibidem:577) Note that with this narrow defini­
tion of technology not just any means-ends relationship counts as 
technology; rather, it stresses means-ends relationships which 
take place on a "material" level. It is easy to see how the narrow 
definition of technology corresponds to Marx's concept of technol-
87ogy which also stresses the material aspect.
In 3.1. I shall discuss Marx's approach to Modern Industry.38 
Here, I am especially interested in his definition of machinery 
and his evolutionary view of technology. Several contemporary 
attempts at conceiving technology in an evolutionary way will be 
discussed in 3.2. Closely connected to this problem is the problem 
of distinguishing between science and technology. I then discuss 
two theoretical possibilities which are contained in Marx's 
general position. The first is technological determinism which I 
address in 3.3.; the second is technological alienation which I 
address in 3.5. Closely connected to the question of technological 
determinism and to an evolutionary view of technology is the 
question whether technology can be conceived as having an "inner 
logic" or "autonomy". I shall address this problem in 3.2. and
3.4., discussing some contemporary approaches. 3.6. will discuss 
the concept of division of labour in Marx.
87 For two usages of a wide notion of technology, see Weber 
(1967:32f.) and Heidegger, who stresses that techné is not 
only the name "for the activities and skills of the 
craftsman, but also for the arts and for the fine arts." 
(Heidegger 1978:294).
88 The German Große Industrie has been translated as "Modern 
Industry" as well as "Large Scale Industry". I shall use the 
former since the text which was at my disposal adopted this 
translation. The decisive differences between the epoch of 
Große Industrie and other epochs (such as manufacture) are 
what are important.
125
It has been claimed by several authors that Marx employs a 
theoretical model which conceives the results of human action as 
becoming independent from their producers (a process called 
objectification) but eventually reappropriated. In cases where 
this reappropriation is not possible but where the objectifica­
tions are retroacting upon the producers in a detrimental way, we
89have a state of alienation. If such a "lack of control" can be 
discerned in the working of technology, if modern technology 
operates behind the backs of the individuals, then we would have 
an exact parallel on the technological level to what Marx analyzed 
regarding economics.90 Moreover, as can be shown, Marx himself 
sometimes suggested such a parallel but did not subsequently 
develop it. That he could not adhere to such a position will be 
made clear as well: if there was something in the human condition 
(technology) which escaped successful social control, his project 
of liberating society from "alien powers" would have failed.
3.1. MARX AS A STUDENT OF TECHNOLOGY
As Rosenberg (1982a) emphasized, Marx was a careful student of 
technology. He argues that
89 See Plemenatz (1975) and Elster (1985) for a distinction 
between spiritual and social alienation.
90 Schelsky spoke of a "neue Selbstentfremdung des Menschen, 
die mit der wissenschaftlichen Zivilisation in die Welt 
getreten ist. Die Gefahr, daß der Schöpfer sich in sein 
Werk, der Konstrukteur in seine Konstruktion verliert, ist 
jetzt die metaphysische Versuchung des Menschen. Der Mensch 
schaudert davor zurück, sich restlos in die selbstprodu­
zierte Objektivität, in ein konstruiertes Sein, zu trans­
ferieren, und arbeitet doch unaufhörlich am Fortgang dieses 
Prozesses der wissenschaftlich-technischen Selbstobjektivie­
rung." (Schelsky 1965, cited in Habermas 1973:172)
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"quite independently of whether Marx was right 
or wrong in his characterization of the future 
course of technological change and its social 
and economic ramifications, his formulation of 
the problem still deserves to be a starting 
point for any serious investigation of 
technology and its ramifications." (Rosenberg 
1982a:34)
According to Rosenberg, Marx "devoted much time and effort to 
explicating the distinctive characteristics of technologies, and 
to attempting to unravel and examine -the inner logic of individual 
technologies." (Rosenberg 1982a:34) Furthermore, "he insisted that 
technologies constitute an interesting subject, not only to tech­
nologists but to students of society and social pathology as well, 
and he was very explicit in the introduction of technological 
variables into his arguments." (1982a:34)
But why was Marx so obsessed by the feature of technology to the 
extent that he focused on it in all his major theoretical works? I 
think that any answer has to consider at least two elements. 
First, Marx sees technology as part of the human condition, as the 
means by which man exercises and regulates his Stoffwechsel with 
nature. Second, Marx was aware of the importance of the productive 
forces for the development of a mode of production, for the evolu­
tion of relations of production, and, specifically, he was 
interested in the role of machines and machinery for the emergence 
of capitalism; likewise, he was interested in the technological 
basis of communist society. In what follows, I shall turn to each 
of the two topics.
3.1.1. Technology as part of the human condition
91 The history of technology is indeed a very young dicipline. 
See Hughes (1979) for an overview of emerging themes in this 
discipline.
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As early as in the Paris Manuscripts he states that modern
industry reveals man's active relationship with nature.
We see how the history of industry and the 
established objective existence of industry 
are the open book of m a n ’s essential powers, 
the perceptibly existing human psychology. (CW 
3:302)
Of course, there has been an original state in which "the free
gifts of nature [were] abundant" (Grundrisse:612) and hence there
was no need to develop technologies'. This state is, according to
Marx, a pre-historical one. As soon as human beings develop
technologies they begin to have a history. Thus we are able to
reconstruct main characteristics of earlier societies by examining
the different ways in which production took place. As Marx states:
Relics of bygone instruments of labour possess 
the same importance for the investigation of 
extinct economical forms of society as do 
fossil bones for the determination of extinct 
species of animals. It is not the articles 
made, but how they are made, and by what 
instruments, that enables us to distinguish 
different economical epochs. Instruments of
labour not only supply a standard of the 
degree of development to which human labour 
has attained, but they are also indicators of 
the social conditions under which that labour 
is carried on. (Capital 1 :175-6)
In the Poverty of Philosophy, Marx is already familiar with the
works of Babbage and Ure who analyzed technology and, particu­
larly, machinery:
The machine is a uniting of the instruments of 
labour, and by no means a combination of 
different operations for the worker himself...
Simple tools; accumulation of tools; composite 
tools; setting in motion of a composite tool 
by a single hand engine, by man; setting in 
motion of these instruments by natural forces; 
machines; system of machines having one motor; 
system of mach.nes having an automatic motor - 
this is the progress of machinery. (CW 6 :186- 
7 )
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The interesting question now is whether these evolutionary stages 
of technology are to be explained from within their own develop­
ment or if they are determined by outside factors. Rosenberg 
suggested that Marx assumed an "inner logic” of technology (Rosen­
berg 1982a:34) whilst simultaneously rejecting any technological 
determinism in Marx. This section will focus on the problem.
In Capital, Marx explicates the concept of Stoffwechel in the
following way:
Technology discloses man's mode of dealing 
with nature, the process of production by 
which he sustains his life, and thereby also 
lays bare the mode of formation of his social
relations, and of the mental conceptions that
flow from them. (Capital 1 :352)
But just as man requires lungs to breathe 
with, so he requires something that is work of 
man's hand, in order to consume physical 
forces productively. (Capital 1 :365)
If we recall Fig. 2, it follows that in Marx's conception ail 
three factors involved in this Stoffwechsel process are changing: 
human beings, technology and nature. Furthermore, Marx aims at an 
identification of a 'driving force', a mechanism which sets the 
change in motion.
My claim is that Marx approaches this problem in two different 
ways. One way is to examine history and to draw conclusions. This 
is essentially an explanatory task. The other way is to evaluate 
the development of the three factors; this is essentially a norma­
tive enterprise. In order to distinguish these two aspects, I use
the terms "historical" and "critical".
Taking the historical approach to the problem we can conclude that 
Marx conceived in principle all three factors as 'driving force':
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(a) nature: geographical determinism
(b) technology: autonomous development, inner logic, evolution
(c)‘ human beings: their needs, developing technologies, transform-
93ing nature.
9 4Thus the circle can be started from all three points.
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Turning to the critical dimension, Marx's theoretical humanism 
immediately springs to the mind. Because the good society for Marx 
is a society in which no alien powers exercise any 'enslaving 
effects' on the individuals, but, quite the contrary, in which 
individuals are fully developed and autonomous, an autonomy of (a)
92 We find an instance of geographical determinism in a passage
(crossed out by Marx) from the German Ideology: "These con­
ditions [geological, oro-hydrographical, climatic; R . G . ] de­
termine not only the original, spontaneous organisation of 
men, especially racial differences, but also the entire 
further development, or lack of development, of men up to 
the present time." (CW 5 :31) See also Manuscripts 1861-3 
where he states that geographical and climatic factors 
determine the differences in the natural tools ("in den
natürlich Vorgefundenen Arbeitsinstrumenten") which in turn 
divide the branches of existence of different tribes (Cf. 
MEGA II.3.1.:266-7).
93 Boserup (1981) makes an argument that population and
technology stimulate each other through history. Since the 
ratio man-land is a decreasing one, human beings develop 
more productive technologies in order to maintain (or 
improve) their situation. Note that Marx also sees the 
possibility that population growth can be a productive 
force, see Grundrisse: 400; 528-9; 749.
94 The determining role of nature may be limited to an original
state where production and society start "from scratch",
(see last footnote). For industrially-developed societies we 
could thus neglect the point. Ironically, however, it ccmes 
in again through the back door, when "careless" use of 
technology and natural resources has led to a debasement of 
the natural environment, which in turn affects human well­
being and requires measures (often new technologies) to 
improve the situation.
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or (b) could cause difficulties for his theory. In his view, a
society cannot be called free as long as enslaving effects are
exercised, no matter if they come from nature or technology. If
technologies are detrimental for the human well-being, they must
not enjoy autonomy in his theoretical framework. With respect to
nature Marx in the German Ideology clearly states that a society
which lives in an untransformed nature can only be called
"borniert": "Hier wie überall tritt die Identität von Natur und
Mensch auch so hervor, dafl das bornierte Verhalten der Menschen
zur Natur ihr borniertes Verhalten zueinander, und ihr borniertes
Verhalten zueinander ihr borniertes Verhalten zur Natur bedingt,
eben weil die Natur noch kaum geschichtlich modifiziert ist..."
(MEW 3 :31; cf. CW 5 : 44 )95 . With respect to technology Marx makes
clear that labour must reappropriate the objectified productive
forces "not only to achieve self-activity, but ... to safeguard
their very existence":
"[Th]e productive forces appear as a world 
for themselves, quite independent of and 
divorced from the individuals, alongside the
individuals; the reason for this is that the 
individuals, whose forces they are, exist 
split up and in opposition to one another, 
whilst, on the other hand, these forces are
only real forces in the intercourse and
association of these individuals. Thus, [...] 
we have a totality of productive forces, which 
have, as it were, taken on a material form and 
are for the individuals themselves no longer 
the forces of the individuals but of private 
property, and hence of the individuals only 
in so far as they are owners of private 
property. Never, in any earlier period, have 
the productive forces taken on a form so 
indifferent to the intercourse of individuals 
as individuals, because their intercourse 
Itself was still a restricted one." (CW 5:86- 
7)
95 I quote from the German original here since the English 
translation loses some of the meaning.
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The only instance which legitimately enjoys autonomy is the fully 
developed individual. True, Marx always acknowledges the eternal 
condition of mankind to produce and reproduce itself within natu­
ral 1 imits ("realm of necessity"). Exactly because such limits do 
exist, so he concludes, the realm of necessity will never vanish 
completely (cf. Capital 3 :820) . But he thinks that alienation also 
in the field of necessity (i.e. transformation of nature) can be 
superseded. This foreshadows my discussion in chapter 5 where I 
give an interpretation of the famous, passage from Capital 3 which 
diverges from the standard interpretation. Here I want to stress 
that the German Ideology can be read in exactly the same way. Marx 
conceives of the reappropriation of the productive forces as syno­
nymous with the development of individual capacities. Since the 
productive forces have developed to a totality,
"this appropriation must have a universal 
character corresponding to the productive 
forces and the intercourse. The appropriation 
of these forces is itself nothing more than 
the development of the individual capacities
corresponding to the material instruments of
production." (CW 5 :87)
The discussion in this chapter, and in the following section
3.1.2., concentrates on Marx's discussion of technological evolu­
tion which seems a challenging enterprise, for it seems that a
tension in his theory arises exactly here: a tension between his
historical and critical analysis. As I shall show, this tension 
takes the form of an opposition between a technological evolution
q cand his humanist claims. In the present chapter, I limit the
96 As Rottleuthner, in another context, put it: "The concepts
of organism and development are linked by their ambivalent
and therefore broad political applicability. Development can
easily be linked with dynamism and progress, with directions 
and goals of development, which recall the ideals of perfec- 
tability of the 18th century. But 'development' was also
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analysis to the question if technology evolves; in the next 
chapter, I embark on the question if technology is autonomous.
3.1.2. Evolution and Technological evolution
The major source in studying this subject is the recently pub­
lished manuscript Zur Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie 1861-63 
(Manuscripts 1861-3 for short)97 where Marx presents, over 
hundreds of pages, major contributions on technology. Already a 
superficial glance into the table of contents shows the importance 
which Marx attributed to this subject. In Abteilung II, volume
3.1., we find under the heading "Der relative Mehrwert" over a 
hundred pages dedicated to cooperation, division of labour and 
machinery. In volume 3.6., Marx returns to the same questions
again. Just to show how close Marx did study matters of techno­
logy, I shall draw to a great extent on passages from this work
(apart from more common sources) which has only recently been
published (in German).
linked ... with the aspect of objectivity, a context which 
was remote from the deliberate, goal-directd action cf men. 
The forces or regularities of development act inevitably. 
History cannot be made." (Rottleuthner 1988:110-1)
97 In fact, parts of these manuscripts had been published from 
1905-1910 under the title Theorien iiber den M e h r w e r t , edited 
by Karl Kautsky, and from 1954-1961 by the Institute for 
Marxism-Leninism at the Central Committee of the CPSU. These 
editions consisted mainly of notebooks V-XV and XX-XXIII; 
the new edition of the Marx-Snqels-Gesamtausgabe contains 
all the notebooks.
133
Marx conceives the development of the productive forces, and of 
relations of production, in an evolutionary perspective. He re­
fuses a viewpoint which would treat the individual inventor as the 
focus of attention. Indeed, in the beginning of the chapter on 
"Machinery and Modern Industry" in the first volume of Capital, 
Marx writes:
A critical history of technology would show 
how little any of the inventions of the 18th 
century are the work of a single individual.
Hitherto there is no such .book. Darwin has 
interested us in the history of Nature's tech­
nology, i.e. in the formations of the organs 
of the plants and animals, which organs serve 
as instruments of production for sustaining 
life. Does not the history of the productive 
organs of man, of organs that are the material 
basis of all social organization, deserve 
equal attention? (Capital 1 :352 fn)
A hundred years later this question has still not received the 
attention it deserves. As Rosenberg rightly observes, this passage 
from Capital "amazingly fresh over a century later, reads like a 
prolegomenon to a history of technology that still remains to be 
written." (Rosenberg 1982a:40)
The reference to Darwin comes out even more clearly in the
Manuscripts (1861-3). Marx explicitly refers to On the Origin of
Species where Darwin distinguishes between the lower and higher
forms of organization of living beings. The criteria for drawing
this distinction is the differentiation of organs. Since Marx
gives a summary of the passage in German, let me reproduce the
English original here. Darwin writes:
"I presume that lowness in this case means 
that the several parts of the organization 
have been but little specialised for 
particular functions; and as long as the same 
part has to perform diversified work, we can 
perhaps see why it should remain variable, 
that is, why natural selection should have 
preserved or rejected each little deviation of
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form less carefully than when the part has to 
serve for one special purpose alone. In the 
same way that a knife which has to cut all 
sorts of things may be of almost any shape; 
whilst a tool for some particular object had 
better be of some particular shape. Natural 
selection, it should never be forgotten, can 
act on each part of each being, solely through 
and for the advantage of each being." (Darwin 
1859/1971:141)
Marx is inspired directly by Darwin and uses an analogy between
biology and technology. ?9 He transposes this distinction to
technology in the broad sense (including division of labour,
tools, machinery etc.)
"Die durch Theilung der Arbeit in der auf sie 
begründeten Manufactur gegebne Differenzie­
rung, Specialisirung und Vereinfachung der 
Arbeitsinstrumente - ihre exclusive adaptation 
to very simple operations - ist eine der 
technologischen, materiellen Voraussetzungen 
für die Entwicklung der Maschinerie als eines 
die Productionsweise und Productionsverhält- 
nisse revolutionirenden Elements." (MEGA 
II.3.6.:1914; emphasis added)
Marx was convinced that the historical development of technology 
which is man's organic nature (see 3.1.1.) cannot be explained by
98 It should be mentioned that Darwin rejected the common
equation of evolution with progress (Gould 1973:36).
99 It is most interesting that Darwin intuitively conceived of
the development of tools and of organs in the same evolutio­
nary way. The Marx/Darwin relation has been a controversial 
topic. This seems to be due to Marx's ambivalent attitude 
towards Darwin, see Groh (1967), Avineri (1968), Gerratana 
(1973), 3all (1979). Marx fiercely rejects the formula 
"struggle for life" which is a basic theme of Malthus. In a 
letter to Kugelmann, Marx stresses that this formula is a 
mere Phrase which is as void (and false) as Malthus's law of 
(over-)population. See Marx to Kugelmann, 27.6.1870. In a 
letter to Lassalle, he praises Darwin for having destroyed 
teleology in the natural sciences (see letter of 16.1.1861).
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individual behaviour (inventions). Rather, it needs to be
explained by an approach which conceives the development of
technology from an observer's standpoint, i.e. as evolution.100 As
Weick put it:
What occurs is simply that an observer watches 
events happen, imposes on these happenings 
some preconception about order, and this pre­
conception then allows the observer to watch 
the changing instances, compare them, and see 
whether there is a progression toward orderli­
ness in those portions being observed. If
there is, evolution has occurred." (Weick 
1979:119)
In the above passage Marx alludes to the mechanism of "adaptation" 
which makes us ask: does it make sense to suggest similarities
between the adaptation of a biological species to an environment 
and a technology which adapts to "very simple operations"? Are we 
not led astray by Marx's application of Darwin's criteria to
technology? Darwin suggests that evolution is a process of natural 
selection which operates by means of variation. The "goal" of 
evolution, however, is not variation (nor is it selection or 
inheritance). These are only the means to secure the survival of 
the species and to reach an increase in reproductive capacity of
T 01the species.‘ This is not to say that the suggested similarities 
are devoid of heuristic value. Weick pointed out that "a
surprisingly rich introduction to theories of evolution can be
obtained with a simple deck of playing cards. If the deck is
100 "A critical history of technology would show how little any 
of the inventions of the 18th century are the work of a 
single individual." (Capital 1 :352 f n ) .
101 According to Gould, we may distinguish between two main
strategies for enhancing reproductive capacity: r- and K-
strategies. The former are directly maximising reproduction, 
the latter are adapting ("fine-tuning") to the environment. 
See Gould (1973:94).
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shuffled repeatedly, it is clear that there is continual change as 
the cards become rearranged, but does the deck evolve? It all 
depends. Some people are willing to accept any rearrangement of 
parts as evolution, whereas others would say that some order must 
occur out of chaos before it can be said that evolution is 
occurring." (Weick 1979:119) Technology and the deck of cards are 
similar in that they do nothing by themselves: technology needs to 
be designed and produced, a deck of cards needs to be shuffled.1'2
There are two main objections to an evolutionary approach within 
social theory. The first contends that the natural and the social 
world are different in that the social world is characterized by 
intentional human action. The second rejects the use of biological 
models in the social sciences in a more principled way. I comment 
on both objections in turn.
(1) It is true that evolution in the biological, and evolution 
in the socio-cultural (including technological) sphere are 
distinct. The most important difference is that the latter does 
not depend on the selection of mutations, since the possibility of 
new combinations is given in each generation (cf. Luhmann 
1984a:589). This leads to an enormous acceleration of evolution.
102 See Luhmann who on the one hand declares that a series of 
structural changes may be described and interpreted as evo­
lution (from an observer's standpoint; cf. Luhmann 1983: 
194), but on the other hand says that socio-cultural evolu­
tion can only exist on the level of society and its subsys­
tems (Luhmann 1983:196). Since society is defined by 
meaningful communications (and only by th e n ) , technology 
seems to fall outside the scope of evolutionary theory. This 
is confirmed by his assertion that society consists of 
events which vanish in the moment of their emergence (cf. 
ibidem,197). In the model which I propose, technology is 
defined as an enduring trait of society which does not 
vanish in the moment of its emergence.
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As Enzo Tiezzi wrote in his instructive Tempi storici, tempi
biologici ;
"II tempo biologico è quella cosa con cui si 
misura l'evoluzione biological e la sua unità 
di misura per studiare il passato è dell'or­
dine di grandezza di millioni di anni: miì-
liardi di anni ci separano dall'origine della 
Terra; centinaia di millioni di anni dalla 
comparsa di alghe, batteri, trilobiti, artro­
podi, pesci; 3 millioni di anni della comparsa 
dell'uomo. Ma il tempo biologico è anche
quella cosa con cui si deve, misurare il futuro
e la rottura degli equilibri biologici sta
inducendo variazioni a livello planetario in 
tempi talmente brevi da accelerare l'orologio 
geologico. Trasformazioni che prima avvenivano 
in millioni di anni possono ora avvenire 
in poche decine di anni e le conseguenti va­
riazioni per gli equilibri umani e sociali 
corrisponderanno a un'accelerazione di mil­
lioni di anni di storia." (Tiezzi 1984:62)
Biological and socio-cultural evolution are thus taking place at 
different speeds and different rhythms which may lead to ecologi­
cal problems. It may occur that the fast evolution of society does 
not permit for an adaptation of some biological species (either of 
the K- or r- type). To the extent that social evolution depends on 
these species, it itself in turn will be endangered.
Unlike Elster, and othhers, I do not see the decisive difference 
between biological and social evolution as resting on the latter 
being characterised by intentional human action. The decisive 
difference is that the social realm evolves at a much faster rate 
than the biological realm. Also, Ball (1979) juxtaposes natural 
and social evolution: "The opening chapter of his Origin notwith­
standing, Darwin fails to see that conscious human selection is, 
when weighted on the scales of human history, vastly more signifi­
cant a factor in evolution than is natural selection through 
chance and accident. Because of human attempts to transform
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nature, 'natural history' is fast becoming 'human history.' Human 
purpose and praxis are replacing chance and accident as the motive 
force of evolution." (Ball 1979:473) But Ball is doubly mistaken. 
First he neglects the fact that for Marx capitalist societies 
cannot be called human societies since they still belong to what 
he called "natural history" (see 1859 Preface).“03 Second, 
following directly from the first point, he does not interpret the 
decisive difference between natural and social evolution as in the 
first place a difference in relative speeds of evolution, but as a 
difference between intentional action which, according to him, 
replaces chance and accident. To repeat: at least for Marx such a 
state of affairs could be established only in communism (the truly 
human society), and not in pre-communist societies.
3all concludes that the "Marx-Darwin-myth" was completely 
unfounded. However, there is something which does not fit into 
Ball's account and which makes understandable a claim like 
Feuer's, viz. that Marxism rests on Darwinian evolution (cited in 
Ball 1979:479-80): Marx, while clearly seeing the differences 
between natural and social evolution and amusing himself about 
Darwin's identification of nature with the free-market categories 
of capitalism, nevertheless tries to develop his own theory of 
social evolution. In this respect E n g e l s ’ speech at Marx's 
graveside (where he called him the Darwin of the social world) was 
not without justification. As Luhmann rightly pointed out:
"Darwin's theory of evolution represents a ra­
dical break with all earlier traditions of
103 Karl Korsch (1938) rightly emphasised that the crucial point 
for Marx was the overcoming of the naturwüchsige traits of 
society. This word cannot be translated adequately into 
English with only one word. Marx uses it in a pejorative 
sense here; it means that people are confronting society as 
something they do not understand or they can do nothing 
about. I shall translate it with the English word "natural".
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thinking about development and perfection, of 
history and order. It is no longer an intelli­
gent cause, no longer God's design, but simply 
a difference that makes the difference. All 
'grand theory' of the 19th century uses this 
scheme of thought. So did Kegel, and, of 
course, Marx." (Luhmann 1984c:61)
There are various thinkers who have tried to adapt an evolutionary 
model to the social sciences, among them Donald Campbell. He tried 
to summarise the main mechanisms of evolution in the following 
w a y :
For an evolutionary process to take place 
there need to be variations (as by mutation, 
trial, etc.), stable aspects of the environ­
ment differentially selecting among such va­
riations and a retention-propagation system 
rigidly holding on to the selected variations.
The variation and the retention aspects are 
inherently at odds. Every new mutation repre­
sents a failure of reproduction of a prior 
selected form. Too high a mutation rate jeo­
pardizes the preservation of already achieved 
adaptations. There arise in evolutionary 
systems, therefore, mechanisms for curbing the 
variation rate. The more elaborate the 
achieved adaptation, the more likely are 
mutations to be deleterious, and therefore the 
stronger the inhibitions on mutation. For this 
reason we may expect to find great strength in 
the preservation and propagation systems, 
which will lead to a perpetuation of once- 
adaptive traits long after environmental 
shifts have removed their adaptedness."
(Campbell 1965, cited in Weick 1979:122)
Several authors have transposed this model to socio-cultural evo­
lution. For Luhmann, social-cultural evolution is evolution in the 
strict sense, too. As he pointed out,
"Trotz all dieser Unterschiede von organischer 
und soziokultureller Evolution ... handelt es 
sich auch bei der soziokulturellen Evolution 
um Evolution im strikten Sinne, nämlich um 
einen ohne Plan bewirkten Aufbau von
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hochunwahrscheinlicher Komplexität." (Luhmann 
1 9 8 4 a :590)
Note that Luhmann defines evolution (both in the biological and 
the socio-cultural sense) as leading to an increase in complexity 
(see also Ballmer and von Weizsäcker, 1974). This complexity is 
the result of selections of individual ("improbable") variations 
(mutations) and thus an improbable event. Evolutionary theory, 
then, would have the task of explaining how it came about that
(both in the natural and social world) highly improbable constel­
lations were selected and stabilised.104 Habermas also tried out 
possible uses which can be made of evolutionary models in the 
social sciences. Although it is very tentative, his article is
worth mentioning here. He asks what sense it makes to transfer
such categories as "variation" and "increase in complexity" to 
society. As to the latter he rightly comments that "increase in 
complexity" is no sufficient criterion for establishing an 
evolutionary hierarchy if we do not know the inner logic of the 
organisms (Habermas 1976:190). Habermas sees the increasing
"learning potential" of societies more as the driving force of 
development. However, as Gould has convincingly pointed out, we 
can derive these criteria by looking at how organisms succeed in
104 See also Gould's stress on the important role played by 
increasing complexity: "Either plants or animals. Our basic 
conception of life's diversity is based upon this division. 
Yet it represents little more than a prejudice spawned by 
our status as large, terrestrial animals." (Gould 1973:113) 
Gould then adopts the five-kingdom typology of Whittaker 
"because it tells a sensible story about organic diversity. 
It arranges life in three levels of increasing complexity... 
[E]volutionary transition from any level to the next occurs 
more than once? the advantages of increased complexity are 
so great that many independent lines converge upon the few 
possible solutions. The members of each kingdom are united 
by common structure, not by common descent." (Gould 
1973:117)
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handling the balance between size and shape (see Gould 1973). 3y 
analogy, if we dissect society in social subsystems, we can formu­
late the criterion that each subsystem must be able to secure its 
own maintenance, given its level of complexity and its operating 
codes. The "goal", so to speak, of its operations thus lies, simi­
larly to natural processes, in securing the continuation of its 
own operations.105
(2) One might wish to reject the use of biological analogies 
in a more rigorous way. Indeed, it is common in the social scien­
ces to be highly sceptical of models or theories which are impor­
ted from biology.106 Biological analogies and metaphors are to be 
found also in Marx.107 I shall thus make a general remark about 
analogies as such and about biological analogies in Marx and my 
own study.
105 At the time Habermas wrote his article, Luhmann hadn't yet
taken his "autopoietic turn". But Habermas already objected
to "hopeless circles of self-referential definitions" in
Luhmann's and Dunn's efforts in establishing criteria analo­
gous to the survival-criter ion in biology.
106 Needless to say, I share this scepticism regarding sociobio­
logy and social darwinism. For a critique, see Gould (1973) 
and Hofstadter (1944).
107 See the afterword to the second edition of Das Kapital,
where Marx cites with approval a Russian reviewer of his
book, who pointed out that it was Marx's method to examine
the evolution of social and economic forms, "in a word, 
economic life offers us a phenomenon analogous to the 
history of evolution in other branches of biology. The old 
economists misunderstood the nature of economic laws when 
they likened them to the laws of physics and chemistry. A 
more thorough analysis... shows that social organisms 
differ among themselves as fundamentally as plants or 
animals." (Capital 1 :28) Marx comments that this generous 
review portrays nothing other than his dialectical method.
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Gregory Bateson remarked once that it is a feature of the 
human brain to think with the help of what he called "abductions". 
This is to say that our perception is guided by specific experien­
ces and concepts. If we encounter something new, we try to explain 
it with common or known ("old") categories, models or theories.
Diese laterale Ausdehnung abstrakter Beschrei­
bungskomponenten wird Abduktion genannt ...
Jede Abduktion läßt sich als eine doppelte 
oder vielfache Beschreibung irgendeines O b ­
jekts, irgendeines Ereignisses oder irgend­
einer Sequenz auffassen... In beiden Fällen 
wird angenommen, daß gewisse formale Characte- 
ristika eines Bestandteils in dem anderen in 
dem anderen spiegelbildlich wiederkehren 
werden. (Bateson 1982:179)
As to the second point, it has been noted by several authors that 
Marx deliberately tried to develop his theory with analogy to the 
natural sciences. Alfred Schmidt already pointed out that in Marx 
we find "strange biological metaphors” in describing man's 
relationship to nature. (Schmidt 1971:78) Schmidt cites Moleschott 
and Liebig who both employed the term Stoffwechsel which Marx 
acquired from them. Moleschott wrote that the soul of the world 
consists in a circulation of matter (cf. Schmidt 1971:86). The 
German philosopher Schelling also used this notion to develop 
parts of his natural philosophy. Indeed, the title of one of his 
writings is called "Von der Weltseele, eine Hypothese der höheren 
Physik zur Erklärung des allgemeinen Organismus" (Schelling
i n p1798) J . The curious thing with Moleschott and Liebig is that 
they coin the term Stoffwechsel with analogy to social concepts: 
Moleschott makes reference to commerce, Liebig to politics. We 
have thus to take into account that at least some categories in
108 It is worth noting that Schelling's philosophy has also been 
interpreted as a forerunner of the new paradigms of self­
organisation, self-reproduction and autopoiesis - see He u ­
ser-Keßler (1986:52).
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the natural sciences were coined by explicit or implicit reference 
to social phenomena. This reciprocal process has also been noted 
by Schmidt:
Wie seit der Antike die Veränderung gesell­
schaftlicher Gebilde bis hin zu Machiavelli 
und Pareto als naturgesetzlicher Kreislauf 
verstanden worden ist, so findet sich auch
schon ebenso früh der Versuch, die Veränderung 
und wechselseitige Umsetzung der Naturdinge
vermittels gesellschaftlicher Kategorien zu
deuten." (Schmidt 1971:91)
As we just have seen, Darwin also can be added to this list; he 
also tried to make plausible the use of a concept (differentia­
tion) by means of an analogy, in this case to the technical world 
(see his knife-example). Furthermore, Darwin also transposed a
mechanism from the social world to the natural world, namely
Malthus' "struggle for existence" (see Rottleuthner, 1987:109)
109a procedure which amused Marx. Lepenies (1976) has shown that 
the concept of division of labour went back and forth between 
sociology and biology: "Spencer spoke of reciprocity (Wechselwir­
k u n g ) as he showed that biology borrowed the concept of division 
of labour from sociology in order to return it in an enriched 
form. Reciprocity signifies the transfer of a concept from one
scientific discipline to another and then back into the original 
discipline." (Lepenies 1976:172, cited in Rottleuthner 1987:101)
109 See the letter to Engels of 18.6. 1862: "It is remarkable
how Darwin recognises among beasts and plants his English 
society with its division of labour, competition, opening up 
of new markets, inventions and the Malthusian 'struggle for 
existence'. His [nature] is Hobbes' bellum omnium contra 
omnes and one is reminded of Hegel's Phenomenology, where 
civil society is described as a 'spritual animal kingdom', 
while in Darwin the animal kingdom figures as civil 
society."
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To come to my own use of such analogies: as will become clear in 
the following discussion, evolutionary concepts in social theory 
indeed borrow much from biology (see Weick 1979). There are 
several authors who believe that central notions of evolutionary 
theory can be put to use in the explanation of social phenomena 
and social change. In chapter 4, I shall test the potential of 
such an approach in comparison to the standard marxist approach 
(as expressed in the 1859 Preface).
3.1.3. Marx's machine definition
Now look at Marx's definition of what a machine is. He rejects
several definitions among them the following:
"Die Erklärung, daß machine a complicated tool 
und a tool a simple machine erklärt nichts.
Die Erklärung, daß Maschine, wo das Werkzeug 
nicht durch Menschenkraft bewegt und Werkzeug, 
wo der Mensch Prime Mover, erklärt einen 
Hundekarren... für eine Maschine, dagegen 
einen mechanischen Strumpfwirkstuhl... für ein 
Werkzeug. Enthält kein Moment, woraus sich der 
social change erklärt." (MEGA II.3.6.:195i, my 
e m p h .)
In a letter to Engels he explained several attempts to define a 
machine:
"You may or you may not know, for of itself 
the thing's quite immaterial, that there is 
considerable controversy as to what distin­
guishes a machine from a tool... if we take a 
look at the machine in its elementary form, 
there can be no doubt that the industrial 
revolution originates, not from motive power, 
but from that part of machinery called the 
WORKING MACHINE by the English, i.e. not from, 
say, the use of water or steam in the place of 
the foot to move the spinniing wheel, but from 
the transformation of the actual spinning 
process itself, and the elimination of that 
part of human labour that was not mere
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EXERTION OF POWER (as in treadling a wheel), 
but was concerned with processing, working 
directly on the material to be processed."
(Letter to Engels, 28.1.1863)
Marx aims to identify a technological element which is able to
produce social change.110 He thus rejects both the defintion of
the English technologists who "call a tool a simple machine and a 
machine a complicated tool" (ibidem) and the definition of the 
"German jackasses, who are great on little matters like this"
(ibidem) and call a plough a machine because it is not moved by
110 The point for Marx is not to have a good definition for its
own sake but to have a definition which is able to capture
the advent of the industrial revolution; and it is precisely
here that the definitions of the Englishmen and the Germans
fail. Marx emphasises his special interest when he admits 
that "[t]o those who are merely mathematicians, these 
questions are of no great moment, but they assume great 
importance when it comes to establishing a connection 
between human social relations and the development of these 
material modes of production." (Letter to Engels of 28.1. 
1863, my emph.) According to Marx, then, the important 
difference is the existence of a mechanism, which can be
found in the models of the clock and the mill. According to
him, "(t]he clock was the first automatic device to be used 
for practical purposes, and from it the whole theory of the 
production of regular motion evolved." (ibidem) Marx is 
aware that machines (which conform to this definition) have 
been employed for a long time. But with their use on a 
broader level a specific dynamics occurs: "The industrial 
revolution began as soon as mechanical means were employed 
in fields where, from time immemorial, the final result had 
called for human labour and not therefore - as in the case 
of the above-mentioned tools - where the actual material to 
be processed had never, within living memory, been directly 
connected with the human hand; where, by the nature of
things and from the outset, man has not functioned purely as
POWER." (ibidem)
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human power.111 Instead, he agrees with Babbage who defines the
machine in the following way:
"Quand par la division du travail, chaque 
opération particulière a été réduite à l'em­
ploi d'un instrument simple, la réunion de 
tous ces instruments, mis en action par un 
seul moteur, constitue une machine." (Babbage 
1833, cited in MEGA I I .3.6.: 1914).112
Marx comments: "Was wir hier hervorheben, ist nicht nur die
Reduction de "chaque opération particulière à l ’emploi d'un 
instrument simple", sondern, was drin involviert ist, die aus der 
Theilung der Arbeit entspringende creation dieser instruments 
simples." (MEGA I I .3.6.: 1914) It is not important what the motor 
is. It may be the human hand and foot, animal powers, elementary 
powers or an automaton (mechanical powers) (cf. MEGA II.3.6.: 
1914). The only important thing is that virtuosity and skill get 
transposed from the worker to the mechanism: "Aber solche Opera­
tionen, die früher des Virtuosen bedurften, der auf dem Instrument 
spielte, jezt hervorgebracht durch die Verwandlung der durch den 
einfachsten mechanischen Anstoss (Kurbel drehen, Rad treten) von
111 In a letter to Engels he admits to be "in considerbale doubt 
about the section in my book that deals with machinery. I 
have never been quite able to see in what way SELF-ACTORS 
changed spinning, or rather, since steam power was already
in use before then, how it was that the spinner, despite
steam power, had to intervene with his motive power."
(Letter from 24.1.1863) And, in the letter from 28 January
of the same year: "For me, mechanics presents much the same 
problem as language. I understand the mathematical laws, but 
the simplest technical reality that calls for ocular 
knowledge is more difficult for me than most complicated 
combinations." For this reason, Marx was attending a 
practical course for working men in the Institute of 
Geology (cf. CW 41:446, 449).
112 Cf.also The Poverty of Philosophy, CW 6:186, as cited above.
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Seiten des Menschen, unmittelbar bewirkten Bewegung in die raffi- 
nirten Bewegungen der Arbeitsmaschine." (MEGA II .3.6.:1917, my 
emph. )113
Machinery rests upon simple cooperation and division of labour,
114but changes them at the same time:
"Die Maschinerie - sobald sie capitalistisch 
angewandt wird...- sezt die einfache Coopera­
tion voraus und zwar erscheint diese... als 
viel wichtigeres Moment in Ihr, wie in der auf 
Theilung der Arbeit beruhenden Manufactur...
Die in der Manufactur entwickelte Theilung der 
Arbeit wiederholt sich einerseits im Innern 
des mechanischen Ateliers, obgleich in sehr 
vermindertem Maaßstab; andererseits, wie wir 
später sehn werden, wirft das mechanische
Atelier die wesentlichsten Principien der auf 
Theilung der Arbeit beruhenden Manufactur über 
den Haufen. Endlich vermehrt die Anwendung der 
Maschinerie die Theilung der Arbeit im Innern 
der Gesellschaft, die Verfielfältigung der
besondren Geschäftszweige und unabhängigen 
Productionssphären. Ihr Grundprincip ist die 
Ersetzung geschickter Arbeit durch einfache 
A r b e i t .♦. " (MEGA II.3.1.:294, my emphasis)
Marx distinguishes historically two stages of transition to
machine work. The first is the development of machines which
have their origin in primitive tools and which eventually led to
the production of machines by means of machines.
113 See also the following passage from the Grundrisse: "[I ]t is 
the machinery which possesses skill and strength, is itself 
the virtuoso, with a soul of its own in the mechanical laws 
acting through it... The workers' activity, reduced to a 
mere abstraction of activity, is determined and regulated on 
all sides by the movement of machinery and not the 
opposite." (Grundrisse:693)
114 See 3.6. for a discussion of his concept of "division of 
labour".
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"Als die beiden klassischen Beispiele der 
Maschinerie, die auf diesem verschiednen Weg 
hervorgeht, sind zu betrachten: auf der einen 
Seite die Spinn- und Webmaschinen, die aus den 
urältesten ... Werkzeugen hervorgingen... Auf 
der andren Seite die Fabrikation der Maschinen 
selbst durch Maschinerie... Historisch geht 
die Umwälzung in der Industrie von der ersten 
Form aus. Es liegt in der Natur der Sache, daß 
erst nachdem die Fabrikation der Waaren durch 
Maschinerie einen gewissen Umfang erreicht 
hat, das Bedürfniß sich fühlbar machte, die
Maschinen selbst durch Maschinen zu produzie­
ren." (MEGA II.3.6.:1915)
In the case of the spinning machine, the worker was reduced to
merely driving the wheel. The mass of the product was no longer in
direct proportion to the physical expense of power. The decisive
feature of machinery is that a mechanism performs operations which
earlier were performed by a virtuoso who played an instrument:
"Von dem Augenblick, wo die menschliche di­
rekte Betheiligung an der Production nur noch 
darin bestand, daß er als einfache power 
wirkte, das Princip der Arbeit durch Maschi­
nerie gegeben. Der Mechanismus war da; die 
Triebkraft selbst konnte später durch Wasser,
Dampf etc ersetzt werden." (MEGA I I . 3 . 6 . : 1917)
The second stage is characterized by the employment of the steam 
engine: "Nach dieser ersten großen industriellen Revolution, war 
die Anwendung der Dampfmaschine als Bewegung producirende Maschine 
die zweite." (MEGA I I .3.6.: 1917) The historical turning point, 
however, is expressed in the first stage (transfer of skill), for 
the simple reason that mankind always had living automatons 
(=animals) which served as a power source. The important diffe­
rence has to be seen in the instrument. The plough contained no 
element which could lead to the industrial revolution: all
movements of men and animals were essentially those of free will, 
the movement was irregular; man had to direct the animals. The 
mechanical act was hidden behind the movement of man and animal:
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they themselves were not forced into a strict geometry. The mill, 
however, can be regarded as the forerunner of machinery; it is the 
first "Arbeitswerkzeug" (see MEGA I I .3.6.:1919). "Auch dieser 
Punkt der Maschinerie an der Mühle entwickelt, daß früher von dem 
eigentlichen Mahlen getrennter Theil der Arbeit, selbständige 
Arbeit, durch dieselbe Triebkraft verrichtet und somit der Arbeit 
des Mahlens mechanisch combinirt wird." (MEGA I I .3.6.;1920-1). It 
is most important to keep in mind the differentia specifica of the 
machine as defined by Marx. It is the transfer of technical skill 
from the worker to the instrument. Recall, also, Marx's definition 
from the Grundrisse where he said that the machine is the virtuoso 
which possesses a soul of its own. In Capital, Marx shifts the 
attention from the technological to the social level (see 3.5.).
But let us return to the consequences of Marx's machine
definition. The effects on the character of the labour performed
under these conditions are summarized as follows:
"Einmal die verwandelte Form der Arbeit, ihre 
scheinbare Leichtigkeit, die alle Muskel­
anstrengung auf die Maschinerie wirft, ebenso 
das Geschick. Die Verlängerung [der Arbeits­
zeit, R.G.] stößt aus dem einen Grund zunächst 
nicht auf physische Unmöglichkeit; an dem
zweiten bricht der Gegensatz des Arbeiters, 
dem seine noch bei der Manufactur vorherr­
schende, jezt gebrochne Virtuosität nicht mehr 
erlaubt sich auf die Hinterfusse zu stellen,
vielmehr dem Capital erlaubt die geschickten 
Arbeiter durch ungeschickte und daher seiner 
Controlle mehr unterworfne zu ersetzen." (MEGA 
I I . 3 .1. 303, my emph.)
This new reality, which is in the first instance a technological 
one, has tremendous social consequences, and negative ones for the 
workers. Marx says that a new class of workers i.e. women and
children, is entering the production process which is completely
obiedient to the despotism of capital. Furthermore, capitalist use 
of machinery lengthens the working day instead of shortening it:
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"Ist einmal durch Tradition der Arbeitstag gewaltsam verlängert, 
so erheischt es Menschenalter, wie in England, bevor die Arbeiter 
fähig sind ihn wieder auf die Normalgrenzen zurückzuführen." 
(ibidem)
3.1.4. The machinery question
"The machinery question in early nineteenth-century Britain was 
the question of the sources of technical progress and the impact 
of the introduction of the new technology of the period on the 
total economy and society. The question was central to everyday 
relations between master and workman but it was also of major 
theoretical and ideological interest. The very technology at the 
basis of economy and society was a platform of challenge and 
struggle." (Berg 1982:9).
Basically, there were two attitudes towards machinery: one which 
welcomed it and saw it as an instance of progress; another which 
condemned it, stressing its de-humanizing effects. The following 
quote from John Stuart Mill may serve as an example of the first 
attitude: "The more visible fruits of scientific progress... the 
mechanical improvements, the steam engine, the railroads, carry 
the feeling of admiration for the modern, and disrespect for 
ancient times, even down to the wholly uneducated classes." (Mill, 
"M. de Tocqueville on Democracy in America", cited in Berg 
1982:11) The counter-position was expressed by writers like Thomas 
Carlyle or Charles Dickens. C a r l y l e ’s cultural critique comes out 
clearly when he compares "the living artisan" with the inanimate 
one: "The huge demon of Mechanism smokes and thunders, panting at 
his great task, in all sections of English land;changing his shape 
like a very Proteus; and, infallibly, at every change of shape, 
oversetting whole multitudes of workmen, as if with the waving of
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his shadow from afar, hurling them asunder, this way and that, in 
their crowded march and curse of work or traffic." (Carlyle 1980, 
vol.23:24 as cited in Berg 1982:12)
Marx was caught between these attitudes. He saw both the pro­
gressive character of machinery but also its debasing effects.115 
He tried to combine both positions, pointing to a higher form of 
industrial society where the negative features would have va­
nished. Carlyle depicted machinery as a "huge, dead, immeasurable 
steam engine, rolling on, in its dead indifference." (Carlyle, 
Sartor Resarus, cited in Berg 1982:12) Marx, in Capital, describes 
a "mechanical monster whose body fills whole factories, and whose 
demon power, at first veiled under the slow and measured motions 
of his giant limbs, at length breaks out into the fast and furious 
whirl of his countless working organs." (Capital 1 :381-2)
This expresses a feeling of anxiety felt by many contemporaries 
of Marx and still felt by many people today.“16 When Dickens 
complained that in modern society everything was quantified, 
mechanised, calculated as "so many hundred hands in this mill; so 
many hundreds horse steampower"117 , Marx would stress the poten­
tial for liberating mankind on the basis of this scientific 
m ethod. In Capital he praises Modern Industry in the following 
way :
115 The latter are sharply expressed in the early Paris
Manuscripts, but also in Capital♦ The difference is that
Capital conceives the debasing effects as due only to the
capitalist use of machinery.
116 Charles Babbage also expressed such an anxiety - see Berg
(1980:11-2).
117 Dickens, Hard Times, as cited in Berg 1980:13.
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" M o d e m  Industry rent the veil that concealed 
from men their own social process of produc­
tion and that turned the various, spontaneous­
ly divided branches of production into so many 
riddles, not only to outsiders, but even to 
the initiated. The principle which is pursued, 
of resolving each process into its constituent 
movements, without any regard to their pos­
sible execution by the hand of man, created 
the new modern science of technology. The 
varied, apparently unconnected, and petrified 
forms of the industrial process now resolved 
themselves into so many conscious and systema­
tic applications of natural science to the 
attainment of given useful effects." (Capital 
1:486)
From this quote at least we may conjecture that Marx ultimately
gave more emphasis to the progressive aspect of machinery than to
119the "spiritual" consequences. This has to do with the emancipa­
tory role he attributed to science, as we shall now see.
3.1.5. Science and technology
It is a commonplace that the main facet of modern technology is 
the growing influence of science. Little agreement exists on 
whether science or technology have a prius over the other, or more
118 There is a passage in the Grundrisse where Marx takes this 
view to extremes: "No longer does the worker insert a
modified natural thing [Naturgegenstand] as middle link 
between the object [Objekt] and himself; rather, he inserts 
the process of nature, transformed into an industrial 
process, as a process between himself and inorganic nature, 
mastering it. He steps to the side of the production process 
instead of being its chief actor." (Grundrisse:705)
119 To be sure, this is also the way in which mainstream Marxism 
presented its answer to the question of "technical 
progress".
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generally, how the relation between the two has to be concep­
tualized. In a recent debate, Fores denied the scientific 
character of technology (modern or otherwise). He maintains that 
there is nothing identifiable which could be called technology; it 
is only Technik which is worth talking about. According to him, 
"it makes no more sense to ask an engineer to be 'scientific' than 
to ask a lawyer to 'be seamanly' or a sailor to 'act like a good 
cook'." (Fores 1988:71). In his view, engineering science is a 
'myth'. However, this view is contrary to a long tradition of 
conceptualizing modern technology which I cannot represent 
adequately here for reasons of time and space. Suffice it to say, 
that from Ure, 3abbage, and Marx onwards, technology's main cha­
racteristic was seen in the growing application of scientific 
findings. This does not mean that technology has to await some 
"ordered" scientific results, or that technology is "applied 
science"; rather it means that modern technology as such
incorporates skills, knowledge and experience, and thereby some
120at least minimal - scientific knowledge. However, Fores is 
right to insist on the distinction between science and technology. 
In order to pursue this issue further, I now explore Marx's 
thought on this matter, confronting it with some contemporary 
analyses.
120 Scheler (1980), in an illuminating study, has claimed that 
it is logic, mathematics and the practice of observing and 
measuring that form the driving force for technical develop­
ment (basic to both science and technology is the Machtge- 
danke, the will to power). Scheler thinks that Technik does 
not in the first place consist in constructing "economically 
efficient" machines, but, following its own logic, is aiming 
at constructing all possible machines: "Der Grundwert, der 
die neue Technik leitet... geht auf das Ziel... alle mög­
lichen Maschinen zu konstruieren und zwar zunächst nur in 
Gedanken und als Plan." (Scheler 1980:125) Only after that 
are two further selections made: one by the engineer, the 
other by the entrepreneur (cf. id.,127); see also Rapp 
(1978:70). I come back to Scheler in 3.3.
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Marx conceives the relationship between science and technology
under capitalism in the following way:
In machinery, the appropriation of living 
labour by capital achieves a direct reality in 
this respect as well: it is, firstly, the
analysis and application of mechanical and
chemical laws, arising directly out of 
science, which enables the machine to perform 
the same labour as that preyiously performed 
the worker. (Grundrisse:705)~
Marx's very concept of the machine would not work without the role 
of science. As he propounded at length in C apital, it was only 
with the emergence of machinery that science could be applied to 
the production process in an unprecedented way. Rosenberg obser­
ved: "By breaking down the productive process into objectively 
identifiable component parts, it creates a structure of activities 
which is really amenable for rigorous analysis." (Rosenberg 
1976b:133). Marx himself put it this way:
The principle, carried out in the factory sys­
tem, of analysing the process of production 
into its constituent parts, and of solving the 
problems thus proposed by the application of 
mechanics, of chemistry, and of the whole 
range of the natural sciences, becomes the 
determining principle everywhere." (Capital 
1:434)
121 In the following statement in the Manuscripts he fairly 
exaggerates the influence of science upon technology when he 
says that every scientific discovery serves as a base for a 
new technological invention: "Jede Entdeckung wird 3asis 
neuer Erfindung oder neuer verbesserter Methoden der 
Production. Erst die kapitalistische Productionsweise macht 
die Naturwissenschaften dem unmittelbaren Productionsprozeß 
dienstbar, während umgekehrt die Entwicklung der Production 
die Mittel zur theoretischen Unterwerfung der Natur 
liefert... Das Capital schafft die Wissenschaft nicht, aber 
es expoloitiert sie, eignet sie dem Produktionsprozeß an. 
Damit zugleich Trennung der Wissenschaft, als auf die 
Production angewandter Wissenschaft von der unmittelbaren 
Arbeit.” (MEGA I I .3.6.:2060)
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This is a quite recent phenomenon. To be sure, science and capital 
have existed for centuries without giving rise to the above 
described process of analysing the production process and applying 
scientific knowledge to it. "It is only at a very recent point in 
history, Marx argues, that the marriage of science and industry 
occurs. Moreover, this marriage does not coincide with the 
historical emergence of capitalism." (Rosenberg 1976a:130). In 
modern industry, technology is for the first time not designed in 
accordance with physical endowments of the workers "but in 
accordance with a completely different logic, a logic which 
explicitly incorporates principles of science and engineering." 
(Rosenberg 1976a:132)
But the mere growth of science is not a sufficient condition for
the growth of productivity. Neither is it justified to think of
technology as application of scientific knowledge. As Rosenberg 
put it, "this perspective obscures a very elemental point: techno­
logy is itself a body of knowledge about certain classes of events
and activities. It is not merely the application of knowledge
brought from another sphere... It is... not a fundamental kind of 
knowledge, but rather a form of knowledge that has generated a 
certain rate of economic progress for thousands of years." 
(Rosenberg 1982b:143)
Thus technology may develop on its own, without the guiding
function of science. Marx was also aware of this when stressing
the "eigendynamics" of technology:
Invention then becomes a business, and the 
application of science to direct production 
itself becomes a prospect which determines and 
solicits it. But this is not the road along 
which machinery, by and large, a r o s e , and even 
less the road on which it progresses in 
detail. The road is rather dissection 
[Analyse] - through the division of labour, 
which gradually transforms the workers'
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operations into more and more mechanical ones, 
so that at a certain point a mechanism can 
step ipto their places. (Grundrisse;704, my 
emph.)*
It is doubtful if Marx would have agreed with attributing
the following characteristics to a communist society:
[T]he normal situation in the past and to a 
considerable degree also in the present, is 
that technological knowledge has preceded 
scientific knowledge... Thus, it is to be 
expected that feasible technological knowledge 
is likely to be attained before the deeper 
level of scientific understanding. At least 
this is so if sufficiently powerful economic 
incentives are at work." (Rosenberg 1982b:144)
Perrow, analysing high-risk systems, points out that poorly-
designed or poorly-understood technological systems are likely to
lead to accidents:
Transformation processes exist in recombinant 
DNA technology, chemical plants, nuclear power 
production, nuclear weapons, and some aspects 
of space missions. Most of these are quite 
new, but it is significant that chemical 
processing is not. While experience has helped 
reduce accidents, accidents continue to plague 
transformation processes that are fifty years 
old. These are processes that can be described 
but not really understood. They were often 
discovered through trial and error, and what
122 See Hegel: "Wenn sich aber die Fabrikarbeit so vervoll­
kommnet, so vereinfacht ist, so kann statt des maschinen- 
mässigen Arbeitens der Menschen die Maschine arbeiten, und 
dieses ist der gewöhnliche Übergang in den Fabriken..." 
(Hegel 1983b:127) Avineri comments: "We thus have here, in 
one of the most speculative documents of German idealist 
philosophy, one of the most acute insights into the working 
of modern, industrial society: from a priori philosophical 
anthropology, Hegel moves on to incorporate the results of 
political economy into a philosophical system - an attempt 
almost identical in its systematic structure with Marx's 
program forty years later." (Avineri 1972:94)
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passes for understanding is really only a 
description of something that works. (Perrow 
1984:85)
Marx, on the other hand, doubtlessly assumed an ever more
explanatory and projective force of science when he wrote:
"Modern industry rent the veil that concealed 
from men their own social process of produc­
tion, and that turned the various, sponta­
neously divided branches of production into so 
many riddles, not only to outsiders, but even 
to the initiated." (Capital’ 1 :456)
The principle which it pursued, of resolving 
each process into its constituent movements, 
without any regard to their possible execution 
by the hand of man, created the new modern 
science of technology. The varied, apparently 
unconnected, and petrified forms of the indus­
trial processes now resolved themselves into 
so many conscious and systematic applications 
of natural science to the attainment of given 
useful effects." (Capital 1 :456-7, my emph.)
Equally optimistic was his trust in technological possibilities: 
"Mirabeaus' "Impossiblel Ne me dites jamais ce bête de mot!" is 
particularly applicable to modern technology." (Capital 1 :448). He 
speaks of an ever-increasing productivity of labour together "with 
the uninterrupted advance of science and technology." (Capital 
1:567) At this point in his theory, Marx seems to enlarge his 
theoretical scheme according to which man transforms nature with 
the help of technology. Now the role of science becomes crucial. 
See Fig. 3.1. for a graphical representation:
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Fig. 3.1
M an----------------^  Science (technology) -------------Nature
t ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Here an intriguing question arises: how can we reconcile Marx's 
statement that technology develops relatively autonomously i.e. 
independently of science, on the one hand, with his statement, on 
the other hand, that science will to an ever- greater extent 
determine the course of technology?
Marx's theory offers two possibilities for such a synthesis. 
First, we can apply again the distinction between a historical and 
a critical approach, which in Marx's case is expressed in the 
difference between an analysis which is "backward-looking" and one 
which is "forward-looking". The second possibility is contained in 
his claim that human labour will be able to reappropriate all 
sorts of objectifications, including modern technology. It is 
true that a rural idyll is the reference point in the famous 
passage from the German Ideology (fishing and hunting); but in the 
same text, Marx also says that the highly-developed productive 
forces of capitalism will be appropriated by the producers, which 
is the very precondition for the full development of the 
individuals (cf. CW 5 :86-7 as cited in 3.1.1.). It is important to 
note that Marx' s basic idea remains the same in this respect, 
what varies is only the stress he gives to different factors. For 
example, in the speech to the "People's Paper" (1856), he invokes 
new-fangled men who would master the new-fangled machinery; in the 
Grundrisse he envisages a fully-automated production process with
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man as mere guardian (see the passage cited below); in Capital he 
stresses that there will be varied work also under communism, 
which makes necessary an all-round development of individuals. But 
the basic idea of the rural model reappears: it is the explicit 
claim that any fixation of persons to one exclusive task has to be 
avoided; the all-round development of human capacities and needs 
is M a r x ’s goal. Regarding the possibilities for the realisation of 
that goal, Marx's argument is quite optmistic; according to him, 
it is based on real relations which .exist in modern industry. 
Therefore, the fully developed individuality is both the aim of 
communism and necessitated by capitalist technology. The rural 
idyll is replaced by a model where individuals, as it were, switch 
from one activity to another, but they do this on the basis of a 
scientific and artistic education (which will also generate new 
needs in them). This model is no utopia but, according to Marx, 
inevitable, since modern technology requires it. A functional 
requirement of modern societies, therefore, leads to the birth of 
communist man, which is quite an extraordinary claim.
To turn to the scientific dimension, it should be said that Marx 
analyses technology mainly in its historical development, inclu­
ding its rapid growth under capitalism. He describes this process 
as an evolutionary process. But it is one thing to state with 
hindsight a blind evolutionary process, another to state it for 
the future. And here, I suppose, not only Marx, but no humanist 
position, could allow for such a possibility. This is why Marx 
distinguished sharply between pre-history and history proper (cf. 
1859 Preface): the first is governed by blind evolution whereas 
the second is controlled and planned by human purposes. And thhis 
is the place where sceince becomes most important for Marx. 
Science provides the means for a planned technology, for a planned 
Stoffwechsel between man and nature; and, what is more, science
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for Marx was not only a desideratum, but a real, unfolding ("be­
fore our eyes") force. Under the regime of science, the gap 
between explanation and evaluation, between blind evolution and
conscious human control, between pre-history and history could be
1 2 3bridged.“ For Marx it is an empirical fact that modern industry
(capitalism) already leads mankind to the threshold of history
proper. Look at his bold outline in the Grundrisse where he
sketches some breathtaking scenarios for a technologically-
advanced, communist society:
Labour no longer appears so much to be inclu­
ded within the production process; rather the 
human being comes to relate more as watchman 
and regulator to the production process it­
self... No longer does the worker insert a 
modified natural thing (Naturgegenstand] as 
middle link between the object and himself; 
rather he inserts the process of nature, 
transformed into an industrial process, as a 
means between himself and inorganic nature, 
mastering it. He steps to the side of the 
production process instead of being its chief 
actor. (...) In this transformation, it is 
neither the direct human labour he himself 
performs, nor the time during which he works, 
but rather the appropriation of his own gene­
ral productive power, his understanding of 
nature and his mastery over it by virtue of 
his presence as a social body - it is, in a 
word, the development of the social individual 
which appears as the great foundation-stone of 
production and of wealth. (Grundrisse:704-5)
Marx's optimism with regard to the transparence of technological 
processes must be subjected to critical examination. It seems that
123 This general outline seems still to apply to present-day 
problems of industrial accidents. As Per row has pointed out, 
it is due to the poor scientific understanding of existsing 
technological systems that their working is sometimes 
dangerous. This view can be contrasted with the standard 
explanation which assumes perfect functioning of technology 
and simply blames the operators in case of an accident.
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it does not concord with the reality of modern technology. Perrow 
emphasized four dimensions of technological systems: linear/com­
plex and loose/tight coupled. The point is that Marx excludes the 
complex dimension form his analysis when stressing that the 
production process gets "dissected" into its component parts. This 
suggests that every instrument in the production process serves 
only one purpose: the production process takes place step by
step. However, examples from the chemical and electrical
industries indicate that there is also a reverse tendency to 
observe: parts or components of technical systems are designed
so as to fulfil more than one function (cp. Perrow 1984).
To return to the problem of science and technology in Marx. 
Above, I suggested that we can reconcile the autonomous 
development of technology and the increasing influence of science 
in Marx's model with the distinction between historical and
critical analysis. But apart from the exegetical task, we are 
still left with the crucial question: how do we distinguish
science from technology and what does their relation look like?
Rosenberg holds that science and technology are essentially two 
different things which have things in common, but are, in the 
first place distinct from each other. The difference lies in the 
specific character of knowledge which is employed. In the case of 
science we have rules, laws and procedures which can be written 
down and discussed by the academic profession. In the case of 
technology, the knowledge which is sometimes employed cannot be 
explained; technical solutions are found which demand scientific 
explanation. From this follows that technology cannot simply be 
conceived as applied science. According to Rosenberg, the main 
bulk of inventions and technical-practical solutions were found 
long before a scientific explanation could account for it. "It is 
still far from unusual for engineers in many industries to develop
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a successful solution to a problem for which there is no 
scientific explanation and for the engineering solution to 
generate the subsequent scientific rersearch that eventually 
provides the explanation." (Rosenberg 1982b:144; see also Marx: 
science depends on the development of trade and industry, cf. CW 
5: 40 )124 .
Price, in a similar vein, says that "the naive picture of 
technology as applied science simply -will not fit all the facts. 
Inventions do not hang like fruits on a scientific tree" (Price 
1982:169). Instead, so he argues, "most technological advances 
derive immediately from those that precede them... old technology 
breeds new in just the same way as the scientific process..." 
(Price 1982:170). Such a characterization would presuppose that 
technology, like science, could be conceived as a social system 
(for further discussion see 3.3.). Price bypasses this difficulty 
in assuming that old technology breeds new, just like old 
knowledge breeds new,125 and in endorsing an actor-model in 
explaining the transfer of knowledge from science to technology.
124 Heidegger made the same point when he wrote: "It is said 
that modern technology is something incomparably different 
from all earlier technologies because it is based on modern 
physics as an exact science. Meanwhile we have come to 
understand more clearly that the reverse holds true as well: 
modern physics, as experimental, is dependent upon technical 
apparatus and upon progress in the building of apparatus." 
(Heidegger 1978:295-6) One strand in the sociology of 
science takes up exactly this point in stressing the 
hermeneutic character of the natural sciences, see Bloor 
(1976); 3arnes (1977); Mulkay (1979); Knorr-Cetina (1985). 
For a criticism, see Archer (1987).
125 Cf. also: "One can, I suppose, create technology to order,
just by wishing it. But ordinarily one is severely 
constrained by the old technology's having or not having the 
capacity to breed a particular desired thing." (de Solla 
Price 1982:170)
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He sees the relationship between the two as an 'interaction' 
(which takes place between persons) since we know of many cases in 
which science has passed into technology and technology has made 
possible new science (cf. Price 1982:171). But the prius is 
science since he notes a time lag between scientific and techno­
logical advance. Price takes an image from Toynbee in order to 
illustrate the relation between the two. The image is of two 
dancers, dancing to the same music; it is impossible to tell who 
is leading, and who following. (Taynbee 1962, vol.1:3? cited in 
Price 1982:170).
But, "[r]ather than supposing that an outside force affects both 
dancers, it seems more reasonable to think that their action upon 
each other keeps them in step." (Price 1982:171) Since the 
influence is reciprocal, we must assume a complete interaction 
(cf. id.). However, there is a time-lag between scientific and 
technological advance which "would seem to indicate that the 
dancers hold each other at arm's length instead of dancing cheek 
to cheek. To use the more precise language of the physicist, the 
relation between science and technology seems to be a weak rather 
than a strong interaction." (Price 1982:171)
To explain the interaction, Price employs an actor model and 
stresses the important role of socialisation of the respective 
actors (i.e. scientists and engineers): "(T)he medium of
transmission is the person and the method is the fact of the 
formal or informal education..." (Price 1982:171) By this mecha­
nism, Price explains the time lag between the two disciplines: it
is simply that both, scientists and technologists, during their 
education, are subjected to some training in the ambient state of 
the respective other discipline. "It follows then that men on the 
research fronts of science and technology will be able to use each 
other's ambient knowledge. It seems too that this will generally
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be the ambient knowledge that is on the average about one genera­
tion of students old - perhaps ten years." (Price 1982:171)126
How hard it is for science and technology to communicate has
been expressed by Price in the following way:
In any case, what commuication difficulty 
there is seems due to the fact that though the 
scientists want to write and the technologists 
want to read, the scientists are writing for 
their colleagues in science, or sometimes for 
their imaginary archive; "they are simply not 
writing the sort of material that the techno­
logists want to read. This frustrates the 
technologists and makes them believe that 
somewhere in this pile of material, if only 
they could find it, there is the very valuable 
material they are lookina for to make new 
products." (Price 1982:173)r27
In summary, then, there seem to exist few if any channels of 
communication between science and technology. Rosenberg is
aware of this, stressing the distinct character and development of 
the two. The dancers in this picture are still dancing together, 
but to different kinds of music! He emphasizes the central role 
which technology has always played in the history of mankind, thus
126 Note that this explanation does not depend on an actor 
model; the same could be said for a systems approach: each 
system uses informations from its environment i.e. from 
other systems too.
127 Marx provides an example from hydrauclics in the 18th
century: "Hydraulik und Hydrotechnik überhaupt im 18. Jadt.
mit vielen Entdeckungen bereichert, grossentheils auch für 
die Müllerkunst sehr vortheilhaft, die indess sehr langsam, 
besonders in Teutschland, dem theoretischen Fortschritt
folgte... Die Theorie der Wasserräder schwer, daher, als 
leere Theorie verschien, die Mühlenbauer nahmen wenig
Rücksicht darauf." (MEGA I I .3.6.:1924)
128 See, also, Stichweh (1987:473), for another example.
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clearly referring to Marx's concept of Stoffwechsel (cf. Rosen­
berg, 1982a:41). He concludes that technology as such can proceed 
without the guiding or assistance of science. "Indeed, if the 
human race had been confined to technologies that were understood 
in a scientific sense, it would have passed from the scene long 
ago." (Rosenberg 1982b:143)129
Technology sets the agenda for scientific research, provides the 
empirical data without which the latter cannot start. Rosenberg 
straightforwardly reverses the common view that science is prior 
to technology: it is technology which "influences scientific
activity in numerous and pervasive ways." (1982b:142) In this 
conception, technology provides empirical data for science just 
as nature does. To be sure, both science and technology have to do 
with man's Stoffwechsel with nature; whereas technology is 
practical-empirical transformation of physical objects, I shall 
define science as one form of social communication about this 
process.130 Science uses the empirical data provided by nature and 
technology as information on which it builds its own system.‘3i
But how can we relate Marx's findings about modern industry to 
this distinction? Marx emphasizes the important role of science in 
the modern capitalist production process. Machinery is for him the 
bodily expression of the abstract principles of science. This is 
not to say, however, that machinery is the mere application of
129 Cf. also, his statement that science and technology repre­
sent two different forms of knowledge. See Rosenberg
(1982a:143), as cited above.
130 Also Marx in the Grundrisse distinguishes a material anc a
mental dimension of the Soffwechsel, see GR:161 and the
distinction implied by Fig. 3.1. above.
131 See 3.4.1. for further elaboration.
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scientific knowledge nor to say that science comes before technol­
ogy. What Marx stresses is the fact that in modern industry scien­
tific knowledge could be applied for the first time in a systema­
tic way and on a large level, and that modern industry gave rise 
to the expansion and importance of scientific research. Yet, what 
is more, Marx's stress of the important role played by science is 
crucial for his communist perspective. Recall the distinction of 
nature^ and nature2 from chapter 2. It is only under the condition 
of transforming nature^^ into nature2 and understanding this 
transformation that mankind liberates itself from alien powers. We 
must thus regard Marx's position as a position which privileges 
the scientific over the technological dimension, for only a second 
nature which is understood provides the basis for communist 
society. It is quite obvious that technologies which are just 
technical installations and happen to work cannot provide the 
technological basis for communist society. They cannot provide 
this basis especially under modern conditions where technologies 
may affect large parts of the globe and its populations in a 
detrimental way over a long period of time.
In summary, then, we might say that science and technology are 
different fields of human activity which are quite distinct as 
regards their basic characteristics. But they also influence each 
other, constituting a relationship which is vital for modern 
industry (see 3.4. for other interrelations). While it is simply 
not so that technology is "applied science", it is indeed true 
that some scientific findings get embodied in technical apparatus.
3.1.6. Formal and real subjugation of labour under capital
Marx assumes that every mode of production transforms nature and 
is forced to produce a surplus product. Historically-modified can
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"only" be the form which this product (and hence the performed
132labour) takes on.
At the beginning of capitalism Marx places a phase called
"formal subjugation of labour under capital", which is characte­
rized in the following way:
"In der That findet sich historisch, daß das 
Capital, im Beginn seiner Bildung, nicht nur 
den Arbeitsprozeß überhaupt unter seine Con-
trolle nimmt (unter sich .subsumirt), sondern 
die besondren wirklichen Arbeitsprocesse, wie 
es sie technologisch fertig vorfindet, und wie 
sie sich auf Grundlage nicht capitalistischer 
Productionsverhältnisse entwickelt haben. Den 
wirklichen Productionsprozeß - die bestimmte 
Productionsweise findet es vor und subsumirt 
sie im Anfang nur formell unter sich, ohne
etwas an ihrer technologischen Bestimmtheit zu 
ändern." (MEGA II.3.1.:82)
The mode of production is commodity production, production for 
exchange value. Labour also has become a commodity but the labour 
process is not yet fully capitalist. Increase in surplus is 
reached mainly by extension of the working day (cf. MEGA
II.3.6.:2136-7). But this method of production triggers off a 
development which leads to a new dynamics. Already under condi­
tions of formal subjugation of labour under capital, the specific 
form of surplus labour leads to 
-increase in production,
132 Cf. MEGA I I .3.6.:2136. See, also, Marx to Kugelmann: 
"Naturgesetze können überhaupt nicht aufgehoben werden. Was 
sich in historisch verschiednen Zuständen ändern kann, ist 
nur die Form, worin jene Gesetze sich durchsetzen." (Letter 
of 11.7.1868) Marx thinks that a socialist society will 
transform surplus labour into necessary labour, because all 
labour will be wanted labour: "The aim is to suspend the 
relation itself [i.e. the capital labour relation, R.G.] so 
that the surplus product itself appears as necessary." 
(Grundrisse:612).
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-continuity and intensity of labour,
-development of the variation of work ("Arbeitsvermögen") 
-differentiation of work 
and, finally, a
-relation between worker and capitalist which is based only on 
exchange and removes all patriarchal and political amalgamations 
(c f . ibidem).
Real subjugation is characterised by the following:
"Die capitalistische Productionsweise hat hier 
bereits die Arbeit in der Substanz ergriffen 
und verändert. Es ist nicht mehr blos die 
formelle Subsumtion des Arbeiters unter das 
Capital; daß er für einen andren arbeitet, 
unter fremden Commando und fremder Aufsicht...
Durch die Verwandlung seines Arbeitsvermögens 
in die blose Funktion eines Theils des Ge- 
sammtmechanismus, dessen Ganzes das Atelier 
bildet, hat er überhaupt aufgehört, Producent 
einer Waare zu sein. Er ist nur Produzent 
einer einseitigen Operation, die nur im Zusam­
menhang mit dem Ganzen des Mechanismus... 
überhaupt etwas proucirt." (MEGA II.3.1.: 253- 
4; c f . also i d .:82)
With this real subjugation we have, additionally,
-production exclusively for trade (cf. MEGA I I .3.6.:214 22),a n d , 
-increase in productivity.133
133 "Das positive Resultat hier, daß die Arbeitszeit fällt, 
deren bedurft wird, um vergrösserte Masse von Lebensmitteln 
zu produciren, daß dieß Resultat durch die gesellschaftliche 
Form der Arbeit erreicht wird und daß der Besitz des 
Einzelnen an den Productionsbedingungen nicht nur als nicht 
nöthig, sondern als unvereinbar mit dieser Production auf 
großer Stufenleiter erscheint... Sobald diese gegensätzliche 
Form wegfällt ergiebt sich also, daß sie [die Arbeiter, 
R.G.] dies Productionsmittel gesellschaftlich, nicht als 
Privatindividuen bes i t z e n ." (MEGA I I . 3.6.:2144), my emph.)
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Under the regime of formal subjugation of labour under capital
the workers are using their instruments (not vice versa, as with
the real subjugation), but they produce under one roof, not
dispersed (as before manufacture).
"Bei der formellen Subsumtion der Arbeit unter 
das Capital erleiden diese Arbeitsbedingungen 
keine weitere Modifikation; sie bleiben 
stofflich betrachtet - Arbeitsmaterial und 
Arbeitsmittel. Aber bei der neuen Productions- 
weise, der Revolution in der Productionsweise, 
die die capitalistische Production schafft, 
verändert sich die Gestalt dieser Arbeitsbe­
dingungen. Sie erhalten neue Bestimmungen 
dadurch, daß sie gesellschaftlich zusammenar­
beitenden Arbeitern als Bedingungen dienen."
(MEGA II.3.6.:2014).
Production now takes place on a large scale because this is 
economically more efficient (cf. MEGA I I .3.6.:2013). But real 
subjugation, which Marx calls the "new mode of production", (cf. 
ibidem:2014) combined with machinery, also transforms the working 
conditions and the work instruments: "Bei der einfachen Coope­
ration und auf Theilung der Arbeit gegründeten Manufactur 
erstreckt sich diese Modification blos auf die allgemeinen 
Arbeitsbedingungen, die gemeinschaftlich benutzt werden können, 
wie Baulichkeiten etc. Bei dem auf Maschinerie gegründeten mecha­
nischen Atelier ergreift sie das eigentliche Arbeitsinstrument." 
(MEGA II.3.6. : 2014, my emph.).
Marx obviously links his definition of machinery to his concept 
of real subjugation of labour under capital. Under the conditions 
of formal subjugation under capital, the labour process is 
essentially pre-capitalist, that is, workers are wage-labourers
134 It seems that Marx includes in "Arbeitsbedingungen" (condi­
tions of work) tools and raw materials ("Arbeitsgegenstand 
und Arbeitsmittel"); see also the treatment in Cohen (1978).
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who work under the control, and for the profit, of capital. But
the instruments they work with are usually not machines. In both
cases, however, the worker is alienated from the means of
production: "Wie bei der formellen Subsumtion der Arbeit unter das
Capital bleiben diese Bedingungen und daher auch ihre veränderte 
Gestalt... den Arbeitern fremder U mstand. Bei der Maschinerie geht 
der Gegensatz oder die Entfremdung sogar... zum feindlichen 
Widerspruch fort." (MEGA I I . 3.6.:2014). Marx describes the deba­
sing of the worker under the regime of real subjugation of labour 
under capital in comparison to the regime of formal subjugation:
"Diese Specialität der Passivität [An- und 
Unterordnen unter die Operationen der
Bewegungen der Maschine selbst, R.G.], d.h. 
die Aufhebung der Specialität selbst als 
Specialität characterisirt die
Maschinenarbeit. Die Verbesserungen innerhalb 
des mechanischen Ateliers selbst darauf 
gerichtet alle Virtuosität, wieder auf seiner 
eigenen Basis hervorgewachsen, möglichst zu 
entfernen. Es ist also ganz einfache Arbeit, 
d.h. ihre Einförmigkeit, Inhaltslosigkeit und 
Unterordnung unter die Maschine. Tödtende
Arbeit, als Arbeit, die wie bei der Theilung
der Arbeit in der Manufactur, völlige 
Subsumtion des Individuums unter sie
erheischt. Sie verhindert die Entwicklung der 
Specialität, specialisirt aber selbst wieder 
diese Specialitätslosigkeit. Die letzte 
Selbstbefriedigung des Arbeiters in der Arbeit 
fällt hier fort, absolute Gleichgültigkeit, 
die durch ihre Inhaltslosigkeit selbst bedingt 
wird... Bei der Manufactur ist die Arbeit 
continuirlich. Im mechanischen Atelier ist die 
Aufmerksamkeit auf die Arbeit der Maschine 
continuirlich, und die durch ihre
Bewegungen... bedingte Bewegung des Arbeiters.
Sein wirkliches Eingreifen dagegen zufällig, 
je nachdem die Maschine einen error begangen 
oder nicht." (MEGA I I .3.6.:2021-2).
The domination of machinery over labour power is established 
whereas in manufacture it was the other way around: "Die
Dienstbarkeit unter die Maschine hier also fortwährend, während in
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der Manufactur das Instrument stets dienend bleibt." (MEGA
1 1 .3.6. : 2022). The degradation of the worker, however, does not
stop with his being dominated by machinery; moreover s/he gets
reduced to an accessory, an appendage of the machine: "Hier die
Menschen bios das lebendige Zubehör, die bewußten Anhängsel der 
bewußtlosen, aber gleichförmig wirkenden Maschinerie." (MEGA
11.3.6.:202 2)
The specific capitalist way to produce surplus comprises the
methods of relative surplus production. Machinery is indispensable 
here. The products of machinery stand in no relation (compared to 
earlier modes of production) to the expense of power of the 
worker135 . "The production in enormous mass quantities which is 
posited with machinery destroys every connection of the product 
with the direct need of the producer..." (Grundrisse:694). For
these reasons, amongst others, Marx praises capitalism,*36 and 
thinks that the revolution in the mode of production'1'37 and pro-
135 Cf. Notebook XIX: "Die Masse des Products ... daher in
keinem Verhältniß mehr mit der körperlichen Anstrengung des 
Fusses als bewegender Kraft..." (MEGA I I . 3.6.:1916)
136 "Ricardo betrachtet mit Recht, für seine Zeit, die capitali- 
stische Productionsweise als die vorteilhafteste für die 
Production überhaupt; als die vortheilhafteste zur Erzeugung 
des Reichthums. Er will die Production um der Production 
halber und dieß ist Recht." This means nothing else "als 
Entwicklung der menschlichen Productivkräfte, also Entwick­
lung des Reichtums der menschlichen Natur als Selbstzweck." 
(MEGA II.3.3.:768, my emph.) Marx praises Ricardo for his 
"wissenschaftliche Ehrlichkeit", in contrast to Malthus's 
"Gemeinheit".
137 "In der großen Agricultur, wie in der großen Industrie, sind 
diese Arbeit und das Eigenthum an den Productionsbedingungen 
nicht erst zu trennen, sie sind faktisch getrennt, diese 
Trennung von Eigenthum und Arbeit, die Sismondi beweint, 
nothwendiger Durchgang zur Verwandlung des Eigenthums an den
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ductive forces is a necessary historical stage before socialist
society. The reason for criticizing capitalism, however is that
production for the sake of production does not lead to the
development of human productivity but only to the presentation of
material wealth [sachlicher Reichtum, R.G.]. This is what is wrong
with Ricardo's phrase "production for the sake of production":
"Andrerseits erscheint daher die Production um 
der Production willen als ihr grades Gegen- 
theil [because of capitalism's tendency
towards overproduction and crises, R.G.].
Nicht Production als Entwicklung der mensch­
lichen Productivität; sondern als Darstellen 
von sachlichem Reichthum, im Gegensatz zur 
productiven Entwicklung des menschlichen 
Individuums." (MEGA II.3.6.:2145) "Das mate- 
rielle Resultat der capitalistischen Pro-
ductionsweise... ist die Steigerung der Masse
der Producte... Doch nach dieser Seite hin
betrachtet stellt sich die capitalistische 
Production als Herrschaft der Sache über die
Person dar." (MEGA I I .3.6. : 2164}
Under capitalism the production of wealth (1) appears as material 
wealth which (2) gets in opposition to the producers. Domination 
of capital over labour in the process of production leads to the
enslavement of workers. Marx explicitly claims that this is a
consequence both of the economic and technological dimension of
production.~3a
Productionsbedingungen in gesellschaftliches Eigenthum." 
(MEGA I I .3.6.:2145, my emph.) Thus the fetishism that the 
producer belongs to the product comes to a standstill and 
togehter with that, all false representations of the social 
character of labour, (cf. MEGA I I .3.6.:2145)
138 In Capital Marx will retreat from this position and blame 
only the economic dimension (capitalist use of machinery) 
for its enslaving effects; see 3.5. for further discussion.
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"Die Subsumtion seiner Arbeit unter das Capi­
tal... die im Begriff der capitalistischen 
Production liegt, erscheint hier als technolo­
gisches Factum. Der Frontstein ist fertig. Die 
todte Arbeit mit Bewegung begabt und die le­
bendige nur noch als eines ihrer bewußten Or ­
gane vorhanden." (MEGA I I .3.6.:2057-8, my
e m p h .)
This means nothing else that capitalism's economy, as well as its 
technology, have escaped human control. The individual -who is
still essential to Marx's critical theory - loses his central
139impact on the explanatory level. Recall figure 2.1., where we
had man, technology and nature standing in a relationship. To be
sure, Marx will never abandon the thought that human needs are the 
driving force for the development of the productive forces.*40 3ut 
Marx also provides a model which is based on a supra-individual 
level:
139 Habermas is thus mistaken when he claims that "Marx did not
reckon with the possible emergence at every level of a
discrepancy between scientific control of the material 
conditions of life and a democratic decision-making 
process..." (Habermas 1971:58) Rather, Marx in his prepara­
tory writings for Capital (above all in his 1861-3 Manus­
cripts ) can be seen as a forerunner of Freyer and Schelsky, 
who, according to Habermas, have developed a counter-model 
which recognizes technology as an independent force.
140 As he put it with respect to machine technology: "Unmittel­
bar wird die Maschinenarbeit als revolutionierendes Element
ins Leben gerufen durch den Überschuß des Bedürfnisses über 
die Möglichkeit, ihn mit den alten Produktionsmitteln zu be­
friedigen..." (MEGA II.3.6.:1973)
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Fig. 3.2
Productive forces
nature (Stoffwechsel)
-► relations of production 
(‘the social’)
Behind 'the social' we again have relations between man and man; 
behind the Stoffwechsel we again have relations between man and 
nature. The three parts of the figure can be conceived as being in 
a process of coevolution which is to say that productive forces, 
nature and social relations develop together. This model 
constitutes a mode of production, i.e. a double relation between 
man and man (the social) and between men and nature 
(Stoffwechsel).141 On the basis of this model, an evolutionary 
approach seems to spring up naturally. Therefore, I will focus in 
the remainder of this chapter (and in chapter 4), on the 
coevolution of productive forces and social relations. Suffice it 
here to say that for Marx there was a development of technology 
from simple tools to complex machinery; likewise, social forms 
developed from simple ("transparent") to complex forms. His hope
141 With respect to ancient societies, Marx formulated this 
connection in the following way: "Those ancient social
organisms of production... can arise and exist only when the 
development of the productive power of labour has not risen 
beyond a low stage, and when, therefore, the social 
relations within the sphere of material life, between man 
and man, and between man and Nature, are correspondingly 
narrow." (Capital 1 :83-4)
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was that communism would bring about simple social forms on the 
basis of complex technology - a question which will be further 
pursued in chapter 5.
3.1.7. Progress?
We can distinguish several criteria for measuring progress. There 
are economic criteria, regarding productivity or per capita in­
come. Productivity is usually defined as the relation between 
costs and benefits, between investments and payoffs. Higher 
productivity thus means to achieve the same output with less
investment, or, which is the same, to achieve more output with the
1 42same amount of investment." Another criterion would be a 
technological one which is purely immanent to technology and which 
judges technological features like reliability, speed, longevity, 
energy input etc. Still another criterion would be spiritual in 
that it asks if people are freer or happier in comparison to 
former states in history.
Apart from the economic criterion, the latter two seem to cause 
difficulties. For how can we distinguish different levels or 
stages of evolution in the technological or ethical realm? And, 
more penetratingly, is progress involved in this development? With 
Weick we could say again: all depends on which criteria we want to 
use. There are no absolute standards regarding technical criteria: 
they are all dependent on a social-cultural-economic context. A
142 Marx is not precise when he writes that "the growth of the 
productive forces of labour means merely that less direct
labor is recquired in order to make a larger product" 
(Grundrisse:831, see also MEGA I I .3.6.:2144, as cited
below), since it is sufficient that the same product is
produced with less labour.
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technology which comes later in time need not be "superior" to a 
previous technology (see Rammert 1988).
Let us, therefore, look for a moment at spiritual criteria in 
judging progress. In a very stimulating book cn Goethe's Faust, 
3inswanger (1982) pointed out that along with modern economic 
growth, mankind witnessed two major losses: beauty and (technical
14 3and economic) security. If we now contrast the purely economic
and technical criteria with the spiritual criteria, we can
conclude that the overall development need not establish an 
unequivocal progress. Marx's criteria, in fact, were not only 
economic and technical, but also spiritual.*44 For Marx, real
wealth is not only, or primarily, expressed in value or material 
goods, but in total individuals. Neither does Marx neglect the 
physical aspect of material production. Again, unlike the
economists, he does take into account qualitative criteria (so 
when he praises the Ancient world for caring most about the 
quality of the products), he does stress the need to transform 
nature with respect to the well-being of individuals. Both points 
make clear that the charge against standard economics of neglec­
ting the natural environment cannot be made against Marx. On the 
contrary, even today his theory offers a framework which is
143 Binswanger distinguishes the latter again into "risk" and 
"worry" (Sorge), cf. Binswanger (1985:65-70).
144 Cohen, for example, stresses only the economic criteria 
when he writes: "The United States can produce, much more 
abundantly per head, everything the medievals could produce, 
and more besides, with the exception of certain products 
perhaps wholly beyond its reach, such as, say, stained glass 
of the kind found on Notre Dame Cathedral... The concept of 
need is not easy to handle, but it would be hard to maintain 
that the unavailability of just that kind of stained glass 
generates an overwhelming frustration." (Cohen 1978:60) 3ut 
these are issues at stake when we discuss the question of 
progress - in this case, a loss of beauty.
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capable of incorporating ecological problems and developing
criteria to solve them. It thus offers a political and 
philosophical framework to deal with the problem in a rational 
way, avoiding irrationalist evasions or the call for a "new
ethics".
It is common in interpretation to neglect the latter element in
Marx. Thus, the following critique of Luhmann is misconceived. He
charges Marx (and Durkheim) for -employing an "evolutionist"
position, since they used the notion of "division of labour": "In
jedem Falle macht dieser Theorieansatz [i.e. division of labour,
R.G] eine Art Fortschrittskonzeption der historischen Entwicklung,
Marx und Durkheim eingeschlossen, fast unvermeidbar." (Luhmann
1984b:320). Ironically, Luhmann's charge backfires: with the same
legitimation we could charge him with being committed to a strong
notion of progress because he employs the concepts of "functional
differentiation" and "increase in complexity". Similarly, one
could charge him with claiming that the more comlexity we have in
society, the more progress exists. As Luhmann himself says,
evolutionary processes are developments which display some
succession of order to an observer. This means that it is the
observer's criteria of order which are crucial here. The
evaluation of this process is equally observer-dependent. If, for
example, an observer labels an evolutionary process as "p-ogress",
he has to show the criteria for doing so. Darwinian theory is not
usually committed to any notion of progress whereas Marxist social
theory definitely is. However, Marx cid present his normative
assumptions. In the Manuscripts (1861-3), Marx shares sides with
Ricardo against Sismondi, defending the former's appraisal of
"production for the sake of production":
"Ricardo betrachtet mit Recht, für seine Zeit, 
die capitalistische Productionsweise als die 
vortheilhafteste für die Production überhaupt; 
als die vortheilhafteste zur Erzeugung des
178
Reichthums. Er will die Production der Pro­
duction halber und dieß ist R e c h t . Wollte man 
behaupten, wie es sentimentale Gegner Ricar­
do's gethan haben, daß die Production nicht 
als solche der Zweck sei, so vergißt man daß 
Production um der Production halber nichts 
heißt als Entwicklung der menschlichen Produc­
tivkräfte, also Entwicklung des Reichthums der 
menschlichen Natur als Selbstzweck." (MEGA 
I I . 3.3.:768)
Marx praises Ricardo's scientific honesty; nevertheless, Marx dis­
tinguishes himself also in this respect from Ricardo. Consider the 
following quote from the same page of the MEGA;
"Die Rücksichtslosigkeit Ricardo's war also
nicht nur wissenschaftlich ehrlich, sondern 
wissenschaftlich geboten für seinen Stand­
punkt . Es ist ihm aber deßhalb auch ganz
gleichgültig ob die Fortentwicklung der Pro­
ductivkräfte Grundeigenthum todtschlägt oder 
Arbeiter. Wenn dieser Fortschritt das Capital 
der industriellen Bourgeoisie entwerthet, ist 
es ihm ebenso willkommen... was liegt dran, 
sagt Ricardo. Die Productivität der mensch­
lichen Arbeit hat sich verdoppelt." (MEGA 
1 1 .3.3.: 768)
But Marx does not say "who cares?" when workers are crushed in the 
factories. Rather, his analyses were "fired by outrage and indig­
nation and the burning desire for a better world" (Lukes 1985:3). 
Neither does Marx content himself with an increase in material 
wealth since this wealth assumes antagonistic forms vis-a-vis the 
producers, as is demonstrated in the following passage:
"Das materielle Resultat der capitalistischen 
Production... ist die Steigerung der Masse der 
Producte... Doch nach dieser Seite hin be­
trachtet stellt sich die capitalistische 
Production als Herrschaft der Sache über die
145 But cf. Marx's judgement of Malthus on the preceeding page, 
MEGA II.3.3.:767.
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Person dar. Denn die Creation der Gebrauchs- 
werthe in steigendem Umfang, Qualität, Mannig­
faltigkeit... erscheint als der Zweck für den 
die Arbeitsvermögen nur Mittel sind, der nur 
durch ihre eigene Vereinseitigung und Snt- 
menschlichung erreicht wird." (MEGA
II.3.6.:2164-5).
3.2. Evolutionary approaches to technology in economic theory
A recent strand in economic theory, especially Neo-Schumpeterian 
economics, conceives technology in an evolutionary way. In the 
following section, I shall therefore discuss an evolutionary 
approach to technology and, only after that, several objections 
against it. The criticisms can be divided into three main strands. 
The first criticism sees the danger of technological determinism 
when endorsing an evolutionary approach to technology. The second 
criticism doubts if the analogy to Darwinism is legitimate or even 
feasible. The third criticism doubts if the distinction between 
system and environment can be made and asks how the system itself 
has to be conceptualized. The remainder of this section, the fol­
lowing 3.3. and 3.4., deal with these problems.
3.2.1. The behavioural theory of the firm
Criticizing neoclassical economics, Nelson and Winter claimed that
existing technologies were not chosen because they were indicated
by market signals or followed from the rational decision of a firm
in order to maximize its profits. On the contrary, so they argued,
the technology of a firm is the outcome of a routine; firms do not
choose technologies, but have them. In their words:
Our principal break with neoclassical tradi­
tion lies in our 'behavorial' treatment of the 
question: why is the firm at any time using 
the technique it is using? A neoclassical
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answer would be that the firm has chosen its 
technique on the basis of profitability calcu­
lations comparing the elements of a large 
choice set (production function). A behavoria- 
list's answer, and the one employed in our 
model, is of a very different form. The pro­
duction technique used by a firm at any time 
is regarded as a complex pattern of routinized 
behavior, of which the input-output coeffi­
cients are a quantifiable aspect. The firm is 
not seen, at any time, "choosing" its tech­
nique from a large choice set, but rather as 
"having" its technique." (Nelson and Winter,
1976:94)
The point Nelson and Winter are making here is that they reject 
the idea that technologies are simply chosen because of their 
profitability. Rather, firms are developing rules and meta-rules 
for the development and selection of technologies. This "evolutio­
nary" approach to technology has been a very influential one in 
the recent debate among economics, economic historians and also 
among sociologists.
The approach contains, however, several points which proved to 
be problematic for scholars working on the basis of it. They 
focused mainly on the question whether technology has "inner 
logic" or "trajectory". This set of questions is closely related 
to the methodological question of Darwinian evolutionary theory.
Dosi, building upon the evolutionary approach of Nelson and
Winter, made the explicit analogy to Darwinian theory. Although he
does not develop a full analogy to Darwinian theory, we can
conclude that Dosi equates specific technologies with "species",
and the environment with economy and society (see Dosi 1984:20).
Now, Dosi holds that the environment does not only select among
mutations, but is also selecting the direction of mutations.
[T]he economic and social environment affects 
technological development in two ways, first
selecting the 'direction of mutatation' (i.e.
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selecting the technological paradigm) and then 
selecting among mutations, in a more Darwinian 
fashion (i.e. the ex-post selection among 
Schumpeterian trials and errors)." (Dosi 
1984:20)
But what exactly does the environment constitute? Dosi stresses
three factors: the economy, politics and institutions. Since there
are many possible technologies which could be chosen, it is
"hardly possible to compare and rank them ex ante" (Dosi 1984:18). 
This is witnessed by the "role often played in the establishment 
of a particular technological trajectory by public ('political') 
forces" (Dosi 1984:18). As examples, Dosi mentions the military 
and space programs in the US and the synthetic chemistry in
Germany which emerged in the post-Bismarck period out of that 
country's drive towards self-sufficiency. 146 Also 'bridging 
institutions' between 'pure' science and applied R&D are of great 
importance here. But these three environmental factors do not 
shape a technological trajectory: technology is still underdeterm­
ined. As Dosi observes, "competition does not only occur between 
the 'new' technology and the 'old' ones which it tends to substi­
tute, but also among alternative 'new' technological approaches." 
(Dosi 1984:19)147 . These remarks, however, indicate that techno­
146 Cf. Dosi (1984:18). Comparing the role of policies with 
respect to automotive and aircraft technology, another 
author states: "In one important respect the development of 
commercial aircraft and aircraft engines was different from 
the development of automotive technology. In the case of the 
automobile the government played no significant role. But 
government support for the development of military aircraft 
and aircraft engines generated technology applicable to 
commercial aircraft." (Klein 1977:109)
147 As I shall propose later, the environmental factors economy, 
politics and science can be viewed as systems themselves. 
Technology in this conception is seen as an emergent 
phenomenon which arises out of the interacting of these
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logy cannot be shown to have a real autonomy, to be a real unity 
which evolves. Rather, it has to be conceptualized as having an 
apparent autonomy but essentially dependent on social factors.148
Dosi not only uses the analogy to biology in explaining techno­
logical trajectories but also an analogy to the philosophy of 
science, especially to Kuhn's concept of "paradigms''. This was 
already hinted at with Nelson's and Winter's approach when they 
alluded to K u h n ’s aperçu "You can't beat something with nothing", 
which means that a new scientific paradigm must be able to replace 
the old one: it is not sufficient to prove the flaws of an
established paradigm, if there is no conception which could take 
its place. Dosi applies this line of thought to technology itself.
"In broad analogy with the Kuhnian definition 
of a 'scientific paradigm', we shall define a 
'technological paradigm' as a 'model' and a 
'pattern' of solution of selected technologi­
cal problems, based on selected principles 
derived from natural sciences and on selected 
material technologies... We will define a 
technological trajectory as the pattern of
three systems. Dosi comes close to a similar statement when 
he writes that the "emergence of radically new technological 
paradigms ... stems from the complex interplay ... between 
advances in science, institutional factors and economic 
mechanisms." (Dosi 1984:292) It follows from this view that 
technology is a "dependent variable" and thus has only an 
apparent evolution; in reality, it is a product of social 
evolution.
148 Rammert reports on a study by Gilfillan who stressed the 
self-referentiality of technical development. This means
that engineers take as a starting point of their activity 
inventions, products and hand-books from their colleagues.
In my view, this is not sufficient to ascribe an autonomy to 
technology. It would only suffice to derive a stagnant line 
of development since these practices would repeat and
imitate each other rather than invent something new.
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'normal' problem-solving activity (i.e. of 
’progress') on the grounds of a technological 
paradigm.” (Dosi 1984:14-5).
Dosi offers us a criterion of progress which is immanent to 
technology itself: problem-solving activities arise within a given 
technological paradigm and around 'focusing devices'. If they
149succeed, this could be an instance of 'progress'. But what if 
we compare different technological trajectories? In this case, the 
answer seems not very clear at all; not even evolutionary theory 
has a ready-made answer to it.150 As we shall see, Marx distin­
guishes in a more general manner between different ("epochal") 
technologies ("technological trajectories"). According to him, 
there are three big historical forms: (1) artisan, (2) manufac­
ture, and (3) machines. Each one stands for a specific historical 
epoch, it is the material base for every social organization (cf. 
Capital 1 :352 fn). For Marx, the transition from (1) to (2) and 
from (2) to (3) was paralleled by an increase in productivity, 
and, to a certain degree, by "progress". His notion of progress, 
however, is neither purely economic nor purely technological; it 
also contains an ethical component.151
149 However, the difference between progress and problem-solving 
activities should be kept in mind. If problem-solving 
activities succeed, there may be progress in the short run 
or on the micro-level; from an observer's viewpoint, and/or 
from the historian's viewpoint, this need not not be true. 
Moreover, it is not said that this "progress" is a linear, 
directional process. It could also be a development on a 
circular, or any other, line.
150 See again Darwin's refusal to equate evolution with pro­
gress, Gould (1973:36).
151 Cf. M a r x ’s judgement of Ricardo, above. See chapter 4 for 
further discussion.
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3.3. Technology as a social system?
At this point it may be useful to state again my own position with 
respect to technology. In my view, technology is (1) a social-
material entity which (2) can undergo evolutionary processes but 
(3) has no autonomy and therefore cannot be conceived as a social 
system. Since (1) and (2) have been elaborated above, I shall draw 
attention here mainly to (3).
Consider, first, two important distinctions which we encountered 
above. One is the distinction between science and technology, the 
other is the distinction between system and environment. I shall 
claim that science,1 but not technology, can be conceived as a 
social system. The difference can be described as follows: the 
first is a homogenous, well-defined field in which actions or 
communications are the basic units and in which meaning is
transmitted; the second is a heterogenous field which has to do 
primarily with the physical reordering of the world.153
In a recent article, Renate Mayntz emphasized the difference
between social systems and socio-technical systems. According to 
her, technological systems cannot be analysed as functional
subsystems of society because the components of technological 
systems are not (only) social.154 Instead, goes her claim, in
152 And not only science, as we shall see later.
153 To avoid a possible misunderstanding: in denying the status
of a social system to technology, one does not deny the de­
cisive role of technology in modern societies.
154 Or, in Habermas' earlier defintion: "(W]e shall understand
"technology” to mean scientifically rationalized control of 
objectified processes. It refers to the system in which 
research and technology are coupled with feedback from the 
economy and administration." (Habermas 1971b:57)
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analysing socio-technical systems, one should leave the ground of 
the theory of social differentiation and conceive technological 
systems (such as large infrastructural technologies) as socio- 
technical systems (Mayntz 1988:236). This approach rightly 
proposes that technology cannot be conceived as a social system. 
However, the consequence which is drawn does not accomodate the 
abstract level on which my discussion is here located. Mayntz aims 
at a theoretical framework which illuminates empirical studies of 
specific technological infrastructure systems; my analysis tries 
to analyze relations between technological and social factors per 
s e .
Several authors have emphasized the similarity between science
and technology. One similarity is that both employ a method of
decomposing (analysing) and recombining (see Price 1982). While 
this is obviously true, there is also a big difference. Consider 
the cases of a scientist and an engineer. The engineer will apply 
the scientific knowledge which he has been learning (his "ambient 
knowledge" in the language of Price); but when it comes to the
point where he has to solve a practical problem, he does not
proceed in an essentially scientific way. It is not that intuition 
plays a greater role here than in science; rather, it is the fact 
that engineers can rest content with solutions they find without 
asking for the exact scientific explanation. Both scientific and 
technological activities are problem-solving, decomposing and 
recombining, but the engineer is concerned with a practical, 
workable solution whereas the scientist is looking for expla­
nations on the level of his academic discipline. In the words of 
Price, science produces papers, technology machines, drugs, pro­
ducts of any sort (cf. Price 1982:170).
Consider now the distinction between system and environment. 
Technology not only stands in a close relationship to science, but
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also to economy and politics.*55 Technology should be seen as 
part of the material world which has already been transformed by 
social labour into tools, instruments, machines.156 Technology 
contains a material and a social element, matter and mind. In 
M a r x ’s formulation: "Nature builds no machines, no locomotives, 
railways, electric telegraphs, self-acting mules etc. These are 
products of human industry; natural material transformed into 
organs of the human will over nature, or of human participation in 
nature. They are organs of the human brain, created by the human 
hand; the power of knowledge, obejectified." (Grundrisse: 706).
Scheler stressed that in modern societies science and economy 
are both autonomous social spheres: capitalist economy is driven 
towards limitless "Erwerben (als actus), nicht zum Erwerb (als 
wachsendem Sachbesitz)..." (Scheler 1980:129) Likewise, science is 
expanding in a similar unlimited way: "Auch die moderne Wissen­
schaft verwaltet weder einen gegebenen stabilen Wahrheitsbesitz, 
noch forscht sie nur um Lösung bestimmter, durch Bedürfnisse 
gestellter Aufgaben willen, sondern sie ist primär ein Wille zu 
'Methoden', aus denen... in grenzenloser Weise in einem unbe­
grenzten Prozesse immer neues materielles Wissen arbeitsteilig - 
fast wie von selbst - hevorgeht." (ibidem).
155 See Scheler (1980) for a model of a triple selection
made by the scientist, the engineer and the entrepreneur to 
which I want to add the political element. The scientist 
wants to construct all possible machines, the engineer all 
workable machines, the entrepreneur all profitable machines 
and the politician all machines which enhance power and
legitimation.
156 Marx presupposes "Naturstoff" which is transformed with the
help of technology which is already transformed "Natur­
stoff", see MEW 3:45.
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For my subject, a third social subsystem is relevant. This is 
politics. There have been some doubts whether politics deserves a 
special treatment within the social sciences. John Stuart Mill 
argued that there can be no such special science, since ” [t]hose 
phenomena... with which the influences of the ethological state of 
the people are mixed up at every step (so that the connexion of 
effects and causes cannot be even rudely marked out without taking 
those influences into consideration) could not with any 
advantage... be treated independently of political ethology..." 
(Mill 1974:906). This argument that politics cannot be studied 
separately since it is mixed up with the national character at 
every step is not very convincing, because the argument is not 
particular to politics - the same can apply to economics, too, for 
example: there are undoubtedly certain nationalities who can be 
said to have a greater business spirit than others. In contrast to 
Mill, Max Weber holds that modern politics in fact forms a 
separate field of human action which can be studied accordingly. 
In Politik als B e r u f , Weber, quite similar to Scheler, starts from 
an analogy to the economy as studied by Karl Marx. Both emphasize 
the analogy, but also that the respective fields are following 
quite unique laws of their own.157 Above, we saw how Scheler 
defined the specific function of science in modern societies. Now, 
how does Weber define politics? According to him, "engage in 
politics" means nothing else than "to seek to influence the 
distribution of power within and between political structures." 
(Weber 1948:83) How is this political realm defined? Weber 
wr i t e s :
"Everywhere the development of the modern sta­
te is initiated through the action of the 
prince. He paves the way for the expropriation
157 Weber says: "The direction of capitalist enterprises, de­
spite far-reaching analogies, follows quite different laws 
than those of political adminstration." Weber (1948:82)
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of the autonomous and 'private' bearers of 
executive power who stand beside him, of those 
who in their own right possess the means of 
administration, warfare, and financial organi­
zation, as well as politically usable goods of 
all sorts. The whole process is a complete pa ­
rallel to the development of the capitalist 
enterprise through gradual expropriation of 
the independent producers. In the end, the 
modern state controls the total means of 
political organization, which actually come 
together under a single head. No single 
official personally owns the money he pays 
out, or the buildings, stores, tools, and war 
machines he controls. In the contemporary 
'state' - and this is essential for the con­
cept state - the 'separation' of the adminis­
trative staff, of the administrative offi­
cials, and of the workers from the material 
means of administrative organization is com­
pleted." (Weber 1948:82)
Although sketched very roughly, these systemic distinctions are 
the ground on which later versions of social theory could find a 
point of departure for their functional and systemic approaches. 
In what follows, I shall take Luhmann's theory as a major refe­
rence point when discussing the differentiation of society into 
subsystems, and the interrelations between them. In his theory, 
politics is that functional subsystem of society in which
" 58collectively binding decisions are taken."
158 Early versions of systems theory saw the political system as 
closely connected to the legal system and sometimes actually
conceived them to be inseparable. For example, Karl Deutsch
suggested conceiving of only one legal-political system.
(Deutsch 1963) Luhmann objected to this view quite rightly
that "solange man mit einer Systemtheorie arbeitete, die auf 
verdichtete Interdependenzen im Vergleich zu gelocketerten 
Interdependenzen im Verhältnis zur Umwelt abstellte, war in 
der Tat nur ein System zu sehen. Diese Theorie muß jedoch 
einen unabhängigen Beobachter voraussetzen, der diese 
Interdependenzen 'objektiv' feststellt. Einen solchen
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As we shall see in a moment, the most convincing solution to the 
problem of distinguishing system and environment is to attribute 
everything which is not part of the system to the environment. 
Thus each of these systems conceives all other systems and the 
environment (such as technology and natural resources) as its 
environment. Note that economy, politics or science have to take 
into consideration the characteristics of existing technology. 
This may influence the systemic behaviour in many ways. Consider: 
politics is confronted with dangerous technologies as a problem of 
legitimation; economy which is keen on certain most profitable 
technologies; scientific research is dependent on technological 
apparatus and research funds.
Fig. 3.3
Beobachter gibt es nicht. Alles Beobachten erfolgt durch 
Beobachter, die ihrerseits empirische, also konditionierte, 
also beobachtbare Systeme sind..." (Luhmann 1988c:4).
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Usually the production of technology itself is conceived of as 
an economic activity, i.e. firms are concerned with the construc­
tion of new technologies. On this view, technology is interpreted 
in a E-T matrix where firms develop technology in their R&D 
departments or buy them from other firms. Economic activity is 
seen as including technological activities, or, to put it the 
other way round, technology is a special case of economic
15 9activity. Although this is a rather crude and narrow version of 
the social dimension of technology, it may serve the purpose to 
illustrate a "technological trajectory". A reason for such a 
"technological trajectory" is the role of fixed capital. As Hughes 
put it,
"The durability of artifacts and of knowledge 
in a system suggests the notion of trajectory, 
a physical metaphor similar to momentum.
Modern capital-intensive systems possess a 
multitude of durable physical artifacts.
Laying off workers in labour-intensive systems 
reduces momentum, but capital-intensive sys­
tems cannot lay off capital and interest pay­
ments on machinery and processes. Durable phy­
sical artifacts project into the future the 
socially constructed characteristics acquired 
in the past when they were designed." (Hughes 
1987:77)
Consider now the enlarged view: here we have scientific, economic 
and political factors shaping technology. Additionally, a new 
technology must be a technology which fulfils certain standards of 
engineering. A new technology thus has to pass four "filters": 
politics, science, economics and engineering. Since this interplay
159 As Max Adler (1964:32) put it: "Wirtschaft und Technik sind 
gar nicht zwei verschiedene Faktoren, die aufeinander wirken 
könnten, sondern sie sind nur zwei Seiten eines und 
desselben Prozesses, des gesellschaftlichen Lebens- und 
Arbeitsprozesses..."
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takes time, we have to reckon with a certain inertia of technolo­
gical development; it is unlikely that all the time technological­
ly revolutionary "shocks" occur. Quite on the contrary, it is 
likely that a process of diffusion and saturation occurs.*60
Piore and Sabel try to explain both technological trajectories and 
historical turning points. Their "possible worlds approach"161 may 
be seen as akin to the "social construction of technology" ap­
proach when they stress that there is no "absolute best techno­
logy": "Thus although the winning design had to meet some minimum
performance standard, the sweep of its success was not a proof of 
unrivaled technical superiority, nor of the existence of a narrow 
track of progress: other variants could have served as well. Power 
in the market, not efficiency (in the sense of a uniquely appro­
priate application of technology) decided the contest." (Piore and 
Sabel 1984:40) Once a breakthrough has been made, many competitors 
choose to follow a proven approach "rather than risk failing to 
find one more suited to their needs." (ibidem) From this the 
authors conclude that "in the world of possible worlds, relatively 
short periods of technological diversification punctuate longer 
periods of uniformity. The technical knowledge that is accumulated 
during the interludes of diversity creates the possibility of di­
vergent breakthroughs: branching points. At these technological 
divides, the different political circumstances in different re­
gional or national economies moves technology down correspondingly 
different paths." (Piore and Sabel 1984:39) Thus they suggest the
160 Economists call this "absorbing Markov processes". I shall 
return in ch.4 to the problem of "stasis".
161 This approch has been developed by Stalnaker and Lewis (and
before them, of course, by Leibnitz). For a good discussion
of the theory with respect to economic history, see Elster
(1978). See also the critical remarks by Lukes (1980).
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"I would interpret the Marxian position to be 
that it is the changing requirements of indus­
try and the altering perception of economic 
needs which provide the stimulus to the pur­
suit of specific forms of scientific know­
ledge. But I would also conclude that the 
Marxian position cannot be adequately descri­
bed as a demand-induced approach without doing 
a severe injustice to the subtelty of Marx's 
historical analysis. For the ability to apply 
science to the productive sphere turn upon 
industry's changing capacity to utilize such 
knowledge... Nor did Marx argue that the his­
torical sequence in which scientific disci­
plines actually developed was also determined 
by economic needs... This strongly suggests at 
least some degree of independence and autonomy 
on the part of science in shaping the sequence 
of industrial change..." (Rosenberg 1976b:135- 
6; see also Capital 1 ;434, 567).
3.3.1. Criticisms: System and environment
In contrast to the above-mentioned model of a "technological 
trajectory", several authors have developed a different approach. 
Pinch and Bijker (1987) speak of a "multidirectional development 
of technology"; Callon (1987) assumes an "actor-network" which 
contains animate and non-animate components; Law (1987) in a 
similar vein, coins the notion of "heterogenuous engineering"; van 
den Belt and Rip (1987) assume a "nexus" between technological 
trajectory and the selection environment (which they see embodied 
in patent law in an exemplary way). All these concepts try to 
avoid what the authors think to be an inherent difficulty of 
evolutionary theory: the distinction between system and
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environment.165 As Callon rightly states: "The systems concept
presupposes that a distinction can be made between the system 
itself and its environment. "‘t66 (Callon 1987:100). But "how do we 
define the limits of a system and explain concretely the influence 
of the environment?" (Callon 1987:100) The main difference to 
Darwinian systems is seen in the fact that in the case of 
technology the selecting criteria are not just given, but 
socially-shaped. Van den Belt and Rip make this point following 
Elster (1984:6): "In biological evolution, although mutations are 
random, the selection process is deterministic; that is there are 
'well defined criteria for accepting or rejecting any given 
mutation.' (Elster). In societal evolution involving technological 
development, even the selection process is far from deterministic: 
Intentions and expectations play a role..." (van den Belt and Rip 
1987:140-1) In other words: actors try to change the actions of 
others and thereby change their environments. "Thus the assumption 
of a selection environment that is truly independent of a particu­
lar technological trajectory is hard to justify." (id.) Against 
this argument three points can be made167 :
165 From this basic assumption follow the different attempts to
resolve the problem: whether "nexus", "actor-network" or
"heterogenous engineering", all try to dissolve the bounda­
ries between system and environment.
166 The theoretical problems which the authors pose themselves
thus arise from a misconception of technology: only if one
tries to define technology as a social system, does the
difficulty of distinguishing system and environment arise. 
Yet another consequence follows from some of their 
approaches: those who think that technology cannot be
regarded as a social system seem to reject systems theory 
tout court (Mayntz is an exception in this respect).
167 As I pointed out in 3.1.2., there is an important difference
between biological evolution on the one hand and social and
technological evolution on the other. This difference lies
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First, if we take into account unintended consequences of human 
action, we cannot assume strategic action to be always successful 
(see Douglas 1986). In this case we again get blind events, which 
can be studied from an observer's standpoint with the help of 
evolutionary models.
Second, there are inherently technical factors which determine a
special course of development in some cases. We can illustrate
this point again with an example from biology. As Gould has
pointed out, "Galileo argued that the bone of a large animal must
thicken disproportionally to provide the same relative strength as
the slender bone of a small creature... This simple principle of
differentiatal scaling with increasing size may well be the most
important determinant of organic shape. J.B.S. Haldane once wrote
that 'comparative anatomy is largely the story of the struggle to
increase surface in proportion to volume'. Yet its generality
extends beyond life, for the geometry of space contains ships,
buildings, and machines, as well as animals." (Gould 1973:173-5).
Gould then presents medieval churches as a testing ground for the
effects of size and shape. There are inherent barriers for the
size of a church, because
"the area of outer walls and windows would 
increase as length cubed. In other words, the 
area of the windows would increase far more
in the different speed of development and the higher 
capacity of the social field in recombining its elements in 
innumerable ways. Evolution of biological species is a rela­
tively slow process which leads to specialisation of natural 
characteristics. Evolution of social forms and of technolo­
gies is a relatively fast process of differentiation and 
recombination of its elements. The last aspect thus deserves 
our special attention (see Luhmann 1984a:569; Tiezzi 1985; 
and see chapter 5).
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slowly than the volume that requires illumina­
tion... Large organisms, like large churches, 
have very few options open to them. Above a 
certain size, large terrestrial animals look 
basically alike - they have thick legs and 
relatively short, stout bodies. Large medieval 
churches are relatively long and have abundant 
outpunchings. The 'invention' of internal 
organs allowed animals to retain the highly 
successful shape of a simple exterior enclo­
sing a large internal volume; the invention of 
internal lighting and structural steel has 
permitted modern architects to design large 
buildings of essentially "cubic form. The li­
mits are expanded, but the laws still ope­
rate.” (Gould 1973:175-7) 8 .
This may be an illuminating illustration when discussing the ques­
tion of technological autonomy or technological trajectories. A 
small car probably cannot be a large car writ small; neither can 
the opposite obtain. In ignoring this, the Ford motor company had 
to make an unpleasant experience:
The troubles that the Ford Motor Car Company 
had in the 1930s producing a compact car 
suggest that some of their problems resulted 
from the fact that they presumed small cars 
are made the same way as large cars: take a 
big car and shrink it. Since Ford knew how to 
make large cars, they thought there was no 
problem..." (Weick 1979:6)
But even if technology develops in accordance with the laws of 
size and shape, it eventually arrives at a halting point. To 
advance technology, new technological solutions must be available. 
We may apply this insight to other dimensions as well, such as 
reliability, life-span, energy-balance of technical artifacts. In
168 As a schoolboy, I was always struck by the example that
there are limits in length for a rope which is hanging
freely. At a certain length it will inevitably break,
because it cannot bear its own weight.
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so doing, we can derive a dynamic model of technical change in 
which periods of simple extension alter with periods of technical 
revolutions. The first phase is characterised by extending 
existing technical principles (such as: bigger, smaller, faster, 
slower, lighter, heavier, more silent, more powerful etc., see 
Rammert 1988). The second phase is characterised by a technical 
invention which helps to overcome a restriction, an obstacle to 
further development. There are several theoretical formulations of 
this problem, such as Hughes' "reverse salients", or Rosenbergs 
"bottlenecks” . Furthermore, there seems to exist an equivalent on 
the economic level in the decrease of returns ("Grenznutzen") or 
in absorbing Markov processes: in these cases a point of
saturation is reached, beyond which no further investment is 
o p t i m a l .
Third, all the approaches discussed above have one basic flaw in 
common: it is their anthropomorphic model of social action and
evolution. Only by placing human action ( ’individuals') in the 
centre of analysis do they arrive at their conclusions. MacKenzie 
most clearly expresses this (mistaken) view when he writes: 
"[A]ctors create and maintain systems, and if they fail to do so, 
the systems in question cease to exist." (MacKenzie 1987:197) And 
Hughes, on whom MacKenzie builds his argument, takes the same view 
in stressing the actor-dependent characteristics of technological 
systems: "Because they are invented and developed by system
builders and their associates, the components of technological 
systems are socially constructed artifacts." (Hughes 1987:52). For 
this reason, "the convention of designating social factors as the 
environment, or context, of a technological system should be 
avoided." (Hughes 1987:52) But what if we reverse the two? Could 
we not imagine technology as part of the environment of social 
systems? I think this is the solution to the problem which, how­
ever, the authors under discussion here cannot allow for. Instead
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of treating technology as the environment of social systems, the 
heroic actions of individual "system builders" must fulfil the 
theoretical blank in the analysis of technology.
Before going into greater detail on the questions of evolution 
and systems theory (chapter 4), I shall keep attention for the 
remainder of this chapter on Marx's own analysis. Next I shall 
discuss Marx's alleged technological determinism (3.4.), the 
question of technological alienation (3.5.) and the division of 
labour (3.6.).
3.4. Marx - a technological determinist?
Discussing the question of technological determinism in Marx, we 
should first of all devote some attention to the problem of
determinism in Marx per se.
Marx is often interpreted as an economic determinist. This
interpretation holds that Marx's 'iron laws of h istory’ rest on
the paramount role of economic motives for social development.
From the German Ideology where he sets up his research programme
of investigating into the "life-process of the real individuals"
(CW 5 :35) to his later Critique of Political Economy he is
obsessed with the important role economic factors play in social
life. A very clear expression of this view is the all-too-famous
"base-superstructure" metaphor. According to this model, it is
clear that the economic base is far more important than the
political, juridical or cultural superstructure:
"In the social production of their life, men 
enter into definite relations that are indis­
pensable and independent of their will, rela­
tions of production which correspond to a de­
finite stage of development of their material
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productive forces. The sura total of these re­
lations of production constitutes the economic 
structure of society, the real basis, on which 
rises a legal and political superstructure, 
and to which correspond definite forms of 
social consciousness. The mode of production 
of material life conditions the social, poli­
tical and intellectual life process in gene­
ral. It is not the consciousness of men that 
determines their being, but, on the contrary, 
their social being that determines their 
consciousness." (CW 29:263).
169Nevertheless, Marx was also a social determinist. This is to 
say that his main interest in explaining historical change was in 
social institutions. This is already indicated by the last sen­
tence in the above-quoted passage from the 1859 Preface♦ In so 
doing, he did not concentrate on individual behaviour nor on 
economic relations "as such". Rather, his approach consisted in a 
specific conception of the social sphere which has its own dyna­
mics. In this sense, Marx was a follower of Hegel; there was 
nothing strange in Marx suggesting that social institutions 
develop according to their own purposes and goals. It has been, 
and, perhaps, still is, fashionable to deride such an approach and 
to assimilate it to another Hegelian concept, viz. the march of 
the Weltgeist through history. But if a rigorous attempt to 
explain decisive historical developments in terms of individuals' 
actions fails (and I think it does), then some kind of 'social 
determinism' will be needed, as developed by sociological 
theories, be they structural, systems or functional approaches. In 
chapter 2, I have analysed Marx's philosophical anthropology; we
169 I need not conceal that in my view this metaphor is not very 
illuminating; on the contrary, it often obfuscates illumina­
ting insights (see, also, Lukes (1982) for a critique). But 
it need also be said that Marx thereby formulated a problem 
which served as a starting point for sociological research. 
See only Weber (1905) and Mannheim (1936).
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may label his intentions there as "ethical individualistic" ones. 
But this normative dimension has to retreat when describing or 
explaining social reality. Marx was aware of this, as he made 
clear in the foreword to Capital 1 : "I paint the capitalist and 
the landlord in no sense couleur de rose. But here individuals are 
dealt with only in so far as they are the personifications of 
economic categories, embodiments of particular class-relations and 
class-interests. My standpoint, from which the evolution of the 
economic formation of society is viewed as a process of natural 
history, can less than any other make the individual responsible 
for relations whose creature he socially remains, however much he 
may subjectively raise himself above them.""70
Marx's social determinism is most clearly expressed in Capital♦ 
In respect of technology, his position is the following: machinery 
can be employed in completely different ways. Capitalism employs 
it to the detriment of the producers; communism will employ it to 
the benefit of the producers. Thus it is good per s e , but bad 
under capitalist use. This offers him the theoretical possibility 
of achieving a social form which produces in a non-alienated way. 
Note that on the basis of a technological determinism such a 
perspective might be difficult. It would be difficult if the 
structure of technology were to impinge on a full development of
170 Many advocates of methodological individualism seem to 
confuse ethical and methodological individualism, to use a 
distinction of Lukes (1971). Or, as Teubner put it, they 
confuse moral-poiltical options with theory constructions 
(Teubner 1989a). Many theorists seem to incur the fallacy of 
embracing an individualistic approach because they consider 
themselves humanists.
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human needs and capacities.171
Turning now to Marx's technological determinism, we should first 
have a clear definition of technological determinism. If we define 
it in the strongest possible sense, it means that technology de­
termines other social spheres (logical determinism) and that it is 
the driving force for social change (historical determinism).*72 
On the first ("logical") level, we can distinguish between a 
strong and a weak notion. The strong notion would probably claim
171 The following passage from Capital 3 can be read as confir­
mation both for the economic and social determinism: "The
specific economic form, in which unpaid surplus-labour is 
pumped out of direct producers, determines the relationship 
of rulers and ruled, as it grows directly out of production 
itself and, in turn, reacts upon it as a determining 
element... It is always the direct relationship of the 
owners of the conditions of production to the direct pro­
ducers - a relation always naturally corresponding to a 
definite stage in the development of the methods of labour 
and thereby its social productivity - which reveals the 
innermost secret, the hidden basis of the entire social 
structure, and with it... the corresponding specific form of 
the state." (Capital 3 :791) As I shall claim, Marx's central 
notions sometimes do not permit of precise differentiation 
between legal, political and economic factors. The concepts 
"relations of production" and "productive forces" overlap; 
they cannot be defined independent of one another. In 
chapter 4, I shall return to this issue, this time seen from 
the viewpoint of Cohen's claim that the productive forces 
have primacy over the relations of production which is a 
technological determinist interpretation.
172 MacKenzie thus refers to both meanings when he writes: "To
be a technological determinist is obviously to believe that 
in some sense technical change causes social change, indeed 
that it is the most important cause of social change. But to 
give full weight to the first term in expressions such as 
"prime mover" and "independent variable", it would also have 
to be believed that technical change is itself uncaused." 
(MacKenzie 1984:474)
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that to one specific technology, one social form which is deter­
mined by this technology exactly corresponds. The weak notion 
would probably claim that to a specific technology a variety of 
social forms may correspond, which consequently are thus not 
determined by technology; rather, they are "allowed by" or "compa­
tible with" that technology. Marx sometimes invokes the weak, 
sometimes the strong notion. The weak version is present when he 
says that artisan technology was the technology of slavery and 
feudalism; the strong version is present when he says that 
capitalism is only capitalism when it is machine-based. However, 
the technological basis of capitalism (together with the coopera­
tive character of the labour process) will also serve communist 
society, which again would suggest the weak version of the argu­
ment. It seems that an evolutionary approach requires the weak 
version, because all elements of a new social form must be already 
present at the prior stage and are always common to both social 
forms.173
Turning to the historical dimension, we must note that Marx does 
not favour the technological argument. He says that both forces of 
production and relations of production are caught in an evolution­
ary development. There are examples of the importance of techno-
173 I think that the strong notion cannot be supported in a 
consistent way. The evolutionary approach advises us to 
subscribe to the weak notion. The weak notion does not 
allow for any combination, it only rules out specific 
combinations. We should thus take into consideration the 
possibility of functional equivalents (see Luhmann 1971). 
Marx, on some occasions, seems to forget his evolutionary 
approach because he cannot withstand the temptation to 
establish a rigid connection between technology and social 
form.
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logical factors174 as well as examples of the importance of social 
and political factors175 .
MacKenzie (1984) is also dealing with the question if Marx can
be called a technological determinist. Commenting on the 1859
Preface "as the definitive statement of historical materialism"
(MacKenzie 1984:476), he writes:
"Anything approaching a careful reading of it 
quickly reveals two things. First, to make it 
into a statement that machines make history, 
the "forces of production" would have to be 
interpreted as equivalent to technology.
Second, to make it into a strong technological 
determinism in the sense outlined above, the 
development of the forces of production would 
have to be taken as autonomous, or at least 
independent of the relations or production."
(MacKenzie 1984:476).
In my view, the first point causes no problems, since technology 
can be conceived as containing skills, knowledge, and 
experience.176 More intriguing is the second question. G.A. Cohen 
has tried to make the second point in the strongest possible way, 
claiming that "(a) The productive forces tend to develop 
throughout history (the Development thesis), (b) The nature of the
174 As when he holds that capitalism and communism cannot be 
based on artisan technology.
175 As when he holds that only with the abolition of the guild 
laws and the consequent establishment of a labour-market, 
only with the discovery of new continents and the import of 
precious metals (CW 6 :185) could capitalism grow up.
176 Habermas overemphasises these non-material elements of 
productive forces. He defines Produktivkräfte as consisting 
of a) labour power; b) knowledge which can be translated 
into productive techniques; c) knowledge which organises, 
mobilises and qualifies labour power. Cf. Habermas 
(1976:152-3).
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production relations of a society is explained by the level of 
development of its productive forces (the Primacy Thesis proper)." 
(Cohen 1978:134) Furthermore, Cohen's intention is "to use (a) as 
part of the argument for (b)." (Cohen 1978:153). In other words, 
if technology can be shown to be the unmoved prime mover, MacKen- 
zie's conditions would be fulfilled. I postpone the discussion of 
this point to chapter 4, but nevertheless will make a judgement at 
this point: Marx did not employ technological determinism in a
consistent way;177 rather, he was tempted several times to use it 
as an additional argument for his theory.
3.5. Technological alienation
My suspicion in 3.1.1. was that Marx runs into a theoretical dif­
ficulty when simultaneously endorsing an evolutionary approach 
towards technology and a normative humanist standpoint. Above, the 
two elements were made compatible by an interpretation which sees 
technological evolution as paralleled by an increase in human ca­
pacities. The total individuals were the result of an objective 
unfolding historical process, of "blind" evolution. But what if 
this diagnosis is not plausible? The tension between the two 
elements turns into a contradiction if the historical and the 
critical level cannot be reconciled. If there was to be no tech­
nology which permitted the realization of M a r x ’s humanist pro­
gramme, he would have remained pessimistic. In fact, as we shall 
see, underlying his theory was optimism.
3.5.1. Technological alienation in the Manuscripts 1861-3
177 See Heilbronner, (1967), for a statement that Marx was an 
explicit technological determinist.
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The forementioned problem gives me a strong reason for locating 
technological alienation in Marx's discourse of the Manuscripts 
1861-3. It is the characteristic of the machine itself (and not 
its employment by capital) which expropriates his abilities from 
the worker, which transfers his skill to the machine.
3efore going into greater detail, I first discuss briefly the 
notions of alienation, reification and fetishism.*78 The concept 
of fetishism derives from the Portuguese "feitico [lat. 
factitius] and means "artificial", "false" and "magic". It was 
first employed in ethnology, but also in philosophy (Schelling, 
Hegel, Kant), sociology (Comte), physics and psychoanalysis. It 
denotes the phenomenon when objects produced by people are 
invested with apparent power (cf. Seidel 1972). Objects do not 
have that power inherently, but the attribution of power to them 
by their producers generates their own apparent power. The fetish 
character of commodities arises because their social character is 
established only after the production i.e. after the use-values 
have experienced exchange and proven their exchange-value. If all 
labour would be performed as social labour from the outset, there 
could be no fetishism. Marx refers above all to commodity, money 
and capital fetishism; the first two he explains at the beginning 
of volume I of Capital; he returns to the third at several places 
throughout Capital, culminating in the "Trinitarian formula"
(volume II I ).
178 The term "Verdinglichung" was first used in a systematic way 
by Lukács, who, in his early formulation, suggested an iden­
tity of "Verdinglichung" and "Entfremdung". See his later 
self-criticism in the 1967 Preface to Geschichte und Klas- 
senbwufltsein. See also Petrovic (1983JT and Geras (1983b), 
for d e f i nitions.
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In a passage in the Grundrisse, Marx links the concept of 
alienation quite tightly to the concept of fetishism. There he 
compares the function of money with the function of "lists of 
current prices". He says: "Money... serves as such only because of 
its social (symbolic) property; and it can have a social property 
only because individuals have alienated their own social relation­
ship from themselves so that it takes the form of a thing." 
(Grundrisse:160). Lists of current prices provide information 
about the activities of all others on the world market (cf. p . 161) 
and are "the best proof of the way in which their own exchange and 
their own production confront individuals as an objective relation 
which is independent of them." (Grundrisse:161). The three 
concepts reification, fetishism, and alienation can be seen here 
as forming the structure of a situation "unworthy of human 
nature": (1) a social relation takes the shape of a thing; (2)
this thing is invested with a power of its own; (3) this power 
reacts upon the individuals as an independent force. (1) stands 
for reification, (2) for fetishism, (3) for alienation. Marx here 
compares money and lists of prices with the result that (2) does 
apply to money but not to the lists of prices. From this Marx 
seems to conclude that the "Aufhebung" of alienation is easier in 
the latter case. He writes: "In the case of the world market, the
connection of the individual with all, but at the same time also
the independence of this connection from the individual, have
developed to such a high level that the formation of the world
market already at the same time contains the conditions for going 
beyond it." (Grundrisse: 161)“79 .
179 Cf. Keynes' drastic statement which may serve here to make 
the distinction clearer. Writing about a furture society, he
says: "We shall be able to afford to dare to assess the
money-motive at its true value. The love of money as a
possession - as distinguished from the love of money as a
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Consider, now, an application of this triad to technology. O b ­
viously, (1) is not relevant here, since man's relationship to 
nature is nearly always mediated by things. The relation to nature 
is no social relation which then assumes the form of a thing, nay, 
it is already in the first place a "dinghaft" relation, it is in 
its very nature characterised by the use of things. However, (2) 
and (3) are relevant, as we can see in every treatment of the 
matter by Marx.
According to Ricoeur, Marx in his Paris Manuscripts employed a
Hegelian model when he analysed
"the inversion of human labour into an alien, 
foreign, seemingly transcendent entity. There­
fore, the transformation by which the subjec­
tive essence of labour... is abolished and 
lost in a power that seems to rule human exis­
tence becomes the paradigm for all similar 
processes. Something human is inverted into 
something which seems to be exterior, exter­
nal, superior, more powerful, and sometimes 
supernatural." (Ricoeur 1986:35).
Ricoeur rightly insists that - in contrast to the dogmatic Marx­
ists - there is no fundamental economic alienation from which all 
other forms of alienation are derived; rather, these other 
alienations are analogical to the Feuerbachian construction (cf. 
Ricoeur 1986:36). Consider, for example, Marx's description of 
money-fetishism:
"Their power [of gold and silver] appears as a 
kind of fate, and the consciousness of men, 
especially in social orders declining because
means to the enjoyments and realities of life - will be
recognised for what it is, a somewhat disgusting morbidity,
one of thise semi-criminal, semi-pathological propensities 
which one hands over with a shudder to the specialists in
mental disease" (Keynes 1931:329)
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of a deeper development of exchange-value 
relations, rebels against the power which a 
physical matter, a thing, acquires with 
respect to men, against the domination of the 
accused metal [verfluchtes Metall] which 
appears as sheer insanity." (CW 29 :487).
If Marx's enterprise is characterized by a strong anthropocentric 
(critical) approach, this must inevitably be in opposition to the 
"machino-centric" description of capitalist reality of produc-
I ontion. Marx, however, does not care, to show how an "Aufhebung"
of this contradiction is possible, how a new, socialist "machine"
can be imagined. Following the "materialist" advice of Marx, this
new "machine" would have to still emerge under the old conditions,
i.e. in capitalism. However, he himself does not show this and he
gives us no touchstone to indicate that it should at all. We can
only presume that he aimed at a similar thing when he writes:
"Es characterisiert überhaupt die capitali- 
stische Production, daß die Arbeitsbedingungen 
der lebendigen Arbeit selbständig, personnifi- 
cirt gegenübertreten, daß nicht der Arbeiter
180 Heidegger's position can be interpreted as a straightforward 
position of technological alienation. The "essence" of 
modern technology, according to him, can neither be under­
stood in terms of instrumentality (means-ends-relationship), 
nor in terms of human activity. The essence of modern tech­
nology is rather that it is concealing instead of revealing. 
"[M]odern technology does not unfold into a bringing-forth 
in the sense of p oiesis. The revealing that rules in modern 
technology is a challenging [Herausfordern], which puts to 
nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy which 
can be extracted and stored as such." (Heidegger 1978:296). 
Nature becomes an object of ordering, a "standing reserve". 
Even man is involved in this process, although he is never 
"transformed into mere standing reserve. Since man drives 
technology forward, he takes part in ordering as a way of 
revealing." (Heidegger 1978:300). This is not the place to 
deal with the exact structure of Heidegger's argument; 
suffice it to say that, for him, "[m]odern technology, as a 
revealing which orders, is thus no mere human doing." 
(ibidem).
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die Arbeitsbedingungen, sondern die Arbeitsbe­
dingungen den Arbeiter anwenden. Gerade da­
durch werden die letztren Capital und der 
Waarenbesitzer, der sie aneignet, Capitalist."
(MEGA II.3.6.:2014) .
According to this outline, a post-capitalist society would be a 
society in which the workers employ the means of production ("im 
Accusativ anwenden", as Marx says - instead vice versa, as in 
capitalism). The creation of a new social form (=abolishing of 
capital) is accompanied by a new technological form (=abolishing 
of enslaving work). Marx aims at overcoming these "contradictory 
forms" of social production: "Sobald diese gegensätzliche Form
wegfällt, ergibt sich also, daß sie dies Productionsmittel 
gesellschaftlich, nicht als Privatindividuen besitzen." (MEGA
I I .3.6.:2144).131
Since technology in capitalism assumes the form of fixed 
capital, two things exert domination over the worker: capital and 
technology. Capital and machinery in their evolution and in their 
functioning are acting in pairs, reinforcing each other, 
conditioning each other. The one is not possible without the 
other. It takes only a small step for Marx to assume that the 
Aufhebung of the capital-labour-relation would also lead to a 
Aufhebung of deskilling machinery. But Marx does not devote any 
discussion to this special problem. He only states in a very 
general way that workers in post-capitalist society will possess 
the means of production socially, not as private individuals.132
181 Note that the new must be already there and is set free 
("unfettered"). Cohen called this the "liberation of the 
content" (Cohen 1978).
182 Cf. MEGA II.3.6.:2144
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In the Manuscripts , Marx is a technological determinist when 
backward-looking and a social determinist when forward-looking. In 
Capital, Marx tries to get out of these theoretical difficulties 
and gives the following solution: his argument builds exactly on 
the "social character of labour". He claims that in capitalist 
modern industry the character of labour is immediately social and 
cooperative; all that needs to be done is the expropriation of 
capital. The advantage of this solution readily springs to mind: 
it is consistent with his evolutionary approach ("new productive 
forces do not drop from the sky", Grundrisse:278), and at the same 
time fits his normative criteria. Only in this way could he bring 
together the explanatory and the evaluative strand of his project. 
We may thus say that although his approach in Capital is far more 
"social determinism", he nevertheless allows for an technological 
argument, too. This occurs when he claims that the social 
institutions have to adapt to the "technical necessity" (Capital 
1:365) of the labour process.
3.5.2. How Marx changed his view: Manuscripts vs. Capital
It is most interesting to what degree Marx maintained this 
definition of machine and its corollaries in his final version of 
C apital. One could show in great detail how he used the material 
from the 1861-3 Manuscripts for the formulation of chapter 13 (15
in the English version) of Capital. But at first sight there seems 
to be a slight difference in the definition of the machine. In 
Capital, he defines it as follows: "The machine ... supersedes the
workman, who handles a single tool, by a mechanism operating with 
a number of similar tools, and set in motion by a single motive 
power, whatever the form of that power may be. (Capital 1 :355).
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Marx also repeats that skill of the worker is transferred to 
machinery: "Along with the tool, the skill of the workman in 
handling it passes over to the machine." (Capital 1 :396). But the 
"slight difference" turns out to be a radical cut between a 
machinery "as such" and the really existing one (of capitalism). 
He cites Ure for the two different aspects of the automatic 
factory ("automatische Fabrik" as Marx calls the "Atelier" now). 
The first is " '[C]ooperation of many orders of workpeople ... in 
tending with assiduous skill, a s_ystem of productive machines, 
continuously impelled by a central power' (the prime mover)" 
(Capital 1 : 394-5). The second is "a vast automaton, composed of
various mechanical and intellectual organs, acting in uniterrupted 
concert for the production of a common object, all of them being 
subordinate to a self-regulated moving force." (Capital 1 : 395).
Now look at Marx's comment: "The first description is applicable 
to every possible employment of machinery on a large scale, the 
second is characteristic of its use by capital, and therefore of 
the modern factory system." (Capital 1 :396).
But this distinction is completely artificial having no real 
basis in the text of Ure. Marx has nowhere shown what "every 
possible employment of machinery on a large scale" could mean. 
Additionally, the first passage of Ure in support of a "neutral" 
use of machinery is self-defeating. Here it is clearly expressed 
that the workers only overlook ("überwachen") a system of 
productive machinery. No virtuosity is inherent in the workers, as
'  8 3Marx himself asserts on the next page." Marx could not rest
183 "Hence, in the place of the hierarchy of specialised workmen 
that characterises manufacture, there steps, in the automa­
tic factory, a tendency to equalise and reduce to one and 
the same level every kind of work that has to be done by the 
minders of the machines..." (Capital 1 :396)
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content with such a perspective. Communism would have to abolish 
the reduction of workers into mere "appendages" to machinery. 
Marx, however, is a materialist. He could neither be content in 
proclaiming such a goal for communist society or advocate a return 
to the medieval "masterpiece" (see his polemic against Proudhon, 
CW 6 :190). He must show a real possibility for abolishing ensla­
vement in the production process which stems from technological 
factors.
It might be that Marx became aware, after the 1861-3 Manuscript 
that he was caught in the "technological trap", that he must 
provide a new technological "elementary form" for post-capitalist 
society which - this not being enough - must be already visible 
under present conditions. Since he could not provide this, he 
constructed it in a somewhat obtuse way from Ure's text. Marx has 
two possibile ways with which to defend his materialist programme:
(a) he can claim that machines can be used in other than 
capitalist ways;
(b) he can claim that under communism another technology will be
1 8 4used in the process of material production."
His strategy combines both points. He follows a) in that he 
takes great pains to show how the liberating potential of
184 But, as already indicated, this new technology would have to 
emerge first under capitalism. Or, taking up the formulation 
of Loh (1975), it would have to emerge as a new combination 
of existing elements.
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machinery is not (and cannot) be set free under capitalism. He
develops b) above all with respect to the character of the labour 
process (see 3.6.)
The introduced distinction, however, has big consequences for 
Marx's further analysis in C apital; we can say that it changes the 
character of his discourse completely. It becomes the guiding 
thread for the remainder of the 13th chapter. We find a dozen 
passages like the following: "Here as everywhere else, we must
distinguish between increased productiveness due to the develop­
ment of the social process of production, and that due to the 
capitalist exploitation of that process." (Capital 1 :398) Marx's 
strategy in chapter 15 is simple: he attributes all negative
features of machinery (essentially those which oppose his theory
of human nature) to the capitalist use; the positive features he
'  8 6attributes to "Maschierie an sich". ‘
Marx provides examples like intensification of work, child and 
woman-labour, lengthening of the working day etc. to prove the 
capitalist use. He stresses these features more than the transfer 
of skill. It is no exaggeration to say that he actually 
substitutes the one for the other. The two, however, are of a 
different theoretical status. The first is historical (and thus 
contingent) the second a n a l ytical. The only analytical instance
185
185 The main point is the increased productivity which allows 
the producing of more output with a given portion of labour 
power. This means that the working day can be reduced 
drastically; and free time, we knew with Marx, is important 
and left for the development of the individual, cf. MEGA 
I I .3.1.:275; MEGA 1 1 .3 . 6.:1909-10; 2088-9.
186 His evolutionary scheme thus anticipates a 'mutation' only 
of the relations, and the mode of, production, not of 
technology.
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(in Capital) is the (spurious) "Ure-distinction", the others are 
historical.187 Now Marx seems to overemphasize the difference 
between the use of machinery by capital and the character of 
machinery as such. The expropriation of skill is no longer 
central, as it was in the Manuscripts. To make it plain: if
capitalists would refrain from using women and children in the 
production process, from lengthening the working day past its 
natural limits etc. their use of machinery would nevertheless be 
capitalist (and not "neutral" application of machinery "as such").
Another instance for Marx's adherance to strategy a) is the fact
that machinery is used by capital as a tool for warfare against
the workers. As Berg pointed out, "Ure's automatic factory was the
image of war" (Berg 1982:201). Indeed, Marx himself was to use
this parallel, too. He writes:
"But machinery not only acts as a competitor 
who gets the better of the workman, and is 
constantly on the point of making him 
superfluous. It is also a power inimical to 
him, and as such capital proclaims it from the 
roof tops and as such makes use of it. It is 
the most powerful weapon for repressing 
strikes, those periodical revolts of the wor­
king-class against the autocracy of capital...
It would be possible to write quite a history 
of the inventions, made since 1830, for the 
sole purpose of supplying capital with weapons 
against the revolts of the working-class."
187 Needless to say that the Manuscripts abound with analytical
examples: "Diefl ist der sehr große Unterschied: ob die
vorhandnen Productionsmittel ihnen als Capital gegenüber­
stehn, und daher nur so weit von ihnen angeeignet werden 
können als nöthig um den surplusvalue and the surplusproduce 
for their employers zu vermehren, ob diese Productionsmittel 
sie beschäftigen, oder ob sie, als Subjekte, die Produc­
tionsmittel im Accusativ anwenden, um Reichtum für sich
selbst zu erzeugen." (MEGA I I .3.3.:1195)
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(Capital 1 :410-1)188 .
This warfare, according to him, is no technological feature;
rather, it is a social feature of class struggle, where
capitalists use machinery as weapon to become independent of
special workers' skills. To repeat; this is the approach Marx
adopts in Capital. In the Manuscripts, however, he additionally
defines the conflict as one between the "iron man" and the man "of
flesh and blood":
"Hier tritt auch die vergangne Arbeit - im 
Automaten und der von ihm bewegten Maschinerie 
als scheinbar unabhängig von der Arbeit 
selbstthätig, statt ihr untergeordnet sie 
unterordnet [should read: unterordnend, R . G . ] 
a u f , der eiserne Mann, gegen den Mann aus 
Fleisch und 3 1 u t . Die Subsumtion seiner Arbeit 
unter das Capital... die im Begriff der capi- 
talistischen Production liegt, erscheint hier 
als technologisches Factum. Der Frontstein ist 
fertig. Die todte Arbeit mit Bewegung begabt 
und die lebendige nur noch als eines ihrer be­
wußten Organe vorhanden." (MEGA I I . 3.6.:2057- 
8, my e m p h .).
188 See also the following passage from the Manuscr ipts: 
"Hier also erst recht die Entfremdung, die die objektiven 
Bedingungen der Arbeit - die vergangne Arbeit - gegen die 
lebendige annehmen, als direkter Gegensatz, indem die ver­
gangne Arbeit, also die allgemein gesellschaftlichen Kräfte 
der Arbeit, Naturkräfte und Wissenschaft eingeschlossen, 
direkt als Wa f f e n erscheinen, theils um Arbeiter aufs 
Pflaster zu w e r f e n , ... theils um seine Specialitat und die 
auf derselben gegründeten Ansprüche zu brechen, theils um 
ihn der im Fabrikwesen fertig organisierten Despotie und 
militärischen Disziplin des Capitals zu unterwerfen. In 
dieser From am entschiedensten erscheinen daher die aus der 
gesellschaftlichen Productivkraft der Arbeit und die von der 
Arbeit selbst gesetzten gesellschaftlichen Bedingungen der 
Arbeit, nicht nur als dem Arbeiter fremde, dem Capital gehö­
rige Kräfte, sondern als gegen den einzelnen Arbeiter im In­
teresse des Capitalisten feindlich und überwältigend gerich­
tete Kräfte. .. " (MEGA 1 1 .3.6.:2057-8, my emph.)
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This passage echoes again a formulation of Ure, who wrote in 1835:
"Thus the Iron M a n , as the operatives fitly 
call it, sprung out of the hands of our modern 
Prometheus at the bidding of Minerva - a
creation destined to restore order among the 
industrious classes, and to confirm to Great 
Britain the empire of art" (Ure 1835:367, 
cited in Berg 1982:201).
Though Ure says that "[t]he news of this Herculean prodigy spread 
dismay through the union, and even long before it left its 
craddle, so to speak, it strangled the Hydra of misrule," 
(ibidem), this does not to stand up to closer scrutiny. As 
Lazonick (1979), has shown, the shop-floor organisation continued
1 g aeven after the introduction of the self-acting mule.
However, the quote from Manuscripts also reveals that Marx
discerned alienation on the technological level alone. This comes
out when he uses the term Frontstein (keystone, coping stone)
which draws to mind architecture. The picture is of an arch which
189 See also the account of Piore and Sable: "In 1830 ... the 
Manchester engineering firm of Sharp, Roberts & Company 
introduced the self-acting mule, and promised its customers 
that the new equipment would allow the substitution of 
unskilled machine operators for skilled cotton spinners - 
thus putting an end to the spinners' union in the mills. 
Ure, a political economist and industrial consultant, 
popularized this claim as a statement of fact; Marx (who 
called Ure the Pindar of the factory) accepted this account 
and, as we saw, made it a starting point for his reflections 
on the decisive role of special-purpose machinery in modern 
industry. Yet the cotton spinner's role in production - part 
supervisor, part recruiter of labor - was far more complex, 
and management's grip on the shop-floor activity far more 
limited, than the machine maker, the consultant, and the 
theorist imagined. The spinners' (now called minders') union 
not only survived but gained extensive control over the use 
of the new technology." (Piore and Sabel 1984:45).
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is completed by a keystone. This keystone prevents the construc­
tion from collapsing and provides its stability. The worker gets 
expropriated of his skills and of his product; it is capital which 
accumulates both and represents itself as the living subject: dead 
labour which is able to move on its own; living labour which 
serves only as an appendage to it.
"Die Vermehrung der Produktivkraft, die aus 
der Theilung der Arbeit, dieser gesellschaft­
lichen Daseinsweise der Arbeit hervorgeht, ist 
also nicht nur Productivkraft des Capitals, 
statt Productivkraft des Arbeiters. Die ge­
sellschaftliche Form dieser combinirten Arbei­
ten ist das Dasein des Capitals gegen den Ar­
beiter; die Combination tritt ihm als über­
mächtiges Verhägni3 entgegen, der er verfallen 
ist durch die Reduction seines Arbeitsvermö­
gens auf eine ganz einseitige Function, die 
getrennt von dem Gesanmtmechanismus nichts 
is t . .. Er [d.Arbeiter, R . G . ] ist selbst zu ei- 
nem blosen Detail geworden." (MEGA II.3.1.:
254, my e m p h .).
"Mit der Maschinerie... erhält die Herrschaft der vergangenen Ar­
beit über die lebendige, nicht nur sociale,... sondern technolo­
gische Wahrheit." (MEGA I I .3.6.:2059. This passage contains in a 
nutshell both a technological determinist and a fetishist position 
- a position which Marx in Capital is going to blur.
3.6. Alienation and the division of labour
The concept of "division of labour" has had a long career from 
ancient Greek Philosophy to Political Economy of Marx's time. It 
is essentially a concept which lacks precision since every author 
and every epoch uses it in a different way. Authors, like Marx, 
who try to use the concept to cover many phenomena are thus easily 
confused in their argument.
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My claim is that the "division of labour" is a rather complex 
subject in Marx; it covers many things and this ensures confusion, 
if one does not distinguish very carefully between the different 
meanings. Marx himself was aware of this danger wnen he criticised 
Proudhon for using the concept "division of labour" in such a 
vague way. Marx's point was that the concept covers too many 
different things which do not have much in common and thus can 
hardly be understood by the term "divide" (cf. CW 6 :180)♦
It is most intriguing, too, to see the commentators of Marx 
slipping into quasi-contradictory statements: as, for example,
Stanley Moore, when he writes that Marx in the German Ideology 
indicates that "division of labour will be transcended in commu­
nist society" (Moore 1980:25), after a few lines stating that 
Marx, in the passage from the German Ideology, "depicts ... a 
situation where specialisation has ended but differentiation of 
functions remains" (ibidem). Similarly, Agnes Heller writes: 
"Without doubt the social division of labour will cease, and with 
it the division of society into exploiters and exploited ..." 
(Heller 1976:105). However, only five lines below she considers it 
possible that in Marx's framework "a division of labour continues 
to exist in another sense of the term" (ibidem). This pinpoints 
the problem: we must know which sense of the term we mean when
talking about the concept "division of labour".
But why, then, am I interested at all in the concept and espe­
cially in connection with technology? I think that both technology 
and the division of labour are essential for Marx's discussion of 
the "good society", i.e. for his communist perspective. Both tech­
nology and division of labour in communist society must be of a 
kind that they exert minimal "enslaving effects" on individuals. 
But both are, on the other hand, main "agents" in the development
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of the preconditions for a communist society. They develop possi­
bilities of transport and communication (world market), reduce the 
social necessary labour, lead to an increase in productivity: in
short, they contribute to the creation of real wealth. But they do 
not bring about this real wealth completely; all they do under 
capitalist relations is produce material wealth ("sachlicher 
Reichtum"), and this only in antagonistic forms (poverty, economic 
crises etc.) Marx's concept of division of labour has - like his 
concept of technology - an historical, and critical dimension.
3.6.1. The concept in Marx
In what follows, I am especially interested in the question how 
Marx, similar to his treatment of technology, employed a "double" 
concept of division of labour. More specifically, I am asking if 
Marx was consistent on the historical and critical level when 
discussing the division of labour.
In his early writings the concept of division of labour is
1 90almost completely critical. The division of labour is an evil 
which leads to the fragmentation of individuals (separation of 
manual and mental tasks) and to the fragmentation of mankind 
(separation into classes) and which, therefore, must be abolished. 
Ricoeur convincingly argues that in the German Ideology the con­
cept of 'division of la b o u r ’ has the same function as 'alienation'
190 As Evans has pointed out, Marx in his early Paris Manus­
cripts "accepts Smith's views on the division of labour, and 
follows him in his failure to distinguish between the social 
division of labour and the workshop division of labour; or 
between the division of labour in Manufacture and the divi­
sion of labour in Modern Industry. Later, Marx was to see 
Smith as the political economist of the period of Manufac­
ture." (Evans 1984:142-3).
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in the Paris Manuscripts. (1986:84). However, as Fetscher puts 
it, Marx in his mature works "no longer pretends that the division 
of labour will altogether disappear. Certainly there will be dif­
ferent social functions and people to fill them..." (Fetscher 
1973:461)192
191
The Poverty of Philosophy may be regarded as a turning point 
where Marx partly continues his critical approach, approvingly 
citing Adam Smith's point that people's different abilities were 
not so much the cause but the effect of the division of labour: "A 
porter differs less from a philosopher than a mastiff from a 
greyhound. It is the division of labour which has set a gulf 
between them." (CW 6 :180)193 .
But, on the other hand Marx in this text approaches economic 
concepts (in opposition to Proudhon) in a historical and
191 But even in the German Ideology we find one instance for the 
necessity of a social division of labour - see CW 5 :47.
192 See, also Moore, (1980:41) for the same view. This interpre­
tation is further supported by the following statement from 
Capital where Marx speaks of the "...fully developed
individual... to whom the different social functions he 
performs, are but so many modes of giving free scope to his 
own and acquired powers." (Capital 1 :488, my emph.); cf. 
also Critique of the Gotha Programme: "[W]hat social
functions will remain in existence [in communist society] 
that are analogous to present state functions? This question 
can only be answered scientifically.." (SW 3 :26).
193 But Marx is not consistent here. A few pages later he speaks
of the "separation of the different parts of labour, leaving 
to each one the opportunity of devoting himself to the
speciality best suited to h i m ..." (CW 6 :183, my emph.) This 
is also the position adopted in the later works; it appears
under the label of 'natural' division of labour which Marx
thinks exists in every social formation, i.e. division of 
labour based on sex, age, personal endowments, geographical 
factors etc. (cf. Capital 1:351).
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explanatory way. Thus he stresses the fact that general concepts 
like division of labour may cover many different things which do 
not have much in common and thus can hardly be understood by the 
term "divide" (see CW 6 :180). This insight Marx derived from his 
reading of Ure and Babbage during his stay in Brussels in 1845 
(see Evans 1984:143). It was especially lire’s emphasis that the 
periods of manufacture and automatic machinery were completely 
distinct which motivated him to reject Proudhon. According to his 
new view, the division of labour is no universal phenomenon but 
rather limited to a specific historical epoch. It partly occured 
in ancient Greece*94 but it was only fully developed under the 
conditions of commodity production on the basis of different 
professions i.e. in capitalism's early period of manufacture.195
It is interesting to see to what degree The Poverty of Philosophy 
anticipates the discussion of C apital. It is a most intriguing 
issue since both works contain a certain tension with respect to 
the evaluation of machinery and division of labour. On the one 
hand, Marx assumes that the introduction of machinery leads to a
194 Xenophon, Plato, Aristotle, Thukydides were concerned with
quality (and hence use-value): it was therefore assumed that 
each man should dedicate himself only to one art, work etc. 
They also assumed an innate capacity of each individual to 
perform certain work. Marx reports: "Die verschiedenen
Bedürfnisse in einem Gemeinwesen erheischen verschiedene 
Thätigkeiten zu ihrer Befriedigung; die verschiedenen 
Anlagen befähigen verschiedene Menschennaturen besser zu 
dieser als jener Thätigkeit. Daher Theilung der Arbeit und 
ihr entsprechend verschiedne Stände. Was Plato überall als 
die Hauptsache hervorhebt, daß so jedes Werk besser gethan 
wird." (MEGA II.3.1.:259-9).
195 The main difference between ancient Greece and the period of 
Manufacture was that the ancient division of labour was 
concerned with the quality of products whereas Manufacture 
was concerned with qua n t i t y ; see Adam Smith's famous example 
of the pin-production.
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further fragmentation of the worker. Thus he writes in The Poverty
of Philosophy:
With the introduction of machinery the divi­
sion of labour inside society has increased, 
the task of the worker inside the workshop has 
been simplified... the human being has been 
further fragmented. (CW 6 :188, amended 
transl.).
In Capital we read:
[T]he detail-worker of today, crippled by 
life-long repetition of one and the same 
trivial operation, and thus reduced to a mere 
fragment of a man... [will be replaced] by the 
fully developed individual..." (Capital 1:
458) .
But, on the other hand, Marx suggests that the introduction of
Machinery leads to a variation of aptitudes, ultimately to a more
fully-developed individual. In the The Poverty of Philosophy we
read that a trend toward universality arises, "the tendency
towards an integral development of the individual begins to be
felt." (CW 6 :190) In C apital, Marx gives the reason for this
development:
Modern industry, through its catastrophes,
imposes the necessity of recognizing, as a 
fundamental law of production, variation of
work, consequently the fitness of the labourer 
for varied work, consequently the greatest
possible development of his varied aptitudes.
(Capital 1 :458).
The meaning of this passage is not only that because 'fitness for 
varied work' is functional for capitalism it is realised. It is 
also a statement about every modern industrial society, not only 
in its capitalist form. As Fetscher observed, "the very nature of 
modern industrial production and the rapid change of its 
technology will demand more many-sided individuals..." (Fetscher 
1973:461).
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But note, also, a very subtle difference between The Poverty of 
Philosophy and Capital. In The Poverty of Philosophy Marx 
ridicules Proudhon's juxtaposition of the division of labour and 
machinery :
"Nothing is more absurd than to see in 
machinery the antithesis of the division of 
labour, the synthesis restoring unity in 
divided labour." (CW 6 :186) .
But it seems that Capital comes close to exactly this position. 
Here Marx on the one hand claims that machinery has stopped the 
division of labour on the other, emphasizing the cooperative and 
social character of production. I return to this question in a 
moment.
In the Grundrisse, Marx stresses the beneficial consequences of 
the division of labour for the prospects of mankind. This 
judgement is based on the the important contribution of the 
division of labour for the development of the productive forces. 
In one passage Marx attributes to the division of labour the role 
of the 'driving force' of historical dynamics which in the end 
will lead to the supersession of capitalism (see Grundr i s s e : 159). 
The critical evaluation of this process is shifted to what we 
might call 'powerlessness' of individuals. It refers to the fact 
that individuals have to subordinate themselves under relations
’ n rwhich exist independently of them and which are alien to them.*
Individuals are subsumed under social produc­
tion; social production exists outside them as 
their fate; but social production is not sub­
sumed under individuals, manageable by them as 
their common wealth." (Grundrisse:158).
196 As we shall see below, this is the essence of Marx's 
critique of capitalism, a critique which informs his view of 
a communist society.
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We may conclude from this that Marx would allow for a certain
social division of labour, as far as it is the product of the
197associated individuals.
Heller summarised Marx's intention very well: "Marx attacks
those theoreticians who tie the specialisation which arises from 
centralisation to capitalist relations of production, 'as if the 
division of labour were not likewise possible if its conditions
belonged to the associated workers, and were regarded by the lat­
ter as their own activity, which they are by their very nature.'" 
(Heller 1976:108; Marx quote in Theories of Surplus Value, cf. 
MEGA I I .3.4. : 1405 ) Heller contends that the bourgeois economists 
want to achieve by this identification a justification for the 
capitalist mode of production. As Marx put it, they seek "a tech­
nological justification for the specific social form, i.e. capita­
list form, in which the relationship of labour to the conditions 
of labour is turned upside down, so that it is not the worker who 
makes use of the conditions of labour, but the conditions of la­
bour which make use of the worker." (cited in Heller, ibdidem; cf 
also MEGA II. 3.4. : 1409 )198 .
This overview has not only shown how closely the historical and 
critical level are intertwined in Marx's discussion of the divi­
sion of labour and modern industry, but also that his critical 
approach is not unequivocal. He considers division of labour to be
197 Selucky in his (otherwise illuminating) treatment of the
division of labour is thus mistaken when he says: "3e that
as it may, Marx and Engels wanted to abolish the division of 
labour." (Selucky 1979:10)
198 Cf., also Habermas' claim that technolcgy in late capitalism 
takes the form of ideology, since "Sachzwänge" are blamed 
instead of obsolete power relations. See Habermas 
(1971b:59).
226
both a positive and negative thing at one and the same time. The 
positive side is that it contributes to the increase in producti­
vity, thus contributing to the material preconditions for commu­
nist society. The negative side is that it contributes to ensla­
ving effects i.e. that individuals get subsumed under a life-long 
task which hinders their development into "total" individuals.199 
Now, it would be naive to think that communism could do away with 
the division of labour because the necessary levels of material 
wealth would already exist. The reproduction of wealth recquires a 
certain social organization of labour, which may be called "divi­
sion of labour". From this follows that communist society must 
develop a social form of division of labour which exercises no 
enslaving effects.200 Unfortunately, Marx dedicated little atten­
tion to the topic of division of labour in society. It seems that 
he would see an inverse relationship between the division of la­
bour inside the factory and the division of labour in society: the 
less division of labour inside the factory, the more division of 
labour in society. My conjecture is that he does see the trend
199 In Capital 1 :343 Marx cites Urquardt with approval: "To
subdivide a man is to execute him, if he deserves the sen­
tence, to assassinate him if he does not... The subdivision 
of labour is the assassination of a people."
200 Both in the early German Ideology and in the Critique of the 
Gotha Program, from 1875 Marx explicitly assumes separate 
"social functions" to exist in a communist society. See CW 
5:47? SW 3:19,26? see also G r u n drisse:158.
201 Actually, the place where this quote occurs deals with manu­
facture but I think it fits the stage of machinery as well: 
"The division of labour in the workshop implies concentra­
tion of the means of production in the hands of one capita­
list; the division of labour in society implies their dis­
persion among many independent producers of commodities...
[I ]n a society with capitalist production, anarchy in the 
social divsion of labour and despotism in that of the work­
shop are mutual conditions the one of the other..." (Capital
227
towards a functionally-differentiated society, which, however, 
will be reversed at a certain stage of historical development.202
3.6.2. The Division of Labour: Manuscripts vs. Capital
As I said, Marx's main interest was to reduce the fragmentary
effects of the division of labour and, as a prerequisite
thereto, the exploration of the possibility. Marx, at least from
the Grundrisse onwards, knows a natural division of labour which
is based on personal endowments and geographical and climatic 
203factors and an occupational, professional division of labour 
which found its most adequate expression in the system of
1:336-7). Capitalist society is only able to organize its 
tasks with the help of despotism and anarchy which to Marx 
must have appeared as a very undesirable state of affairs.
202 See also Elster: "Like Weber and Dürkheim, Marx thus saw the
progress of history up to the present as one of constant
differentiation. Unlike them, he did not see this as an
irreversible process, but predicted that there would occur a 
final stage of integration, or loss of differentiation." 
(Elster 1985:113).
203 "Hodgskin bemerkt richtig, daß Theilung der Erwerbszweige,
also der gesellschaftlichen Arbeit, in allen Ländern und
unter allen politischen Institutionen Platz greift. Sie 
existirt ursprünglich in der Familie, wo sie naturwüchsig
aus physiologischen Unterschieden, Geschlechts- und Alters­
unterschieden hervorgeht. Die Verschiedenartigkeit der 
individuellen Organisationen, körperlichen und geistigen 
Anlagen wird neue Quelle derselben. Dann aber kömmt durch
verschiedne Naturbedingungen ... [geographischer und klima­
tischer Art, R.G.], Verschiedenheit in den natürlich Vorge­
fundenen Arbeitsinstrumenten hinzu, die die Erwerbszweige 
verschiedner Stämme theilt und in dem Austausch derselben 
haben wir überhaupt die ursprüngliche Verwandlung von 
Product in Waare zu suchen." (MEGA I I .3.1.:266-7).
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manufacture, modern industry destroys this division of labour and 
leads to a form of cooperation.204 Marx's political perspective is
20 5to regulate this cooperation socially and to allow for an all­
round education and training of the whole working population 
(Capital 1 :458). He refuses to return to the ideal of the 
craftsman as Ricoeur pointed out:
For Marx, we must push the industrial system 
to its last consequences in order to achieve a 
solution at the level of the illness. The 
nostalgia of romantics fo.r an earlier labour 
situation is thus misplaced. The craft worker 
who made a complete work still did not control 
the market; the value of the work was 
determined by someone else." (Ricoeur 1986:53)
Marx strongly opposed a life-long subordination of individuals to 
specialised tasks in all of his works; in other words, he opposed 
a fusion of occupational ar I technical division of labour. The 
division of labour within society is, however, a broader concept 
than the division of tasks: the occupational division of labour is 
only one part of the social division of labour.
204 According to Marx the concept of cooperation is the
universal form of which the division of labour is only a
special case: "Dieß ist die Grundform, Theilung der Arbeit
setzt Cooperation voraus oder ist nur eine spezifische Weise 
derselben.. Die Cooperation ist die allgemeine Form, die 
allen gesellschaftlichen Arrangements zur Vermehrung der 
Productivität der gesellschaftlichen Arbeit zu Grund 
liegt... Cooperation ist also zunächst das unmittelbare 
nicht durch den Austausch vermittelte - Zusammenwirken 
vieler Arbeiter zur Production desselben Resultats..." (MEGA
I I .3.1.:229-30) "So z.B. Fischfang. Resultat wenn viele auf 
einmal - wie bei der Jagd. Bauen von Eisenbahnen. Graben von 
Kanälen etc." (MEGA I I .3.1.:231) .
205 Cf. Capital 1 :400: "The factory code ... is but the capita­
list caricature of that social regulation of the labour-
process which becomes requisite in cooperation on a great 
scale, and the employment in common, of instruments of 
labour and especially of machinery."
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The following figure may help to clarify the different levels 
and meanings of the concept "division of labour":
Fig. 3.4: Division of labour in society
Factories
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No doubt the base-superstructure stands behind this model. How­
ever, from this model arises an important ambiguity: what Marx 
calls "division of labour in society" is sometimes a synonym for 
"social functions", sometimes it describes everything outside the 
factory. But these two meanings are not identical, as is evident: 
productive activity inside the factory is one important social 
function.
In Cap i t a l , Marx speaks of the division of labour in general, in 
particular, and in detail (see Capital 1 :331-2). We may identify 
the different types of division of labour as the three levels in 
Figure 3.4. 206
When Marx speaks of the abolition of the old division of labour, 
it is clear that it is meant to refer to the division of labour 
inside the factory and which still lingers on from the period of 
manufacture and is artificially kept alive by capital. Marx wanted 
to abolish the role of the "detail-worker of today, crippled by 
life-long repetition of one and the same task...", (Capital 
1:458), which was, according to him, a real tendency of machine 
production under capitalism. The historical and the critical 
dimension are congruent here.
The distinction between division of labour within society and
division of labour within the factory is stressed by Marx in the
following way:
While division of labour in society at large 
[...] is common to economic formations of 
society the most diverse, division of labour 
in the workshop, as practised by manufacture.
206 Since Marx here examines the division of labour in the 
sphere of p r o duction, he pays no attention to the upper part 
of the figure.
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is a special creation of the capitalist mode 
of production alone. (Capital 1 :339).
But note that it is manufacture which is characterized by the 
division of labour. According to Marx, modern industry does not
2 0 7know a division of labour. In modern industry we have a "divi­
sion between machines", the workers being appendages to it, void 
of any skill.
This leads me to the intriguing - question of the different
approach of the Manuscripts from that of Capital. In the former
work, Marx depicts the difference between manufacture and modern
industry in the following way: in the period of manufacture the
instruments of work are subjected to the virtuosity and skill of
the worker, hence the division of labour was a real division of
labour, a division between different sorts of labour.
Die Theilung der Arbeit führt zu einer Dif­
ferenzierung und damit Vereinfachung der
Instrumente, die als Arbeitsmittel dienen;
daher auch zur Vervollkommnung dieser Instru­
mente. Aber in ihr bleibt nach wie vor das 
Arbeitsmittel Arbeitswerkzeug, Instrument, 
dessen Anwendung von der persönlichen Virtuo­
sität der einzelnen Arbeiter abhangt, Leiter 
ihrer eigenen Geschicklichkeit ist, in der
207 "Die Maschinerie - sobald sie capitalistisch angewandt 
wird...- sezt die einfache Cooperation voraus und zwar 
erscheint diese... als viel wichtigeres Moment in ihr, wie 
in der auf Theilung der Arbeit beruhenden Manufactur... Die 
in der Manufactur entwickelte Theilung der Arbeit wiederholt 
sich einerseits im Innern des mechanischen Ateliers, 
obgleich in sehr vermindertem Maaßstab; andererseits, wie 
wir später sehn werden, wirft das mechanische Atelier die 
wesentlichsten Principien der auf Theilung der Arbeit 
beruhenden Manufactur über den Haufen. Endlich vermehrt die 
Anwendung der Maschinerie die Theilung der Arbeit im Innern 
der Gesellschaft, die Verfielfältigung der besondren 
Geschäftszweige und unabhängigen Productionssphären. Ihr 
Grundprincip ist die Ersetzung geschickter Arbeit durch 
einfache Arbeit..." (MEGA II.3.1.:294, my emph.).
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That zu seinem natürlichen Organ hinzugefügtes 
Kunstorgan." (MEGA II.3.1.:269, my emph.).
It is concentration instead of dispersion of the elements of the
production process which is characteristic of the manufacture.
Marx calls the manufacture the mode of production specifically
corresponding to the division of labour (cf. MEGA 1 1 .3.6.:270). In
modern industry, on the contrary, there exists a division of
machines, under which living labour is subjected.
Die Maschinerie tritt negativ auf gegen die 
auf Theilung der Arbeit in der Manufactur 
beruhnde Productionsweise und die auf Basis 
dieser Theilung der Arbeit producirten Specia- 
litäten des Arbeitsvermögens. Sie entwerthet 
das so specialisierte Arbeitsvermögen, und 
reducirt es theils auf einfaches, abstraktes 
Arbeitsvermögen, theils producirt sie auf 
ihrer eigenen Basis eine neue Specialisierung 
desselben, deren Characteristikum die passive 
Unterordnung unter die 3ewegung des Mechanis­
mus selbst ist? die vollständige Anfügung an 
seine Bedürfnisse und Erheischnisse." (MEGA
I I .3.6.:2016)
Simple cooperation and division of labour get totally transformed
once machinery becomes the main way of producing:
"Wir kommen nun zu dem auf einem System der 
Maschinerie beruhnden mechanischen Atelier.
Hier findet natürlich Theilung der Arbeit 
statt... Sie hat ihre materielle Basis, an den 
verschiednen, specificirten Maschinen... Hier 
im mechanischen Atelier besteht der Körper 
dieses Gesammtmechanisnus aus den differen­
zierten Maschinen selbst... Es ist hier nicht 
ein besonders entwickeltes Arbeitsvermögen, 
das sich als Virtuose des besondren Instru­
ments bedient-^ sondern ei ist das selbst 
agirende Instrument, das ihm besonders und 
beständig attachirter Diener bedarf." (MEGA 
I I . 3.6.: 2020, second err.ph. mine).
In the system of manufacture, the tasks are distributed according 
to a hierarchy of skills and powers. Specific physical and mental
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abilities of individuals are seized upon and developed in their 
one-sidedness in order to produce a common, general mechanism (cf.
jnoMEGA I I .3.6.:2020). By contrast, in the mechanic atelier there
no longer exists a hierarchy of abilities; instead, we have a 
general nivellement of services with the consequence that the 
workers can work at different machines with little prior training 
time. In Capital, he states that the proportion of skilled to un­
skilled workers has been completely reversed. In contrast to manu­
facture, where an "organised group" of workers formed the work­
force, modern industry has an "essential division" between "work­
men who actually employed the machines ... and into mere atten­
dants of these workmen... In addition to these two principal 
classes, there is a numerically-unimportant class of persons, 
whose occupation it is to look after the whole of the machinery 
and repair it from time to time; such as engineers, mechanics, 
joiners, & c." (Capital 1 :396) .
The division of labour changes its character: in the system of 
manufacture it is the division of specialized abilities; in the 
mechanic atelier, it is the division of specialized machines, 
under which the various groups of workers are distributed. "Es ist 
mehr Verteilung der Arbeiter unter specialisirte Maschinen als 
Theilung der Arbeit unter specialisirte Arbeitsvermögen..." (MEGA
II .3.6.:2021; see also Capital 1 :396). This is what Marx meant 
when he said above that the mechanic atelier "overthrows the 
essential principles of manufacture, which was based on the 
division of labour." (MEGA I I .3.1.:294). In a letter to Engels, 
Marx asked for an empirical confirmation of Ure's claim that the
208 In the M a n u scripts, Marx often uses this term to denote the
new technological character of the post-manufacture age. In
Capital he calls it automatic factory, or, more generally,
"Modern Industry".
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division of labour (as described by A. Smith) was a characteristic
2 0 9trait of manufacture, rather than modern industry.
Under manufacture, the construction of new instruments had to be
done with respect to human abilities and characteristics:
Erstens also wird das Arbeitsvermögen dieser 
besondren Operation angeeignet. Zweitens aber, 
da die 3asis der Operation selbst der mensch­
liche Körper bleibt, findet statt, wie Ure 
sagt, daß diese Appropriation zugleich 'dis­
tribution, ou plutot l ’adaptation des travaux 
aux differentes capacites individuelles.1 D.h. 
die Operationen selbst werden den natürlichen 
und erworbenen Fähigkeiten angepaßt in ihrer 
Trennung. Es ist nicht Auflösung des Processes 
in seine mechanischen principes, sondern eine 
Auflösung mit Rücksicht darauf, daß diese 
einzelnen Processe als Functionen menschlicher 
Arbeitsvermögen ausgeübt werden müssen." (MEGA
I I .3.1.: 274) .
Modern industry, on the contrary, is characterized by the 
principle that machines get constructed under the sole influence 
of scientific analysis and natural laws. Marx echoes here a 
central theme from the work of Andrew Ure who stressed that 
machinery is preferable for factory-owners because it is not 
dependent on the skills of craft workers. Another point is that 
Marx repeats Ure's judgement that modern industry has eliminated 
the division of labour.210
209 "For my book I need an example showing that, in mechanical 
workshops, the division of labour, as forming the basis of 
manufacture and as described by A. Smith, does not exist. 
The proposition itself has already been set forth by Ure." 
(Letter to Engels, 6.3.1862)
210 See 3erg (1982:197-8) With respect to the relation between 
Babbage and Ure she writes: "Cardwell has described Ure's 
Philosophy of Manufacturers as a fairly obvious imitation of 
Babbage with some insight into the automatic factory. But,
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Consider, now, the discussion in Capital. Marx repeats the
general line of argument, but changes his evaluation completely:
now he sharply criticises the division of labour under the system
of manufacture, drawing on Ferguson and Smith:
[The division of labour in manufacture] "in­
creases the social productive power of labour, 
not only for the benefit of the capitalist 
instead of that for the labourer, but it does 
this by crippling the individual labourers."
(Capital 1 :344).
"In manufacture, as well as in simple co­
operation, the collective working organism is 
a for.n of existence of capital... manufacture 
proper not only subjects the previously inde­
pendent workman to the discipline and command 
of capital, but, in addition, creates a hier­
archic gradation of the workmen themselves.
While simple co-operation leaves the mode of 
working by the individual for the most part 
unchanged, manufacture thoroughly revolu­
tionizes it, and seizes labour-power by its 
very roots. It converts the labourer into a 
crippled monstrosity, by .orcing his detail 
dexterity at the expense of a world of produc­
tive capabilities and instincts; just as in 
the States of La Plata they butcher a whole 
beast for the sake of his tide or his tallow."
(Capital 1 :340, my emph.)
in fact, Ure took pains to distinguish himself from 3abbage. 
He rejected the principle of the division of labour as the 
significant feature of the factory, and referred to Babbage 
by implication when he argued that the "scholastic dogma of 
the division of labour into degrees of skill has been explo­
ded by our enlightened manufacturers". They are "better 
acquainted with the general economy of the arts, and better 
qualified to analyze them into their real principles, that 
the recluse academician can possibly be, who, from a few ob­
solete data, traces out imaginery results, or conjures up 
difficulties seldom encountered in practice"." (3erg 1982: 
197-8; the Ure-quote is from The Philosophy of Manufacturers 
at p . 23-4).
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M o d e m  industry, on the other hand, he now sees more positively:
it is more productive than manufacture, since it is not dependent
on a certain number of skilled craftsmen and their skills.
Instead, an objective productive organism, a "skeleton", takes
their place. The 'subjective principle' of adapting the
instruments to personal abilities, falls away. The production
process gets analyzed in its constitutent parts.
"In manufacture, it is the workman who, with 
their manual implements, must, either singly 
or in groups, carry on eac-h particular detail 
process. If, on the one hand, the workman 
becomes adapted to the process, on the other, 
the process was previously made suitable to 
the workman. This subjective principle of the 
division of labour no longer exists in 
production by machinery. Here, the process as 
a whole is examined objectively, in itself, 
that is to say, without regard to the question 
of its execution by human hands, it is 
analyzed into its constituent phases; and the 
problem, how to execute each detail process, 
and bind them all into a whole, is solved by 
the aid of machines, chemistry." (Capital 
1:359)211 .
In Capital, he judges the possibilities for a broad development of 
individuals to be better on the basis of machinery. In the Manus­
cripts and Cap i t a l , he suggests that the division of labour 
belongs to the period of manufacture; that modern industry with 
the dominance of machine production, has eliminated division of
211 Cf. also the following passage: "The principle which it
pursued, of resolving each process into its constituent 
movements, without any regard to their possible execution by 
the hand of man, created the new modern science of 
technology. The varied, apparently unconnected, and 
petrified forms of the industrial processes now resolved 
themselves into so many conscious and systematic 
applications of natural science to the attainment of given 
useful effects.” (Capital 1 :456-7) See also Capital 1 :434 
and 567.
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labour. However, this refers only to the division of labour inside 
the factory.
To illustrate the different character of the means of produc­
tion, Marx uses the metaphor of "dwarf-instruments", (Capital
1:361), as being characteristic for manufacture, whereas "cyclopic
machines", or even "cyclopic monsters", (Capital 1 :360,364), are 
characteristic of modern industry. This indicates that, although 
monsters may be more horrible than dwarfs, neither is immediately 
preferable: dwarfs and monsters are both weird figures for humans. 
More important is Marx's juxtaposition of the social character of 
labour in these two technological epochs. In manufacture the 
worker is expropriated of his skill which becomes in turn embodied 
in the "Gesamtarbeiter":
"Intelligence in production expands in one 
direction, because it vanishes in many others.
What is lost by the detail labourers, is 
concentrated in the capital that employs 
them... In manufacture, in order to make the 
collective labourer, and through him capital,
rich in social productive power, each labourer
must be made poor in individual productive 
powers." (Capital 1 :341)
We are wrong if we think that machinery also displays this 
feature :
"Machinery... operates only by means of asso­
ciated labour, or labour in common. Hence the 
co-operative character of the labour process 
is, in the latter one, a technical necessity
dictated by the instrument of labour itself."
(Capital 1 : 364-5)“ .
212 The English translation does not render the following inter­
esting connotation: as the German original says machinery
"funktioniert nur in der Hand unmittelbar vergesellschaf­
teter oder gemeinsamer Arbeit", (Kapital 1 :407). Now, this 
is the same formula that Marx employs when describing a
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This is the complete reversal of the argument in the Manuscripts. 
To avoid misunderstanding: in the Manuscripts Marx also emphasizes 
the point that machine production leads to higher productivity, 
and that the labour process becomes social. Large-scale production 
seems irreconcilable with single ownership of the means of
production:
''Das positive Resultat hier, daß die
Arbeitszeit fallt, deren bedurft wird, um 
vergrösserte Masse von Lebensmitteln zu 
produciren, daß dieß Resultat durch die 
gesellschaftliche Form der Arbeit erreicht 
wird und daß der Besitz des Einzelnen an den 
Productionsbedingungen nicht nur als nicht 
nöthig, sondern als unvereinbar mit dieser 
Production auf großer Stufenleiter erscheint 
... Sobald diese gegensätzliche Form wegfällt 
ergiebt sich also, daß sie [die Arbeiter,
R.G.] dies Productionsmittel gesellschaftlich, 
nicht als Privatindividuen besitzen." (MEGA
II.3.6.:2144, my emph.).
The fact that the workers are still fragmented, and developed only 
in narrow specialities, he considers to be an inheritance of
manufacture, which is, however, enhanced by capitalist use of
machinery (see Capital 1 :398) .
The decisive difference between the Manuscripts and Capital is the 
fact that according to the Manuscripts the worker under the system 
of manufacture is in full possession of his knowledge and skill, 
that it is him, the human be i n g , who commands the instrument;
decisive feature of communist society, viz. that labour 
would be social from the outset ("unmittelbar vergesell­
schaftet"), whereas in capitalism the social character of 
production does prove itself only post festum, after the 
exchange of private products. It is no accident that Marx 
assimilates the character of work under Modern Industry to a 
feature of communist society.
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modern industry, on the contrary, is the most perverted form of
capitalist technology (i.e negative in comparison to manufacture):
"Diese Specialität der Passivität [An- und 
Unterordnen unter die Operationen der Bewe­
gungen der Maschine selbst, R.G.], d.h. die 
Aufhebung der Specialität selbst als Speciali­
tät characterisirt die Maschinenarbeit. Die 
Verbesserungen innerhalb des mechanischen 
Ateliers selbst darauf gerichtet alle Virtuo­
sität, wieder auf seiner eigenen Basis hervor­
gewachsen, möglichst zu entfernen. Es ist also 
ganz einfache Arbeit, d.h. ihre Einförmigkeit, 
Inhaltslosigkeit und Unterordnung unter die 
Maschine. Tödtende Arbeit, als Arbeit, die wie 
bei der Theilung der Arbeit in der Manufactur, 
völlige Subsumtion des Individuums unter sie 
erheischt. Sie verhindert die Entwicklung der 
Specialität, specialisirt aber selbst wieder 
diese Specialitätslosigkeit. Die letzte 
Selbstbefriedigung des Arbeiters in der Arbeit 
fällt hier fort, absolute Gleichgültigkeit, 
die durch ihre Inhaltslosigkeit selbst bedingt 
wird... Bei der Manufactur ist die Arbeit 
continuirlich. Im mechanischen Atelier ist die 
Aufmerksamkeit auf die Arbeit der Maschine 
continuirlich, und die durch ihre Bewegungen 
... bedingte Bewegung des Arbeiters. Sein 
wirkliches Eingreifen dagegen zufällig, je 
nachdem die Maschine einen error begangen oder 
nicht." (MEGA 1 1 .3.6. : 2021-2).
Marx reverses his judgement in Capital. He now conceives manufac­
ture, as we have seen, as the technological regime which expro­
priates the workers from their skills, cripples their individuali­
ties etc. Likewise, he conceives Modern Indurstry as a turning 
point, as a mode of production in which the character of labour is 
already unmittelbar gesellschaftlich, "cooperative". The virtuo­
sity, knowledge, and skills are embodied in the Gesamtarbeiter, 
albeit belonging to capital. On the basis of this construction it 
is sufficient to expropriate capital in order to return the lost 
capacities to the Gesamtarbeiter.
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An additional point is of interst here. Marx said that the co­
operative character of the labour process is a "technical 
necessity" (see Capital 1 :365). This suggests that he adheres to a 
sort of "technological primacy". First develop technologies, then 
social institutions. This standpoint makes is easy to present the 
trend towards communism as "inevitable", or "lawlike".
Technological determinism was a very appealing concept for Marx 
because it offered him the chance to prove the inevitability of 
communism. Every time he analyses the role of technology in 
history, he is tempted to endorse a determinist view, no matter if 
we take the The Poverty of Philosophy, the Manuscripts 1861-3, or 
Capital. However, in the Manuscripts, Marx is left with the most 
discomforting theoretical problems which spring from his insis­
tence on the central role of machinery and its de-humanizing 
effects. Therefore, he makes little reference to the technological 
base of communism, which, after all, seems the most interesting 
question, given his evolutionary approach to technology and social 
institutions. In C apital, he solves this problem by stressing the 
cooperative character of the labour process as the decisive 
feature of modern industry, thus suggesting a "genetic link" with 
communist society. Using a distinction of Agnes Heller, we may say 
that Marx did not rely on the "subjective will" to bring about a 
higher form of society; he was not content until he could find 
some "natural laws" providing the possibility for transition.
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CHAPTER 4: HISTORICAL MATERIALISM
All earlier modes of 
production were essen­
tially conservaiive.
Karl Marx
4.1. Productive forces and mode of production
Marx's interest in technology, stated time and again in this work,
stems from his materialist approach to studying society. As he
stated in Capital 1 :
Technology discloses man's mode of dealing
with nature, the process of production by
which he sustains his life, and thereby also
lays bare the mode of formation of his social
relations, and of the mental conceptions that 
flow from them. (Capital 1 :352) .
In this statement, a relationship between three elements is ex­
pressed: (1) the transformation of nature; (2) forms of social
213relations; and (3) mental conceptions. These three elements
have been evident in Marx's work since the early German Ideology.
213 As Douglass North put it: "Marx's overall analysis, set in 
the context of economic history, explores human interre­
lationships as a vehicle for studying the increasing mastery 
of humans over nature. The growth of the productive forces 
of human beings was an ongoing process in the subordination 
of nature to man. As humans learned how to produce and use 
intermediate goods, it became necessary to define the rela­
tionship amongst human beings with respect to the production 
and use of these tools." North (1986:58).
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In the canonical 1859 Preface, Marx states the following relation­
ship between these elements:
"In the social production of their life, men 
enter into definite relations that are indis­
pensable and independent of their will, rela­
tions of production which correspond to a de­
finite stage of development of their material 
productive forces. The sum total of these re­
lations of production constitutes the economic 
structure of society, the real basis, on which 
rises a legal and political superstructure, 
and to which correspond _ definite forms of 
social consciousness. The mode of production 
of material life conditions the social, poli­
tical and intellectual life process in gene­
ral. It is not the consciousness of men that 
determines their being, but, on the contrary, 
their social being that determines their con­
sciousness. At a certain stage of their deve­
lopment, the material productive forces of 
society come in conflict with the existing 
relations of production, or - what is but a 
legal expression for the same thing - with the 
property relations within which they have been 
at work hitherto. From forms of development of 
the productive forces, these relations turn 
into their fetters. Then begins an epoch of 
social revolution." (CW 29:263).
My discussion has so far shown that Marx's main critical concern 
was to investigate the conditions for realising the 'good life'. 
To this end, he was interested in the liberating potential of 
technologies and social forms. As to the former, we already have 
seen in chapter 3 that Marx was able to conceive of problems which 
stem from man's dealings with nature. From this he did not 
conclude that it is the fault of technology as such (or of a 
specific, dominating attitude towards nature). I think he was 
right to reject such a conclusion. As to the latter, he concluded 
that the negative sides of technology only stem from its capita­
list employment: in so doing I think he was wrong. He did not 
conceive of the possibility that specific forms of technology
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would cause ecological problems for every social form/ not only 
for capitalism.
The present chapter takes up again the subject of chapter 3; 
this time/ however, from the specific viewpoint of G.A. Cohen's 
analysis. I first discuss Cohen's interpretation of Marx's 
historical materialism, concentrating on two main questions: (1) 
the question of the Development and Primacy Theses; (2) the 
methodological question, i.e. Cohen's proposed functional 
explanation (4.1. and 4.2.). My theoretical interest is the 
following: while agreeing with Cohen (against Elster) that game
theory cannot replace functional explanation within historical 
materialism (or even within the social sciences), I do not agree 
completely with Cohen's way of posing the problem nor with his 
solution. I shall propose not only a revision of the Development 
and Primacy theses and the functionalism they seem to imply but 
also a reformulation of this set of questions in a way which takes 
into account ecological arguments (4.3. - 4.5.).
4.2. Productive forces and historical materialism
The economic historian Douglass North asserts that Marx's
"historical materialism" still deserves serious attention:
"The complex interrelationships between the 
productive forces of an economy, the property- 
rights system of an economy, and the political 
structure are clearly at the heart of the di­
lemma of all economies through time in respect 
of the ability to realize the potential of an 
economic society. It was Marx's genius to rea­
lize that this was the heart of the issue and 
... he provided us with brilliant clues to
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it." (North 1986 :63)214
G.A. Cohen's Karl Marx's Theory of History (KMTH for short) is un­
doubtedly one of the most ambitious contemporary efforts to ana­
lyse the relation between productive forces, relations of produc­
tion and social superstructures. The basic argument of the book is 
the claim that Marx was committed to the following pair of theses: 
"(a) The productive forces tend to develop throughout history (the 
Development thesis), (b) The nature of the production relations of 
a society is explained by the level of development of its produc­
tive forces (the Primacy Thesis proper)" (Cohen 1978: 134). As to 
the latter, Cohen comments: "The primacy thesis is that the nature 
of a set of production relations is explained by the level of de­
velopment of the productive forces embraced by it (to a far grea­
ter extent than vice versa)... The primacy thesis ... implies that 
changes in productive forces bring about changes in production re­
lations" (Cohen 1978:134-5).
Cohen's technological interpretation of history draws a sharp 
distinction between (asocial) productive forces and (social) 
relations of production. The development thesis claims that there 
is a tendency for the productive forces to develop; the primacy 
thesis claims that the relations of production are explained by 
the level of the productive forces; and the superstructure is 
explained by the character of the productive relations. But this 
is only half of the story. The other half is that the superstruct­
ure stabilizes the productive relations and the productive rela­
tions are propitious for the productive forces. Both parts of the 
argument are made compatible by means of a functional explanation
214 North's own approach, it is worth noting, builds upon the 
transactions-cost approach.
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(see below).215
The reader will notice that I equate productive forces with
technology, an equation which is basically true for capitalist
societies. It seems that size and density of population played an
equivalent role in precapitalist societies. With capitalism, it is
clearly technology. As Marx put it in the Grundrisse:
"This still without regard to the fact that 
increase in population increases the produc­
tive force of labour, since*it makes possible 
a greater division and combination of la­
bour..." (Grundrisse:400).
"The greater the extent to which production 
still rests on mere manual labour, on use of 
muscle power... the more does the increase of 
the productive force consist in their collabo­
ration on a mass scale... Capital, in its true 
development, combines mass labour with skill, 
but in such a way that the former loses its 
physical power, and the skill resides not in 
the worker but in the machine and in the 
scientific combination of both as a whole in 
the factory." (Grundrisse:529).
After an exegetical demonstration which is supposed to show that 
Marx was committed to both the Development thesis and the Primacy 
thesis, Cohen goes on to assert the pair of claims as true. As to 
the validity of the development thesis, he admits that his defence 
is "not conclusive, but it may have some substance." (Cohen 
1978:151). The defence contains "two facts about human nature, and 
one fact about the situation human beings face in history." (Cohen 
1978:150) The first fact about human nature is (c) that "men are, 
in respect to be specified, somewhat rational." The historical
215 In an exchange with Elster, Cohen revised his position 
and claimed that it is not functionalism which lies at the 
basis of historical materialism, but consequence explana­
tions. For the difference, see Cohen (1982:35-42).
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situation (d) of men "is one of scarcity." The second fact about 
human nature is (e) "that men possess intelligence of a kind and 
degree which enables them to improve their situation." (Cohen 
1978:152). As we have seen, (d) is not universally true. Marx 
envisages two possible points of departure for mankind: one in 
which "the free gifts of nature [were] abundant" (Grundrisse: 612) 
and little pressure existed to develop technologies.216 The other 
possibility is that the natural circumstances are such that men 
have to wrestle with nature in .order to obtain a living, (e) 
denotes the fact that mankind uses technologies in order to 
transform nature.
Cohen acknowledges that his defence has two large gaps: "The
first is that (d) does not disclose the relative magnitude of 
man's material problem and consequent interest in its solution, by 
comparison with other human problems and interests. Perhaps 
certain cultural and social possessions are worth a great deal of 
material sacrifice, in the calculus of human welfare." (Cohen 
1978:153) I return to this in 4.5. But even supposing that this 
point favours his case, the argument would not be complete, "(f]or 
it is not evident that societies are disposed to bring about what 
rationality would lead men to choose. There is some shadow between 
what reason suggests and what society does" (Cohen 1978:153). Marx 
himself seemed to assume that "the gulf between the demands of 
reason and the actual tendency of history" is filled by maintai­
ning "a rough correspondence of interests between ruling classes 
and humanity at large" (Cohen 1978:153). Cohen, however cannot 
accept this claim for solving his difficulty (i.e. filling the 
gulf between reason and reality), because "the claim is closely
216 However, an increase in the size of population may alter 
this state.
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related to the primacy thesis (b), and it is our intention to use 
(a) as part of the argument for (b)" (Cohen 1978:153).
Cohen now brings to bear "a striking historical datum: that 
societies rarely replace superior productive forces by inferior 
ones" (Cohen 1978:150). Cohen takes this br^ad generalization to 
give additional power to the somewhat unstable claims (c) to (e). 
This is so, because "good productive forces do not yield to less 
good ones, in the normal run of thing,s... [y]et productive forces 
are frequently replaced, by better ones" (Cohen 1978:154). For 
this reason, statements (a) to (e) help to explain the discrepancy 
between the rarity of regression and the frequency of progress.
Let us now turn to the validity claim of the primacy thesis. 
Cohen offers two arguments in defence of it. The first is "that a 
given level of productive power is compatible only with a certain 
type, or certain types, of economic structure. Slavery, for 
example, could not be the general condition of producers in a 
society of computer technology, if only because the culture needed 
in labourers who can work that technology would lead them to 
revolt, successfully, against slave status" (Cohen 1978:158)217 . 
The second is that Cohen is not content, as many Marxists are, to 
state a certain constraint which the productive forces impose on 
the relations of production. In his view, such an attitude is 
unsatisfactory, "[f]or the c onstra; t is symmetrical.2iS If high
217 As Marx remarked, "Don Quixote long ago paid the penalty for 
wrongly imagining that knight errantry was compatible with 
all economic forms of society." (Capital 1 :86 fn)
218 Note that under this premise no determinism is implied. As
Cohen himself emphasizes, he does not discuss determinism, 
but "only" the question of primacy: how do changes in
productive forces and relations of production affect each 
other when they do?
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technology rules out slavery, then slavery rules out high 
technology" (Cohen 1978:158).
As Cohen puts it, "[w]e may argue for (b) on the basis of (a) 
and the facts of constraint, (a) says that the productive forces 
are disposed to develop. Given the constraints, with sufficient 
development of the forces the old relations are no longer compa­
tible with them" (Cohen 1978:158). Hence they will be replaced 
along with the development of the productive forces or, if they 
resist, after a time-lag contradiction obtains. This contradic­
tion, however, can only be solved by an adaption of the relations 
of production to the forces of production, not vice versa.
I am aware that this summary of Cohen's main argument is a very 
condensed one but I hope that it will suffice for the following 
discussion. Since I think that Cohen's approach does contain very 
valuable elements for my study, I shall look a little more closely 
at his assumptions and definitions, especially in the light of 
some criticisms made against it.
The criticisms I am dealing with have concentrated on the 
following main propositions of the book: (a) the development
thesis; (b) the primacy thesis; (c) the rationality assumptions; 
(d) the methodology implied.219
Since the rationality assumptions are sine qua non conditions 
for the development thesis (which in turn is necessary for the 
primacy thesis), I shall start with the development thesis and the 
implied problem of rationality. To anticipate the result of my 
discussion, I should say that in my view the central flaw in
219 See the debate in Political S tudies, Inquiry, Journal of 
Philosophy, and Analyse & K r i t i k .
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Marx's 1859 Preface (and thus in Cohen's defence of it) is that
its basic notions cannot be defined independently of one 
220another. This becomes clear also in Cohen's own treatment where 
he fails to provide an asocial explanation of the tendency of the 
productive forces to develop.221 My own proposal draws on
evolutionary and systems theory. I do not object to the
development thesis generally but reject it on the grounds which 
have been put forward in its defence. It follows equally that the 
Primacy thesis has no place in my theoretical framework.
4.2.1. Productive forces and rationality
Cohen's strategy to give the 1859 Preface a consistent shape, and
thus to defend it, is basically the following. Productive forces 
tend to develop autonomously, without the influence or "help" of 
social relations. This operation is designed to avoid the crucial 
problem of mixing the explanans with the explanandum.222 For Cohen 
everything depends on the possibility of such an analytical sepa­
ration. If he does not succeed in showing that there is an autono­
mous tendency for the productive forces to develop, if he has to
220 My criticism is thus complementary to the one of Lukes who 
denies the possibility of constructing relations of produc­
tion independently from the superstructure in a "rechtsfrei" 
manner - see Lukes (1982).
221 We can detect a similar problem in Habermas' theory. He 
distinguishes between instrumental and communicative action 
and assumes that the former can take place without the 
latter. See Krahl (1971:393) for a critique.
222 Cf., also, Marx, who refers to "a dialectic of the concepts 
of productive force (means of production) and relations of 
production, a dialectic whose boundaries are to be deter­
mined, and which does not suspend the real difference" 
(Grundrisse:109) .
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take recourse to social factors which explain this development, 
then his explanation becomes circular.
Cohen defines productive forces in the following way: they
include labour power, raw materials, instruments of production,
2 2 3science, spaces and premises (cf. Cohen 1978:40-55). Since Marx 
never provides a list of productive forces, his discussion is 
based "partly on scattered remarks and partly on general 
theoretical considerations" (Cohen 1978:42). But in Cohen's list 
at least labour power and science are social notions; hence if the 
tendency of the productive forces to develop hinges upon these 
factors, this development cannot be explained in asocial terms. 
Consider first the use of labour power. As Cohen himself asserts, 
"the development of the productive forces is very largely the 
growth in knowledge of how to control and transform nature, and 
that _is a development of labour power" (Cohen 1978:41). One must 
avoid thinking of the owners of this labour power, i.e. the 
immediate producers, as isolated individuals. As became clear in 
chapter 2, no such methodological individualism can be imputed to 
Marx's philosophical anthropology. Knowledge and skills exist and 
can be promoted only in social context. One of the main instances 
of growth in productive forces is, according to Marx, population 
growth, cooperation and division of labour, issues typically 
missing from Cohen's account. Cohen concedes that cooperation 
might be necessary for the actual development of productive forces 
(and if it were so, cooperation will occur) but denies that it is 
necessary for the potential development of the productive forces: 
"Relations might possess the potential to develop the forces in 
the sense that if cooperation with them is forthcoming, they will
223 Contrast here Habermas' nearly completely non-material 
definition, Habermas (1976:152-3).
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do so: cooperation is evidently not necessary to their possessing 
that potential" (Cohen 1983a:210).
But compare this statement with Marx's insistence that men
always produce in a cooperative way:
"In production, men enter into relation not
only with nature. They produce only by co­
operating in a certain way and mutually ex­
changing their activities. In order to pro­
duce, they enter into definite connections and 
relations with one another and only within 
these social connections and relations does 
their relation with nature, does production 
take place." (CW 9:211, my emphasis; see also 
GR:84, 529).
But let us see how Cohen tries to adduce evidence for his claim.
Cohen distinguishes between (1) "an autonomous tendency for the
productive forces to develop" and (2) "a tendency for the
productive forces to develop autonomously" (Cohen and Kymlicka
1988:177). The former does not refer to any social factors whereas
the latter does. In order to support his asocial explanation,
Cohen assumes a basic rationality operating on the level of
isolated human individuals which leads them to increase their
22 4productive power.
Two main objections have been made to this position, to which I 
now turn: one doubts the correspondence of the theory with the
224 Cohen illustrates the difference between the two statements 
with the following metaphor: "A child has an autonomous
tendency to grow up. He is born with a disposition to do so 
which is not externally instilled in him by, for example, 
his parents. But it does not follow that he has a tendency 
to grow up autonomously, where that means independently of 
parental and other assistance. The asserted autonomy of the 
tendency of productive power to grow is relevantly similar." 
(Cohen and Kymlicka 1988:177).
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empirical facts, the other argues that the whole account is caught 
in circularity.
Levine and Wright have objected that the rationality assumptions 
do not concord with the historical facts. Cohen and Kymlicka 
concede: "The picture unintentionally suggested by KMTH is of
individual producers, or cooperating groups of them, striving to 
upgrade their skills and means of production, so that labour will 
lie less heavily upon them, a picture, in which global productive 
progress is the aggregate result of those several strivings.” 
(Cohen and Kymlicka 1988:175).225 Levine and Wright have called 
this the Rational Adaptive Practices (RAP) and have claimed that 
it is has been falsified by the known record of history; it was 
not the material situation of the producers but class-specific 
rationality what brought about development. (Levine and Wright, 
1980) But if the RAP account is empirically false, the basic 
strategy of Cohen, i.e. to distinguish an autonomous tendency of 
the productive forces to develop from social forms which are 
favourable to that development, fails. Cohen acknowledges this 
challenge: "The upshot is a dilemma. Either (i ) maintain a RAP
account of the development thesis, thereby preserving the autonomy 
of the tendency to development, and enabling a non-circular 
derivation of the primacy thesis, the entire procedure however, 
resting upon an empirically false premiss; or (ii) adopt an 
empirically defensible "class-specific rationality" interpretation 
of the development thesis (as Levine and Wright do, R.G.], but 
then the autonomy of productive development is lost and the 
attempt to infer the primacy thesis involves a vitiating circle." 
(Cohen and Kymlicka, 1988:176).
225 Strictly speaking, the "cooperating groups" are not admitted 
by Cohen's claim that the tendency for the productive forces 
to develop has to be explained in an asocial way.
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According to him, the productive forces are not "unmoved 
movers", but moved by human beings. As has been shown above, Cohen 
needs an asocial historical force in order to make his argument
work. But basic to the RAP account is a model of human individuals
as isolated beings. This seems neither to be a valid historical 
assumption nor to express Marx's view in this case.
Recall the discussion in chapter 2, where human beings were 
defined as biological and social beinjgs. Cohen now must assume 
that human beings already show on the biological level the 
capacity to improve their material situation i.e. animal laborans 
instead of animal sociale. For Marx this would obviously be a 
nonsensical statement. For him, humans always produce together 
with others; the isolated individual is an abstraction which he
ridiculed time and again. To make it plain: the very activity of
producing is a social activity.
That for Marx the biological and the social dimension were 
inextricably linked together has been shown several times in this 
study. Consider here only Marx's example of the architect: no
architect exists in isolation; he has the characteristic of being
an architect courtesy of a social group which assigns to him the
2 2 6position and profession he has.
William Shaw has rejected the legitimation of such a criticism 
of Cohen's theory. He holds that Cohen's generalization as 
expressed in the development thesis is a "generalization about 
human society and not a claim about each individual's 
motivation... The claim that men's productive forces tend to
226 It is worth noting that on the basis of the RAP account 
Cohen's theory employs a form of methodological individual­
ism.
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develop does not entail that each man tends to develop the 
productive forces" (Shaw 1986:203). But in this formulation the 
crucial question is still unanswered: where does the tendency of 
the productive forces to develop come from? Shaw seems to propose 
an explanation on the level of "aggregate individuals"; not each 
and every individual is productivity-enhancing, but an overall 
result of their common striving is such. Now this is either an 
explanation on the level of methodological individualism and can 
be illustrated with invisible hand mechanisms (cf. Buchanan 
1983:426), or it relies on the social dimension of human 
productive activity. The first possibility is explicitly rejected 
by Shaw, whereas the second would run counter to the self-imposed 
condition to explain the tendency of the productive forces to 
develop in asocial terms.
But G.A. Cohen has changed his mind on this issue: he has 
rejected the RAP account explicitly. Cohen now presents a non-RAP 
view, building on a statement of Philippe van Parijs (Cohen and 
Kymlicka, 1988; see van Parijs 1984:96). This new claim reads as 
follows:
"[B]eing rational, people retain and reject 
relations of production according as the 
latter do and do not allow productive improve­
ment to continue... [T]he non-RAP claim does 
not posit a 'search and selection process 
which operates directly on the ... productive 
forces' but 'one which operates on the re­
lations of production, which in turn control 
the search-and-selction of productive forces.'
This non-RAP reading of the argument for 
the development thesis preserves the autonomy 
of the tendency of the forces to develop. The 
tendency is not now seen as an effect of the 
"class-specific rationalities" attached to 
given sets of social realtions; on the 
contraray. Particular class-specific
rationalities prevail only as long as they are 
associated with class structures that serve a
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more basically grounded impulsion to produc­
tive progress." (Cohen and Kymlicka,
1988:178)
The last sentence in this passage only confirms verbally a 
position from which nothing is left. Here the productive forces 
develop because of a specific rationality on the level of social 
relations. This is a far better account than the RAP account; but 
this one seems to fall into the trap of cicularity. This is so 
because the burden of explanation is _shifted from the productive 
forces to social relations, hence a social argument enters the 
premiss of the development thesis. The structure of his model 
changes drastically as soon as Cohen transfers the rationality 
from the asocial to the social level: now the rationality opera­
ting within social relations becomes crucial for the explanation 
of the development of the productive forces. However, this is the 
complete reversal of his initial claim i.e. to explain social 
relations by asocial productive forces.
3ut Cohen does not seem ready to accept such a critique. In­
stead, building on the distinction between (1) an autonomous ten­
dency of the productive forces to develop and (2) a tendency of 
the productive forces to develop autonomously, he might wish to
227 Jon Elster also questions the validity of the development 
thesis. He summarises Cohen's account in the following way: 
"The argument assumes (i) that progress is in the interest 
of humanity, (ii) that there always is some social class 
whose interests coincide with the interest of humanity in 
general and (iii) that this class will get the upper hand in 
the class struggle... For this broad statement no other 
argument is given than that 'there is a general stake in 
stable and thriving production, so that the class best 
placed to deliver it attracts allies frcm other strata in 
society.' (p.292) This, I submit, simply is not true; the 
general interests of society do not create their own 
fulfilment." (Elster 1980:124).
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attribute the rationality mechanism to (2) and to limit himself to 
an abstract statement of the sort that productive forces tend to 
develop, just like children have the tendency to grow taller. But 
if this remains the essential and final arguement, the criticism 
of Elster is still valid: "Still there are many children, but only 
one history of the world, and I do not believe that Cohen really 
means to hedge his argument to the extent of imputing only 
counterfactual implications to his thesis." (Elster 1980:124)
This should make clear that a strategy of demonstrating an 
asocial tendency of the productive forces to develop is bound to 
fail. My own reconstruction of Marx consequently does not assume 
an autonomous tendency of the productive forces to grow, but a 
process of co-evolution of productive forces and social institu­
tions. Productive forces are at every point in their development 
influenced by the social form in which they operate. This state­
ment reflects on a social level what is already contained in 
Marx's philosophical anthropology: it belongs to the very nature 
of humans that they are social beings.
As will become clear in a moment, Marx was far from looking for 
RAP mechanisms to support his outline. Quite the contrary, his 
analysis starts on the level of social relations. The starting 
point is the degree to which the division of labour has set apart 
town and country, commerce and industry, manual and mental labour, 
branches of industry, and has brought about means of transport and 
communication which connect virtually every local group with 
everyone else (world market).223 Marx explains the important point 
of transition from feudalism to capitalism by contingent facts:
228 Sometimes, above all in the early writings, Marx conceives 
the separation between the two classes of capitalists and 
workers also as a form of division of labour.
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the existence of mechanical sciences, money capital, machines and
free labour. All these factors merged under specific historical
circumstances. Once this had occurred, a self-sustaining and self-
replicative process was set in motion: capitalism reproduced
itself on an ever larger scale, driving out all other modes of
productions (or pushing them into niches). Joshua Cohen expresses
a similar view when he writes:
"But surely, it will be said, there has been 
productive progress, and the blockages consi­
dered, whatever their longevity, were imperma­
nent. The problem is that the force of this 
objection derives from focussing on capitalism 
and its tendency to expand into noncapitalist 
regions. What is specific to capitalism is 
precisely that the economic structure ties in­
terests to productive growth and distributes 
power so that these interests are more likely 
to be satisfied than in noncapitalist forms. 
Specifically, competition among producers 
provides a strong interest in productivity- 
increasing strategies, and the existence of a 
labor market makes it more difficult for labor 
to block these strategies..." (Joshua Cohen 
1982:270).
G.A. Cohen claims that the development thesis holds true for the 
whole of history; I agree with Joshua Cohen and Elster (1980: 124) 
that it essentially holds true for capitalism. I think Marx was 
right in separating capitalism from all previous modes of 
production in so far, as the previous modes are closer to each 
other (in respect of economic efficiency) than to capitalism: "All 
earlier modes of production are essentially conservative".* '
229 Capital 1: 457; see also the reference to the Communist
Manifesto (MEW 4:465), made by Marx on the same page. In an 
illuminating article Welskopf pointed out that the progress 
in the development of productive forces was a historically 
discontinuous one. The peaks of development "jumped" over 
the globe: from Asia and Northern Africa to the Mediterre-
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I turn now to the second major problem. The danger of circula­
rity has been spelt out in an even more penetrating criticism by 
Joshua Cohen (1982). For Joshua Cohen, there seems to be no way 
out of this trap, except by endorsing an additional argument, a
"subargument" or "striking historical datum", as G.A. Cohen calls 
it. "Its premiss... was that societies frequently replace 
productive forces by better ones, and only very infrequently by 
inferior ones." (Cohen and Kymlicka, 1988:185; see also Cohen 
1978:150). Joshua Cohen calles this .claim the "Alleged Facts" and 
provides some empirical counterevidence (see Joshua Cohen, 
1982:266-9). In contrast to G.A. Cohen he claimes that history 
displays frequent regression and stagnation of productive forces. 
Cohen and Kymlicka in turn pointed out that one has to distinguish 
between "actual and potential output per person, and between
technical progress and productive progress in a comprehensive
sense." (1988:190) I think that these "conceptual clarifications" 
are rather evasive: they no longer offer good criteria for
supporting the "Alleged Facts". Take the example of China. G.A.
Cohen might wish to argue that Chinese society developed produc­
tive forces because they provided the possibility of increasing 
the potential output per person. Taking for granted such an 
argument, I simply object that this is no longer "a striking
nean (Antiquity), Europe (feudalism and emergence of capita­
lism), North America (capitalism) to the countries of Eas­
tern Europe and Asia (socialism). No region of the world 
occupied the peak in two epochs which followed each other; 
see Welskopf (1974). Compare here also Gould who wrote with 
respect to biological evolution: ” [T]he evolutionary transi­
tion from any level to the next occurs more than once; the 
advantages of increased complexity are so great that many 
independent lines converge upon the few possible solutions. 
The members of each kingdom are united by common structure,
not by common d e s c e n t ." (Gould 1973 :117).
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historical datum": in this case an inferior productive force has
not been replaced by a superior one. Cohen might then argue that 
neither has the reverse been proven i.e. a superior productive 
force has not been replaced by an inferior one. But in so doing, 
Cohen offers an overdetermined account to support the validity of 
the Development thesis: on the one hand he claims that productive 
forces may sometimes have grown without giving rise to an actual 
increase in per capita income; on the other hand he claims that 
even if the productive forces stagnate, the Development thesis 
would not be invalidated, since even rare progress would then be 
sufficient to support his claim. 230
To summarize: the foregoing discussion has shown that the deve­
lopment thesis cannot be defended in the way required by Cohen's 
premises. If we are ready to infer historical data, we enter a 
discussion about what are "normal" patterns of development for the 
history of mankind (see Shaw 1986:206). I do not think that we are 
to expect a clear answer to such a question. As Theda Skocpol, in 
her review of Barrington Moore's Social Origins of Dictatorship 
and Democracy, has claimed, any comprehensive study of social 
change has to take into account an intersocietal dimension. This 
is to say that an analysis which restricts itself to intrasocietal 
changes is bound to fail. As she put it,
"the revolutionary methods of launching moder­
nization ... could be interpreted in large 
part as attempts to maintain substantive 
national political sovereignity in a moderni­
zing world dominated by the earlier "Bourge­
ois" (economic and/or political) modernizers 
... Possibilities for continued industrializa­
tion and/or democratization in the wake of
230 Similarly evasive is Shaw's contention that only recent his­
torical research has been interested in these questions, 
which would explain the weak form of an argument of Cohen's 
type, cf. Shaw (1986:205).
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'bourgeois revolutions' are in part determined 
by international relationships and condi­
tions..." (Skocpol 1973:32-3)
This shows indeed that an argument of this degree of simplicity 
and ambition (Cohen and Kymlicka 1988:175) does not work.
Many authors have maintained that technology is an autonomous 
force in history and that it evolves according to an inner logic. 
As I claimed in chapter 3, these views cannot be defended. We can 
speak of technology as having an evolution, but only an "apparent" 
autonomy: it is a heterogenous field of human and social practice 
which cannot be conceptualised on par with social systems. What 
can be observed is a differentiation of tools and increasing com­
plexity. True, in capitalism this technological evolution is like­
ly to be translated into increasing productivity, too. This is so 
because the very process of invention is linked to the economic 
system. But this fact is not sufficient to claim an autonomous
development of technology: here it is defined by economic needs.
4.2.2. The spectre of functionalism
I now come to the methodological question. Cohen has been sharply 
attacked for employing functional analysis in explaining how the 
productive forces cause change in social institutions and, at the 
same time, social institutions exist because of their beneficial
impact on the development of the PF. Cohen links the Development
thesis and the Primacy thesis together using a functional
explanation.
Jon Elster argued that it is close to impossible to find func­
tional explanations in the social sciences. According to him it is 
essentially a method which yields good results in biology, but o b ­
scures the issues at hand in the social sciences. (Sister 1980:
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125-6) This is so for the following reason: a functional explana­
tion explains an event E as occurring because of its beneficial 
consequences for something else, (X). Or, in his words:
"An institution or a behavorial pattern X is 
explained by its function Y for group Z if and 
only if:
(1) Y is an effect of X;
(2) Y is beneficial for Z;
(3) Y is unintended by the actors producing X;
(4) Y - or at least the causal relation 
between X and Y - is unrecognized by the 
actors in Z;
(5) Y maintains X by a causal feedback loop 
passing through Z." (Elster 1983:57).
Now Elster claims that having described the beneficial consequen­
ces and the occurrence of Y, we do not have an explanation at all,
unless we can show the existence of a feed-back-mechanism which 
secures that Y will indeed occur: "No one has any quarrel with 
functional explanation where the mechanism is actually shown to be 
at work. The hard question is whether one can ever be justified in 
setting forward a functional explanation even in the absence of a 
specific mechanism. In biology this question is to be answered in 
the affirmative, because the general mechanism of natural selec­
tion creates a presumption that beneficial consequences explain 
their own causes." (Elster 1980:126) According to Elster, social 
scientists unfortunately and typically do not satisfy all five 
conditions of the above list; and typically, what is missing, is 
the last condition.
Mary Douglas (1986) accepted Elster's demand, insisting at the 
same time that social sciences cannot do without functional expla­
nations. In fact, she defends much of Durkheim's and Merton's 
programme, rejecting any naive ("arm-waving") functionalism. Cohen 
took another line of defence when he claimed that there are always 
mechanisms at work, even when we are not able to show them (see 
Cohen 1980:133-4). This epistemological point, however, offers us
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little resistance against bad functionalist arguments of the type 
"whenever an event y has beneficial consequences it will occur." I 
thus take sides with Cohen in insisting on the importance of func­
tional analysis for the social sciences,231 but also accept
Elster's demand that in order to have a proper explanation, we 
need to provide some sort of mechanism. Elster concludes that 
social scientists should be committed exclusively to causal and 
intentional explanations in order to avoid obscure or pre-
scientific results. Elster would, be prepared to accept a 
functional analysis if the mechanisms at work could be shown.
Otherwise it would have the status of a metaphysical notion.
From the structure of Elster's five conditions and his comments 
one can conclude that he regards functional explanation as a
variety of causal explanation, since he ties cause and effect in a
2 32very tight manner. The only difference between a functional and 
a proper causal analysis would thus be the direction in which the
2 33causal chain is running. But this premiss need not be accepted
231 And, especially, his insistence that game theory cannot re­
place the central ssumptions of historical materialism. See 
also Berger and Offe: "Logically, the game starts only after 
the actors have been constituted, and their order of prefe­
rences has been formed as a result of processes that cannot 
themselves be considered as part of the game.” (Berger and 
Offe, 1982:525).
232 Von Foerster (1984) coined the term "trivial machines" to
denote the deterministic connection between input and out­
put, where input is understood as sufficient condition for a
certain output. One can easily see how this applies to a d e ­
terministic cause-effect relationship.
233 Cohen explicitly holds that functional explanations or
"consequence explanations" (as he later calls them) are a
variety of causal explanations - see Cohen (1980:130). Luh-
mann holds exactly the opposite position, as Berger and Offe 
rightly observed: "Luhmann surprisingly, but plausibly, sug-
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blindly. Another proponent of functional analysis clearly accepted 
the criticisms made by authors like Nagel and Hempel with respect 
to the "strong functionalist" paradigm. In 1962, Luhmann stated 
that "it is not immediately possible to explain causes by their 
effects.” (Luhmann 1970:10, my transl.). The function of an 
action, seen as effect, cannot be taken to explain the factual 
occurrence of that action. Functional analysis thus needs some 
additional arguments which qualify these effects and functions. 
"The functional argument is not to conclude a specific need from 
an existing "service" [Leistung] and thus to justify the existence 
of this service." (Luhmann 1970:15, my transl.) So far, Sister and 
Luhmann could agree. But where Elster is sceptical that such "mi­
crofoundations" can be found (if not on the basis of methodologi­
cal individualism and causal explanation), Luhmann is sceptical 
that a causal model will be possible at all, assuming that an 
uncertainty relation obtains between cause and effect. According 
to him, it is not possible to determine cause and effect 
simultaneously, for variables in social research typically cannot 
be separated. For Luhmann, the interesting question is thus not: 
Does A always cause B? but: Are A, C, D, E functionally equivalent 
to produce B? This approach opens up a space for alternative 
possibilities and a gain in knowledge. Luhmann consequently 
charges the "causal sciences" as metaphysics, since they try to 
fix action to invariant relations between determinant causes and 
determined effects (cf. Luhmann 1970:26). It seems that Luhmann's 
functional analysis does not claim the same explanatory power as
• • •
gests that we reverse the relationship of 'functionality' 
and 'causality'. In his view, functional relations are no 
longer a special subcase of causal relations, but causal 
relations a subcase of functional ones." (Berger and Offe, 
1982:522).
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Cohen's functionalist explanation (or any causal explanation in 
general); it is no accident that Luhmann avoids talking about 
"explanations". His concern is about functional equivalents which 
would give us more illuminating insights than strict causal 
connections (see also 3erger and Offe, 1982).
In his Soziale Systeme, Luhmann seems to come close to C o h e n ’s 
insistence that functional analysis may be a useful tool even in 
the case where micro-mechanisms cannot be shown to be at work, 
when he writes: "Der Erkenntnisgewinn [der funktionalen Methode] 
liegt gleichsam quer zu den Kausalitäten, er besteht in ihrem 
Vergleich. Man kann ihn erzielen, auch wenn Kausalitäten zunächst 
nur hypothetisch als noch nicht ausreichend erforscht unterstellt 
werden." (Luhmann 1984a:84) Die funktionale Methode ist "letztlich 
eine vergleichende Methode, und ihre Einführung in die Realität 
dient dazu, das Vorhandene für den Seitenblick auf andere Möglich­
keiten zu öffnen. Sie ermittelt letztlich Relationen zwischen Re­
lationen: Sie bezieht etwas auf einen Problemgesichtspunkt, um es 
auf andere Problemlösungen beziehen zu können." (ibidem, p.85) 
Larmore and others have objected to this view in that the relation 
between these functional equivalents is not clear and that 
arbitrary equivalents could be listed. Luhmann replied: "Dies
trifft jedoch nicht zu. Entscheidend ist, daß die Hinzufügung 
durch den Problemgesichtspunkt begrenzt wird, so daß nicht Belie­
biges, sondern nur Einiges und oft nur Weniges in Betracht kommt 
... Die eigentliche Theorieleistung, die den Einsatz funktionaler 
Analysen vorbereitet, liegt demnach in der Problemkonstruktion. 
Daraus ergibt sich der Zusammenhang von funktionaler Analyse und 
Systemtheorie." (Luhmann 1984a:86). However, Luhmann is not as 
vulnerable as Cohen, since he does not accept the underlying claim 
regarding scientific research. At least from a footnote in Soziale 
Systeme, we can guess that for him it is not scientific explana­
tion which is at stake, but the specific form of increasing and
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reducing complexity (cf. id., p. 85). According to him, mainstream 
science is fascinated by a parallel between the structure of theo­
retical statements ("Aussagestruktur") and the structure of the 
object ("Gegenstandsstruktur” ). 234 In fact, Luhmann's decisive
turn has been the adaptation of a constructivist epistemology. 
Cohen, on the other hand, shares the premisses of mainstream 
science which makes his position in the debate with Elster more 
vulnerable.
It is interesting to introduce Weber's analysis of religion 
here. Weber used the notion of "elective affinity" [Wahlverwandt­
schaft ] to analyze specific social and cultural developments, such 
as the rise of Protestantism and capitalism. The term stems from 
chemistry and was taken up by Goethe who wrote a novel with that 
title.235 But it was also known in philosophy where Kant employed 
the term "affinity". The "art of divorce" served him to separate
234 For a criticism of the "natural science model" see also 
Charles Taylor, according to whom this rests on "the view 
that the natural sciences can provide us with paradigms for 
the methods and procedures of the social science. We think 
we understand the activity of exploring nature. Here, too, 
we are certainly over-complacent. But we tell ourselves a 
tolerably clear story of what goes on in natural science, 
and the very success of our research seems to indicate that 
we have here the norm for science in general. The prestige 
of this norm then stops further enquiry." (Taylor 1985:91- 
2). Without embarking on an exposition of the question if 
there are different sorts of scientific knowledge, we can 
propose two general solutions to the problem stated by 
Taylor: either we look for explanations sui generis in the
social realm, or we stick to a "monist" view, rejecting, 
however, the realist epistemology which underpins the 
natural science model. In the latter case, both natural and 
social sciences construct their own object of knowledge.
235 Cf. Johann Wolfgang Goethe, Die Wahlverwandtschaften (1809); 
see Howe (1978:371).
266
the rational from the empirical. Weber became familiar with
Kant's philosophy via Kuno Fischer (see Howe 1978:377). A logical
or analytical affinity was a "property of the concepts that they
have certain features in common with other concepts", as the Ency-
clopädische Wörterbuch der kritischen Philosophie noted in 1797
(see Howe 1978:376). The classical definition was that of Bergman:
"Suppose A to be a substance for which other 
heterogenous substances, a, b, c, &c., have an 
attraction; suppose further A combined with c 
to saturation (this unit I. shall call Ac), 
should, upon the addition of b, tend to unite 
with it to the exclusion of c, A is then said 
to attract b more strongly than c, or to have 
a stronger elective attraction for it; lastly, 
let the union of Ab, upon the addition of a, 
be broken, let b be rejected, and a chosen in
its place, it will follow that a exceeds b in
attractive power, and we shall have a series 
a, b, c in respect of efficacy. What I here 
call attraction, others denominate affini­
ty..." (Bergman 1775, cited in Howe 1978:374-
2 36
236 In the final paragraph of Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, 
Kant suggested the "moral sciences" proceed accoraing to the 
methods of mechanics or Chemistry: "Diesen Weg nun in
Behandlung der moralischen Anlagen unserer Natur gleichfalls 
einzuschlagen, kann uns jenes Beispiel [der Mechanik] anrä- 
tig sein, und Hoffnung zu ähnlichem guten Erfolg geben. Wir 
haben doch die Beispiele der moralisch-urteilenden Vernunft 
bei der Hand. Diese nun in ihre Elementarbegriffe zu zer­
gliedern, in Ermangelung der Mathematik aber ein der Chemie 
ähnliches Verfahren, der Scheidung des Empirischen vom Ra­
tionalen, das sich in ihnen vorfinden möchte, in wiederhol­
ten Versuchen am gemeinsamen Menschenverstände vorzunehmen, 
kann uns beides rein, und was jedes für sich allein leisten 
könne, mit Gewissheit kennbar machen, und so, teils der 
Verirrung einer noch rohen ungeübten Beurteilung, teils ... 
den Genieschwüngen Vorbeugen, durch welche, wie es von 
Adepten des Steins der Weisen zu geschehen pflegt, ohne alle 
methodische Nachforschung und Kenntnis der Natur, geträumte 
Schätze versprochen und wahre verschleudert werden." (Kant 
1977:301-2)
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5)237
In. the climate of the beginning of the 20th century, with the in­
fluence of vulgar marxists’ economic determinism, Weber tried to 
escape such a narrow way of thinking using the metaphor of elec­
tive affinities. The vulgar marxists' interpretation of social 
life and social evolution was based (1) on the base-superstructure 
model which was (2) taken in a causal way and (3) with the super­
structure explained in purely economic terms. Engels protested
* l i aagainst this interpretation but his intervention hardly
settled the debate. Ever since then, orthodox Marxists have 
enormous difficulties in handling the relations in the base- 
superstructure model.239 Against this poor model, and the confu­
sion which it caused, Weber suggested another analytical model, 
as, for example, in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalism:
"In view of the tremendous confusion of 
interdependent influences between the material 
basis, the forms of social and political 
organization, and the ideas current in the 
time of the Reformation, we can only proceed 
by investigating whether and at what points 
certain correlations [Wahlverwandtschaften] 
between forms of religious belief and 
practical ethics can be worked out." (Weber
237 "From chemistry and Bergman would come the basic paradigm of 
elective affinity; from literature and Goethe, its applica­
tion to the portrayal of social relationships; from philoso­
phy and Kant, the art of divorce of the empirical from the 
rational and the affinity of all things in their possibi­
lity." (Howe 1978:382)
238 See his letters to Joseph Bloch, 21.-22.9. 1890; to Conrad 
Schmidt, 27.10. 1890; to Franz Mehring, 14.7. 1893 and to W. 
Borgius, 25.1. 1894.
239 Thousands of scholars since then have been looking for the 
"last instance" or the "relative autonomy".
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2 401905, transl. Parsons:91)
Certainly, there have been attempts to define the marxist term of 
"determination" exactly in this sense of "correspondence", or 
"correlation".241 Cohen too suggests something similar when he 
says that an existing productive force is only compatible with a 
small range of social relations242 , which means that a strict 
determination does not obtain. Weber's methodological programme 
is thus a comparatively modest one, in the sense that it does not 
establish causal or lawful connections: "When we construct a
'stage of culture', then this thought construct, analyzed into 
judgements, means only that the individual appearances that we 
thereby assemble conceptually are 'adequate' to one another, 
possess a certain measure of 'inner affinity' [innere Verwandt- 
schaft]... with one another, but never that they follow from one 
another with any kind of lawfulness." (Weber 1905, as cited in 
Howe, 1978:378).
240 Unfortunately, Parsons translated Wahlverwandtschaft as cor­
relation instead of elective affinity. Howe's translation 
reads as follows: "... in view of the immense confusion of 
reciprocal influences between the material bases, the forms 
of social and political organization, and the intellectual 
and spiritual contents of the cultural epochs of the Refor­
mation, one can proceed only by first of all inquiring as to 
whether and in what points definite elective affinities 
between certain forms of its religious faith and its work 
ethic are discernible." (Howe 1978:368) See also Schluchter 
(1981:142).
241 See Raymond W i l l i a m s ’ suggestion that a determination sets 
only limits and does not determine ("bestimmen") in the 
strong sense (Williams 1977:83-9). But the problem is not 
just a semantic one of how to translate the German "bestim­
men", since Engels already had trouble in explaining what 
"bestimmend in letzter Instanz" meant (see above).
242 The underdetermination of the relations by the forces of 
production is developed in Cohen (1978:163-5).
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Recall, now, Marx's analysis of capitalism and machinery. We can 
view it from the standpoint of Cohen's, Luhmann's and Weber's 
standpoint. According to Cohen, we would get a functional relation 
between productive forces and social relations. According to
Luhmann, there may be functional equivalents to actual solutions 
and we should avoid the mistake of regarding the actual as the 
"necessary" and inescapable solution. Piore and Sable, for
example, claim that handicraft production (combined with computer 
technoogy) may well be a "functional".243 alternative to industrial 
mass production (Piore and Sable, 1984). According to Weber, there 
must obtain "elective affinities" between the elements which form 
a unit. The question if machinery is compatible with communist 
society may serve as an example here. As we have seen in chapter
3, Marx was ambiguous about this problem. In the Manuscripts of 
1861-3, he regarded machinery as inherently de-skilling, leading 
to the enslaving and crippling of human beings. In Capital, he 
revised his position, stressing the cooperative character of mass 
production and blaming only the social form, i.e. capitalism which 
employs machinery. From the viewpoint of present-day western
societies we might add the effects of machinery on the natural 
environment. In the following sections I shall thus try to 
establish some possible relations between capitalism and 
machinery, postponing the question of communism to chapter 5.
2 444.3. Capitalism and Machinery as autopoietic systems?
243 I put functional in quotation marks, because the authors 
themselves do not use the term.
244 This section owes much to discussions I had with Gunther 
T e u b n e r .
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The starting point for my elaboration here is the curious way in
which Marx links capitalism and machinery. He wants to stress that
capital has found in machinery its adequate mode of production 245
which is to say that before the use of machinery the mode of
production could not be called capitalist:
Modern Industry had therefore itself to take 
in hand the machine, its characteristic 
instrument of production, and to construct 
machines by machines. It was not till it did 
this, that it build up for itself a fitting 
technical foundation, and stood on its own 
feet. (Capital 1 :363).
With respect to the social form, he says that only from that point 
on, where capital exists in its "pure'' form (i.e. essentially as 
capital-labour relation), does it stand on its own feet and is 
therefore capitalist in the real sense of the word.
245 "Bei der reelen Subsumtion... treten alle die changes ein in 
dem technologischen Procefl, Arbeitsproceß, die wir entwik- 
kelt haben... Es ist hier also nicht nur das formelle Ver­
hältnis das sich ändert, sondern der Arbeitsproce3 selbst. 
Einerseits schafft die capitalistische Productionsweise... 
eine veränderte Gestalt der materiellen Production. Andrer­
seits bildet diese Veränderung der materiellen Gestalt die 
Basis für die Entwicklung des Capitalverhältnisses... theils 
als Folge, theils als Basis." (MEGA I I .3.6.:2142, my emph.) 
"Mit der realen Subsumtion der Arbeit unter das Capital fin­
det eine völlige Revolution in der Productionsweise selbst 
statt...” (MEGA I I .3.6.:2143-4)
246 "The full development of capital, therefore, takes place
or capital has posited the mode of production corresponding 
to it - only when the means of labour has not only taken 
the economic form of fixed capital... and when fixed capital 
appears as a machine within the production process, opposite 
labour; and the entire production process appears as not 
subsumed under the direct skilfulness of the worker, but 
rather as the technological application of science." 
(Grundrisse:699, my emph.; cf. also MEGA I I . 3.6.: 2059) It 
would be an interesting question to ask if this is also true 
the other way round. In other words, can we assume that ma ­
chinery has found in capital its adequate social expression?
271
"The capitalist system presupposes the com­
plete separation of the labourers from all 
property in the means by which they can 
realize their labour. As soon as capitalist 
production is once on its own feet, it not 
only maintains this separation, but reproduces 
it on a continually extending scale." (Capital 
1 : 568 , amended translation).
This is a process which
"transforms, on the one hand, the social means 
of subsistence and of production into capital, 
on the other, the immediate producers into 
wage-labourers." (Capital 1 :668)
The capitalist mode of production
"produces not merely the material products, 
but reproduces continually the production 
relations in which the former are produced, 
and thereby also the corresponding 
distribution relations." (Capital 3 :879)
In both cases the "crutches" of precapitalist modes of production 
could be thrown away. We are thus in both cases dealing with self- 
referential operations: production of capital by means of capital, 
production of machinery by means of machinery. It seems tempting 
to apply autopoietic systems theory to these two processes since 
Marx himself conceives the material and the social as self- 
referential processes.247
247 Sztompka (1974:177) has claimed that "Marx may be pronounced 
the forefather of the modern systems approach in social
science." In an illuminating article, Amburgery and McQuarie 
try to interpret M a r x ’s categories in a systems-theoretic
way. In contrast to Cohen, who stresses the primacy of the 
productive forces, Amburgery and McQuarie emphasize the 
"reciprocal linkeages between the various subsystems of this 
model." (Amburgery and McQuarie 1977:100). In their view 
Marx's model is an open systems model, since every social
form stands in relation to the natural environment from 
which it gets its "inputs". In autopoietic systems theory
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Autopoietic theory has been developed in biology (Maturana 1980; 
Varela 1980) and in social theory (for example, Luhmann 1984, Hejl 
1982; Willke 198.; Teubner 1988).248 This "emerging paradigm" 
takes as its point of departure the concepts of "self-reference", 
basic circularity and operative closure of social systems. 
However, as has been emphasized by several proponents (Teubner 
1987,1989; Roth 1987; Buhl 1987; Zolo 1988) one has to be careful 
not to mix up the concepts of self-referentiality, self­
reproduction, and autopoiesis.
Autopoietic theory defines system and environment in a different 
way than "General Systems Theory"; it combines systems theoretical 
elements with evolutionary theory and post-ontological epistemo- 
logy. In some versions, like Luhmann's, it tries to overcome basic 
theoretical difficulties of older sociological approaches, like 
Parsons's structural-functionalism or General Systems Theory.
How is an autopoietic system defined? Stichweh, following Luhmann, 
gives four criteria which must be fulfilled to call a social 
system autopoietic:
the systems are conceived as closed systems; the natural 
environment has the status of a material c o ntinuum. In a 
way, there arises again the problem of variable discretion
i.e. the problem of defining variables independently of each 
ether. Autopoietic theory is more precise in defining 
system-boundaries than the open-systems approach. Since I do 
not think that we should use the concepts of productive 
forces and relations of production as units of analysis, I 
propose to take the economy, politics and science as closed 
sys t e m s .
248 For a critique which is not completely hostile to the con­
cept of autopoiesis as such, but doubts the validity of 
using it in broad analogy to biology as a new "super- 
paradigm", see Bühl (1987).
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1. operational closure: operations of the system relate only to 
operations of the same system;
2. definition of its own elements: the systemic process defines 
what will function as its elements;
3. production of its own elements: an autopoietic system is a
network of processes which produce elements for this system;
4. Self-definition of the system-boundary (cf. Stichweh 1987:448- 
9).
Someone might propose to apply criteria 1-3 to technology and 
say that technology is operationally closed and has clearly defi­
ned elements. He would probably describe technology as a system of 
instrumental artifacts which produces instrumental artifacts.249 
Taking this assumption for granted for the sake of the argument, 
we could therefore say that technology is operationally closed. 
Turning to the elements of the system, we might say that it does 
not matter of which substances the elements of an autopoietic 
system consist (they may be books, factory buildings, banks or 
persons), because "elements" of the system are not things or 
persons, but operations. However, as shall become clear in a 
moment, such a proposition fails on the general ground that 
technology cannot be conceived as a social system. According to 
Luhmann, a social system "consists of meaningful communications - 
only of communications, and of all communications. It forms its 
elementary units from the synthesis of information, communication,
249 It would be production of technology by means of technology 
(to allude to Sraffa's Production of Commodities by Means 
of Commodities). Taken in the above sense, technology would 
be a special case of commodity. Now it would not be diffi­
cult to show how value-production can be seen as a circular 
process. But can we also apply this circularity to techno­
logy? Marx himself gave us a few hints to conceive techno­
logy in that way i.e. as basic circularity, see, for exam­
ple, Capital 1 :363; Grundrisse:699.
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comprehension..." (Luhmann 1988a:18). Again, technology could be 
conceived as a specialised social communication which can be 
defined apart from political, religious, economic, and scientific 
communications. Technology could even be conceived of as a self- 
referential and self-reproductive process: whenever engineers are 
constructing a new technology, they are likely to take machines 
and textbooks of colleagues as models (see Rammert 1988). However, 
technology cannot be conceived as an autonomous social spehere, 
since it is no meaning-based system. It would be absurd to see the 
essential elements in a thus conceived technological social system 
as consisting of communicative events. What gives technology its 
specific role in social life is, on the contrary, that its basic 
elements are material in character.250
In addition to the above definition of a social system, Luhmann
calls a social system an autopoietic system in so far it is
"a recursively closed system, which can nei­
ther derive its operations from its environ­
ment nor pass them on to that environment. It 
cannot communicate with the environment but it 
can and must necessarily communicate about the 
environment... This is a very clear, very un­
equivocal state of affairs, which does not p o ­
se any fundamental difficulties in the concept 
of unity or in the demarcation of the system 
from the environment... [The system] does not, 
for example, consist of physical events nor of 
isolated individual behaviour..." (Luhmann 
1 9 8 8 a :18-9).
250 A further clarification might be in order here. Cohen (1978) 
holds that the antonym of "material" is not "ideal" but 
"social". In my conception, this opposition is less rigid; I 
agree with Cohen that technology is to be distinguished from 
social relations but I do not agree that it is completely 
asocial in nature.
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According to Luhmann’s position, "[a]n autopoietic system ... con­
stitutes the elements of which it consists through the elements of 
which it consists." (Luhmann 1988a:14). Elements of a social
system are events or communications. Events "have no duration in 
which they can change, but disappear immediately on their
emergence... Since the social system ... consists of nothing but 
communications, it belongs to this type of system that consists of 
events." (Luhmann 1988b:341-2) From this account it is difficult, 
if not impossible, to conceive technology as a social system.251 
Take first the aspect of events. Since technology produces durable 
artifacts, it hardly falls under the category of an "event". 
Consider, next, the aspect of communication. Technology may be 
conceived of in communicative terms as well. This is the case 
when, for example, engineers discuss the design of a new machine,
or when politicians confer on the problem of dangerous technolo­
gies. But the "essence" of technology can hardly be grasped with 
the notion of communication alone. Technology typically produces 
"a machine, a drug, or a process of some kind" (Price 1982:170).
Luhmann additionally brings to bear a further criterion: every
functional sub-system of society has its own "binary code" which 
organises its operations. He defines money as the "code" of the
251 From Luhmann's quote it also becomes clear that Marx's 
thought and autopoietic theory are located on two different 
"ontological" levels: the former assumes that societies are 
able to have a direct contact with their environment, the 
latter denies exactly this and insists on the purely commu­
nicative dimension of society. For Marx, the possibility 
that society has a direct contact with nature was at the 
very heart of his theory. As we saw, he regarded the 
conscious transformation of nature as the precondition for 
history. For autopoietic theory, on the other hand, an 
environment "out there" does not exist; what exists are only 
system-internal constructions of reality. I return to this 
problem below.
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economy, power the code of the political system, truth the code of 
the scientific system etc. The point of Luhmann's argument is that 
the autonomy of the various social systems consists in their 
coding: it is the economy which decides what counts as payment and 
what not; it is the political system which decides what counts as 
power and what not; it is the scientific community which decides 
what counts as scientific knowledge and what not. It follows as a 
corollary that politics cannot solve the problems of science, the 
economy cannot solve problems of the political system, science 
cannot solve the problems of economy etc.
In this sense a technological system is neither a social nor an 
autopoietic system. It is the realm in which mankind organizes its 
Stoffwechsel with nature. This is a process which proceeds partly 
by means of communication, partly by means of material transforma­
tion of the environment. From my definition and the discussion in
3.3. it follows that the material dimension is crucial for the 
concept of technology. Luhmann's theory also draws attention to
this material element as "eternal presupposition" for social
systems:
"All systems form in a presupposed materiality 
continuum, which Maturana calls medium. For 
example, they presuppose a structure of matter 
rooted in atoms, just as the formation of
atoms obviously presupposes energy capable of 
being bound. In the formation of systems, 
then, there is never any kind of recreation of 
the world in each individual case. This mate­
riality continuum which has in each case to be 
presupposed takes no heed of the system bound­
aries of the differentiating system; it is 
both inside and outside the system. It never­
theless limits the possibilities of system 
formation, since only such systems are possi­
ble that are compatible with the materiality 
continuum. The emergence of social systems 
based on meaning processing presupposes the 
existence of a multiplicity of such materiali­
ty continua and is thus rather improbable."
(Luhmann 1988b:338).
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Social systems rest on this material continuum but operate on the 
basis of social meaning. In so doing, they are constructing their 
own social reality.
So far the notion of material continuum is in accordance with
Luhmann's use. However, I think we can make use of it in another
respect as well. It fulfills the function of keeping together the 
different social systems "from below". It makes plausible that 
politics, economy and science not only get in contact occasionally 
or punctually but that they are coupled on the basis of this 
material continuum. This provides the "material basis" for the 
linkeage of the social systems which have an influence on technol­
ogy. Assuming that the three social systems are relevant for the 
development of technology (science, politics, economy), from a
cross-tabulation we get three relevant combinations. The potential 
financial reward of a technological invention links technology 
immediately to the economic system (E-t-[S]), perhaps without
giving much importance to the scientific system. Science is the
environment for the economy i.e. inventions depart from an
available given standard of scietific knowledge. If for political 
reasons research is directed towards certain goals, it is the
political system which gives rise to that research. The financing
involves the economic system too (P-S-E-t). The political system 
may also enhance technological development in a direct way by
subsidizing innovative firms (P-E-t).
At this point a basic objection could be made. As I discussed 
Marx's model of Stoffwechsel, it was clear that society (by virtue 
of its "Arbeitsprozeß") had the possibility of transforming the 
environment in a physical way. It is precisely this possibility
that is denied by Luhmann. It is impossible for society to derive 
operations from its environment and to pass operations on to that
environment. How can we, then, reconcile the proposed systems
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approach with Marx's analysis of technology? Are the two theories 
mutually-exclusive since they presuppose different ontologies?
I shall not doubt that the theories are far apart with regard to 
ontological considerations. However, they are by no means incompa­
tible. The solution is quite easy: Luhmann's theory also acknow­
ledges a "materiality continuum" which is presupposed to systemic 
operations and which is inside and outside social systems (see 
also 4.3.3.).
In Marx, the labour process is a goal-oriented transformation of 
nature which takes place with tools (or processes) and is "zweck- 
rational" i.e. determined by means-ends relationships. From this 
goal-orientation it follows that technology stands in a close re­
lationship to rational human action or to a systemic rationality: 
the goals are in most cases clearly defined by technical imperati­
ves: produce product x!, solve problem y!, adjust Z! whereas au-
topoietic systems do not have a final goal, end, or 'telos'. The 
product and goal of their working are they themselves. Marx on the 
level of the valorisation process employed a method which can be 
seen as showing all traits of "basic circularity" and self-refe­
rence, even of autopoiesis.252 The capitalist economy is an auto- 
poietic system par excellence (see also Breuer 1987). But, as we 
have seen, it is not possible to extend this analogy to the pro­
cess of use-value production as such, to man's transformation of 
nature, in short, to technology.
These considerations suggest that the possibilities cf influenc­
ing technology are not so small. It seems that pessimistic analy­
ses which have it that technology has slipped out of control of
252 See his definition of capital as essentially referring to 
itself, as "automatisches Subjekt" (Das Kapital 1 :169).
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human action (Ellul 1964; see also Winner 1977) tell only half the 
truth: it is true, indeed, that technology is evolving according
to its own Sachgesetzlichkeit ("technical imperatives"), moves in 
the way of "trajectories", and cannot be determined by individual 
action. Furthermore, it is true that attempts to change existing 
technologies in some normative direction must fit three different 
logics or pass three different "filters". This narrows down the 
range of feasible possibilities. But it is not true that technolo­
gy as such develops according to its own logic (inner code), or 
even moves away from the human world. A pessimistic argument would 
have to show that all technologies have merged together into one 
technological trajectory from which no escape is possible.253 But 
this argument seems to be absurd: for example, there is nothing 
inherently technological which would prescribe the exclusive use 
of nuclear energy in industrially-developed countries.
In a particularly useful essay, Hughes also addresses the
problem of identifying a technological system when he says that 
"[t]echnological systems solve problems or fulfil goals using 
whatever means are available and appropriate; the problems have to 
do mostly with re-ordering the physical world in ways considered 
useful or desirable..." (Hughes 1987:53) However, his approach is 
not informed by autopoietic theory. Rather, so its seems, he 
remains with a model which conceives systems as open, input-using 
and output-producing. But how do we distinguish a technological 
system then from any other system? Or are all social systems 
varieties of one, all-embracing technological system? In this case 
we could conceive of the technological system as a subsystem of
every social system: politics, law, economy and art use
253 See Adorno and Horkheimer (1981) as an illustration of such 
pessimism.
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technologies.254 Hughes is also aware of the difficulty when 
endorsing the wide definition of technology. He thus tries to make 
the following qualification to the definition of technology: "It
is problem solving usually concerned with the reordering of the 
material world to make it more productive of goods and services."
(Hughes 1987:53, my emphasis). But the criterion of productivity
is basically an economic one, which is to say that technology
2 5 5itself cannot measure the "productivity" of itself. But a defi­
nition which stresses the urge for no.velty won't do either: many
other systems are concerned in the same way about that. Hughes' 
solution is thus to resort to a sort of action theory. It sounds 
ironic, but to make his system approach work, he needs a systems
builder i.e. a person who forges the heterogenous elements toge­
ther and takes care that new technology will be more productive.
My suggestion, then, is to define technology because of its 
heterogenous character as "allopoietic" (cf. Maturana 1982:159). 
It is essentially instrumental, a pool of skills and knowledge 
which is linked to all other systems: science, economy, and
politics.256
254 See Weber (1972:32).
255 For another attempt see Dosi, supra. Engineers who work in
the field of machines and power transformation usually use
"Leistungsgrad" (performance) as an indicator for the
efficiency of their products, but this physical criterion is 
quite different from efficiency in the economic or social
se n s e .
256 The first relation is emphasized by Price, the first and the
second by Rosenberg, the second and the third by Piore and
Sabel. For the influence of politics on technological
development see also Dosi (1984), Burke (1975) and Klein
(1977).
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Having rejected the notion of an "autonomous" technology, I now 
ask: How shall we conceive of the coevolution of technology and 
society? Is technology at any point in time socially determined 
and hence subjected to human design? Instead of determining life, 
is it not itself completely determined by social arrangements? I 
deal with this question in two steps.
(1) As far as the question juxtaposes social and technological 
determinism, it is paralleled by a similar ambivalence in Marx. As 
I suggested above, Marx believed in both technological determinism 
and social determinism because of a twofold theoretical interest. 
Its first element is historical: to find out which variable
'explains m o s t ’; the second element is critical: to estimate the 
technological and social possibilities and requirements for a 
communist society. From this follows Marx's reductionism and his 
determinism of one sort or another. There is nothing wrong with 
reductionism and determinism if it is supported by certain 
theoretical assumptions and empirical evidence. My suspicion is, 
however, that Marx was led astray by this approach. He wavered 
between a social and a technological determinism depending on his 
prevailing theoretical interest. In a very rough way,257 we can 
say that he was a technological determinist when he tried to 
explain historical development ('backwards'-oriented), but became 
a social determinist when he tried to evaluate the possibilities
2 5 8for a communist society ('forwards'- oriented).
Recent studies in the history and sociology of technology are 
strongly opposed to technological determinism (Pinch and 3ijker
257 For the necessary qualifications, see 3.4.
258 As we saw in 3.5. and 3.6., the two approaches can be found 
in a nearly ideal-typical way in the Manuscripts 1861-63 and 
in Ca p i t a l .
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1987; Hughes 1987; Law 1987; MacKenzie 1987) and argue for a 
strong social determinism. Pinch and Bijker try to apply the 
"strong programme" (developed in the sociology of science) to 
technology. The label they adopt therefore is "Social construction 
of technology" (SCOT). The starting point for their approach is 
the Kuhnian notion of scientific paradigm, especially as further 
developed by Mulkay and others. Whereas Kuhn restricted his 
analysis to the natural sciences, several attempts have been made 
to extend it to the social sciences.. Pinch and Bijker now try to 
apply it to technology, thus claiming that technology, just like 
natural and social sciences, is a social construction which gets 
stabilized during a process of "closure" i.e. technologists come 
to agree on a specific technology as the solution to a specific 
problem. There is nothing "inherently" superior in a technology 
which becomes dominant over competing technologies; it is simply a 
matter of convention. From this it follows that a history of tech­
nology has to dispense with the idea that dominant technologies 
are the "better" technologies in comparison to other technologies. 
The point is to treat successful and unsuccessful technologies in 
the same way ("symmetry of explanation") and to show how 
contingent factors led to a decision which selected this or that 
technology. In my view this approach is a good starting point for 
any sociological analysis of technology. However, there are two 
comments I want to make. The first is that the notion of "social 
shaping" is too vague. As I have shown above, the "social" must 
be further decomposed into social subsystems (politics, economics, 
and science) in order to trace the inner dynamics of technology. 
From this it follows that it is not sufficient that "technological 
closure" takes place; the technology which is successful in the 
"middle run" has to pass through economic and political filters as
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well. The second point is that Pinch and Bijker try to employ
their argument as an argument against an evolutionary view of 
technology. They assume that once they can show that a process of 
closure takes place in the technological field, this is evidence 
against an evolutionary view of technology. But this assumption is 
completely mistaken; the contrary follows from their argument. To 
disprove an evolutionary view it is not sufficient to show that 
intentional human actions and choices are at work. As the example 
of the deck of cards (cf. Weick 1979J can show, an attribution of 
the label "evolution" to any development of an entity over time 
depends in the first place on the criteria of order which an 
observer wants to apply (see also 3.3.1.).
Thomas P. Hughes admits that technological systems "are both 
socially constructed and society shaping..." (Hughes 1987:51). 
Viewing technology as system, he comes close to attributing an 
autonomous development to it. However, Hughes refuses to subscribe 
to such a notion. He coins the term of "momentum" for the pheno­
mena that technological systems consolidate and grow. As he expli­
citly points out, " [mjomentum... remains a more useful concept 
than autonomy. Momentum does not contradict the doctrine of social 
construction of technology, and it does not support the erroneous 
belief in technological determinism. The metaphor encompasses both 
structural facts and contingent events." (Hughes 1987:80). I think 
this formulation makes the point very well: what is needed is a 
theory which is capable of combining structural and contingent 
events. Hughes, however, does not offer much of such a theory. Un­
fortunately, he limits himself to historical illustration and very 
weak theoretical generalisations. On the one hand, he doubts the 
autonomy of technology (Hughes 1987:79), on the other he concedes
2 59
259 Consider the cases of nuclear energy and genetic 
engineering.
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that "(1large systems with high momentum tend to exert a soft de­
terminism on other systems, groups, and individuals in society." 
(Hughes 1987:54-5, my emphasis) But how can technology exert a 
determining force if it is not autonomous? This question leads to 
the second step of my discussion.
(2) As far as the objection juxtaposes autonomous and heterono- 
mous systems the following can be said. As theoretical and empiri­
cal considerations show, the 'malleability' of technology has its 
limits. It seems that it is not possible to impress a specific 
shape on existing technology at any time in any direction. Such 
attempts are likely to fail in one of three senses: these attempts 
may be dysfunctional, irrelevant or detrimental to the acting sys­
tem itself. 260 As Piore and Sabel (1984) maintain, there exist 
specific 'branching points' in the development of technology which 
make 'human choice' possible. But apart from the strong notion of 
social construction of technology, ve should consider another 
possibility which goes beyond the question of "determination". In 
this conception technology is conceived of having some 'eigen- 
dynamics' (in the sense that technical properties inhibit or en­
hance certain technological developments), but is at the same time 
shaped by social factors. Let me thus return again, this time in 
more detail, to evolutionary theory.
4.3.1. Evolution and Darwinian systems
The systems-approach which I discussed in the last section and the 
evolutionary approach which I shall examine in this section, have
260 Cf. Teubner's 'regulatory trilemma'; Teubner (1987).
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a common reference point in functionalism. As van den Berghe 
pu t it,
functionalism and the dialectic share an evo­
lutionary notion of social change. For both 
Hegel and Marx the dialectic process is an 
ascensional spiral towards progress. The 
functionalist concept of differentiation 
postulates an evolutionary growth in structu­
ral complexity and functional specificity 
analogous to biological evolution. Admittedly, 
these two evolutionary views are different, 
and each presents serious difficulties. We are 
all aware of the pitfalls of organicism, the 
teleological implications of 'progress', and 
the untenability of assuming that evolution is 
unilinear or has an endpoint... Nevertheless, 
the convergence of the two theories on some 
form of evolutionism suggests that the concept 
of social evolution (in the minimal sense of 
change in discernable directions) may be ines­
capable..." (van den 3erghe 1963:703)
Kolakowski stressed that Marx endorsed an evolutionist view of
history (progress!) which he adopted from Hegel : "Hegel’s
historicism had played an important part in the origin of Marxism,
by providing a basis for the evolutionist view of history."
(Kolakowski 1978:250). 3ut Marx also endorsed Darwin's approach,
praising his anti-teleological implications.
"Darwin's work is most important and suits my 
purpose in that it provides a basis in natural 
science for the historical class struggle...
Despite all shortcomings, it is here that for 
the first time, 'teleology' in natural science 
is not only dealt a mortal blew but its 
rational meaning is empirically explained."
(Marx, letter to Lassalle from 16.1.1861) .
261 This is not to say that Marx subsequently broke with teleol­
ogy having read Darwin. His theory of history in fact bears 
a strong teleological influence; but perhaps he saw his the­
ory as explaining the "rational meaning" of such an apparent 
teleology. Without any doubt, his theory was intended to
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Since Marx's analysis explicitly attempts an evolutionary explana­
tion of productive forces and mode of production, we might look a 
little bit closer at Darwinian systems. Eigen and Schuster (1977; 
1978a; 1978b) have emphasized the following properties of Darwi­
nian Systems which they regard as their "necessary prerequisites":
"The essential requirement for a system to be 
self-selective is that it has to stabilize 
certain structures at the expense of others...
The criteria for evaluation must involve some 
feedback property, which ensures the identity 
of value and dynamic stabi-lity. An advanta­
geous mutant, once produced as a consequence 
of some fluctuation, must be able to amplify
itself in the presence of a large excess of
less advantageous competitors." (Eigen and 
Schuster 1977:547).
The "advantageous mutant" in our case is, of course, the machine. 
But Marx's theory contains also an evolutionary scheme for the
modes of production. The "advantageous mutant" in this case is
capitalist commodity production. We can conceive the evolution of 
technology (machinery) and mode of production (commodity 
production) a) in isolation from each other and b) in co-evolution 
with each other.262
provide the scientific explanation for the advent of com­
munist society.
262 According to Schumpeter's striking phrase, you may "add as 
many mail-coaches as you please, you will never get a rail­
way thereby." (Schumpeter 1934:54) But equally important is 
to stress that the new emerges as a result of recombinations 
of the already existing; as Loh stressed: "Das Neue in einer 
Entwicklung kommt zum Bisherigen nicht einfach hinzu, son­
dern das Neue konstelliert sich durch Formenentwicklung aus 
dem bis dahin Entwickelten. Entwicklung ist ein Kombina­
tionsprozeß." (Loh 1975:261) This is M a r x ’s evolutionary 
approach which Marx himself usually labelled (somewhat mis­
leadingly) "materialism".
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a) This case would apply to machines which emerged long before 
capitalism. It is the case of specialization and differentiation 
that Marx refers to. They were the precondition for the rise of 
machinery. Capital also existed before capitalism, above all
in the form of money capital. However, far more interesting for my 
study is b ) . Here we can make use of the concept of "functional 
linkages". One of M a r x ’s implicit theoretical tasks was to provide 
an explanation for the fact that out of a variety of technologies 
and modes of production the capitalist mode and machinery, combi­
ned together, became the successful ones and drove out all others 
(or pushed them into 'niches').264 Moreover, they survived by re­
inforcing one another. The mechanism can be described as follows:
"Functional integration of an ensemble con­
sisting of several self-replicative units 
requires the introduction of catalytic links 
among all partners. These linkages, superimpo­
sed on the individual replication cycles of 
the subunits, must form a closed loop, in
263 The two model-machines which the 16th century inherited 
from antiquity were the clock and the mill. Cf. Marx's 
letter to Engels of 28.1.1863. Note that both machines are 
not based on a deskilling of the handicraft worker; this 
aspect furnishes a theoretical perspective which conceives 
machinery not as primarily something which expropriates the 
worker from his skills but as something solving Stoffwechsel 
problems in a unique way. In other words: in cases where no 
skills are expropriated, machinery could be the basis for a 
communist society. However, it would also have to conform to 
ecological standards.
264 3allmer and von Weizsäcker criticised in Eigen and
Schusters' model of the hypercycle that it does not allow 
for "niches": "Eigen läßt den neben Mutation und Selektion
gleichgewichtigen Evolutionsfaktor der Isolation unberück­
sichtigt." (Ballmer and von Weizsäcker, 1974:248) This neg- 
lection might inhibit the very emergence of evolution: "Die 
Eigensche Theorie baut gegen die Fortführung der Evolution 
über die Hyperzyklenstufe hinaus das entscheidende Hemmnis 
selbst auf: Die Ausrottungsstrategie des erfolgreichsten
Hyperzyklus gegen alle anderen, wie sie in Eigens quasi­
physikalischem Fitness-Kriterium angelegt ist." (ibidem).
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order to stabilize the ensemble via mutual 
control of all population variables. Indepen­
dent competitors, which under certain spatial 
conditions and for limited time spans may co­
exist in 'niches', as well as catalytic chains 
or branched networks are devoid of self­
organizing properties, typical of hypercycles.
Mere coexistence is not sufficient to yield 
coherent growth and evolution of all partners 
of an ensemble." (Eigen and Schuster 1978a:40- 
1 ).
Recall here Marx's description of capitalism where machines are 
built by machines, capital produced by capital and, as a precondi­
tion, labourers are separated from all means of production. Before 
the advent of capitalism, all these elements (also the model- 
machine m i l l ) had existed in niches. As we shall see, Marx is 
never suffciently clear on whether technology is a "self-replica- 
tive unit" or a "functional linkage".
Eigen and Schuster list several properties of the so-called 
hypercycle, from which the seventh is of special interest here: 
"Selection of a hypercycle is a 'once-for-ever' decision. In any 
common Darwinian system mutants offering a selective advantage can 
easily grow up and become established. Their growth properties are 
independent of the population size... a hypercycle, once 
established, can not easily be replaced by any newcomer, since new 
species always emerge as one copy (or a few)." (Eigen and Schuster 
1978a:41). With these methodological tools, we may read the 
following passages from the Manuscripts and gain new insight into 
the problems with which Marx was confronted in his enterprise.
265 See von Neumann (1966) for an exposition of how we may 
conceive of machines capable of self-replication.
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In the following passage, Marx stresses the gradual development
of modes of production and technology using an analogy to geology:
"Wie man bei der Reihenfolge der verschiedenen 
geologischen Formationen nicht an plötzliche, 
scharf getrennte Perioden glauben muß, so 
nicht bei der Bildung der verschiedenen ökono­
mischen Gesellschaftsformationen. Im Schoß des 
Handwerks entwickeln sich die Anfänge der Ma- 
nufactur und findet sich stellenweise... schon 
Anwendung von Maschinerie..." (MEGA II.3.6.:
1972).
Note that Marx, while speaking of "economic modes of production",
gives examples of technologies in order to distinguish them:
artisan production, manufacture and machines. Evolutionary theory
also stresses the gradual development, the emerging of one form
out of another: "Evolution is conservative and therefore appears
to be an almost continuous process, apart from occasional drastic
changes. Selection is in fact based on instabilities brought about
by the appearance of advantageous mutants that cause formerly
stable distribution to break down. The descendants, however, are
usually so closely related to their immediate ancestors that
changes emerge very gradually." (Eigen und Schuster 1978b:367).
"Das allgemeine Gesetz aber, das durchgeht, 
daß die materielle Möglichkeit der späteren 
Form in der früheren geschaffen wird, sowohl 
die technologischen Bedingungen, als die ihnen 
entsprechende ökonomische Struktur des Ate­
liers." (MEGA I I .3.6.:1973)
"Es ist hier vor allem zu bemerken, daß es 
sich hier um keine genaue technologische
266 Cf. also Grundrisse: "It must be kept in mind that the new
forces of production and relations of production do not
develop out of nothing, nor drop from the sky, nor from the
womb of the self-positing Idea; but from within and in 
antithesis to the existing development of production and the 
inherited, traditional relations of property." (Grund­
risse : 278)
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Scheidung handelt, sondern um solche Revolu­
tion in den angewandten Arbeitsmitteln, die 
die Productionsweise und daher die Produc- 
tionsverhältnisse ungestaltet; also hier spe­
ziell die capitalistische Productionsweise 
characterisirt." (MEGA II.3.6.:1915).
Mit der einmal erreichten Revolution in den 
Produktivkräften - die sich technologisch 
zeigt - tritt auch Revolution in den Produk­
tionsverhältnissen e i n ." (MEGA II.3 . 6 . :1973, 
my emphasis).
It may be said that these quotes strongly support a technological- 
determinist view of history i.e. the emergence of the machine 
caused the change in the relations of production: after the
revolution in productive forces comes a revolution in the 
relations of production. But there need not be a causal relation. 
Marx only says that with technological revolution a social 
revolution also occurs. Technical and social revolution are thus 
parallel processes, with no causal connections involved. This 
interpretation is further supported by Marx's affirmation that not 
only present technology but also the present mode of production 
must have forerunners in the previous evolutionary stage: "Das
allgemeine Gesetz aber, das durchgeht, daß die materielle Möglich­
keit der späteren Form in der früheren geschaffen wird, sowohl die 
technologischen Bedingungen, als die ihnen entsprechende ökonomi­
sche Struktur des Ateliers." (MEGA II.3.6.: 1973, my emphasis).267 
This allows two possibilities of conceiving the "social" and the 
"technical": a causal and a functional model of historical change. 
We may interpret the following passage in both ways:
"Die durch Theilung der Arbeit in der auf sie 
begründeten Manufactur gegebne Differenzie­
rung, Specialisirung und Vereinfachung der 
Arbeitsinstrumente - ihre exclusive adaption 
to very simple operations - ist eine der
267 See also Grundrisse:278, previous fn.
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technologischen, materiellen Voraussetzungen 
Car die Entwicklung der Maschinerie als eines 
die Productionsweise und Productionsverhalt^ 
nisse revolutionirenden Elements.'1 (MEGA ÏT.
3.6.:1914, my emphasis).
Consider first the causal interpretation. According to this the 
division of labour leads to ("causes") differentiation and specia­
lization of the work instruments which constitutes the material 
condition for the development of machinery. Machinery, in turn, is 
one of the elements which leads to a revolution of the mode and 
the relations of production. If we leave aside the division of la­
bour for a moment, we get the following sequence:
Fig. 4.1
•• T a ------- * - S x
I
Tfc ►  Sy . . .
Technology T^ leads to social revolution and eventually to
social form S . Within this social form S a new technology T x x b
arises which brings about social form S . Note that we have both aytechnological and a social determinism here: T ---- >S stands for
3 * 268 the technological, S --- >T stands for the social determinism.x b
There is a causal effect of technology on the social form before a 
revolution and a causal effect of the social form on technology
268 This model also fits Cohen's claim that productive forces 
exert primacy over the relations of production but the 
latter stabilize and enhance the former. In case it loses 
this propitious feature, it is eventually replaced by a new 
social form.
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after a revolution. The canonical source for a technological de­
terminism is the 1859 Preface; support for social determinism are 
found in the following passages from Capital 1 ;
"At a given stage in its development, the nar­
row technical basis on which manufacture res­
ted, came into conflict with requirements of 
production that were created by manufacture 
itself." (Capital 1 ;347) "Manufacture produced 
the machinery, by means of which Modern 
Industry abolished handicraft and manufactu­
ring systems in those spheres of prouction 
that it first seized upon. The factory system 
was therefore raised, in thè natural course of 
things, on an inadequate foundation. When the 
system attained to a certain degree of deve­
lopment, it had to root up this ready-made 
foundation, which in the meantime had been 
elaborated on the old lines, and to build up 
for itself a basis that should correspond to 
its methods of production." (Capital 1 :361).
In both cases the "requirements" or the "methods of production" 
are the driving force which cause a change in technology. This is 
clear illustration that the growth of the productive forces has to 
be explained in a social way. Cf. also:
"Unmittelbar wird die Maschinenarbeit als 
revolutionierendes Element ins Leben gerufen 
durch den Überschuß des Bedürfnisses über die 
Möglichkeit, ihn mit den alten Produktionsmit­
teln zu befriedigen..." (MEGA I I . 3 .6 . : 1973).
Consider now the second possibility.
Fig. 4.2
. . . T a
S z
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In the language of Eigen and Schuster this is a case of "functio­
nal integration". According to Eigen and Schuster, such a functio­
nal integration requires 'catalytic links' between the self- 
replicative units. These linkages must form a closed loop in order 
to stabilize the ensemble (see Eigen und Schuster 1978a:40-l). 
Similarly, Marx wants to establish a kind of "elective affinity" 
or "Wahlverwandtschaft" between machinery and capitalism. This 
elective affinity has the following traits. Capital as "processing 
value" does not know any limits. Likewise, machinery does not 
depend on craft skills of workers nor on an increased number of 
working population in order to produce more commodities: the sole 
limits are physical (raw materials), and technical in character. 
As a result, a worker who is employed by capitalist machinery 
becomes dispossessed in two ways: in the technological realm, he 
gets dispossessed of his skill, in the economic realm, of the
2 CQproduct of his labour. Note that in the case of a functional 
integration we have a co-evolution of social forms and technolo­
gies. Cohen said that "slavery rules out computer technology, but 
also computer technology rules out slavery." (Cohen 1978:153). 
Apart from this extreme example I shall leave open the question 
for the moment if capitalism with, say, craft technology, as domi­
nant technology, is equally impossible (see chapter 5).
4.3.2. A machino-capitalist hypercycle
Using the definition of Eigen and Schuster as an heuristic device,
269 I leave aside here if this expropriation is "just" or "un­
just" - see the contributions of Wood, Brenkert, Cohen, 
Elster, Lukes and others with respect to the economic 
as p e c t .
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I shall now try to define the "self-replicative units", the "cata­
lytic links" and the "closed loop". In a first tentative approach, 
the "self-replicative units" might be listed as follows:
A capital 
B labour power 
C machines 
D raw materials
In Marx's view, then, there are essentially two hypercycles which 
stabilize each other: productive forces, relations of production 
and the superstructure. Elements A-D all existed before capita­
lism; the 'capitalist hypercycle', however, is structured by the 
re- composition of all elements.270 A-D are commodities which can 
be bought on the market; they fuse together in the production 
process where A-B constitutes a social relation, B-C a technical 
relation. B-D forms the elements of A (value) under the aspect of
2 71 ♦use-value. But if Marx links up machinery and capitalism in
such a definite way, it is impossible to speak of "Maschinerie an 
sich", independent of (bad) capitalist use: machinery is capitali­
stic, capitalism is machinery. Consequently, the historical per­
spective must change: a post-capitalist society must also be a
post-machinery society. From the Poverty of Philosophy onwards,
270 In the Grundrisse Marx emphasises that the separation of 
these elements was the outcome of a long historical process 
of dissolution of old forms of production. "Nicht so, dass 
Kapital die objektiven Bedingungen der Arbeit schafft." 
(Grundrisse, Berlin:406) Capital is the product of an 
evolutionary process, as are the instruments of work. "Eigen 
ist dem Kapital nichts als die Vereiningung der Maßen von 
Händen und Instrumenten, die es vorfindet. Es agglomeriert 
sie unter seiner Botmäßigkeit." (id.,407)
271 Marx additionally emphasizes that A and C dominate B; since 
"domination" has no place in Darwinian systems, I shall 
leave this aside here.
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where he says "The handmill gives you the feudal lord" Marx has 
a curious theoretical scheme in mind. It consists of the law-like 
connection of forces of production, mode of production, and 
relations of production. The most significant and famous 
expression of this is to be found in the 1859 Preface and is 
commonly called "historical materialism". My claim is that Marx
attributes to each of these analytical units (forces, modes and
27 3relations of production) an elementary form. In the case of
productive forces it is (i) artisan-,. (i i ) manufacture-, and (iii) 
machine-production. In the case of mode of production it is use- 
value and commodity production. ("Die Waare ist die elementare
2 7 2
272 "Social relations are closely bound up with productive 
forces. In acquiring new productive forces men chance their 
mode of production; and in changing their mode of 
production, in changing their way of earning their living, 
they change all their social relations. The hand-mill gives 
you society with the feudal lord; the steam-mill, society 
with the industrial capitalist." (CW 6 :166) The example of 
the handmill may be historically untenable (see Elster 
1985), but here I want to emphasize that it was Marx's aim 
to find such correspondances.
273 Maybe we are now living in a post-machinery age which is 
characterized by electronic and cybernetic systems. Accor­
dingly, we should expect a social form which corresponds to 
it. Much has been talked about "post-industrial" society and 
its charactersitics. In my view, however, the central diffe­
rence of contemporary modern societies is not their indus­
trial or post-industrial character but the difference bet­
ween stratified class societies and functionally different­
iated societies. In Marx's model a class division occurs 
also on the technological level because the great majority 
of the working class is an "appendage" to the machine. If we 
apply his model to present western societies, we would 
expect a new technology which is different in this respect. 
If machines were run by workers who are not reduced to 
appendages, we could speak of a new, liberating technology. 
See Kern and Schumann (1984) for some empirical examples.
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Form des burgerlichen Reichtums"). In his evolutionary model we 
get the sequence (j) use-value, (j j ) exchange-value (commodity)
2 7 5and again (j') use-value production. On the level of relations 
of production, we have slavery, feudalism, capitalism and 
communism, (j) corresponds to antiquity, (jj) to capitalism and 
(j1) to communism.276 The Middle Ages already partly produced 
commodities. Antiquity and communism have a social character of
274
274 The crucial point around which Political Economy revolved, 
and which only Marx solved, was his discovery that in capi­
talism the product (i.e. the commodity) reflects the double 
character of labour which is embodied in it. In other words: 
the commodity unites use-value and exchange-value just as 
labour unites use-value-oriented concrete labour and 
exchange-value-oriented, surplus-producing abstract labour. 
Marx explicitly credited himself with this discovery (see 
his letter to Engels of 8.1.1868).
275 As in ancient Greece, the middle ages (i.e. its artisans) 
were producing essentially use-value not primarily exchange- 
value. This is the valuable point for Marx. But he cannot 
simply return to the middle ages or to antiquity since he 
wants to establish a use-value-orientated production on the 
basis of capitalist productivity (but without domination of 
exchange-value). The high level of productivity is the valu­
able point in the case of capitalism. Marx's vision of com­
munism thus seems to assume that all good things go togehter 
- cf. also Elster (1985) and Lukes (1985).
276 Note that there corresponds an ethical evolutionary scheme, 
(Grundrisse:158) and German Ideology (CW 5:78-9), where Marx 
says that individuals were freer before the advent of capi­
talism. Habermas seems to be more optimistic as regards the 
evolutionary potential of the "ethical realm": "Whereas Marx 
localized the learning process important for evolution in 
the dimension of objective thought - of technical and 
organizational knowledge, of instrumental and strategic 
action, in short, of productive forces - there are good 
reasons meanwhile for assuming that learning processes also 
take place in the dimension of moral insight, practical 
knowledge... learning processes that are deposited in more 
mature forms of social integration, in new productive 
relations, and that in turn first make possible the intro- 
duction of new productive forces." (Habermas 1979:97-9).
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production. The first is regulated by blind rules, the second by a 
conscious plan (and the application of science). In feudalism and, 
above all, in capitalism, the market co-ordinates the many
2 7 7independent private producers. If we represent these three
evolutionary strands graphically, we can detect an empty field:278
277 It has been claimed that there exist basically two forms of
socialisation: markets and hierarchies (see Williamson
1975). Another position holds that there are three forms: 
market, organisation, and solidarity (see Polanyi 1944). 
As we shall see, it can be claimed that communism would, or 
should, be marketal, hierarchical or solidario - or a 
mixture of them.
278 I do not further distinguish between different forms of an­
cient societies, such as slavery, and asiatic mode of pro­
duction. See Elster (1985).
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Figure 4.3
Mode of 
production
Antiquity Feudalism Capitalism Communism
Main
technology
t(X)ls tools,
manufacture
manufacture,
machine
111
Form of 
product
use-value use-value/
exchange-value
exchange-value use-value
Purpose of 
production
production 
for needs
production 
for needs
production for 
surplus
production for 
needs
Form of 
socialisation
social produc­
tion, regulated 
by blind rules
political regulation; 
guilds and estates, 
partly markets
independent 
producers, market 
regulation
social production 
regulated by con­
scious plan
A return to use-value production in communist society takes place 
on a higher and broader level than the Ancient one - on a higher 
level because mankind has more developed needs, and more capaci­
ties to fulfil them, on a broader level because the development of
productive forces is enjoyed not only by a polis but by the whole
2 7 9of mankind.
4.3.3. Structural coupling
279 I have strictly remained within the framework provided by 
Marx and therefore do not discuss the (questionable) heuris­
tic value of an approach which emphasizes the character of 
tools for distinguishing historical epochs, see Welskopf 
(1974).
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The elements in the model outlined above of a machino-capitalist 
hypercycle are partly material-physical, partly social. Only
capital is a social relation, as Marx never tires of reminding
280us. As already indicated, technology cannot be conceived of as 
a social system.
It might be useful to approach the problem from another view­
point; this time the focus is on the interplay or "structural 
coupling" of social systems in their environment.t8~ Recall the 
passage from Max Scheler cited in 3.3. (with my addendum regarding 
politics) where the drive towards domination of nature was 
conceived as the outcome of the following interactons: the scien­
tist wants to construct all possible machines; the engineer wants 
to construct all workable machines; the entrepreneur wants to 
construct all profitable machines; the politician wants to con­
struct all machines which enhance legitimation. If we transform 
this model from the level of interaction between individuals to 
the systemic level, we see the interaction of three different 
social systems: economy, politics and science.
Technology is an emergent phenomenon which springs from the 
interplay of these social systems. Because of the durability of
280 According to him, it would be completely fallacious to
conceive capital exclusively in a definite, palpable form 
such as money-capital, machinery, buildings etc,
281 See Maturana: "Die Geschichte der strukturellen Kopplung
eines Organismus und seines Nervensystems an ein Medium ist 
daher eine Geschichte von Interaktionen, in deren Verlauf
eine Struktur durch operationale Relationen moduliert wird, 
die einem Beobachter als Verhalten erscheinen, die jedoch 
ausschließlich strukturell bedingt und realisiert sind... 
(1982:21). Luhmann's theory also offers the possibility of a 
"structural coupling" of different social systems. He
discusses this in the chapter on "Interpenetration" in his 
Soziale Systeme; cf. Luhmann (1984).
300
technical artifacts, technology is an enduring phenomenon. As part 
of second nature, it belongs to the environment of all societies; 
modern societies are additionally characterized by the interaction 
of their social subsystems with technology. The interaction 
between technology and social subsystems is not symmetrical; it is 
not the case that all three subsystems pull and push technology 
with the same power, in the same direction, or with the same 
success (see again 3.3.).
From this model, a "technological trajectory", but no technologi­
cal determinism, can be derived. This is so for the following 
reasons. Every system operates according to its own rules and 
expectations about the operations of other systems. For example, 
the economy has to take into account that the legal context may 
change in the near future, that new scientific inventions will 
become available, or a technological solution. Politics may try to 
resist or enhance certain technologies, scientific work or econo­
mic activities. Science observes that a specific discovery would 
elicit massive financial rewards so concentrates on a specific 
research path. Each systemic operation takes time. Meanwhile, the 
Stoffwechsel takes place with technologies which are available. 
Small improvements and changes occur during their daily 
application. This explains the existence of a "technological tra­
jectory". A technological revolution may occur either as a result 
of cumulative changes within a technological trajectory, or as a 
result of scientific discoveries which become applicable to trans­
formation processes. However, technological determinism is exclu­
ded, since there are economic, political and scientific incentives 
at work, which lead to a change of technology. In Maturana's 
words, the "medium" can only select structural changes within the 
systems, it cannot determine them:
"Wenn der Organismus und sein Nervensystem
geschlossen und somit strukturdeterminierte
Systeme sind, und wenn sie au3erdem
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strukturell dynamische Systeme in dem Sinn 
sind, daß ihre Strukturen sich aufgrund ihres 
eigenen Operierens ständig verändern, dann 
kann eine Interaktion in ihrem Medium 
Strukturveränderungen lediglich selektieren, 
nicht aber festlegen." (Maturana 1982:20).
This model might also be read in the light of the 1859 Preface 
where the medium would be the productive forces and the systems 
woulc be the relations of production. Several points need mention­
ing here:
1. The concept of "relations of production" lacks precision. It 
encompasses economic, legal and social meanings. In order to make 
it more precise, it should be decomposed into its constituent 
parts.
2. The concept of superstructure is misleading since it uses a 
metaphor which suggests a picture of a building with more and less 
important floors. It suggests that the base (ground floor) could 
exist without the superstructure (first floor).
3. Cohen's interpretation tries to avoid some of the difficulties 
by proposing a functional relationship between the elements. Thus 
we have a primary layer of productive forces which explain the 
relations of production which explain the superstructures. But 
superstructures stabilize relations of production which in turn 
stabilize productive forces. This functional analysis fails on the
grounds of its own premiss i.e. to explain productive forces in
2 8 2asocial terms.
282 See Lukes for a similar critique of the separation of the 
superstructure from the base, see Lukes (1983).
302
4. My own position, in contrast, concurs with the approach that 
there are some functional links involved in M a r x ’s model but it 
defines the units in a different way. The most important 
difference is to rob technology of its autonomous status; in my 
view, only social systems enjoy such a position. Moreover, social 
systems fulfil also the requirement that they can be defined 
independently from each other. Circularity is involved in their 
self-production (which is no defect of the theory!), but is not 
involved in the relation between them. Yet, the question remains; 
which productive forces will be suitable for communism? Will they 
take the form of machinery which per definitionem degrades man to 
an appendage? According to evolutionary theory, a new, "libera­
ting" technology cannot be brought about by intentional action 
alone, rather, its hypothetical emergence would be the result of 
the interplay of the economic, political and scientific system.
4.3.4. Summary
On a Weberian account, as briefly pointed out in 4.2.3., an elec­
tive affinity between capital, machinery and science obtains which 
explains the fusion of these elements in capitalist society.283 On 
the basis of Eigen and Schuster's account, this process can be de­
scribed as a hypercycle. Stripped to its essentials, manufacturing 
and machine technology, movable capital, propertyless workers, 
competition ar.d extension of intercourse are the elements of the 
hypercycle. Capital is the self-replicative unit, the others are 
"catalytic links". According to autopoietic theory, capitalism is 
a social system which reproduces itself; it reproduces the system
283 This is, of course, not Weber's precise thesis, which, as is 
known, analyses the relation between religions and economic 
forms.
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by the production of its elements and it produces its elements by 
its elements. Taking these three approaches together, we can state 
that neither in the model of elective affinities nor in the model 
of the "hypercycle" nor in the theory of "autopoiesis” technology 
can an autonomy be assigned.
4.4. An empricial illustration: the transition from feudalism to 
capitalism
In this section, I trace some of Marx's analysis with respect to 
the transition from feudalism to capitalism, thereby also showing 
that a causal analysis is not feasible.
Marx never developed fully an historical account of the emer­
gence of capitalism. He was mainly interested in the logical 
preconditions of capitalist production. Thus he restricted his 
historical sketch in the end of Capital 1 to demonstrating how 
capital and labour power came into existence. However, there are 
some pages in the German Ideology (see CW 5 :66-81) and in the 
Grundrisse which can be exploited for my purposes here (I shall 
rely mainly on the passage from the German Ideology).
In the German Ideology, Marx gives an outline of the dynamics of 
capitalist production under the regime of the guilds and other 
feudal bonds. Marx's account takes as its premise an ever greater 
division of labour which separates town and country, commerce and 
industry, and branches of industry. The result is the extension of
2 8 4communications which are particularly important for the
development of the productive forces.
284 The German "Verkehr" is usually translated as "intercourse".
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"As long as there exists no intercourse 
transcending the immediate neighborhood, every 
invention must be made separately in each 
locality... In primitive history every 
invention had to be made daily anew and in 
each locality independently." (CW 5 ;67)
With the establishment of the world market and large-scale indus­
try, "the permanence of the acquired productive forces [is] assu­
red" (CW 5 :67), Marx assumes.285 However, the empirical starting 
point for the evolution of capitalism is the manufacture of
weaving. This first and most important branch of manufacture uses
machinery. The rising demand for clothing gave weaving a big
stimulus. A new class of weaver came into existence in the towns. 
Because of its very nature "weaving resisted the trammels of the 
guilds"; it was carried on mostly in villages and market centres 
without guild organisation. Merchant capital, and capital of
manufacture, created a mass of movable capital. At the same time, 
peasants and vagabonds provided the army of the workpeople. The 
discovery of America and of the sea-route to India led to a new 
impetus for manufacture; the import of gold and other precious 
metals gave an additional stimulus to the creation of movable 
capital. Commerce and navigation led to the establishment of the 
world market, albeit in a restricted form, because of its split­
ting up into separate parts, each of which was exploited by a par­
ticular nation. Real competition between nations was prevented.
Marx distinguishes the above two forms of manufacture and com­
merce as two distinct historical periods. The third period, then, 
is large-scale industry. It had to respond to the ever-increasing
285 Somewhat naively, we might add today, standing on the
shoulders of Merton. As Douglas (1986) has pointed out,
multiple discoveries and institutional forgetting are
complementary processes which also take place in modern 
times.
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demand for manufactured products. According to Marx, several 
preconditions must be fulfilled for this mode of production: 
application of natural powers in industry, machinery, a huge 
division of labour, freedom of competition inside the nation and 
the development of theoretical mechanics. We may interrupt Marx's 
outline at this point and ask ourselves: what sort of explanation, 
if any, is employed? Let me try to provide an interpretation.
Marx gives an account of how a new form of production drives out 
another form: "Hence the decline of the guilds as scon as they
come into contact with manufacture." (CW 5 :70). This seems to be 
an argument on the level of selection. Taking Elster's five points 
from above, and equating (Y) with the advent of manufacture, (X), 
with some needs of feudal society, (Z), we then have to ask how 
condition (5), i.e. the feed-back loop by which Y maintains X 
through Z, can be fulfilled.
At first sight, there seem to be many causal relations at work: 
needs giving a 'stimulus', discovery of America providing the 
'impetus' etc. On the other hand, Marx speaks of preconditions for 
this development (freedom of competition, natural sciences, 
machinery, wage-labour). But these preconditions are themselves 
products of historical processes. Whatever these are, we are not 
able to identify a prime mover (or first cause) which sets into 
motion the whole process. Besides, the picture does not resemble a 
chain-reaction, but, rather, a network in which all elements 
influence all the others. It seems as if increasing demand ("human 
needs") is the motive power behind the whole. But since demand is 
only effective as economic demand, there must be a prior income 
which then can show up as demand. It thus seems as if we are lost 
in vicious circles and infinite regresses: capitalism still does 
not get off the ground.
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Let us therefore change the text for a moment. In Capital 1 , 
Marx tells us that English feudal lords tranformed their agricul­
tural land into pastures for sheep to graze which in turn was 
caused by the flourishing of Flemish wool manufacture, followed by 
a consequent rise in wool-prices. In fact, the whole "clearing of 
estates" created a propertyless class of free labourers. But apart 
from the economic motivation (i.e. Dutch competition), there is a 
political factor (the dissolution of feudalism) and a religious- 
political factor (the dissolution of .the property of the Church).
We still do not get a coherent explanation. Every string we 
catch dissolves into many fibres; every line we follow reveals
* > Q C
itself as a circle.“- The most reasonable approach would thus be
to take the preconditions of capitalism as historically-contingent
and analyze only the self-enhancing processes which eventually
2 8 7created modern capitalism. Since his theory tells him that the
capital-labour-relation is essential to understand capitalism, 
Marx restricts historical analysis mainly to the point where the 
emergence of those two elements (and their constitution as a 
social relation) takes place.
286 Neo-darwinian biology seems to have the same difficulty in
explaining how the "closure" of the hypercycle is brought
about. "Die zwangsläufig folgende Frage, wie der Zyklus sich 
schließt, wie es zum 'Hyperzyklus' kommt, wird in der 
Literatur meistens in relativ großen Sprüngen beschrieben." 
(3allmer and von Weizsäcker, 1984:241).
287 Marx would probably have insisted on a more law-like ac­
count. In the Grundrisse, and C a p i t a l , he establishes some 
evolutionary stages of the development of social forms which 
emerge from each other "out of necessity". But it is not
clear whether this applies also to technical forms i.e.
whether production based on artisanship had to give way to 
manufacture and only to manufacture.
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And yet there seems to be a privileged element in Marx's account. 
This is technology. He starts the historical sketch in the German 
Ideology with a glance at the division of labour. He states that 
the biggest division between manual and mental labour is the
division between town and country. In the countryside, outside the
iflflcontrol of the guilds, evolves the system of manufacture. Marx 
knows with Hegel and Adam Smith that manufacture with its division 
of labour is far more efficient than the earlier system of 
craftsmanship.289 But the guilds prevented manufacture from 
growing up. Here we have an example for Marx's claim that social 
institutions may "fetter" productive forces. Historical evidence 
told him that the drive of the productive forces is stronger than 
the repression of social institutions. The guilds were simply by­
passed and had to bow later before the rise of manufacture. This 
is the "technological bias" in Marx's analysis. However, techno­
logy is always embedded in specific social relations, in this case 
within the capital-labour relation. I thus conclude that it was 
part of Marx's implicit research programme to examine social
288 When he describes the emergence of movable capital, of wage- 
labour, of competition and of the establishment of a "cash 
nexus" (X for short) he always presents it in the form of 
"With the advent of manufacture, X also occurred". These are 
clearly concomitant processes which are not caused by 
manufacture although it may seem that manufacture was the 
"subject" of this process. In the Grundrisse, he speaks of a 
process of dissolution which brought about the elements or 
preconditions for capitalism (see Grundrisse:496 ff.).
289 See the famous pin-making example of Adam Smith as cited in 
Hegel's early Jenaer Systementwürfe: "(A]n einer Stecknadel 
arbeiten in einer englischen Manufactur 18 Menschen; jeder 
hat eine besondre und nur diese Seite der Arbeit; ein 
einzelner würde vielleicht nicht 20; nicht 1 machen können; 
jene 18 Arbeiten unter 10 Menschen vertheilt machen 4000 des 
Tags; aber auf die Arbeit dieser 10, wenn sie unter 18 
arbeiteten, würden 48000 in einem Tag kommen." (Hegel 
1975:323).
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relations and productive forces in their co-evolution. A confirma­
tion is the transition from manufacture to Modern Industry. As 
already noted, Marx here assigns a degree of importance to social 
factors (see Capital 1 :347;361 and MEGA II.3.6.:1973).
But to come back to the functional analysis: what sort of rela­
tions of production were functional for the development of the 
productive forces? As we have seen, in manufacture (and even more 
in large-scale industry) the capital-labour relation was the 
important, dynamic social relation. Relations of production which 
are functional for this relation must thus secure: (a) private 
property in the forms of free labour and free capital; (b) free 
market competition; (c) an institution which secures both (a) and
2 9 0(b) viz. the modern state.
However, Marx does not stop with this account. Within the 
technical form of manufacture a new technology arises which will 
take the place of the old: this is large-scale industry based on 
machinery. Manufacture already used machines in its production 
process. Eventually, manufacture also produces machines which are 
able to produce machines. Once this task is accomplished - manu­
facture has performed its "historical service" - it becomes super­
fluous. The new productive forces of modern industry no longer de ­
pend on crafts of any sort. This is certainly a suggestive picture
290 On this analysis the democratic form of the modern state is 
a contingent event. To be functional for the productive for­
ces, it is sufficient to secure private property and compet­
ition. To be sure, there are historical reasons which made 
the democratic form of the state necessary e.g.s. the anti- 
feudal, anti-authoritarian, pro-science and, in some coun­
tries, pro-enlightenment conjuncture. See also Barrington 
Moore's analysis, (Moore 1966), which stresses the impor­
tance of class-constellations for the final shape of speci­
fic political forms of capitalism.
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which has not lost any of its power. But perhaps Marx was led 
astray by the implicit suggestion that machinery itself was self- 
reproductive. In the language of Eigen and Schuster, it would have 
evolved from a "functional linkage" into a "self-replicative 
unit". But there are severe theoretical difficulties in supporting 
such an assumption not to speak of its lack of plausibility. Even 
a fully automated-industry, which employs robots instead of human 
labour power, cannot be said to be only produced by machines. This
2 91technology is also linked to science,. politics and the economy.
4.5. Evolution of technology and social institutions under 
ecological constraints
In the following discussion, I want to come back to the question 
of historical progress and the criteria for measuring it (see 
3.1.7.). First of all, I want to stress that under present condi­
tions we are faced "with a new kind of 'contradiction between the 
development of the forces of production and existing social pro­
ductive relations' which appears... in all industrial societies" 
as Schefold (1977:247, my emphasis) so aptly put it.
If we accept the terminology of the 1859 Preface, we can no 
longer assume that modern societies have to adapt their institu­
tional arrangements to the productive forces but that they have to 
attempt to shape the productive forces in a way which makes their 
detrimental effects upon the natural environment and upon human
291 It is a common theme in science fiction to assume the con­
trary i.e. technology completely beyond the control of 
social relations. This persistent metaphor takes its force 
from a deep anthropological "fear" of the machine. The 
machine is something between the living and the dead; cf. 
Bahr's stimulating book (1985).
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beings decrease. The social institutions and the productive forces 
have to become reflexive if the original claim of development and 
progress is to be sustained.
Traditional marxist analyses assumed that the institutional 
change would be tantamount to the abolishing of private property 
relations. This solution is fatally flawed in the light of ecolo­
gical problems.
But not even a sophisticated author like G .A . Cohen offers these 
considerations sufficient room in his interpretation of historical 
materialism.292 We would be badly advised to adopt his outline for 
the discussion of ecological problems since it offers only the 
perspective that class struggle might fight out the contradiction 
between productive forces and relations of production until new 
social relations have been established which are propitious for 
the productive forces. But it seems that in the case of ecological 
problems it is the very nature of some productive forces which 
causes considerable ecological damage. Hence, if we would rely on 
their ''autonomous'' development, we would be left witnessing even 
more disasters.
Late capitalism is still characterised by a "frightening" pro­
ductivity, to use Bahro's expression (cf. Bahro 1977:9, 51). If we 
judge the performance of capitalism on the basis of economic or 
technical criteria (productivity), there is no reason to assume 
that a new social form would be required to "unfetter" a develop­
ment of the productive forces. Marxism, interpreted in such a 
scheme of productive forces/relations of production, loses all of 
its critical impetus. However, in my opinion, there is still much
292 I say "sufficient" because there is a degree of awareness of 
the problem (see infra).
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justification for claiming exactly such a critical dimension for 
Marxism. In order to do so, another theoretical frame will be 
needed. As I have pointed out, it is crucial for such an approach 
to incorporate non-economic criteria into our standards of 
measuring progress. Since Marx did so, we have the possibility of 
endorsing this dimension in judging how successful a mode of 
production is in transforming nature.
It is not the institution of private property which fetters the 
development of the productive forces; and, on the other hand, it 
is not the institution of state planning which has lead to an 
unfettered development of the productive forces either in the wide 
(domination of nature) or in the narrow (economic) sense. Ironi­
cally, the history of the last seventy years has shown that it is 
still the capitalist arrangement which develops the productive 
forces (at least in the narrow sense) best. Anc, even worse for 
the performance of socialist planning, the socialist arrangement 
of the productive forces did not prevent the emergence of severe 
ecological problems. If socialist countries had a slower develop­
ment of productive forces, it was not because they adopted an 
ecological policy which consumed part of the resources necessary 
for the development of the productive forces.
Marx employed ethical and physical arguments when judging histo­
rical forms of society. With respect to the first, he stated un­
equivocally that people were happier in previous modes of produc­
tion :
"Die Bedingungen, unter denen das [Kapital-J 
Verhältniß ursprünglich erscheint, oder die 
als historische Voraussetzung seines Werdens 
erscheinen, zeigen auf den ersten Blick 
doppelseitigen Character - auf der einen Seite 
Aufloesung niedrigerer Form der lebdendigen 
Arbeit - auf der andren Seite Aufloesung 
glücklichrer Verhältnisse für den unmittelba­
ren Produzenten. Einerseits Aufloesung von
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Sklaverei und Leibeigenschaft. Andrerseits 
Aufloesung der Form, worin die Productionsmit- 
tel unmittelbar als Eigenthum des unmittelba­
ren Producenten vorhanden sind, sei es daß 
seine Arbeit vorwiegend auf Gebrauchswerth 
(Agricultur) oder Tauschwerth (städtische 
Arbeit) gerichtet ist. Endlich Aufloesung der 
Form des Gemeinwesens, worin der Arbeiter als 
Organ dieses naturwüchsigen Gemeinwesens 
zugleich Eigenthümer oder Besitzer über seine 
Productionsmittel gesetzt ist.” (MEGA
11.3.6:2288) .
With respect to the second problem, he held quite an optimistic 
view, as we saw in chapter 2. Capitalism, he thought, displays the 
inherent tendency to recycle waste if it is cost-reducing. On the 
other hand, things which have no price are likely to be wasted 
under capitalism - examples are air, water, and most importantly, 
human beings. It is their flesh, blood and nerves which capitalism 
wastes in an unprecedented way.
Considering the present conditions of industrially-developed 
countries, this account seems to be questionable; but I claim that 
the premise on which it is built is still valid. The premise is 
the following: out of a given set of costs, capitalists try to 
reduce each factor, be it labour or raw material. This premise is 
as valid today as it was a hundred years ago. The difference lies 
in the different structure of costs (relative prices). In Marx's
293 Cf. the early formulation in the Holy F a m i l y : "In the modern 
world each person is at the same time a member of slave 
society and of the public commonweal. Precisely the slavery 
of civil society is in appearance the greatest freedom 
because it is in appearance the fully developed independence 
of the individual, who considers as his own freedom the 
uncurbed movement, no longer bound by a common bend or by 
man, of the estranged elements of his life, such as 
property, industry, religion, etc., whereas actually this is 
his fully developed slavery and inhumanity." (CW 4 :116) See 
also Rosdolsky (1968:488 ff.).
313
time, labour was a relatively cheap factor which has now become 
much more expensive. Raw materials, on the other hand, have not 
become cheaper in general: some raw materials have become cheaper, 
some more expensive, some are free (or nearly free), as they were 
in Marx's time (air and water). Certainly, labour has become
protected by law. It therefore cannot be wasted in the same way as
it could a hundred years ago. On this different empirical basis, 
we obtain results different from Marx's. Today we witness the
depletion of natural resources which are only partially recycled,
apart from animal species made extict. It goes without saying that 
only the relatively expensive raw materials are recycled by 
capitalists.294 The cheap ones are wasted. It is completely 
rational for a capitalist (as for a private consumer) to throw 
away what would require some labour time to restore its use-value 
if he can readily buy the material at a comparatively low price. 
If a capitalist has the alternative of buying one ton of a metal 
or of extracting it from a salt which comes out as waste from his 
production process, he will decide on the basis of relative pri­
ces. Similarly, the private consumer throws away his TV set when 
costs of repair exceed a certain percentage of the costs of a new 
TV set.
At the same time, we observe another tendency in this process: 
the tendency to substitute expensive raw materials with cheaper 
raw materials. The result of this is that man to an ever greater 
extent mediates his Stoffwechsel with nature by a process which 
transforms nature ('raw material') into artifacts. Ecologists 
doubt that this success in transforming nature is a rational one. 
If one compares the efficiency of production as an economic 
process with its efficiency as a technical process in so far as it
294 I do not consider here public recycling of paper, glass etc.
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involves energy, we may find that there is a discrepancy (see
Schefold 1977). In fact, if societies do not succeed in providing
enough cheap energy to maintain its present system of nature
transformation based on economic rationality, the 'Development
thesis' would not hold true, because in this case mankind would
have to retreat to a 'lower' state of development (in the sense of
economic rationality): it would have to produce by using more
labour inputs. The rationality assumption would thus turn out to
be false, or at least lead to non-r_ational outcomes. In order to
avoid such a result, economic rationality would have to be
substituted, or supplemented, by an energy-conscious rationality.
As we have seen, Cohen's 'Development thesis' rests on the sole
variable of material wealth, which in the context of the present
work certainly is not a sufficient one. Cohen, at the very end of
his book, dedicates some attention to this problem. He admits that
"if resources are to be used more sparingly, recourse to them must
to some extent be replaced by continued reliance on human labour
power... (Cohen 1978:323) Is this a reason to be pessimistic about
post-capitalist society, since the promise of increased leisure
cannot be fulfilled? Not at all, replies Cohen. Such pessimistic
"reflections depend on a crude concept of leisure... By 'leisure'
we have meant freedom from unwanted activity, not freedom from
productive activity. That the two have gone together under
capitalism does not mean that they are fated to coincide in the
future." (Cohen 1978:323) As we shall see in the next chapter,
this distinction is an illuminating one, but one with which Marx
2 95was already familiar.
Victor (1980) also maintains that Marx's framework entails the 
physical dimensions of economic processes. After criticizing
295 It thus does not run "against a deep current of thought in 
Marx", as Cohen supposes (cf. Cohen 1978:323).
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neoclassical economics for its blindness with respect to ecologi­
cal problems, Victor holds that Marx's "broadly conceived analyti­
cal framework is not open to the same criticism ... that can be 
levelled at the neo-classical framework." (Victor 1980:207). 
Neoclassical economics have had only one major contribution which 
recognized the problem; this was Kenneth Boulding’s article "The 
Economics of the Coming Spaceship Earth". As Victor put it, 
Boulding "pointed out that the economic activities of consumption, 
production, and trade involve a rearrangement of matter and not a 
creation of new material." (Victor 1980:198). But this approach is 
hardly new for someone familiar with M a r x ’s theory:
This new approach to economic activities is
particularly insightful for analysing 
environmental issues. It may be surprising to 
discover, therefore, that in fact it is not 
really a new approach at all. Economists as 
distinct in their orientation as Alfred
Marshall and Karl Marx devoted substantial
passages in their respective treatises to a 
description of economic activity in precisely 
these terms." (Victor 1980:198)
This leads me to the core of Marx's theory. I maintain that Marx 
throughout his work endorsed an ethical theory on which his 
analysis and scientific edifice rests. This ethical theory can be 
summed up in the following way:
Marx's main concern regarding mankind as a whole, and individual 
human beings, was to search out the possibilities for an abolition 
of all "enslaving effects" which would fetter the development of 
individuals in a universal way. For example, he writes in the 
Theories of Surplus Value that people under capitalist conditions 
are "dominated by the pressure of an extraneous purpose which must 
be fulfilled, and the fulfillment of which is regarded as a social 
duty." (TSV 111:257) In the Grundrisse, Marx defines "real 
wealth" in terms of individual self-realization, a process which
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includes an increasing domination of nature and is at the same
time an ongoing process i.e. a process which has no halting point.
This passage synthesises his philosophical anthropology with
perfectionism and his conception of emancipation:
"[Wjhen the limited bourgeois form is stripped 
away, what is wealth other than the universa­
lity of individual needs, capacities, pleasu­
res, productive forces, etc., created through 
universal exchange? The full development of 
human mastery over the forces of nature, those 
of so-called nature as well as of humanity's 
own nature? The absolute working-out of his 
creative potentialities, with no presupposi­
tion other than the previous historic develop­
ment, which makes this totality of develop­
ment, i.e. the development of all human powers 
as such the end in itself, not as measured on 
a predetermined yardstick? Where he does not 
reproduce himself in one specificity, but 
produces his totality? Strives not to remain 
something he has become, but is in the abso­
lute movement of becoming?" (Grundrisse:4 88).
Social division of labour in class societies is most likely to 
initiate extraneous purposes. Marx, writing on a future communist 
society in the Critique of the Gotha Programme, asserts that 
"in a higher stage of communist society, ... the enslaving 
subordination of the individual to the division of labour, and 
therewith also the antithesis between mental and physical labour 
[will have] vanished..." (SW 3 :19). As we have already seen, Marx 
thought that people were happier in earlier modes of production 
(MEGA:II.3.6.:2288) and also freer (CW 5 :78-9). But pre-capitalist 
conditions where the worker owns his means of production, 
typically exclude (a) concentration of means of production; (b) 
cooperation; (c) division of labour within one production process;
(d ) social mastery and regulation of nature; (e) free development 
of social productive forces (see Capital 1 :714).
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Marx thought that it is possible, probable and even inevitable
that mankind will reach an non-enslaving mode of production in
socialist society. Socialist society would synthesise the moral
level of ancient societies with the achievements of modernity; it
would combine the concern for use-value production (quality of
products) of antique society with the general availability of
2 96commodities in modern capitalist society (quantity). In the
Grundrisse, he says that only under modern conditions does an 
interest arise in what sort of property yields maximum wealth; in 
ancient Greece, the interest was in which sort of property yields
the best citizen (cf. Grundrisse: 487).
The historical condition for the fusion of 'happiness' with 
'material wealth for the greatest number’ would be a sufficient 
level of productive forces which frees man from wrestling with 
nature to a large degree. Capitalism was the mode of production 
which served this purpose. Thus Marx praised capitalism for the 
development of the productive forces. But capitalism still does
not bring about a full "social mastery and regulation of nature".
People still are the pawns in a mechanism which they do not under­
stand. As Marx emphasises, there is a paradoxical tendency at
w o r k :
"In our days, everything seems pregnant with 
its contrary. Machinery, gifted with the 
wonderful power of shortening and fructifying 
human labour, we behold starving and 
overworking it. The new-fangled sources of 
wealth, by some strange weird spell, are 
turned into sources of want. The victories of 
art seem bought by the loss of character. At
the same pace that mankind masters nature, man
296 In the Manuscripts Marx examines ancient Greek thinkers like 
Xenophon, Plato, Aristotle and Thucydides. They were concer­
ned with the quality of products (use-values); therefore, it 
was assumed that each man should dedicate himself only to 
one art or work.
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seems to become enslaved to other men or to 
his own infamy. Even the pure light of science 
seems unable to shine but on the dark 
background of ignorance. All our invention and 
progress seem to result in endowing material 
forces with intellectual life, and in stulti­
fying human life into a material force." (CW 
14:655-6)
This paradoxical tendency, this regress within progress, made 
Marx condemn capitalism. It is a social form which makes people 
suffer, which has an irrational performance (economic crises) and 
reifies social relations. This condemation is a moral condemna-
2 97tion, even if Marx refused to accept such a label. It is a
moral condemnation, because someone who is interested exclusively 
in the level of productive forces has no reason to condemn the 
social form which is beneficial to that development, if this
297 He often endorses an ironic attitude, as when he cites 
Goethe's poem "An Suleika". Marx refers several times to 
this poem. He attributes it to the propagators of capitalism 
and to the capitalists themselves when he exposes the misery 
produced by capitalism. Confronted with the number of dead 
workers in mines, they would, according to Marx, respond 
with the poem which reads as follows:
Sollte diese Qual unse qualen,
Da sie unsre Lust vermehrt,
Hat nicht Myriaden Seelen 
Timurs Herrschaft aufgezehrt?
Marx, in turn, uses the same poem in the opposite sense, 
stressing above all the 3rd and 4th verses which refer to 
the expectation of a socialist revolution. This use of the 
pcem is a clear instance for Marx's view that history until 
the advent of socialist society is a natural process in 
which it takes a certain number of souls which have to be 
sacrificed in order to achieve the downfall of the tyrant. 
Of course, one can characterize this position as simply 
describing ("value-free") a mechanism; but only the 
underlying evaluation (sacrifice, tyrant) provides meaning 
(for the social scientist) and motivation (for the oppressed 
m a s s e s ).
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social form goes along with a development of the productive forces 
both on average and in the long run. If the setbacks are only tem­
porary or so small that they cannot reverse the general direction 
of the development of the productive forces, there would be no 
reason to object to such a development. But Marx is not concerned 
about "net gains" of the sum total of progress and regress. The 
point is that both notions have many dimensions which make it 
difficult to scale or quantify them.
The fact that Marx did condemn capitalism for these very 
'setbacks' reveals clearly the existence of another criterion 
besides the 'productivist' one. To repeat, this criterion is an 
ethical one.298
If we accept this interpretation of Marx's theory, we are in a 
better position to pose the question of ecological problems and 
the level of productive forces again. Now, if Marx's ultimate 
concern was the abolition of enslaving effects and to bring about 
a social form which organises its transformation of nature in a 
rational way, he would have had to take into account the 
possibility that man's very Stoffwechsel with nature entails the
298 Marx does not share the criticisms of modernity which would 
like to abolish modern technology and modern conflicts. 
Against such backward-oriented positions, Marx says: "On our 
part, we do not mistake the shape of the shrewd spirit that 
continues to mark all these contradictions. We know that to 
work well, the new-fangled forces of society, they only want 
be to be mastered by new-fangled men - and such are the 
working men. They are as much the invention of modern time
as machinery itself." (CW 1 4 :656) Nietzsches's Übermensch
comes to mind here, but also Marx's dictum that people only
set themselves tasks which they are able to fulfil. The
emergence of Marx's "superman" is a process which can be 
determined technologically: since the productive forces of
capitalism are universal ones, the producers who 
reappropriate them are becoming universal individuals.
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danger of 'enslaving effects'. Marx seems to overestimate the 
degree of a successful social mastery of nature under capitalist 
conditions. He is indeed aware of severe ecological problems which 
arise as a cause of capitalist conditions. However, we may doubt 
if Marx's own position offers a perspective here. As he states in 
Capital, a higher synthesis of agriculture and industry would 
avoid disturbances in the process of Stoffwechsel (see Capital 
1:474). This is consistent with his view in the German Ideology 
that the division between town and country would have to be super­
seded in communism. In this respect, modern reality does not seem 
to fit his plea: there are industrial, agricultural and undevelo­
ped areas on the planet. In some regions, the distinction between 
town and countryside has vanished, but not necessarily to the 
benefit of its inhabitants. At least in industrially developed 
countries people who live in the countryside are less and less 
farmers but simply people who prefer living outside the towns.
Nevertheless, it is modern industry which frustrates such a 
higher synthesis: "The more a country starts its development on 
the foundation of modern industry, like the United States, for 
example, the more rapid is this process of destruction." (Capital 
1:475). This is another instance where Marx seems aware of the 
possibility that the very nature of a productive force might cause 
huge undesirable effects i.e. that it is not only the capitalist 
form which is responsible (see 3.6.). But this would create insur­
mountable difficulties for his theory. He thus adds immediately:: 
"Capitalist production, therefore, develops technology... only by 
sapping the original sources of all wealth - the soil and the 
labourer." (Capital 1 :475). With respect to the detrimental 
effects of modern industry on human labour power, Marx tried to 
make his analysis consistent in the final version, i.e. in 
Capital, as we have seen in 3.6. With respect to detrimental 
effects of modern industry on the natural environment, M a r x ’s
321
analysis remains ambigous: it allows for both possibilities,
blaming the productive forces and social relations.299
According to Marx, a social mastery of nature can be achieved 
only in communism. As he states in Capital, a higher synthesis of 
agriculture and industry would avoid "disturbances" in the Stoff- 
wechsel between man and nature. This is consistent with his view 
(as expressed in the German Ideology) that the separation between 
town and country will be overcome by communism. The miserable 
state of the natural environment, the separation of the globe into 
agricultural and industrial zones, the dangers arising from the 
present methods of transforming nature indicate clearly that
mankind has not yet succeeded in mastering nature. We may thus 
regard the solution of ecological problems as a test case for
communismi.e. only that social form which succeeds in incorpora­
ting reflexivity into its modus operandi will be worth being 
called "communist".
The actual presence of ecological problems motivates my attempt 
to reformulate Marx's theory in this respect. A reformulation 
would read in the following way: higher levels of productive
forces are not sufficient for communism to be superior to
capitalism. To be superior, communism has to ensure not only the 
development of the productive forces but also the abolishing of 
enslaving effects which stem from technology. Communism will be
299 Recall Marx's statement on the "greedy farmer [ w h o ]  snatches 
increased produce from the soil by robbing it of its ferti­
lity." (Capital 1 :253). Also, here, it is not a specific 
social relation (for example, capitalism) which exhausts the 
soil but a behaviour which may occur under several social 
relations, under relations which exacerbate a greedy attitu­
de towards nature.
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the first form of human society in which mankind has reached 
"mastery over nature".
This formulation has another form as Marx's famous statement in 
the 1859 Preface, and as formalised by Cohen. As Ernst Bloch 
observed, all rejoice about great technical progress is in vain 
because progress in technology can be accompanied by regress in 
society (cf. Bloch 1959:814).
Marx did not pay enough attention to the possibility that tech­
nological and scientific progress need not be parallelled by 
social progress. He partly followed the optimistic tradition of 
the Enlightenment (Bacon, Descartes) which assumed such a parallel 
(see Leiss 1972). But Marx was also deeply influenced by (German) 
romanticism. This tradition informed his theory of moral evolution 
of mankind (from a non-alienated primordial state to personal 
dependence, to impersonal dependence to total freedom.300 Since 
Marx took for granted that history would inevitably lead to a 
final reconcilation in communist society, he could formulate the 
relation between productive forces and social institutions as an 
objective relation. If we, basing ourdelves on historical evi­
dence, challenge this assumption, we can nevertheless derive the
300 See Grundrisse: "Relations of personal dependence (entirely 
sponateous at the outset) are the first social forms, in 
which human productive capacity develops only to slight 
extent and at isolated points. Personal independence founded 
on objective dependence is the second great form, in which a 
system of general social metabolism, of universal relations, 
of all-round need and universal capacieties is formed for 
the first time. Free individuality, based on the universal 
development of individuals and on their subordination of 
their communal, social productivity as their social wealth, 
is the third stage." (Grundrisse:158).
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criteria for the superiority of communism from Marx's own frame­
work: only a society which is able to calculate the results of its 
own working fulfils the condition of being a communist society.

CHAPTER 5: COMMUNISM
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Sinnlos daher, von Erfinden, das für sich allein steht, 
ein sicher Gutes zu erwarten. Es ist nicht immer besser 
als die Gesellschaft, die es setzt und gebraucht.
Also können Fortschritten der 'Naturbeherrschung' sehr 
große Rückschritte der Gesellschaft entsprechen, auch 
die 'Naturbeherrschung1 sieht dann danach aus.
Ernst Bloch
5.1. Two faces of communism
One conclusion which I have reached so far is that a communist 
society must be a society which regulates its interchange with 
nature in a rational way; this is to say that the existence of 
severe ecological crises would inhibit calling such a society 
"communist". This proposition follows from Marx's insistence that 
human emancipation does not only mean material abundance and non­
existence of wage-slavery but also spiritual wealth (happiness) 
and conscious control of the individuals over their life- 
conditions. In what follows I shall focus on a possible ambiguity 
in this notion of communism. The ambiguity is contained in the 
last proposition: all depends how strong a claim is made with
respect to conscious control and how the realm of "life- 
conditions" is defined. My suggestion is to distinguish between 
two notions of communism. If we summarise some remarks of Marx 
with respect to communism in general, we could compile the 
following list:
1. abolition of private property;
2. abolition of classes, class-exploitation and class-oppressicn;
3. universalisation of happiness;
4. universalisation of material wealth;
5. expanding of disposable time;
6. return to use-value production;
7. reappropriation of man's objectifications;
8. total individuals;
9. conscious control.
The dividing line lies somewhere between 5 and 7. The difference 
between the two notions can be connected to the principles of 
market and plan and to the presence or absence of alienation and 
fetishism.301 Whereas the strong notion requires the superseding 
of alienation, the weak notion would allow its persistence. I re­
turn to this difference in 5.5.2. and 5.6.
In the Paris Manuscripts, Marx himself gives a hint of such a 
distinction: here he says: "Communism is the necessary form and 
the dynamic principle of the immediate future, but communism as 
such is not the goal of human development, the form of human 
society." (CW 3 :306) . In his later writings he equates the
release of all human powers with communism. Nevertheless, there is 
still a tension within his concept of communism. For example, in 
his Critique of the Gotha Program, Marx introduces a lower stage 
of communism, which by later Marxists has been called socialism 
(cf. Lenin 1917:472). With this distinction we have again a weak 
and a strong notion of communism. But before discussing this pos­
sible tension, I shall first look at decisive traits of communism 
"as such", as described by Marx.
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301 For a distinction see 3.5.
302 Maihofer (1968) points out this possible difference. It is
possible that Marx here refers to "crude communism", a
notion which he used in the Paris M a n u scripts, too. See also
Avineri (1968).
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In the Comments on James M i l l / (1844) Marx defines the "human
society" as a society which makes possible the full release of
human nature:
Let us suppose that we had carried out
production as human beings. Each of us would
have in two ways affirmed himself and the 
other person. ...I would have directly
confirmed and realized my true nature, my
human nature, my communal nature. Our products 
would be so many mirrors in which we saw
reflected our essential nature. (CW 3 : 227-8)
Marx contrasts production under capitalist relations with 'produc­
tion as human beings', where the latter is a synonym for com­
munism. Human beings are charcterised as creative and communal 
beings. Capitalism thwarts the full development of the indivi­
duals, although - at least according to the "official" position 
developed in Capital - it contributes to that development in so
far as it enhances the variety ("Vielseitigkeit") of work and
creates the social-cooperative character of work. A society which 
enabled the release of all human powers would be 'the human
society'.
Marx approaches the project of emancipation not from a given 
"system of happiness" but rather from the features of human
nature. The first approach would be a static and doctrinal one, 
whereas the second starts from empirical facts and scientific 
observation viz. that human beings have developed their productive 
powers i.e. their domination over nature. Humans were, and are, 
able to do so because they are creative and communal. They develop 
new productive forces within social relationships. This approach 
gives Marx clear criteria to judge historical forms of production, 
including the capitalist form. If a social form "fetters" the 
project of mankind to increase mastery over nature, it will be 
replaced by a social form better adapted to that need. The mecha-
327
nisms which bring about this replacement are equally historically- 
observable real forces. For Marx, then, the scientific and the 
normative view converge, since the abolition of capitalism is not 
only desirable but a "process which unfolds beyond our eyes" (as 
he put it in the Communist Manifesto)303 . We have to interpret 
Marx in this context when, in Capital 1 , he approvingly cites the 
monk Ortes of Venice, who said: "Instead of proposing useless 
systems for peoples' happiness, I shall limit myself to investiga­
ting the causes of human misery." (Das Kapital 1 : 675-6, my 
translation). There can be no doubt that Marx saw the causes of 
human misery in the "fettering" instances of human nature: 
whenever the "promethean" trend of man was thwarted, human misery 
was the result. The reader will note that I am using the word 
"fetter" with a different meaning from the usual one. The locus 
classicus for the notion of fettering is the 1859 Preface, where 
it occupies a central place to describe the relation between 
productive forces and relations of production in the course of 
history. The standard interpretation of the 1859 Preface is mainly 
about economic criteria, about fetters to the optimal use or 
development of productive forces. But we must not forget that the 
productive forces which are embodied in specific technologies and 
forms of social cooperation are the "expression" or 
objectification of the creative individuals who strive towards a 
world which leaves no place for superior powers. This humanist 
model lies at the heart of Marx's discussion of the relation 
between productive forces and relations of production. It would be 
mistaken to interpret the Preface in mere quantitative economic
303 Lukes (1985:37) interprets Marx as an "anti-utopian 
Utopian", claiming that Marx, "in quasi-Hegelian 
fashion, [is saying] that with the forward movement of 
history, a vantage point becomes available from which the 
self-transformation of capitalism into socialism becomes 
increasingly visible. Adequate knowledge of this process, 
though not of the shape of future society, becomes available 
to the scientific observer." (Lukes 1985:41)
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terms. True, capitalism fettered the development of the productive 
forces in this respect, too (remember that this was Lenin's 
central claim in his theory of imperialism) and that Marx 
also criticised capitalism in this respect.304 I say "also" 
because this was neither his sole nor his most important 
criticism. In 4.6., we saw that a spiritual element was always 
present in Marx's definition of "progress” . We also saw that a 
successful Stoffwechsel between society and nature has to be 
included and that the Marxian theory offers the tools for such an 
analysis. After all, this is the crucial point for the whole 
debate between Marxists and environmenalists: if Marxism has a 
narrow, quantitative, "productivist" notion of what increase in 
the productive forces means, the environmenatlists' challenge of 
Marxism is completely in order. If, on the contrary, Marxism has a 
wider notion of the term (and I think it has) then the environmen­
talists' charge is not only misplaced, but the ecological proble- 
matique can be tackled by Marx's theory in an illuminating way.
In the German Ideology, we find a contrast between communism
and all earlier modes of production:305
Communism differs from all previous movements 
in that it overturns the basis of all earlier 
relations of production and intercourse, and 
for the first time consciously treats all
naturally evolved premises [" naturwüchsig" ] 
as 'he creations of hitherto existing men, 
strips them of their natural character and 
subjugates them to the power of the united
individuals... The reality which communism 
creates is precisely the true basis for
rendering it impossible that anything should 
exist independently of individuals, insofar as
304 See Elster's discussion of different possible meanings of 
"fettering” .
305 Of course, Marx does not yet use the term "mode of 
production” . However, as the context makes clear, he is not 
only talking about a communist (social) movement but about 
communism as a social form.
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reality is nevertheless only a product of the 
preceding intercourse of individuals." (CW 5 :
81, my emphasis).
Note again that the word "natural" in the quotation does not so 
much refer to "nature", but is used in the sense of 'given', 'un­
changeable', 'opaque'. Not only n a t u r e ^  but also nature2 can thus 
have "naturally-evolved" characteristics. The more mankind suc­
ceeds in transforming nature, the less this is conceived as a 
mystical power but something subjugated to the power of the united 
individuals. This aspect of actively transforming nature becomes 
of crucial importance here and distinguishes Marx from Feuerbach's 
passive naturalism. For Marx, nature as such cannot be cognitively 
captured. As he put it with Vico, we can understand only what we 
have produced ourselves (see 5.5.1.).
In Capital, Marx again analyses 'natural premises' and the
possibility of treating them as the creations of 'hitherto
existing men'. In so doing, he employs the Stoffwechsel concept to
analyse the relation of society to nature and conceives of human
development in the circle of externalization, objectification and
appropriation (cf. Habermas 1985). Under capitalism, the circle is
interrupted, since the product of the producers does not return to
them. Hence, to close this circle, private property needs to be
abolished and labour has to be constituted as social labour from
the outset. Marx presents four models of non-capitalist
production. The first is Robinson's isolated production, the
second is feudalism, the third is a patriarchial farmers'
community, and the fourth is
"a community of free individuals, carrying on 
their work with the means of production in 
common, in which the labour-power of all the 
different individals is consciously applied as 
the combined labour-power of the community."
(Capital l;82-3).
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Now, this "community of free individuals" is obviously a synonym 
for communism. Feudalism and the patriarchic family are both based 
on personal dependence, with the difference that feudalism rests 
on an enforced division of labour whereas the patriarchic family 
rests on a "spontaneously developed division of labour" (Capital 
1:82). These rural-patriarchalic communities thus could almost be 
called communist, if they were not founded on the "immature deve­
lopment of man individually" which is reflected in the "ancient 
worship of Nature" (Capital 1 :83,84). Historically, these communi­
ties have been eroded to the extent that personal dependence has 
given way to impersonal dependence, transforming labour-power into 
a commodity.336
Communism, for Marx, is thus a stage of society in which the
30 7united individuals (freely associated men) act upon their
material production and conceive their products as products of
their own; not as products of nature, and not as mystical
productsi.e. products of capital:
"The life-process of society which is based on 
the process of material production, does not 
strip off its mystical veil until it is 
treated as production by freely associated 
men, and is consciously regulated by them in 
accordance with a settled plan." (Capital 
1:84, my emphasis).
306 I employ here the evolutionary scheme from the Grundrisse 
where Marx depicts a development of mankind from personal 
dependence to impersonal dependence to freedom, see 
Grundrisse:158. The full quote is given in 4.5., final 
footnote.
307 The notion of "individual" is a modern concept which emerges 
directly from the dissolution of relations of personal 
dependence, i.e. when labour-power is transformed into a 
commodity. In other words, members of a patriarchaic family 
are not "individuals" - they are parts of a collectivity.
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"Natural character" and "mystical veil" are interchangeable in the 
quote from the German Ideology (CW__5:81, quoted above) and in the 
preceding quote from Capital - they fulfil the same function in 
his argument. When Marx says here that production must be 
"regulated in accordance with a settled plan", this can be
interpreted as a more concrete formulation of the German 
Ideology's "subjugation of human creations to the power of the 
united individuals." Communism will be the historical stage under 
which men for the first time supersede the natural character of 
the Stoffwechsel. The preconditions for such a society are the 
establishment of the world market and the existence of a universal
308class: the proletariat.
In this section I, touched upon three questions which need fur­
ther examination. The first is the question of transforming nature 
and the cognitive possibilities which are required for a human
society - a question which I discuss further in 5.3. and 5.5.1. 
The second is the question of how this "conscious control" will be 
organised. Does something like central state planning follow from 
Marx's theory? (5.5.2.). Closely linked to this topic is the third 
question: how are the weak and the strong notion of communism
linked in Marx? (5.5.2. and 5.6.) But next I shall consider the
308 Note that both preconditions refer to communicative aspects; 
the creation of the world market consists in the extension 
of means of transport and communication; likewise, the 
proletariat is a universal producing and suffering class 
which represents the interests of humanity. In contrast to 
earlier producers, the industrial workers are producing 
cooperatively, a fact which enhances communication. 
Comparing countries with different population density, Marx 
draws attention to the fact that a country with less density 
may compensate such a possible disadvantage with respect to 
productive power by means of communication. See Capital 
1:333.
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notion of labour which, according to Marx, forms the link between 
society and nature.
5.2. Labour
In this section I, focus on how Marx conceives of the character of 
productive activity in communist society. Is it true that he 
equated labour (as necessary, nature-transforming activity of the 
human race) with unwanted activity? Did he conceive of communist 
society as a society in which labour has been transformed into 
completely free activity? Is Marx's ideal of labour something 
close to "play"? In what follows I shall answer all these 
questions in the negative.
5.2.1. The critical dimension of the concept of labour
Human beings are natural and social beings. Their life-
activity (LebensauBerung) is thus not mere transformation of
nature, but conscious and creative transformation of nature. This
is what distinguishes them in the first place from animals, as
Marx pointed out in the Paris Manuscripts;
"Free conscious activity is man's species 
character... The animal is immediately 
identical with its life-activity... Man makes 
his life-activity itself the object of his 
will and consciousness... Conscious life- 
activity directly distinguishes man from 
animal life-activity... Admittedly animals 
also produce. They build themselves nests, 
dwellings... But man in the working up of the 
objective world... duplicates himself not 
only, as in consciousness, intellectually but 
also actively, in reality, and therefore he 
contemplates himself in a world he has 
created." (CW 3; 275-7).
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Human beings are not only creative, but also communal. "The 
individual is the social being. His manifestations of life - even 
if they may not appear in the direct form of communal 
manifestations of life carried out in association with others - 
are therefore an expression and confirmation of social life." (CW 
3:299)
Marx saw clearly that the present conditions of production
(capitalist relations) impinge upon the full realization of these
human characteristics. As he wrote in the German Ideology:
Thus things have come now to such a pass that 
the individuals must appropriate the existing 
totality of productive forces, not only to 
achieve self-activity [ Selbstbetäti­
gung, R.G.], but, also, merely to safeguard 
their very existence... The appropriation of 
these forces is itself nothing more than the 
development of the individual capacities
corresponding to the material instruments of 
production ... Only at this stage does self­
activity coincide with material life which
corresponds to the development of individuals 
into complete individuals [Totale Individuen,
R.G.] and the casting off of all natural 
limitations... With the appropriation of the 
total productive forces by the united 
individuals, private property comes to an 
end." (CW 5 : 87-8, my emphasis)
The abolition of these conditions would thus give rise to the 
realization of all human powers. This "expressivist" notion of 
labour (Ch. Taylor 1975) is present in all stages of Marx's
theoretical development. It is most important to keep in mind 
Marx's concept of labour as self-creation of the human race.
5.2.2. Labour and Enjoyment
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In my view Marx constantly employed an ideal of labour which was a 
combination of work and enjoyment.309 An instance for this 
approach we can find, for example, in the Paris Manuscripts where 
he writes: "In political economy labour occurs only in the form of 
activity as a source of livelihood... [Pjolitical economy knows 
the worker only as a working animal - as a beast reduced to the 
strictest bodily needs." (CW 3 :241, 242). The alienated state of 
labour is constituted by "the fact that labour is external to the 
workeri.e. it does not belong to his intrinsic nature; that in his 
work, therefore, he does not affirm himself but denies himself, 
does not feel content, but unhappy, does not develop freely his 
physical and mental energy but mortifies his body and ruins his 
mind." (CW_3:274)310
In the German Ideology, writing about the relation between 
individuals and the productive forces, he states: "Labour, the 
only conncetion which still links them with the productive forces 
and with their own existence, has lost all semblance of self­
activity and only sustains their life by stunting it." (CW 
5 :87)311
309 My interpretation thus differs from that of most commenta­
tors, for example Moore (1980), Cohen (1978), Arendt (1958), 
Habermas (1976), Heller (1976). I agree, rather, with 
Avineri (1967).
310 Moore (1980:98-9) rightly lists authors like Aristotle, 
Rousseau, Schiller and Hegel who, like Marx, developed an 
ideal of labour which is linked to an ideal of human nature. 
In terms of political philosophy this is the tradition which 
endorses a notion of "positive freedom".
311 As Habermas rightly pointed out: "Marx darf das Prinzip der 
Arbeit freilich nicht zu eng fassen, wenn er im Begriff der 
Praxis auch den vernünftigen Gehalt der bürgerlichen Kultur 
und damit die Maßstäbe unterbringen will, anhand deren sich 
der Rückschritt im Fortschritt identifizieren läßt." 
(Habermas 1985:80)
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The same general approach is to be found in the Grundrisse where 
he introduces the distinction between labour and play. Marx 
opposes Fourier who advocates a transformation of labour into play 
(see Grundrisse:712). He maintains that such a transformation 
would be impossible, and, furthermore, even the most free work
(like composing) is a most serious activity (see
312Grundrisse:611). But Marx also opposes the view of Adam Smith
who regards all work as an 'oath' and views leisure as the ideal
human situation. Against this position Marx puts forward his
different anthropology: i.e. that man, in his "normal state of
health, power, activity" has the need for a normal quantum of work
and hence interruption of leisure.
"In the sweat of thy brow shalt thou labour! 
was Jehova's curse on Adam. And this is labour 
for Smith, a curse. 'Tranquility' appears as 
the adequate state, as identical with 'free­
dom' and 'happiness'. It seems quite far from 
Smith's mind that the individual, 'in his nor­
mal state of health, strength, activity, 
skill, facility, also needs a normal portion 
of work, and of the supersession of tranquili­
ty." (Grundrisse:611).
Although the Grundrisse would be seen to turn away from the early 
writings because of their deliberate 'realist' tone against 
Fourier, instead they rather confirm the position taken there viz. 
that labour and enjoyment in principle can, and should, go 
together; in the Grundrisse, we find the formula of 'travail
312 Benjamin in his Passagen Werk endorsed Fourier's vision, ar­
guing that once human labour ceases to be exploited, nature 
also ceases to be exploited and hence work can become play: 
"Hört diese [Ausbeutung, R.G.J auf, so wird die Arbeit 
ihrerseits den Character der Ausbeutung der Natur durch den 
Menschen abstreifen. Sie wird sich dann nach dem Modell des 
kindlichen Spiels vollziehen, das bei Fourier dem travail 
passione der harmoniens zugrundeliegt." (Benjamin 1982:456). 
I return to Benjamin in a moment.
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attractif' for this fusion. Marx stresses the need human beings 
have for work, which may be done in an enjoyable way ('travail 
attractif') or in an fragmented, alienated, unhappy way (as under 
capitalism). But Marx clearly opposes the extreme position that 
labour could be transformed into play. (This Fourierian view 
employs the same anthropology as Adam Smith. Both regard human 
beings essentially as 'homo ludens’ or at least having a strong 
'leisure preference')3"3 .
Let us now examine the concept of labour in Capital. Marx starts 
with a theme which by now is familiar to the reader: man is part 
of nature, nature is man's inorganic body with which he must keep 
in contact in order to survive. This Stoffwechsel is therefore, in 
the first place, a necessity rather than a desire.314 So far as 
"labour is a creator of use-value... it is a necessary condition, 
independent of all forms of society, for the existence of the 
human race; it is an eternal nature-imposed necessity, without
313 Some anthropological research seems to confirm this view, 
see Sahlins, Godelier and others. But Marx also at times 
employs this view when he says that men were essentially 
forced to develop their productive forces, to work, etc. 
Ironically, on the same page of the Grundrisse as where he 
criticises Fourier, Smith and Proudhon, he writes: "Ur­
sprünglich die freiwilligen Gaben der Natur reich, oder 
wenigstens nur anzueignen..." Either there is a gulf between 
Marx's anthropological assumptions and his historical 
materialism, or people in such low stages of productive 
forces were not able to engage in the exercise of their 
human nature.
314 Note that this approach is already present in the early 
writings and in the German Ideology: "The worker can create 
nothing without nature, without the sensuous external world. 
It is the material on which his labour is realised, in which 
it is active, from which and by means of which it produces." 
(CW 3:273)
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which there can be no material exchanges between man and Nature, 
and therefore no life." (Capital 1 : 50).
Some commentators have been led astray by this formulation.315 
There can be no doubt that Marx in Capital, too, endorsed a 
normative concept of labour. Admittedly, there are some passages 
in which he seems to praise modern factory work for itself. As my 
discussion in chapter 3 has shown, this appraisal had nothing to 
do with praising stupid, monotonous or repellent work. The 
extoling merely referred to the social, cooperative character of 
production which would serve as a foundation stone of communist 
society. He praised the capitalist mode of production for having 
abolished life-long attachment of one individual to one profession 
or branch of activity; he praised the tendency to develop more
abilities, and, finally, the essentially cooperative character of
316industrial production. On the other hand, Marx is aware of the 
deskilling and other harmful consequences of these tendencies 
under capitalist relations. Since Marx, in Capital, takes great 
pains to show that potential progress (both in the economic and 
spiritual sense of the term) is not set in motion as a result of 
capitalist social relations, it would be foolish for him to 
endorse a concept of labour which was devoid of any emancipatory 
element.317
315 Agnes Heller maintains that Marx in Capital regards labour 
essentially as a social duty, not as a vital need (Heller 
1976:110). I will address this contention in a moment.
316 I am not sure if Marx proposed here a "downright silly" po­
sition, as Elster (1985:81) suggests.
317 In this respect Hannah Arendt's critique of Marx seems to be 
misconceived; see also Honneth (1982).
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5.2.3. The realm of necessity
Human beings, whether they want to or not, must participate in the 
Stoffwechsel with nature. With this argument, Marx seems to come 
close to Adam Smith. But does it really follow that he has to give 
up his concept of 'travail attractif’? A widespread view holds 
that Marx, at least in Capital 3 , becomes more pessimistic and 
introduces the dichotomy of labour and leisure, where the first is 
alienated, the second free, conscious activity. The two are inter­
preted as corresponding to the realms of necessity and freedom and 
it is assumed that the early Marx dreamt of communism as the 
"realm of freedom", whereas the later Marx came to acknowledge 
some undelightful necessities. I think that such interpretations
318are completely misconceived. Since the famous passage from
Capital 3 has - to my mind - caused considerable confusion among
many commentators, I shall devote some attention to it. Marx says:
"In fact, the realm of freedom begins only 
where labour which is determined by necessity 
and mundane considerations ceases; thus in the 
very nature of things it lies beyond the 
sphere of actual material production. Just as 
the savage must wrestle with nature to satisfy 
his wants, to maintain and reproduce life, so 
must civilized man, and he must do so in all 
social formations and under all possible modes 
of production. With his development this realm 
of physical necessity expands as a result of 
his wants; but, at the same time, the forces 
of production which satisfy these wants also 
increase. Freedom in this field can only con­
sist in socialised man, the associate produ­
cers, rationally regulating their interchange 
with nature, bringing it under their common 
control, instead of being ruled by it as a 
blind power; and achieving this with the least 
expenditure of energy and under conditions 
most favourable to, and worthy of, their human 
nature. But it nonetheless still remains a
318 See, also, my own treatment in Grundmann (1988).
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realm of necessity. Beyond it begins that 
development of human energy which is an end in 
itself, the true realm of freedom, which, 
however, can blossom forth only with this
realm of necessity as its basis. The 
shortening of the working day is its basic 
prerequisite." (Capital 3 :820)
From this it follows very clearly that communism will never be a 
pure "realm of freedom" - but the younger Marx did not entertain 
such a belief either. Marx, both in the 1840s and in the 1860s and
70s, knew that mankind must transform nature in order to safeguard
his existence and he expounded this view several times;319 but
something else follows from this too.
Marx does not suggest that all that communism can bring about is 
a significant reduction in labour time. We are led astray if we 
would equate the reduction of working time with a reduction of the 
realm of necessity, as many authors seem to do. When Marx speaks 
about "development of human energy which is an end in itself" 
(Capital 3:820), this refers to his earlier treatment of the 
problem of how human wealth can be conceived. Take, for example, 
the following passage from the German Ideology where Marx draws 
some attention to the definition of spiritual wealth and praises 
the establishment of the world market as an important element in 
this respect: "From the above it is clear that the real
intellectual wealth of the individual depends entirely on the
319 Marx, the aristotelian, conceives of the realm of necessity 
and the realm of freedom both in a similar and in a 
different way from Aristotle. They are similar in stressing 
the natural necessity of labour as a life-maintaining 
process; they are different in that Marx does not locate 
labour in the realm of o i k o s , the private household, to 
which in Aristotle the nobler politeia, the public, 
corresponds. Marx introduces labour into the public sphere, 
attributing to it "noble" characteristics and locating an 
emancipatory dimension in it.
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wealth of his real connections. Only this will liberate the 
separate individuals from the various national and local barriers, 
bring them into practical connection with the production 
(including intellectual production) of the whole world and make it 
possible for them to acquire the capacity to enjoy this all-sided 
production of the whole earth (the creations of man)." (CW 5 :51). 
In the Grundrisse, he returns to this problem, citing a view which 
sees in the establishment of impersonal relations an advantage: 
"It has been said and may be said that this is precisely the 
beauty and greatness of it [the world market]: this spontaneous
interconnection ... which is independent of the knowing and 
willing of the individuals, and which presupposes their reciprocal 
independence and indifference. And, certainly, this objective 
connection is preferable to the lack of any connection, or to a 
merely local connection resting on blood ties, or on primeval, 
natural or master-servant relations." (Grundrisse 161-2). But at 
the same time he adds a critical judgement: "Equally certain is 
that individuals cannot gain mastery over their own social 
interconnections before they have created them. But it is an 
insipid notion to conceive of this merely objective bond as a 
spontaneous, natural attribute inherent in individuals and 
inseparable from their nature (in antithesis to their knowing and 
willing). This bond is their product. It is a historic product. It 
belongs to a specific phase of their development. The alien and 
independent character in which it presently exists vis-a-vis 
individuals proves only that the latter are still engaged in the 
creation of the conditions of their social life, and that they 
have not yet begun, on the basis of these conditions, to live it." 
(Grundrisse:162).
I return in 5.5. to the Vico argument contained in this passage. 
What is of interest here, is that the world market is a condition 
for the development of human wealth. Communism will not abolish
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the world market, but bring it under the conscious control of the 
producers. Consider now again the passage from the Grundrisse 
which has been cited in chapter 4.5. and which defines "real 
wealth" :
"In fact, however, when the limited bourgeois 
form is stripped away, what is wealth other 
than the universality of individual needs, 
capacities, pleasures, productive forces, 
etc., created through universal exchange? The 
full development of human mastery over the 
forces of nature, those of so-called nature as 
well as of humanity's own nature? The absolute 
working-out of his creative potentialities, 
with no presupposition other than the previous 
historic development, which makes this totali­
ty of developmenti.e. the development of all 
human powers as such the end in itself, not as 
measured on a predetermined yardstick? Where 
he does not reproduce himself in one specifi­
city, but produces his totality? Strives not 
to remain something he has become, but is in 
the absolute movement of becoming?" (Grund­
risse :488).
I take this eloquent list of rhetorical questions as an extended 
version of the short remark in Capital 3 , where Marx speaks of the 
development of human energy as end in itself. From the above 
passage it is clear that the development of human powers depends 
(1) on a given stage of transformation of nature; (2) on human 
capacities which have already been reached; (3) on new capacities 
which emerge and on human needs which set in motion the drive for 
new goals. Or, in the language of Capital 3 , "the true realm of 
freedom, ... however, can blossom forth only with this realm of 
necessity as its basis." (Capital 3 :820) But it follows equally, 
and this is the stress in Capital 3 , that mankind for this reason 
will always have to work. Only a stationary society would allow 
for the reduction of labour time to an insignificant length. 
However, Marx leaves no place for a "stationary state" of society 
which would have been for him a society restricting human freedom
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in an unacceptable way. The development of human powers demands 
the production and reproduction of the conditions necessary for 
it* The shortening of the working day is the prerequisite for this 
"development of human energy as an end in itself", as Marx claims 
in Capital 3 . In order to further defend my position that Marx was 
not content with a simple reduction of working time in communist
society, I give two possible readings of this sentence. First, it
can be argued that the above claim refers above all to capitalist 
conditions where labour indeed has an alienated character. The 
shortening of the working day is a condition for the producers to 
be able to develop new creative powers and new needs. The working 
time, the work-load and the alienated character of labour under 
capitalism fetters such a development. Therefore, the working day 
has to be shortened. But if, in a communist society, labour has 
lost its alienated character, if humans develop their creative 
potential also in and through the process of production, there may 
be less importance of shortening the working day. Imagine people
who already in capitalist society are among the happy few to
perform above all creative labour. Many of them would consider a 
limitation of the working time as restriction of their personal 
needs and creativity. In a communist society, according to Marx, 
surplus labour itself will become a need (see Grundrisse, Berlin: 
231).
Second, in a passage in the Manuscripts 1861-63, Marx defines
free time in the following way:
"Indem Arbeitszeit frei wird - und die Mehrar­
beit schafft nicht nur freie Zeit, sie macht 
Arbeitsvermögen, das in einem Productionszweig 
gebunden war, Arbeit überhaupt frei (dieß ist 
der Punkt) für neue Produktionszweige. Es 
liegt aber in dem Entwicklungsgesetz der 
menschlichen Natur, daß sobald für die Befrie­
digung eines Kreises der Bedürfnisse gesorgt 
ist, neue Bedürfnisse frei werden, geschaffen 
werden. Indem das Capital daher die Arbeits­
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zeit über das zur Befriedigung der Naturbe­
dürftigkeit des Arbeiters bestimmte Maaß 
hinaustreibt, treibt es zu größerer Theilung 
der gesellschaftlichen Arbeit... und damit der 
Bethätigung der menschlichen Anlagen in neuen 
Richtungen." (MEGA I I .3.1.: 175).
Elster thinks that it is a "vexed issue whether Marx believed that 
in communism man would realize himself in work or outside of it" 
(Elster 1985:84) and suggests three possible readings of the 
texts. The first is that work will become life's prime want, the 
second is that work will become superfluous and the third that man 
will realize himself outside work. As textual evidence, Elster 
cites a passage from the Grundrisse ("he steps to the side of the 
production process", Grundrisse:705) to support the second 
reading, and the above quoted passage from Capital 3 to support 
the third reading. However, as follows from my discussion, I
propose to dismiss the second and the third reading, retaining
32 0only the first.
I now turn to another misinterpretation of the passage which is 
in issue. Some authors have interpreted it as if it would contain 
the possibility of a leap from the realm of necessity into the 
realm of freedom. Engels, in his Anti-Dühring, coined the term of 
"humanity's leap from the realm of necessity into the realm of 
freedom". He argued that with the seizing of the means of produc­
tion by society, man becomes "master of his own social organi­
sation." (CW 2 5 :270). However, Engels' treatment of the matter is 
based on social aspects alone, as becomes even more clear in the
320 That the Grundrisse do not intend to abolish labour tout 
court seems to be plain. Heller claims that labour is 
conceived as a vital need; the control of the production 
process presupposes highly-developed individuals.
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following passage: "Man's own social organisation, hitherto con­
fronting him as a necessity imposed by nature and history, now 
becomes the result of his own free action. The extraneous objec­
tive forces that have hiterto governed history pass under the 
control of man himself." (ibidem). But Marx, in the above passage, 
makes an argument about natural necessities. He says that human 
beings, in their development, will expand their wants thus 
creating a counter-tendency to a decreasing realm of necessity. 
There might be one possibility for such a leap: if we imagine a 
"stationary state" (James Stuart Mill) which is able to produce 
its wealth in an ever decreasing amount of time - if its 
population remains constant and no new needs are developing. This 
necessary transformation of nature could be done by means of an 
automated production process. But such a stationary state is 
completely incompatible with Marx's definition of what human 
freedom means. It is an integral part of his theory of human 
nature that humans develop, that they are creative and innovative,
that they aquire new needs and knowledge and find new solutions to
321emerging problems. In Capital 1 , he writes:
321 See the following passage from John Stuart Mill: "I cannot, 
therefore, regard the stationary state of capital and wealth 
with the unaffected aversion so generally manifested towards 
it by political economists of the old school. I am inclined 
to believe that it would be, on the whole, a very conside­
rable improvement on our present condition. I confess I am 
not charmed with the ideal of life held out by those who 
think that the normal state of human beings is that of 
struggling to get on; that the trampling, crushing, elbo­
wing, and treading on each other's heels, which form the 
existing type of social life, are the most desirable lot of 
human kind." (Mill 1909:748). While Marx could have agreed 
with the undesirable traits of industrial society, he cer­
tainly would not have agreed with the endorsement of the 
stationary state. See, also, Fetscher (1985).
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Only by suppressing the capitalist form of 
production could the length of the working-day 
be reduced to the necessary labour time. But, 
even in that case, the latter would extend its 
limits. On the one hand, because the notion of 
'means of subsistence' would considerably 
expand, and the labourer would lay claim to an 
altogehter different standard of life. On the 
other hand, because a part of what is now 
surplus-labour, would then count as necessary 
labour..." (Capital 1 :496) .
The point is that Marx is talking about natural limits to the 
transformation of nature which stem from this peculiarly human 
condition. In other words: the social character of human beings 
re-establishes anew the natural limits at each stage of historical 
development. The "natural limits" are physically given and social­
ly produced.322 Since these natural limits do exist, no matter if 
physically given or socially produced, there is no place for 
speculation about mankind's "leap" into the realm of freedom, as 
the Marxist tradition has assumed. The standard Marxist inter­
pretation holds that the realm of freedom will be based on mate­
rial abundance., only with this will it be possible to overcome 
personal differences. The similarities of this reading with the 
following observation of Hume are obvious. In A Treatise of Human 
N a t u r e , Hume pointed out that the conditions for justice derive 
from a specific situation in which mankind finds itself limited by 
selfishness and limited generosity of the human mind and scarcity 
of external objects (cf. Hume 1964, 266-7). However, among people 
imbued with mutua affection, things are often rendered common 
property, as "married people in particular lose their property and 
are unacquainted with the mine and thine... The same effect arises 
from any alteration in the circumstances of mankind, as when there 
is such a plenty of any thing as satisfies all the desires of
322 See Hirsch (1976).
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m e n . . In which case the distinction of property is entirely lost, 
and every thing remains in common.'' (Hume 1964, 267).
And s
” (I)f men were supplied with every thing in 
the same abundance, or if every one had the 
same affection and tender regard for every one 
as for himself; justice and injustice would be 
equally unknown among mankind.” (Hume 1964,
267)
Interestingly, Marx also uses part of this argument in the Cri­
tique of the Gotha Programme. Needless to say, he did not include
the aspect of mutual affection, but the aspect of material abun­
dance is clearly seen as the basis for the withering away of 
justice. This line of argument played a most important role in the
aftermath of the Russian Revolution, where it was supposed to
explain why a country like Russia with such little material wealth 
could not do away with the state bureaucracy, for example. Trotsky
used this argument, saying that state and money would remain
necessary as long as the material basis (i.e. more or less abun­
dance) did not allow their withering away (Trotsky 1936:56 ff.).
But one should not overestimate the passage from the Critique of 
the Gotha Programme, for Marx was aware that people were dif­
ferent, that even personal antagonisms might survive capitalism
(cf. 1859 Preface) and thus the conditions of justice might not
disappear in communism (see also 5.5.3.). But let us return to the
interpretation of the quoted passage from Capital 3 .
%
Most commentators share the opinion that M a r x ’s position as 
expressed in the above passage was essentially pessimistic (in 
comparison with the early writings, and, of course, in comparison 
with the Grundrisse), or anti-utopian (cf. Cohen 1978:323). In 
what follows I shall discuss these claims.
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In commenting on the above passage from Capital 3 , G.A. Cohen 
writes: "On this account, freedom inside socialist industry is
regrettably limited, and Marx looks for what he calls true freedom 
beyond the economic zone. His idea is ... that labour ... being a 
means of life, ... cannot be wanted [but) will be replaced by 
desired activity as the working day contracts." (Cohen 1978:324). 
I think that this is a wrong interpretation. Cohen seems to inter­
pret this passage as if it dealt with the same problems which Marx 
discussed in the Grundrisse and where he tried to combine labour 
and enjoyment. But the above passage is simply not about this 
question. The stress in Capital 3 lies on the question of how far 
a socially liberated ("emancipated") society can emancipate itself 
from eternal natural necessities even where labour has been 
transformed into "travail attractif11. Marx does think of an 
introduction of freedom into the realm of necessity, although put 
in a rather negative way: "freedom in this field can only consist 
in..." Marx surely thinks that the realm of necessity can be 
regulated by human beings in a non-alienated way, in a manner 
which is "worthy of their human nature". But Marx makes it clear 
that all activity in this field is determined by nature, and for 
this reason he calls it the realm of necessity. The notion refers 
to the transhistorical Stoffwechsel between man and nature, which 
is expressed in the phrase "just as the savage must wrestle..." 
Cohen's confusion comes out most clearly in his comment on this 
natural necessity. He writes: "Granted, there will always be a
set of operations on whose completion the provisioning of the race 
depends. But it does not follow, and it is not equally undeniable, 
that there will always be tasks which men perform against their 
inclination because they have to." (Cohen 1978:324). Whereas the 
first sentence accepts the eternal necessity of transforming 
nature, the second introduces a somewhat obscure imputation to 
Marx, since Marx in the above passage nowhere speaks about 
personal "inclinations". It is a transhistorical, invariable
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feature of mankind, that it has to transform nature, under all 
social arrangements and in all stages of its development with the 
exception of tribal pre-class communities which only appropriated 
the gifts of nature. It is an historically variable feature how 
this interchange with nature is organised; and it is a historical 
fact (Marx, moreover, certainly thought that it was historically 
inevitable) that this interchange has not yet been organized in a 
rational way, has not yet been brought under the common control of 
the (associated) producers. Quite the contrary: the producers are 
ruled by "it" (i.e. by the natural necessity of transforming
nature and its results) as if it were a blind power. Marx, 
optimistically, thinks that a future society will be able to
change this and he lists four criteria according to which it 
should be done: 1. socialized man, associated producers (as
against egoistic individuals, only pursuing their individual
interests), 2. rational control of the interchange with nature 
(as against being ruled by it as a blind force), 3. spending as 
little energy as possible during this interchange, 4. establi­
shing conditions for this interchange which are most favourable
32 3and worthy of their human nature. But, as Marx makes clear,
this still remains a realm of necessity; not because labour has an 
unwanted character ("social duty" in Heller's words) in the sense 
that people are forced by others to work, but in the sense that 
they are forced by nature to work.
It may be useful to discuss, additionally, the interpretation of 
Agnes Heller here in order to make my intention clearer. She cites 
a passage from the Theories of Surplus Value which reads as 
follows: "But free time, disposable time, is wealth itself,
323 The utopian strand of this outline is considerable, cf. only 
point 2: rational control. In its strong version, this claim 
would exclude unintended consequences from social life.
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partly for the enjoyment of the product, partly for the free 
activity which - unlike labour - is not dominated by the pressure 
of an extraneous purpose which must be fulfilled, and the 
fulfillment of which is regarded as a natural necessity or a 
social duty, according to one's inclination." (TSV 3 :257, cited in 
Heller 1976:105) . She comments: "In the model which is outlined
in Capital and in Theories of Surplus V a l u e , production for needs 
is not correlated with labour as a vital need, but with labour as 
a 'social duty'. (Heller 1976:110)325 .
But Heller fails to see that for Marx, too, that type of labour 
which is a vital need has at the same time the character of a 
natural necessity. This natural necessity is a social duty since 
society has to maintain its interchange with nature i.e. every 
social form has to establish rules according to which the 
interchange with nature is accomlished. As I said above (contra 
Cohen), even "travail attractif' belongs to the realm of 
necessity, since it is forced upon mankind by nature. Marx wants 
to stress that this extreme conclusion follows from the 
existential situation of mankind as a product of natural evolution
324 The original reads as follows: "Aber free time, disposable
time ist der Reichtum selbst - theils zum Genuß der
Producte, theils zur free activity, die nicht wir die labour 
durch den Zwang eines äußeren Zwecks bestimmt ist, der 
erfüllt werden muß, dessen Erfüllung N a t u r n o t w e n d i g k e i t  
oder sociale Pflicht, wie man will." (MEGA I I .3.4.:1388)
325 Hannah Arendt (1958), in particular, stressed this duty
character of work in Marx, thereby influencing a whole range 
of thinkers, among them Habermas. I rather agree with 
Honneth that this appraoch deprives the concept of labour 
its normative dimension; moreover, it is based only on the 
historical experience of modern industry, where a big 
percentage of wage labour has lost all of its emancipatory 
capacity (see Honneth 1982). Such a deprivation has no base 
in Marx at all.
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which is dependent on nature. The growth of productive forces and
the abolition of class rule can change nothing in this respect.
But the abolition of class rule will lead to a different character
of work in the production process, as Marx points out:
Es versteht sich von selbst, daß die time of 
labour selbst, dadurch, daß sie auf normales 
Maß beschränkt, ferner nicht mehr für einen 
andren, sondern für mich selbst geschieht, zu­
sammen mit der Aufhebung der socialen Gegegen- 
sätze zwischen master and men etc, als wirk­
lich sociale Arbeit, endlich als Basis der 
disposable time einen ganz ändern f r e i e m  
Character erhält und daß die time öf labour 
eines man, der zugleich der man of disposable 
time ist, viel höhere Qualität besitzen muß, 
als die des Arbeitsthiers. (MEGA II. 3.4.:
1388, my emphasis)
Whereas in capitalism workers are transformed into working animals 
("Arbeitsthiere"), in communism the individual's labour assumes a 
free character. This view entails a) that labour is a vital need
3 2 7and b) that it can be done in a pleasant way. When Keller
juxtaposes labour as duty and labour as a vital need she fails to 
distinguish between two different forms of duty. 3ut as I would 
maintain, one cannot understand Marx's position properly if one
326 Avineri rightly pointed out that ” [m]an can never emancipate 
himself from this basic existential need, but he can emanci­
pate himself from the process that makes the satisfaction of 
these needs into a dehumanizing drudgery." (Avineri 
1967:237).
327 It may cause some confusion that Marx equates "natural 
necessity'' with "social duty" in the above passage, espe­
cially in the light of my insistence that we ought to dis­
tinguish between natural and social factors which shape 
man's existence. But there is no contradiction involved. 
Marx simply holds that if social relations ("social duties") 
appear as natural neccessities, we have a condition of 
fetishism i.e. social relations are naturalized which - for 
Marx - is a state "unworthy of human nature".
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does not recognise that in the above passage, (Capital 3 :820), two 
kinds of duty are involved. The first is a duty which is imposed 
upon individuals from nature and which Marx terms "natural 
necessity"; the second is a duty which is imposed upon individuals 
from other individuals, from one class upon another. Marx regards 
only the first duty as unchangeable; whereas the second, it goes 
without saying, caused his outrage. If we interpret Marx in this 
way, labour as "duty" and labour as "vital need" need not 
contradict each other: the duty imposed by nature can be fulfilled 
in a free and unalienated way. Cohen recognised this possibility 
when he made the analogy to another "natural duty": "Some eating
is enjoyable" (Cohen 1978:324)328 .
Marx, discussing child labour, makes clear that he held produc­
tive activities indispensable even for children, in order to make 
them "full individuals". He clearly rejected all existing capita­
list forms of child labour which only destroyed the childrens' ta-
329lents and health; but at the same time he insisted on the edu­
cative principle to combine theoretical with productive activi­
ties :
A general prohibition of child labour is in­
compatible with the existence of large-scale 
indistry and hence an empty, pious wish. Its 
realisation - if it were possible - would be 
reactionary, since, with a strict regulation 
of the working time according to the different 
age groups and other safety measures for the 
protection of children, an early combination 
of productive labour with education is one of 
the most potent means for the transformation 
of present-day society." (SW 3:29)
328 Ironically, Cohen intended this as an argument against Marx.
329 For another interpretation, see footnote 369.
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This should make sufficiently clear that Marx had an emancipatory 
notion of labour also in his later works. But yet another problem 
arises with Heller's account. According to her, Marx "stresses 
that labour always remains the realm of necessity and that the 
realm of freedom 'begins' outside it (in free time)." (Heller 
1976:110). This is obviously not true. As I have shown above, Marx 
does locate elements of freedom within the realm of necessity: he
gives four criteria which need to be fulfilled. The fourth says 
that human beings should organize their production in a way most 
favourable and worthy of their human nature. This is in line with 
M a r x ’s general position according to which labour and enjoyment 
ought, and can, go together.
An explicit claim that Marx belongs among the great pessimists 
in modern european thought is made by Alfred Schmidt. He rightly 
interprets the passage in Capital 3 as containing a question about 
the natural limits to human freedom. Schmidt thinks that mankind, 
on the one hand, transforms first nature to an ever greater degree 
into second nature with the result that nature gets humanised 
("Einwanderung ins Subjekt", cf. Schmidt 1971:123). On the other 
hand, he maintains that the rock of nature will be eternally in 
opposition to mankind (see Schmidt 1971:162). This is nature's 
undissclvable rest which will never be transformed.330 Schmidt's 
argument is obviously shaped in contrast to Ernst Bloch's nature 
speculation, in contrast to his hope for a reconcilation of 
mankind with nature to which I shall turn in a moment. 3efore 
discussing Bloch's position (and Schmidt's critique of it), we 
shall first look at Habermas' analysis of the relation between 
first and second nature.
330 However, a bit problematic is that Schmidt imputes Freud's 
Triebverzicht to Marx, see Schmidt (1971:140-3).
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5.3. Habermas: Marx between Kant, Fichte and Hegel
Habermas, like Schmidt, emphasises the double influence of Kant
and Hegel on Marx's concept of nature. The knowledge that first
nature cannot be completely transformed into second nature thwarts
the Hegelian component in Marx's model. Instead, argues Habermas,
something like the Kantian Ding an sich re-emerges here.
"The materialist concept of synthesis [through 
social labour] thus retains from Kant the 
fixed framework within which the subject forms 
a substance that it encounters. This framework 
is established once and for all through the 
equipment of transcendental consciousness or 
of the human species as a species of tool- 
making animals. On the other hand, in distinc­
tion from Kant, Marx assumes empirically medi­
ated rules of synthesis that are objectified 
as productive forces and historically trans­
form the subjects' relation to their natural 
environment." (Habermas 1971a:35).
Habermas holds that Marx tried to overcome this theoretical 
dilemma by means of Fichte's philosophy. In so doing, Marx limits 
Fichte's absolute ego to mankind, which is a product of natural 
evolution and at each stage in its history is determined by the 
productive forces available to it. This can be stated in Fichte's 
terms where ego confronts its non-ego: "This interpretation given 
by Fichte with stubborn logic to Kant's pure apperception sheds 
light on the identity of socially laboring subjects as it is 
conceived by materialism. As an identical ego they find themselves 
confronting an environment that obtains its identity in labor
processes; this environment is not ego." (Habermas 1971a:39)
Habermas rightly emphasises that Marx is congenial to Fichte's 
insistence (against Kant) that the unity of consciousness is
achieved only by an act of self-consciousness: it is a product of 
activity (cf. Habermas 1971a:40). Marx's stress on the active
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element in man's relationship to nature here, parallels his judge­
ment of Feuerbach. Having appreciated Feuerbach's philosophy in 
the early 1840s, Marx in 1845 reassures himself of the importance
of the active element, which was developed by idealism. As he
wrote in the first Thesis on Feuerbach: "The chief defect of all 
previous materialism (that of Feuerbach included) is that things 
[Gegenstand], reality, sensuousness are conceived only in the form 
of the object, or of contemplation, but not as sensuous human 
activity, practice, not subjectively. Hence, in contradistinction 
to materialism, the active side was set forth abstractly by
idealism - which, of course, does not know real, sensuous activity 
as such." (CW 5 :2) Marx restates with Fichte Hegel's critique on 
Kant without sharing Hegel's identity philosophy:
"Marx restricts Fichte's absolute ego to the 
contingent human species. Its act of self-
generation, the activity in which it constitu­
tes itself, is thus absolute only in relation 
to historical formations of the ego and the 
non-ego, to societal subjects and their mate­
rial environment. Production is conditioned on 
both sides by 'natural presuppositions'
[nature and human labour, R.G.]" (Habermas
1971a: 40).
But, Habermas continues, Marx's approach does not allow for a 
critical self-reflection of the productive subject, because Marx 
limits production or praxis to labour (see Habermas (197ia:42). 
Habermas claims that there is a discrepancy between Marx's social 
theory and his philosophical self-understanding. In his social 
theory he was aware of both instrumental and communicative action, 
where the first consists of transforming nature, the second is 
emebedded in cultural traditions and is exercised via symbolically
mediated interaction. However, so goes Habermas' charge, Marx did
not translate this insight into his philosophical framework. 
"Taken by itself, scientific-technical progress does not yet lead 
to a reflexive comprehension of the traditional, 'natural'
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operation of the social life process in such a way that self- 
conscious control could result..." (Habermas 1971a:51).
5.3.1. Labour and Interaction
Habermas' theoretical interest is thus in the first place to pro­
vide some thoughts on the philosophical-epistemological level. He 
does not think that Marx's concept of labour can fulfil this task. 
Instead, he introduces a distinction between two types of action: 
instrumental, nature-transforming action (which is characterised 
by means-ends-relationships) on the one hand, and communicative 
action on the other.331 He characterises the first type of action
as typical of social systems, the second as typical of the life-
222world. I doubt that this distinction can help us tackle the 
ecological problematic. One reason for my scepticism is this: even 
granted that the institutional conditions for human emancipation 
do exist, there might still be something which escapes Habermas' 
framework but which is contained in that of Marx, above all in his 
analysis of machinery in the Grundrisse and the Manuscripts (1861- 
3 ) . In other words, Habermas suggests that we could separate a 
conscious control of social life-production from the process of 
material production: "Marx very precisely distinguishes the self- 
conscious control of the social life process by the combined 
producers from an automatic regulation of the process of produc­
tion that has become independent of these individuals. In the
331 Thereby taking up the distinction made by Aristotle (and
further developed by Hannah Arendt) between praxis and
p o i e s i s .
332 Instrumental action therefore not only refers to the trans­
formation of nature, but also to the operation of social
systems.
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former case the workers relate to each other as combining with 
each other of their own accord. In the latter they are merely 
combined..." (Habermas 1971a:51).
But this "automatic regulation of the process of production" may 
constrain the "self-conscious control" for ever. Communism in the 
strong sense ("human society") would thus be impossible. Habermas 
himself is aware that the development of productive forces leads 
to an increasing embodiment of knowledge in machines (Habermas
1971a:55 ("auf die Ebene von Maschinen abgebildet wird", Habermas
1968:76) which has its limiting value in the "organisation of 
society itself as an automaton" (Habermas 1971a:55). But if this
is true, then Habermas' distinction between instrumental and 
communicative action becomes less important. For what can the
"self-reflection" (which is embedded in the latter type of action) 
achieve? According to Habermas, it can achive abolition of
ideological delusion (Verblendung) and class rule. But perhaps a 
still more urgent problem has been thereby neglected: the
existence of a productive automaton which remains even after the 
fall of bourgeois order as an "animated monster". Communism could 
only mean the establishment of a classless society which is, 
however, still a society in which "superior powers" are generated 
and reproduced systematically. Habermas does not seem to realise 
that Marx's "ingenious combination of Kant and Fichte" (Habermas 
1971a:55) is not doomed to fail because his model offers no place 
for critical self-reflection, but that on Marx's own account we 
have to reckon with the possibility that first nature can be 
transformed into second nature (under industrial conditions) only 
by paying the price of technological alienation. In other words, 
growth in productive forces leads to an increase in artefacts,
vis-a-vis which the producers are only "combined", not combining.
As Marx noted in the Grundrisse:
"The combination of this labour appears just
as subservient to and led by an alien will and
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an alien intelligence - having its animating 
unity elsewhere - as its material unity ap­
pears subordinate to the objective unity of 
the machinery, of fixed capital, which, as 
animated mo n s t e r , objectifies the scientific 
idea, and is in fact the coordinator, does not 
in any way relate to the individual worker as 
his instrument; but rather he himself exists
as an animated individual punctation mark, as
its living isolated accessory." (Grundrisse:
470) .
Now, if this trend cannot be reversed under communism, the "true 
human society" will remain utopia for ever. Habermas, although 
citing the same passage, does not pay attention to this problem. 
He remains blind to the problem which technology poses to modern 
societies, since he thinks that technology can neither be brought 
back into the life-world of the individuals nor that another type 
of technology can be imagined. He seems to assume that in order to 
make the producers the beneficiaries of a growth in productive 
forces,334 the establishing of a society in which the ideal speech 
situation is institutionalised would be necessary and sufficient. 
My argument against this is that not even such a society would
have the means for controlling the unbounded "animated monster".
As before, the producers would be the combined and not the combin­
ing. When they are stepping aside the production process and enga­
ging in discursive activities, they will eventually realise that 
their way of transforming nature must be changed; and is precisely 
here that Habermas' model does not show how the two can be brought
333 As I have shown in chapter 3, Marx's final analysis in Capi­
tal differs from this outline.
334 Habermas rightly sees that growth in productive forces and 
the conditions of the good life are not identical, the for­
mer can "at best serve" the latter, cf. Habermas (1971b: 
119).
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together, unless he can show how the communicative action influen­
ces the instrumental one.335
There is a certain ambivalence in Habermas (with respect to 
technical progress) which comes out in his "early" critique of 
Marcuse. Here Habermas seems to immunize technical development 
against criticism: "The idea of a New Science will not stand up to 
logical scrutiny any more than that of a New Technology... For 
this function, as for scientific-technical progress in general, 
there is no more 'humane substitute'." (Habermas 1971b:88). But 
here Habermas confuses technical and scientific development,
336partly identifying science with technology. To avoid a possible 
misunderstanding here, I should say that I agree that in indus­
trially developed societies there can be no functional alterna­
tives to science and technology; but there can be other technolo­
gies (whilst it is difficult to imagine another science).337
Habermas presents a somewhat different approach in the article 
"Technology and Science as Ideology" which was written three years 
earlier. Here Habermas acknowledges that "this thesis of the auto­
nomous character of technical development is not correct." (Haber­
mas 1971a:59). He rightly sees that "the pace and the direction of
335 Given his distinction between system and life-world, we have 
the possibility for citizens' protest against exaggerated 
claims from the system ("Ubergreifen systemischer Imperative 
auf die Lebenswelt").
336 The reason for this is his immaterial definition of 
productive forces, see chapter 4.
337 This is the result of my analysis of social systems in chap­
ter 3 and 4, where I argued that technology is no social 
system. It follows that technology is open to social 
determination, its autonomy only an apparant one. The 
concrete shape of existing technologies is the result of 
conflicts and negotiations between social systems.
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technical development today depend to a great extent on public 
investments." (Habermas 1971a:59). Moreover, he says that 
technology is coupled with economy, science and politics (cf. id.) 
But even on the basis of this approach he stops short of consider­
ing the topic of changing existing technologies when he writes 
that "through the unplanned sociocultural consequences of 
technological progress, the human species has challenged itself to 
learn not merely to affect its social destiny, but to control it." 
(Habermas 1971a:61) This is to say "the social potential constitu­
ted by technical knowledge and ability [is brought] into a defined 
and controlled relation to our practical knowledge and will." 
(Habermas 1971a:61) He sees the main obstacle to this in social 
interests that arise naturally [ naturwüchsig ]out of the 
compulsion of the reproduction of social life without being 
reflected upon and confronted with the declared political self-
understanding of social groups." (Habermas 1971a:60, amended 
3 3 8translation ) This is definitely not a mere restating of the 
orthodox Marxist position that it is only captalist class rule 
which needs to be abolished; even a "classless" industrial society 
would probably (to a certain extent) face these problems. But 
Habermas fails to show how the communicative type of action can 
change the course of technological development since here he 
thinks that it should be changed. Habermas himself poses the 
question in the following way: "[H]ow can the relatiom between 
technical progress and the social life-world, which today is still 
organized in a natural way, be reflected upon and brought under 
the control of rational discussion?" (Habermas 1971a:53, amended 
translation). Habermas's answer points to the liberating potential 
of an undistorted political discussion. Such a discussion is 
prohibited by domination (Herrschaft), by interests which are not
338 I use the term "natural" to render the German "naturwüch­
sig", as is done throughout this work.
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subject to public justification (cf. Habermas 1971a:61). I doubt 
that such a diagnosis and therapy is sufficient for the problem at 
stake. Habermas's somewhat imprecise use of the notion of 
"domination" is obscuring rather than illuminating here. For what 
is meant by this notion? Obviously it is to denote the interests 
of social systems vis-a-vis the life-world, or, as he later says, 
the spill-over of systemic imperatives to the life-world. However, 
these social systems operate according to different systems-codes; 
I find it difficult to fuse them together under the general head­
ing "Herrschaft". I would maintain that it is more illuminating to 
investigate the different mechanisms of the sub-systems of society 
( i.e. also their conflicts!) in order to bring out both the dan­
gers of some modern technologies and the possibilities to solve 
them.339
To summarise: Habermas' framework seems to imply too rigid a
distinction between different types of action, such that the 
communicative element is excluded from nature-transforming 
activities. Ironically, he himself has to reintroduce the
communicative element to enable social reflexivity. This re-
introduction is necessary for Habermas, since he is aware that a 
liberated society has not only to become self-reflexive in its 
communicative sphere, but also in its technical-instrumental
sphere. But is, then, the separation between instrumental and 
communicative action of great help for the understanding of
ecological problems?
5.4. Messianic Marxism
339 For an attempt to do so, see Luhmann (1986).
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In this section, I set out to examine two writers who present an 
extraordinarily unorthodox Marxism: Ernst Bloch and Walter Benja­
min. Both writers are most interesting in that they focused on the 
problem of modern societies' relationship with nature already some 
40 years ago. I shall claim that they are able to arrive at a 
position which is peculiarly aware of ecological problems on the 
basis of their metaphysical orientation.
5.4.1. Ernst Bloch: Marxism of technology
It is a merit of Bloch's analysis that he addresses the problem of 
science and technology for communist society in a detailed way. In 
his book Das Prinzip Hoffnung, written during World War II and 
published in the 1950s, he discusses the question of technology 
above all in the chapter "Wille und Natur, Die technischen 
Utopien". He praises bourgeois technology for having achieved some 
degree of progress, especially in constructing what he calls "de- 
organicist" technology (entorganisierte Tec h n i k ). This term is to 
denote the fact that modern technology cannot be understood any 
longer as a simple extension or replacement of the body (tool- 
arm; saw-teeth; eye-iens; etc.) but must be conceived as something 
completely new: "Und je mehr Technik die letzten Reste ihrer alten 
Bodenständigkeit verliert, ... in synthetischer Rohstofferzeugung, 
in Strahlungsindustrie und was noch sonst in herrlicher Hybris: 
desto intimer wie zentraler muß die Vermittlung mit dem eigeschal­
teten Naturwesen geraten." (Bloch 1959:784, 814). This "de-
organicist" technology enables a more intimate mediation with 
nature.
But at the same time, he charges bourgeois technology with being 
too abstract, of pressing forms onto natural contents without un­
derstanding them: "Unsere bisherige Technik steht in der Natur wie 
eine Besatzungstruppe in Feindesland, und vom Landesinnern weiß
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sie nichts, die Materie der Sache ist ihr transzendent." (Bloch 
1959:814)340 . In this respect, bourgeois technology is similar to 
capitalist economy: both produce accidents. Nevertheless, bour­
geois technology is more reliable than its economy: "Gewiß ist die 
bürgerliche Technik kraft ihrer Wahlverwandtschaft mit natürlichen 
Mechanismen bedeutend solider als die kapitalistische Wirtschaft, 
auch nicht-euklidische Kühnheiten sind ihr nicht versagt, sie 
zeichnen sich, wie zu sehen war, bemerkenswert ab." (Bloch 
1959:812). Bloch aims at a more intimate transformation of nature 
following Bacon: "Die Naturbeherrschung ... dient bei Bacon der 
Aufrichtung eines 'regnum hominis'... 3acons großer Grundsatz: 
'natura parendo vincitur' ... blieb lebendig, doch er wurde durch 
das Interesse einer 'Ausbeutung' der Natur durchkreuzt, durch ein 
Interesse also, das mit der natura naturans, die Bacon noch kennt 
und als 'causa causarum' auszeichnet, nichts mehr zu tun hat, 
geschweige daß es mit ihr verbündet wäre." (Bloch 1959:766-7).
Against this Bloch holds that we have to construct new technolo­
gies which achieve a more intimate relationship with nature; a 
relationship which is totally different from the attitude of a 
conquerer who stands in the land of the enery, pushing around the 
recalcitrant elements. Bloch accepts that it is mankind's project 
to gain fuller mastery over nature. However, he does not agree 
that "exploitation of nature" should be part of that project.
340 The metaphor of the conqueror was also used by Engels - see 
CW 2 5 :461. Interestingly, Engels says the following with 
respect to the Italian Alps: "When the Italians of the Alps 
used up the pine forests on the southern slopes, so 
carefully cherished on the northern slopes, they had no 
inkling that by doing so they were cutting at the roots of 
the dairy industry in their region: they had still less
inkling that they were depriving their mountain springs of 
water for the greater part of the year and making it 
possible for them to pour still more furious torrents on the 
plains during the rainy seasons." (CW 2 5 :461).
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There are two terminological questions which arise here. The first 
is the question whether nature can be exploited, if it makes sense 
to speak of an "exploitation of nature" in the strict sense.341 
When talking about exploitation, we usually have individuals in 
mind who, according to some moral standards, can be said to ex­
ploit other individuals. Obviously, this does not apply to man's 
relationship to nature, unless one is prepared to adopt an ap­
proach which attributes rights to nature (see the discussion in 
chapter 2). In a weaker sense, however, we all speak of exploita­
tion of natural resources, a process which Bloch does not oppose 
as such. "Marxismus der Technik, wenn er einmal durchdacht sein 
wird, ist keine Philantropie für mißhandelte Metalle, wohl aber 
das Ende der naiven Übertragung des Ausbeuter- und Tierbändiger­
standpunkts auf die Natur." (Bloch 1959:813) The second, and more 
important, question seems to be that Bloch uses the term also in 
another sense: he wants to express the fact that people will not
succeed in mastering nature if they "exploit" it i.e. if they are 
not able to transform it according to some inherent laws or 
structures of the material elements. This means that they will not 
succeed in transforming it if they do not urderstand the laws and
34 2mechanisms involved.
Bloch's position is thus a position within modernity, accepting 
central claims cf Enlightenment Philosophy. He shares the belief 
that mankind can prosper in transforming nature; he does not 
reject the development of science and technology; on the contrary,
341 Note that Bloch himself put "exploitation" in quotation 
m a r k s .
342 As Bodei aptly pointed out, ancient thought conceived of 
technical solutions as solutions directed against nature; it 
was only with modern writers that they were understood as in 
accordance with natural laws - see Bodei (1983).
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he holds that only more developed technologies will contribute to 
mankind's prospering. These new technologies, however, need to be 
based on more profound insights into nature - something which 
seems inhibited by present capitalist relations. In so doing, he 
implicitly tries to defend the 1859 Preface, although it is not 
clear if he charges capitalism with insufficient development or
insufficient use of new productive forces. But at the same
time, Bloch is aware that not every increase in productive forces 
contributes to social progress when he says that all rejoice about 
great technical progress is in vain if it forgets that technical 
progress can be accompanied by social regress (cp. Bloch 
1959:814).
My interpretation of Bloch is very charitable compared with that 
of Alfred Schmidt, for example. Let me therefore briefly sum up 
the criticisms of Schmidt. He charges Bloch (1) with overestima­
ting the possibility of unifying subject and object. Bloch aims at 
a "mystical nature-subject" (Natursubjekt) which has not yet344 
revealed itself; (2) with being obscure about the "openness”
[UnabheschlossenheitI and "latency” of nature. I address the two
points in turn.
(1) Schmidt is right when he insists that mankind's purposes will 
always remain alien to nature - also in socialism (cf. Schmidt 
1971:167) and that mankind has to outwit nature. In this respect 
Bloch's terminology is indeed misleading (or self-contradictory). 
Consider the following passage by Bloch: "An Stelle des Technikers
343 See Elster (1985:259) for a distinction.
344 This is the crucial notion for Bloch: the "not-yet-
character" of all exsting.
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als bloßem Überlisters oder Ausbeuters steht konkret das gesell­
schaftlich mit sich selbst vermittelte Subjekt, das sich mit dem 
Problem des Natursubjekts wachsend vermittelt." (Bloch 1959:787). 
This may sound strange and confused, but one may interpret it that 
Bloch wants to stress the possible role of nature as co-producer, 
a role which can be set forth only on the basis of a deeper under­
standing of nature. But then, to repeat, he gets self-contradic­
tory, since also the Baconian approach implies an "Überlister"- 
technology. Moreover, also the cooperative role of nature would 
put man in the role of exploiter or Uberlister: either humans 
appropriate what nature freely produces, or they combine natural 
processes in a way beneficial to them: in the latter case, the 
"cunning of reason" (=überlisten) is at work. Of course, I agree 
that there are mystical and religious elements in B l o c h ’s concept 
of nature; but, nevertheless, I think that the interpretation 
which I gave above is a legitimate one. To put it in another way, 
Bl o c h ’s metaphysical beliefs may have made him sensitive to a 
problem which does not interest so much traditional Marxists. We 
could say, then, that Bloch's analysis was non-Marxist in its 
motivation but Marxist in its method. It is admitted that there is 
a "metaphysical surplus" which does not square with Marxian 
thought (see also Hudson 1982).
(2) Schmidt's doubts about nature's "latency" seem to be even less 
justified. Here it is Bloch, rather, who is in greater accordance 
with the natural sciences. As we know from Darwinism, nature is an 
essentially unfinished and open process. Curiously, Schmidt thinks 
that higher beings than humans cannot emerge (cf. Schmidt 1971: 
167). This seems to me an exaggerated amthropocentrism, one which 
conceives mankind as the centre of the universe. Evolution is a 
blind, and thus open process, the stages of which are not prede­
termined.
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5.4.2. Walter Benjamin: the Resurrection of Past Generations
In chapters 3 and 4, I presented and discussed some evolutionary
approaches to social history. It was argued that, on a materialist
conception, the new can only emerge as a recombination of the
existing. Such a view certainly may be challenged from several
positions. One of them is a position which expects the new as the 
totally different from the present. Walter Benjamin, in his
"Geschichtsphilosophische Thesen", put forward such an argument.
Criticising the notion of progress held by the German Social
Democratic party, he noted that this was problematic in that it
conceived of progress as (a) progress of the human species, (b) as
unlimited (perfectability) and (c) as inevitable (cf. Benjamin 
3 451974:700). But basic to these three problematic notions is a
346concept of time as empty and homogenous. Against such a concept
Benjamin contends that history is a construction which is located
in our time, not in empty and homogenous time: "Die Geschichte ist
Gegenstand einer Konstruktion, deren Ort nicht die homogene und
leere Zeit sondern die von Jetztzeit erfüllte bildet." (Benjamin
1974:701) This fact allows us to cite past events, just like
fashion cites past clothes; the French revolution cited ancient
Rome and understood itself as a renewal of it.
"The French revolution viewed itself as Rome 
reincarnate. It evoked ancient Rome the way 
fashion evokes costumes of the past. Fashion 
has a flair for the topical, no matter where 
it stirs in the thickets of long ago; its a 
tiger's leap into the past. This jump,
345 Note that his charge does not fit an evolutionary approach, 
as presented in chapters 3 and 4.
346 Lukács in his seminal Geschichte und Klassenbewufltsein 
(1923) noted that modern capitalism transforms time into a 
pure quantitative category - see Lukács (1971:179-80).
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however, takes place in an arena where the 
ruling class gives the commands. The same leap 
in the open air of history is the dialectical 
one, which is how Marx understood the 
revolution." (Benjamin 1973:263)
Central to Bejamin's argument is the notion of "blasting out" 
(h e raussprengen) these past events from the continuum of history. 
This metaphor corresponds to a second one which refers to the 
picture we have of these past events and which is available to us 
only in moments of danger. Benjamin coins the term "flashing" 
(aufblitzen) for it: "Nur als Bild, das auf Nimmerwiedersehen im 
Augenblick seiner Erkennbarkeit eben aufblitzt, ist die 
Vergangenheit festzuhalten." (1974:695) . With these two basic
concepts, we can understand Benjamin's different conception of 
social change. There is no stream of progress in which the Social 
Democratic Party and the working class can swim, but there are 
unique historical opportunities where a picture becomes available 
to the historical subject which can be reactivated in such 
moments. "Dem historischen Materialismus geht es darum, ein Bild 
der Vergangenheit festzuhalten, wie es sich im Augenblick der 
Gefahr dem historischen Subjekt unversehens einstellt." (ibidtm). 
This last technique refers to the method of the materialist 
historian; for the fighting class the cognitive flashing is
34 8combined with practical blasting out ("heraussprengen"). 
Benjamin's preoccupation with the phlegmatic politics of the 
Social Democrats leads to an overreaction. He frankly endorses an 
extreme subjectivism: for him, there seem to be no historical laws 
or mechanisms but only the one of the grasping of unique
347 "The past can be seized only as an image which flashes up at 
the instant when it can be recognised and never seen again." 
(Benjamin 1973:257).
348 Note that both metaphors are metaphors from war; Benjamin 
wrote this text in 1942.
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historical opportunities. This "tiger's jump” into the past
corresponds to his claim of an increasing acceleration of history,
as he noted in Thesis XVIII:
"'In relation to the history of organic life 
on earth' writes a modern biologist, 'the 
paltry fifty millennia of homo sapiens 
constitute something like two seconds at the 
close of a twenty-four-hour day. On this 
scale, the history of civilized mankind would 
fill one-fifth of the last second of the last 
hour.' The present, which, as a model of 
Messianic time, comprises- the entire history 
of mankind in an enormous abridgement, 
coincides exactly with the stature which the 
history of mankind has in the universe."
(1971:265)
Although Benjamin calls this approach the true approach of the 
historical materialist, it is, rather, idealist. The "totally 
different" is not something which has not yet been there, but, 
rather, something which has indeed existed a long time ago. Prole­
tarian revolution therefore consists in bringing back a lost state 
of history. Revolution, for Benjamin, is redemption, revenge for 
the injustice to former generations.
Not man or men but the struggling, oppressed 
class itself is the depository of historical 
knowledge. In Marx it appears as the enslaved 
class, as the avenger that completes the task 
of liberation in the name of generations of 
the downtrodden. This conviction ... has 
always been objectionable to Social Democrats 
... Social Democracy thought fit to assign to 
the working class the role of the redeemer of 
future generations, in this way cutting the 
sinews of its greatest strength. This training 
made the working class forget both its hatred 
and its spirit of sacrifice, for both are 
nourished by the image of enslaved ancestors 
rather than that of liberated grandchildren." 
(Benjamin 1971:262).
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Although Benjamin is not concerned with future generations, he
is able to work out a sensitive position in relation to nature.
However, this sensibility comes from his religious background. As
he noted in Einbahnstraße, human beings have to revere nature,
since they depend on nature and are not able to give it anything.
Thus, whenever they receive something from nature, they ought to
be grateful.
"Aus den ältesten Gebräuchen der Völker 
scheint es wie eine Warnung an uns zu ergehen, 
im Entgegennehmen dessen, * was wir von der 
Natur so reich empfangen, uns vor der Geste 
der Habgier zu hüten. Denn wir vermögen nichts 
der Muttererde aus Eigenem zu schenken. Daher 
gebührt es sich, Ehrfurcht im Nehmen zu 
zeigen, indem vor allem, was wir je und je 
empfangen, wir einen Teil an sie zurückgeben, 
noch ehe wir des Unsren uns bemächtigen...
Nach athenischem Brauch war das Auflesen der 
Brosamen bei der Mahlzeit untersagt, weil sie 
den Herren gehören.” (Benjamin 1972:101).
A society which greedily robs nature's treasures will suffer in 
the long run: "Ist einmal die Gesellschaft unter Not und Gier 
soweit entartet, daß sie die Gaben der Natur nur noch raubend 
empfangen kann, daß sie die Früchte, um sie günstig auf den Markt 
zu bringen, unreif abreißt und jede Schüssel, um nur satt zu 
werden, leeren muß, so wird ihre Erde verarmen und das Land 
schlechte Ernten bringen." (Benjamin 1972:101) According to
2 1 Q
349 In Annex B to the T h e s e s , Benjamin makes clear that his 
approach is informed by Jewish religion: "We know chat the 
Jews were prohibited from investigating the future. The 
Torah and the prayers instruct them in remembrance, however. 
This stripped the future of its magic, to which all those 
succumb who turn to tie soothsayers for enlightenenment. 
This does not imply, however, that for the Jews the future 
turned into homogenous, empty time. For every second of time 
was the strait gate through which the Messiah might enter." 
(Benjamin 1971:266) But see Adorno (1977:619) for a view 
which mentions Benjamin's concern for future generations.
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Benjamin, a society without exploitation might be able to give 
nature something back, even to "improve” it: "Hört diese [Ausbeu­
tung, R . G . ] auf, so wird die Arbeit ihrerseits den Character der 
Ausbeutung der Natur durch den Menschen abstreifen... Eine solche 
vom Spiel beseelte Arbeit ist nicht die Erzeugung von Werten 
sondern auf eine verbesserte Natur gerichtet." (Benjamin 1982:456, 
my emphasis)
Now, one might say that Benjamin's approach is forceful and 
persuasive but has the disadvantage as being based solely on an 
ethical dimension: gratitude towards nature.350 Of course, he
wants to abolish the social conditions which inhibit such an 
"alien" relationship to nature, but cne might ask if this can be a 
realistic perspective for industrial societies. Let me thus turn 
to Benjamin's "technical utopia". Benjamin, unlike some "green" 
fundamentalists, does not reject technological development. When 
proposing Fourier's ideal of labour ( i.e. play), Benjamin is 
aware that labour can become play only on the basis of the most 
developed productive forces: "Die Entfaltung im Spiel setzt höchst 
entwickelte Produktivkräfte voraus, wie sie der Menschheit heute 
erst zur Verfügung stehen und im Gegensinn ihrer Möglichkeiten 
bereitgestellt werden: für den Ernstfall nämlich." (Benjamin
1982:456) Likewise, this "liberated labour" is to "improve" nature 
by technical means. Benjamin again cites with approval Fourier's
350 Interestingly, Bloch (1959:782) juxtaposes Schiller's and 
Goethe's concept of nature; according to Bloch, the former 
wants to dominate nature ("wohltätig ist des Feuers Macht, 
wenn sie der Mensch bezähmt, bewacht"), the latter is 
grateful to nature:
"Erhabener Geist, du gabst mir alles, 
worum ich bat. Du hast mir nicht umsonst 
Dein Angesicht im Feuer zugewendet.
Gabst mir die Natur zum Königreich,
Kraft, sie zu fühlen, zu genießen."
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Phalansteres: "Nach Fourier sollte die wohlbeschaffene gesell­
schaftliche Arbeit zur Folge haben, dafl vier Monde die irdische 
Nacht erleuchteten, daß das Eis sich von den Polen zurückziehen, 
daß das Meerwasser nicht mehr salzig schmecke und die Raubtiere in 
den Dienst des Menschen träten. Das alles illustriert eine Arbeit, 
die, weit entfernt die Natur auszubeuten, von den Schöpfungen sie 
zu entbinden imstande ist, die als mögliche in ihrem Schöße 
schlummern." (Benjamin 1974:699)3 5 1 . Perhaps it should be said 
that nowadays we may have the possibility of creating such animals 
with the help of genetic engineering (not on the basis of libera­
ted work): but who would be delighted? Similarly, the poles may be 
melting in the near future, but with quite disastrous consequen­
ces .
Furthermore, Benjamin hopes that mankind will make true cosmic 
experiences - which he thinks indispensable - with the help of 
technology. The ancient relationship towards the cosmos was 
mediated by the experience of ecstasy (R a u s c h ), while we moderns 
have technical possibilities at hand. These possibilities are 
extrapolated from war-technologies which, of course, have been 
used only for destructive purposes. The result was a "river of 
blood" (cf. Benjamin 1972:147). But at the same time Benjamin is 
fascinated by these new technologies: "Hochfrequenzströme 
durchfuhren die Landschaft, neue Gestirne gingen am Himmel auf,
351 Note the similarity with Bloch who uses the notion of na­
ture's co-productivity, its "latency". See also the simila­
rity to B l o c h ’s technological utopia: "Wie die Ketten­
reaktionen auf der Sonne uns Wärme, Licht und Leben bringen, 
so schafft die Atomenergie... aus Wüste Fruchtland, aus Eis 
Frühling. Einige hundert Pfund Uranium und Thorium würden 
ausreichen, die Sahara und die Wüste Gobi verschwinden zu 
lassen, Sibirien und Nordkanada, Grönland und die Antarktis 
zur Rivera zu verwandeln." (Bloch 1959:775).
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Luftraum und Meerstiefen brausten von Propellern..." (ibidem)352 
However, the fascination is immediately withdrawn when Benjamin 
adds the following to his enumeration: "...und allenthalben grub 
man Opferschächte in die Muttererde" (ibidem). The ruling class's 
yearning for profit had changed the bride's bed into a river of 
blood (cf. ibidem). This sexual metaphor can be seen to conceive 
of the possibilities of technology in the same way as Bloch: as in 
principle leading to a more intimate relationship with nature. 
Again, like Bloch, these possibilities are not put into practice 
as a result of capitalist relations.
Benjamin holds that the notion "domination of nature" is a
suspect one. Who would trust a father, he asks, who beats up his
children and declares the domination of children to be
educational?
"Naturbeherrschung, so lehren die Imperiali­
sten, ist Sinn aller Technik. Wer möchte aber 
einem Prügelmeister trauen, der Beherrschung 
der Kinder durch die Erwachsenen für den Sinn 
der Erziehung erklären würde? Ist nicht Erzie­
hung vor allem die unerläßliche Ordnung des 
Verhältnisses zwischen den Generationen und 
also, wenn man von Beherrschung reden will, 
Beherrschung der Generationsverhältnisse und 
nicht der Kinder? Und so auch Technik nicht 
Naturbeherrschung: Beherrschung vom Verhältnis 
von Natur und Menschheit.” (Benjamin 1972:
147).
With this formulation, Benjamin arrives at an extraordinary in­
sight: he captures a central problem of modern societies in an 
ingenious fashion. He concentrates on the results of relations of 
domination, stressing the need for reflexivity. We gain nothing, 
he says, if we insist on the right to dominate nature (assuming we
352 Note the parallel to writers like Ernst Jünger or the 
Italian futurists; see Hinz (1985) for the latter.
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wish to use that term). Instead, he continues, we should be able 
to control ("dominate") this relation. This formulation is 
congenial to Marx's project in that it stresses both the need for 
transforming nature with the help of technologies and the need to 
evaluate these transformations. Domination of nature thus becomes 
a reflexive concept.353
5.5. Conscious Control and Central Planning
5.5.1. Marx, Vico and social complexity
Marx derived part of his historical optimism from Vico and the 
tradition which followed him (cp. Berlin, 1976:94,137). Indeed, if 
Vico's claim were true, there would be a powerful reason to share 
Marx's optimism. As Marx indicated in a footnote in Capital 1 , he 
agreed with Vico that man can understand the world which is his 
own product much better than the world of nature (which is, accor­
ding to Vico, the product of God). Marx says:
"Does not the history of the productive organs 
of man, of organs that are the material basis 
of all social organisation, deserve equal 
attention? And would not such a history be 
easier to compile, since, as Vico says, human 
history differs from natural history in this, 
that we have made the former, but not the 
latter?" (Capital 1 :352).
It is noteworthy that many commentators have not noticed the im­
portant implications which follow from this claim. Marx is often 
charged with having overlooked the fact that nature will never be 
completely transformed. Alfred Schmidt also bases his criticism of
353 See, also, Luhmann (19 8 4 a :644-5) who defines social rationa­
lity as the system's awareness of the reflexivity of its own 
operations on its environment.
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Bloch on this line of argument: "Auch bei wachsender Vermittlung 
wird Natur nicht zu einem völlig von uns gemachten... Darin drückt 
sich das wesentlichste Unterscheidungsmerkmal von idealistischer 
und materialistischer Dialektik aus: es kommt bei Marx auch in
einer wahrhaft menschlich gewordenen Welt nicht zur völligen
Versöhnung von Subjekt und Objekt. Dies macht Blochs identitäts­
philosophische Hoffnung zuschanden." (Schmidt 1971:162) But 
Schmidt neglects the more basic problem: (even granted that nature 
and society could be reconciled) what if human creations still 
cannot be conceived as human creations and thus not fully 
understood?354 In other words, what if the social sphere loses its 
privileged cognitive status?
After all, it is only natural for us to doubt such a privileged 
status for the social sciences: did not the positivists charge the 
humanities with indulging in unscientific enterprises and of pre­
tending to have gained knowledge about non-natural things? The 
motivation for this attack came from their experience of self- 
proclaimed human sciences, such as Marxism and Psychoanalysis on 
the background of a fundamental crisis of the exact sciences such 
as physics and mathematics.355 It would be interesting to examine 
how different epochs (and different writers) have seen this 
cognitive problem - a task which lies outside the framework of 
this study. What I want to do here is to formulate some doubts
354 Marx faces this problem when he discusses a possible
"deviation" of technologies from human abilities. However,
he assumes a strong functional mechanism to be at work here 
which links human abilities to existing productive forces. 
See CW 5 :87-8 and Capital 1 :488.
355 How strong this positivist influence was (and still is), we
can see if we look at commonsense opinions regarding this 
problem. It is a widespread view that the natural sciences
are able to know more about nature than the social sciences
about society.
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regarding Marx's privileging of "the social" with respect to 
cognition. I do this by looking at some results of contemporary 
social research.
Todd La Porte, in his seminal Organised Social Complexity (1975)
observed that
"[0]ne particulary striking aspect of modern 
political and social development has been the 
capacity of men to construct social systems 
encompassing more and more .groups. Our lives 
are bounded by agencies, organizations, combi­
nes, coalitions, and associations: networks of 
hundreds of connected groups and persons...
One consequence of these increases in group 
connections... has been the tightening of or- 
ganiszational dependencies affecting social 
dynamics and political movements. Another has 
been a rapid increase in the numver of people 
and agencies affecting the day-to-day expe­
riences of individuals. Closely related to 
this increase has been one in the number of 
surprises we encounter. They are generally 
disturbing surprises, caused by the interrup­
tion or frustration of our expectation by some 
hitherto unrecognized dependency." (La Porte 
1975:3)
La Porte calls this a condition of social complexity - to be more 
precise, of organized social complexity. "Systems that are 
characterized by organized complexity... are those in which there 
is at least a moderate number of varaibles or parts related to 
each other in organic or interdependent ways." (1975:5). The most 
obvious empirical referents are "social groups with conscious 
purposes, such as formal organizations or informal, but cohesive, 
groups and associations." (1975:6) It is imp. Important that these 
systems are self-conscious in order that their interaction can 
count as organized. La Porte then provides a working definition of 
organized social complexity: "The degree of complexity of
organized social systems (Q) is a function of the number of system 
components (C.), the relative differentiation or variety of these
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components(D .), and the degree of interdependence among these 
components (I ). Then, by definition, the greater C . , D. , and I ,
K 1 } K
the greater the complexity of the organized system (Q)." (La Porte 
1975:6) La Porte concludes: "[I]f it is true that the texture of 
life and its social institutions has become increasingly complex 
and can be expected to continue so, the implications for social 
theory, for political science, for the techniques of inquiry, and 
perhaps most important - for public policy are enormous." (La 
Porte 1975:18)
Now this is obviously an argument which presents a strong chal­
lenge to the Vico-Marx position.356 For if these are pervasive 
traits of modern societies, Marx's hope for an abolition of feti­
shism, for a full reapropriation of man's objectivations, for a 
"reconcilation", is doomed. It is not doomed because of an "indis- 
solvable" rest of nature, which cannot be transformed, but for the 
opposite reason: even if mankind succeeds very well in transfor­
ming nature we have to take into account the paradoxical result 
that it now suffers from social opacity. The process which leads 
to such a result is the development of the productive forces, 
which have grown not only in efficiency but also in size: as Marx 
himself was aware, the relation between individual (craft worker) 
and technology (his craft instrument on which he played like a 
virtuoso) was reversed with the advent of modern industry. To run 
certain technologies, it is indispensable to have a whole network 
of social institutions. Immediately connected to this diagnosis is
356 The challenge becomes even stronger if we assume that 
ecological problems arise out of an interplay between social 
and natural processes, both (at times) poorly understood - 
not to speak of their complex interaction. How little we 
know in this respect can be grasped from the discussion 
which followed the publication of several "world-models" 
(Club of Rome and others) which tried to connect several 
factors in an obviously unsatisfying way.
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the question of planning, or of "social steering". I am not only 
lacking space but also competence to discuss the different 
judgements on the prospects of planning in complex societies.357 I 
only want to bring out a theoretical dilemma (which seems to be 
also a historical one) and which Marx did not confront.
Recall his distinction between ancient societies and communism. 
In ancient societies people were dependent on nature to a big 
degree. Their "mastery" of nature is on a low level. To this cor­
responds a mystical world view: nature is essentially an opaque 
thing for human beings, whereas social relations in ancient socie­
ties are transparent. Communist societies, on the other hand, have 
succeeded in transforming nature into second nature, resulting in 
a (nearly) transparent nature and a transparent society. In bet­
ween ancient and communist societies lie societies which, to dif­
fering degrees exhibit natural and social opacity? but the gross 
course of history seems to follow a road on which natural opacity 
decreases and social opacity increases - up to a point (capita­
lism) where, according to Marx, the social realm is most opaque, 
but the possibilities to break it up increase proportionally. But 
this mechanism is a rather speculative one. Marx excludes the pos­
sibility that social opacity cannot be blasted away, but perhaps 
at most reduced. The growth of productive forces has led to a d e ­
crease in natural opacity but also to an increase in social opa­
city. Whereas Marx saw this opacity as a result of false reality 
which could be transformed into a true reality, some contemporary 
sociologists are more sceptical. They explain social opacity by 
social complexity which cannot be abolished. In other words, the 
"inverted world" (Marx) presents an irreversible stage of social 
evolution. According to their approach, the evil has to be located
357 See the contributions of La Porte, Perrow, Mayntz, Scharpf, 
Luhmann, Teubner, Willke and others.
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more deeply than Marx locates it. If they are right, then Marx's 
assumption that with the abolitiorf of capitalism fragmentation and 
alienation would also vanish must % e  regarded as obsolete. I re­
turn to this question in 5.6.
5.5.2. Central planning?
In 5.1., I made the distinction between a weak and a strong notion 
of communism. The decisive difference has been identified in the 
existence of alienation and fetishism. However, according to Marx, 
alienation and fetishism have their social roots in privately 
producing units i.e. under market conditions. The dichotomy 
market/plan becomes most important?- here. As we shall see, Marx was 
not very clear about the survival of markets in communism and the 
role of central planning. Take, first, his assertion in Capital 
that "only products of different labour processes, carried on 
independently for the accounts of different private individuals, 
confront one another as commodities." (Capital 1 :49, amended 
translation) This qualification enables Marx to claim that a 
socialist economy which has abolished exploitation, but continues 
to exchange products, is also free of commodity fetishism, since 
its products are no commodities. But this claim overlooks the fact 
that if different units of production (for example, workers' 
cooperatives) under socialism exchange products with each other, 
these products assume the form of commodities since they are use- 
value and exchange-value at one and the same time. Marx offers 
only a verbal resistance to such a conclusion by insisting that 
the different units of production must be carried on by private 
individuals in order that their products assume the form of 
commodities (which, rather than providing a solution, begs the 
question). The whole problem therefore seems to come down to the 
question of market and plan.
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Before going into detail, a preliminary remark is in order. Up 
to now, I have quoted several passages from Marx where he speaks 
of "conscious control" or a "settled plan" which would be neces­
sary for a communist society. I should like to stress that these 
notions are philosophical and abstract notions. We cannot, there­
fore, immediately derive from them an answer to the question if 
Marx was in favour of central planning or not. And, what is more, 
he might even have opposed central planning if it came into 
opposition with the "conscious control" i.e. if the side-effects 
and irrationalities of central planning would have thwarted the 
full conscious self-control of mankind's fate. As I shall claim, 
Marx's theoretical framework requires both markets and plan. Marx 
needs markets for the transformation of concrete labour into 
abstract labour, and he needs the plan to establish the social 
character of labour from the outset. There is no way out of this 
d i l e m m a .
As to the first, Marx criticised Proudhon and the Ricardian 
socialists Bray and Gray several times for their proposal to 
abolish money and substitute it with certificates for labour
358time. Marx's main point of criticism is that their solution
would be self-defeating, since it proposes that goods be produced, 
but not exchanged, as commodities (cf. Moore 1980:73; see also 
Cohen 1978:127-8). Marx never proposed to "count any two hours of 
concrete labour as equivalent. This is the solution of Proudhon
3 5 9and Duhring, but not that of Marx." (Moore 1980:73) . Instead,
358 See CW 29:320ff.
359 See Marx: "Complicated labour ... [is] labour of greater
intensity and greater specific gravity ... [which] resolves 
itself into simple labour put together; it is simple labour 
raised to a higher power, so that for example one day of 
skilled labour may equal three days of simple labour." (CW 
29:273)
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claims Moore, Marx was looking for a mechanism to translate con­
crete labour into abstract labour, since he was constantly aware 
of every societies' need to perform this transformation. In a 
letter to Kugelmann he writes "That this necessity of the distri­
bution of social labour in definite proportions cannot possibly be 
done away with by a particular form of social production but can 
only change the mode of appearance, is self-evident." (SW 2 ;419).
In A Contribution to the Critique of Politcal Economy, Marx 
explains:
To measure the exchange values of commodities 
by the labour time they contain, the different 
kinds of labour have to be reduced to uniform, 
homogeneous, simple labour, in short to labour 
of uniform quality, whose only difference, 
therefore, is quantity. This reduction appears 
to be an abstraction, but it is an abstraction 
which is made every day in the social process 
of production. The conversion of all commodi­
ties into labour time is no greater an ab­
straction, and is no less real, than the reso­
lution of all organic bodies into air." (CW 
29:272) .
But how, then, translate and measure more complicated labour? Here 
Marx relies on the reality of bourgeois society which has already 
brought about the transformation of a great part of social labour 
into simple labour: "The greater part of the labour performed in 
bourgeois society is simple labour as statistical data show." (CW 
29:273). But what, then, about the smaller part of complicated 
labour? How is the reduction brought about? Marx's answer in this 
text is evasive when he says: "The laws governing this reduction 
do not concern us here." (CW 29:273).
Eight years later, in the first volume of C apital, Marx concei­
ves of labour performed under conditions of modern industry as 
nearly completely simple labour: "Hence, in the place of hierarchy
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of specialsied workmen that characterises manufacture, there 
steps, in the automatic factory, a tendency to equalise and reduce 
to one and the same level every kind of work that has to be done 
by the minders of the machines..." (Capital 1 :396)360 .
Finally, consider the following passage from the Manuscripts 
1861-63:
Was aber die individuelle Verschiedenheit der 
Arbeiter betrifft, die dieselbe Arbeit ver­
richten, so ist darüber folgendes zu bemerken:
Diese Verschiedenheit am größten im handwerks- 
mässigen Betrieb (und in den höhren Sphären 
der s.g. unproduktiven Arbeit.) Sie verschwin­
det mehr und mehr und ist auf kaum zu berech­
enbaren Spielraum beschränkt in der entwickel­
ten capitalistischen Production, wo Theilung 
der Arbeit und Maschinerie vorherrscht." (MEGA 
II.3.1.:209)
To turn to the other horn of the dilemma. Marx never tires of de­
manding that labour be directly part of the aggregate labour of 
society, that it not only acquires this social character post 
festum, through the market, but from the outset. This insistence 
derives from his insight that fetishism and alienation arise only 
in conditions under which the producers are separated from each 
other, where "fragmentation has become the normal state of af­
fairs" (MEGA I I .3.6.:2181), where products assume the form of 
value - in a word: in market economies. From this insight follows 
his proposal to abolish markets and to substitute them with a 
central plan:
360 Heller suggests that this was Marx's solution for the trans­
formation problem of complicated into simple labour for com­
munist society too. At first sight this view seems compel­
ling and it also corresponds to Marx's evolutionary approach 
that the new must already be visible beneath the old form. 
Nevertheless, it cannot be regarded as a solution at all 
(for the reasons see infra).
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If we conceive society as being not capitalis­
tic but communistic, there will be no money- 
capital at all in the first place, not the 
disguises cloaking the transactions arising on 
account of it. The question then comes down to 
the need of society to calculate beforehand 
how much labour, means of production, and
means of subsistence it can invest ... In
capitalist society however where social reason 
always asserts itself only post festum great 
disturbances may and must constantly occur."
(Capital 2 :318-9).
Note that society is conceived here to calculate labour quanta.
However, Marx does not tell us how this should be done. He only
suggests that producers may now get paper certificates for their
performed work:
"In case of socialised production the money- 
capital is eliminated. Society distributes
labour-power and means of production to the
different branches of production. The produ­
cers may, for all it matters, receive paper 
vouchers entitling them to withdraw from the 
social supplies of consumer goods a quantity 
corresponding to their labour time. These
vouchers are not money. They do not circu­
late." (Capital 2 :362).
There are several problems with that solution. The first is that
labour has been reduced to simple, homogenous labour in order that
it can be compared. However, this does not match with Marx's 
position that the character of labour under communism will
definitely be different from that under capitalism, a point to 
which I come in a moment. Another difficulty is that Marx thinks 
that these vouchers would not circulate. But who would ensure 
this? Would it not be natural to assume that they get exchanged,
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that a market of labour vouchers would emerge?361
In the Critique of the Gotha Programme/ Marx runs into a diffi­
culty when he claims on the one hand that in the first stage of 
communism each should be rewarded according to her labour contri­
bution, but, on the other hand, recognizes that labour is hetero­
genous i.e. different workers perform different amounts of labour 
in a given time period (see SW 3 :18-9).
To summarise the argument so far. In order to abolish fetishism, 
Marx needs to abolish labour markets; in order to calculate the 
ratios of concrete and abstract labour, he needs to retain
362markets. My claim is that Marx employs the term "conscious
control" to cover two different principles of organising the 
economy: market and plan. Note that market and plan are not as
such incompatible; mixed economies or market socialism may be 
feasible social forms.363 In the Civil War in France, Marx in fact
361 Note that Marx at this point takes up the proposal of the 
Ricardian socialists, and of Proudhon, to substitute money 
for such vouchers. The difference is that production now is 
socialised - Marx is therefore consistent in criticising 
their proposal and to propose something similar here. (But 
note how uncomfortable he feels: he says meinetwegen they 
may receive paper vouchers...)
362 See Kosta, Meyer, Weber (1973:99ff.) who report about 
attempts in the GDR to measure complicated labour without 
m a r k e t s .
363 See Moore for a position that the Communist Manifesto con­
tains a model of market socialism which Marx was later to 
abandon. (Moore 1980:66-70). Social theory has developed the 
following concepts to distinguish between three forms of 
socialization. Luhmann (1984a:522) distinguishes between 
competition, cooperation and exchange; Elster, following 
Polanyi, distinguishes between market, planning and
• • •
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seems to combine markets and plan:
[Those] memebers of the ruling class who are 
intelligent enough to perceive the impossibi­
lity of continuing the present system - and
they are many - have become the obtrusive and
full-mouthed apostles of co-operative produc­
tion. If co-operative production is not to re­
main a sham and snare; if it is to supersede 
the Capitalist system; if united co-operative 
societies are to regulate national production 
upon a common plan, thus taking it under their 
own control, and putting an end to the con­
stant anarchy and periodical convulsions which 
are the fatality of Capitalist production - 
what else, gentlemen, would it be but Commu­
nism, 'possible' Communism? (CW 22:335)
What makes markets and plan incompatible in Marx is that he 
albeit indirectly - focuses on labour-markets♦ Either labour is
sold and bought on markets, or it is directly connected to social
labour within a central plan - a middle way seems excluded.
Heller, as already noted, maintains that in the Grundrisse and 
Capital Marx had different concepts of labour. In the Grundrisse,
reciprocity. These two typologies are different, but also 
overlapping. I propose to fuse them under the headings of 
market, state and solidarity. Now, it seems that any modern 
society employs all of the three mechanisms. A s ir.ple 
thought can illustrate this. Take first the plan: if it is 
not perfect (and who would assume it can be?), there will 
always emerge a market besides the plan - albeit a black 
market. (Above we saw that it would be natural to assume the 
circulation of labour-vouchers. Similarly, it would be 
absurd for a "free" society to simply forbid markets). 
Likewise, if the market does not work perfectly (and who 
would assume it does?), some redistributive measures must be 
taken by the state. Finally, solidarity seems to always 
operate in social relations, at least on the micro-level 
(families) but also on higher levels (agreements between 
firms, institutions etc.).
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Marx views labour as a vital need, whereas in Capital he views 
it as a social duty. To this contrast corresponds, according to 
Heller, labour as complicated labour in the Grundrisse and labour 
as simple labour in Capital. Now if this were true, Marx's market 
dilemma could be resolved easily: since all labour is homogenous 
simple labour, there is no need to have markets which transform 
concrete into abstract labour; they can be equated from the 
outset; the many individual labours can be aggregated to a social 
labour via plan.
But H e l l e r ’s claim is misconceived. She forgets that we have to 
distinguish between Marx's analysis of labour under capitalism and 
his prediction about the character of labour under communism. 
Without doubt Heller's reference to Marx's analysis of labour in 
the Grundrisse refers to a communist society whereas the analysis 
of Capital is concerned with the labour performed under present 
capitalist conditions.
If my exegetical analysis in chapter 3 was right, then Heller's 
claim is even more misplaced. In 3.5., I maintained that Marx, in 
the Grundrisse and in the Manuscripts 1861-63, stresses the fact 
that the workers get reduced to mere appendages to machinery (as a 
result of technological conditions) whereas in Capital he limits 
this fact to capitalist society. This is to say that the reduction 
of complex labour to simple labour is done only under capitalist 
relations. In other words, it is no technological but a social 
fact that all labour becomes homogenous, simple, repelling, mono­
tonous work. But Marx, in the Grundrisse and the Manuscripts 1861- 
6 3 , presents this fact also as a technological fact: simple labour 
which exists under capitalism is largely predetermined by the 
rhythm of the machine.
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Labour gets reduced to simple labour under capitalist condi­
tions, but will it retain this character in communism? Obviously 
not, if we look at Marx's own writings. I already quoted the 
passage from Capital where Marx stresses the need for varied work 
which becomes realised first under capitalist relations. Certain­
ly, one could say that varied work may be at the same time simple 
work - in this case, Heller's contention would be right. But Marx
in Capital also stresses the need for an all-round education which
is a clear sign that labour cannot be conceived as simple work.364
In my view, Marx did not change his basic position in respect of
labour from the Grundrisse to C apital. But he has moved into a 
dilemma whose two aspects are the following: either he has a
consistent position in favour of labour markets which transform 
complex into simple labour; but this solution entails the danger 
of fetishism and alienation. Or he has a consistent position in 
favour of planned labour allocation - in which case he has to 
assume that labour under communism has the same character as under 
capitalism.
5.5.3. Social complexity and personal differences
In this section, I briefly point to an apparent difficulty with 
Marx's concept of communism which rests on the contention of many 
critics that Marx undervalued (i) the importance of personal con­
flicts and (ii) the importance of social functions. I address 
these two points in turn.
364 Marx never abandoned his philosophical anthropology with the 
central notion of "total individuals".
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og eMarx repeatedly stated that individuals were different. How­
ever, he seemed to believe that only under conditions of class 
societies, especially capitalism, would personal differences turn 
into conflicts. With the abolition of private property and clas­
ses, he argues, personal differences can be put to the benefit of 
all instead of turning into conflicts between individuals. In the 
German Ideology, Marx and Engels assert that "with the abolition 
of the basis, private property, with the communistic regulation of 
production (and implicit in this,, the abolition of the alien 
attitude [Fremdheit] of men to their own product), the power of 
the relation of supply and demand is dissolved into nothing, and 
men once more gain control of exchange and the way they behave to 
one another..." (CW 5 :48). In the Communist Manifesto, we read: 
"In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class 
antagonisms, we shall have an association, in which the free 
development of each is the condition for the free development of 
all." (CW 6 :506) In the Comments on James M i l l , we read: "Let us 
suppose that we had carried out production as human beings. Each 
of us would have in two ways affirmed himself and the other 
person. (1) In my production I would have objectified my 
individuality, its specific character, and therefore enjoyed not 
only an individual manifestation of my life during the activity, 
but also when looking at the object I would have the individual 
pleasure of knowing my personality to be objective, visible to the 
senses and hence a power beyond all doubt. (2) In your enjoyment 
or use of my product I would have the direct enjoyment both of 
being conscious of having satisfied a human need by my work, that 
is, of having objectified man's essential nature, and of having 
thus created an object corresponding to another man's essential 
nature... I would have directly confirmed and realized my true
365 of. 1859 P r e f a c e , The Critique of the Gotha Programme.
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nature, my human nature, my communal nature. Our products would be 
so many mirrors in which we saw reflected our essential nature." 
(CW 3 ; 227-8).
As far as this argument rests on the assumption of limitless 
material abundance it must be rejected on the grounds that 
Marx himself gave: there will never be a society with limitless 
material abundance. As far as the argument rests on the assumption 
that personal endowments and interests can be chanelled via a 
division of labour to the benefit of all, it seems to presuppose 
an irrealistic notion of social harmony. As Elster pointed out, 
"[e]ven assuming people to be moved by altruism or a concern for 
the common good, they might not have a common conception of what 
that good is." (Elster 1985:458). Marx could agree with such an 
account, arguing that this is characteristic of the first stage of 
communism, which is "in every respect, economically, morally and 
intellectually, still stamped with the birth marks of the old 
society from whose womb it emerges." (SW 3 :23) And in the early 
Paris Manuscripts, Marx conceives of a "crude communism" which may 
well correspond to the two stages in the Gotha Programme. Marx 
w r i t e s :
This type of communism - since it negates the 
personality of man in every sphere - is but 
the logical expression of private property, 
which is this negation. General envy consti­
tuting itself as a power is the disguise in 
which greed re-establishes and satisfies it­
self, only in another way. The thought of 
every piece of private property as such is at 
least turned against wealthier private proper­
ty in the form of envy and urge to reduce 
thincs to a common level, so that this envy 
and urge even constitute the essence of compe­
tition. Crude communism is only the cumulation 
of this envy and of this levelling-down
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proceding from the preconceived minimum." (CW 
3:295)5 .
Maihofer pointed out that for this reason law as a social function 
would be indispensable for communist society.367 Now this seems to 
contradict Marx's hope of a "withering away of the state". 
Maihofer and others have claimed that Marx never entertained such 
a hope. What Marx actually said, was that "public power loses its 
political character" and that the proletariat will install an
association in place of the old bourgeois society which excludes
36 9the existence of classes and the conflict between them. But
consider M a r x ’s comments (On the Jewish Q uestion) on the "perfect"
state as embodiment of the universal:
"The perfect political state is, by its
nature, man's species-life, as opposed to his
material life. All the preconditions of this 
egoistic life continue to exist in civil 
society outside the sphere of the state, but 
as qualities of civil society. Where the 
political state has attained its true develop­
ment, man - not only in thought, in conscious­
ness, but in reality, in life - leads a
twofold life, a heavenly and an earthy life: 
life in the political community, in which he 
considers himself a communal being, and life 
ind civil society, in which he acts as a
private individual, regards other men as a
366 In both texts, according to Marx, all memebers of society
are w o r k e r s . As Elster pointed out, "what Marx in his youth
saw as a blind alley, he later cam to see as a necessary, if 
transitional stage." (Elster 1985:452)
367 See Lukes (1985:98ff.) for an eloquent exposition of further
r e a s o n s .
368 See Communist Manifesto and Poverty of Philosophy. According
to Maihofer, the formula of withering away of the state was
Engels's invention. However, and ironically, Engels himself 
envisages a "Gemeinwesen" which organizes the association of 
communist society. See Maihofer (1968:14 ff.); see also Zolo
(1974).
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means, degrades himself into a means, and 
becomes the plaything of alien powers." (CW 
3:153-4, my emphasis).
From this Marx concludes:
"Only when the real, individual man re-absorbs 
in himself the abstract citoyen, and as an 
individual human being has become a species- 
being in his everyday life, in his particular 
work, and in his particular situation, only 
when man has recogised and organised his "for­
ces propres" as social forces, and conse­
quently no longer separates’ social power from 
himself in the shape of political power, only 
then will human emancipation have been accom­
plished." (CW 3:168) .
It is not only that the bourgeois has to be eradicated in order to
retain the life of the citoyen, it is rather the whole separation
which Marx aims to supersede (in the sense of "aufheben"). This
follows clearly from Marx's treatment of the bourgeois state as an
instance for alienation:
Out of this very contradiction between parti­
cular and the common interests, the common
interest assumes an independent form as the
st a t e , which is divorced from the real indivi­
dual and collective interests, and at the same 
time as an illusory community... (C W 5 :46).
Elster convincingly argued that all debates and procedures of 
allocation of resources and of finding solutions to social prob­
lems are likely to assume a political character. This leads me to
369 This is a theme which has been taken up again by the 
communitarian critique of liberalism. Communitarians want to 
fuse public and private, political and moral dimensions. 
Interestingly, they seem to commit the same fallacy in assi­
milating the "self-rule" of society to that of an indivi­
dual. However, to use Elster's words here in criticizing 
Marx, "this is a scale-error of monumental size and impor­
tance", cf. Elster (1985:458).
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the second question i.e. if Marx also overlooked the need for the 
maintenance of social functions such as law, economy, politics 
etc. in communist society.
We have already seen that Marx claimed that the state would lose 
its political character in communism. This seems to entail commu­
nism eradicating the political system altogether. Insofar as Marx 
or Marxists adhere to such a position, it must be regarded as 
basically unrealistic. As social research in this century has 
shown, there is a trend of "autonomisation of social spheres". One 
could even conceive of these social autonomisations as analogous 
to the autonomisation of the economy which Marx so brillantly 
analysed. But if it is true that such an autonomisation has taken 
place, it is improbable that it can be simply reversed. Writers 
like Habermas explicitly acknowledge that this social differentia­
tion has to be interpreted as an "evolutionary achievement" which 
is to say that every modern complex society must work according to 
the laws of different social subsystems in which money and power
are the two main means of steering (see Habermas 1981, vol. 2:499,
501).
Marx, on the one hand, seems open to such a position when he
writes in the Critique of the Gotha P r o gramme: "What social
functions will remain in existence that are analogous to present 
state functions? This question can only be answered scientifi­
cally..." (SW 3 :26) Equally open for the functional requirements 
of modern society (in this case of large-scale industry) was his 
position on education. As we saw, Marx claims that many-sided 
individuals will be needed by large-scale industry and that the 
educational system brings them forth. In the passage on child- 
labour he goes even as far as to use the requirements of modern 
industry as an argument for the inevitability of child-labour,
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which to my view is a somewhat sinister statement.370 In summary, 
Marx acknowledges the need of modern societies for having functio­
nally separated social spheres; sometimes he even entertains a 
naive functionalist view assuming that the requirements of large- 
scale industry will be fulfilled automatically.
But on the other hand he clearly favours an abolition of social 
systems if and in so far they are superior powers and are experi­
enced as fate by the individuals. He favoured a community model 
over a society model. But if the modern world is characterised by 
such objectifications like social systems which are essential to 
the functioning of society (whether based on "socialist" or 
"capitalist" principles) it seems impossible to bring them back 
completely into the realm of intersubjective action (Habermas' 
"Lebenswelt" or the communitarians "community") - which was Marx's 
hope in the Jewish Question (inter alia). This would only be pos­
sible on the condition that all social functions could be perfor­
med by small local communities. However, as several authors have 
pointed out, any complex society needs some large-scale institu­
tions which are organised on a regional, national and interna­
tional level and display some degree of centralisation. It seems 
obvious, therefore, that alienation is inevitable here (and it may 
already exist on lower levels, from the intersubjective dimension 
upwards).
How could we explain this ambiguity in Marx? Lukes suggested 
that there might be a contradiction between the individualistic 
and the communitarian impulses in Marx's thought:
370 He should have separated more clearly between the capitalist 
need for child-labour and his reasons for favouring a combi­
nation of theoretical and practical education. The way it 
stands, it could be interpreted as if Marx would not resist 
the squandering of childrens' lives in the factories.
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"The notion of individuality, to which ...
Marx was so much attached, ... which reached 
the nineteenth century through Romanticism,
Goethe supplying its artisitc and Schleier- 
macher its metaphysical foundation - this 
notion prescribes that 'each individual is 
called or destined to realise his own incompa­
rable image' (Simmel). The notion of communi­
ty, to which Marx was no less attached, which 
is no less rooted in the Western political 
tradition, pictures individuals as finding 
their fulfilment in reciprocity and solidarity 
rather than competition and self-assertion, 
and in mutual identification in common activi­
ties and the pursuit of common purposes."
(Lukes 1985:96) .
This argument would explain the first ambiguity i.e. the problem 
of personal conflicts. With respect to the second problem we have 
to look even more closely at the philosophical tradition Marx 
inherited. This is the task of the last section.
5.6. Technology and the Limits of the Philosophy of the Subject
Marx follows Hegel in assuming that the subject will reapprcpriate 
its own 'creations', its own objectifications. But, as 3enhabib 
(and others) have shown, this assumption is dogmatic. Nothing 
guarantees or proves that there will be a subject or a reappropri­
ation. Benhabib rightly pointed out that "Hegel's critique is 
based upon the normative image of a life form that has become 
'transparent' and intelligible to the intellect, and in which
371 As Schiller pointed out: "Nicht auf das Individuum bezieht 
sich dieser Bildungsprozeß, sondern auf den kollektiven 
Lebenszusammenhang des Volkes: 'Totalität des Charakters muß 
bei dem Volke gefunden werden, welches fähig und würdig sein 
soll, den Staat der Not mit dem Staat der Freiheit zu 
vertauschen.'" (Schiller, Sämtliche W e r k e , B d . 5:579; quoted 
in Habermas 1985:59)
394
individuals once again can recognize themselves as part of a 
'living' as opposed to a 'dead' totality." (Benhabib 1986:30). 
But there is an ambivalence in Hegel's immanent critique of natu­
ral right theories which Marx was to inherit:
"[0]n the one hand, he criticizes the dogma­
tism of modern natural right theories in 
reifying present social relations; on the 
other hand, he himself admits that there is no 
moment in the present upon which to anchor the 
view of a unified ethical life. The ideal of 
an ethical life is not an immanent but a 
transcendent ideal, in the sense that it in­
volves looking back to the past." (Benhabib 
1986:32) .
Marx, like Hegel, conceives of human culture as a historical
product of man's objectifications; the objects are the expression
of man's inner essence and are thus prone to a "reappropriation".
This reappropriation becomes necessary because the actual course
of history has led to an alienation of man from his objects. As
Benhabib puts it,
"Marx's early diagnosis of the antagonism 
inherent in bourgeois civil society clearly 
parallels the Hegelian one of Entzweiung♦ The 
principle of essential unity is denied 
methodologically, but it is reasserted at the 
normative level as the immanent utopia which 
Marx claims is the implicit 'ought' towards 
which actuality must evolve... The 
reappropriation of the powers and
potentialities that humanity has alienated 
from itself is the dream." (Benhabib 
1986:38,39) .
If we cannot rely on a complete "Aufhebung" of alienation, we may
372 See also Ricoeur (1986).
395
expect a reduction of alienation. This is to say that from the 
two models of communism only the weaker one is available. To re­
call: the strong model is based on four elements:
1. reappropriaticn of all objectifcations;
2. total individuals;
3. conscious control;
3 7 44. production for use-value.
These elements are three inseparable "moments" of the promethean 
image of mankind. Total individuals are individuals who have 
reappropriated their objectifications and have brought all their 
activities under their common conscious control.375 This strong 
notion of communism clearly belongs to the notion Bildunq of 
German Idealism (Humboldt, Herder) which Marx took up from Hegel's 
philosophy (but also from Feuerbach's materialism). As we have 
seen, it is contained both in Hegel's model of transformation of 
first nature into second nature which alone makes possible a 
rational character of the world and in Feuerbachs's critique of 
religion which Marx considered the starting point of all critique. 
According to him, in the emerging modern epoch, science, techno­
logy and bourgeoisie had to fight religious tutelage and free 
themselves from that grip. But, equally, the established modern
373
373 Moore claims that Marx is able to reach the weak notion of
communism on the basis of his historical materialism; the
strong notion, however, can only be derived from his 
philosophical communism.
374 Production for use-value implies that markets are abolished,
a conclusion which does not follow from Marx's analysis. In
C a p i t a l , and the quoted passage from the Civil W a r , he
leaves open the possibility that the economy, is, at least 
partly, based on exchange; but the products would then be 
commodities, a conclusion which he tries to avoid.
375 The notion of conscious control can be traced back to Dante, 
see Girnus (1974); Klein (1974).
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epoch has to carry on the fight against every other form of "fate" 
or "alien powers".
It is thus up to the human species to acquire control over its 
own fate (social and natural processes) and to develop all of its 
species powers, as embodied in individuals.
Contrast now the weaker notion of communism:
1. abolition of private property;
2. abolition of classes, class-exploitation and class-oppression;
3. universalisation of happiness;
4. universalisation of material wealth;
5. expanding of disposable time.
I included (3) in this list since Marx thinks that people in for­
mer modes of production were happier (cf. MEGA I I .3.6.:2288). But 
people in earlier modes of production certainly did not have full 
conscious control over their life-conditions: nature was an alien 
power, even if society was relatively transparent. Religious 
alienation was the normal state of these societies. I mention this 
only to show that (3) does not mean abolition of alienation. This 
is necessary to distinguish the weaker from the stronger notion of
376communism.
376 Marx (not only in his early writings) seemed to believe that 
with the abolition of private property all other points 
would follow more or less automatically; at least the fol­
lowing passage from the Paris Manuscripts can be interpreted 
in such a way: "Communism is the positive transcendence of 
private property, as human self-estrangement and therefore 
as the real appropriation of the human essence by and for 
man; communism therefore as the complete return of man to 
himself as a social (i.e. human) being - a return accompli­
shing consciously and embracing the entire wealth of pre­
vious development." (CW 3 : 296; cp. also MEGA I I .3.6 .:2144) .
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Let me now restate the problematique of the present work in the 
light of the above. Ecological problems are seen as the result of 
an autonomisation of the social and technical sphere. The human 
species has developed technologies in order to dominate nature; at 
a certain point in their development these technologies can no 
longer be controlled by individuals, but only by units of social 
cooperation. If we recall the evolutionary models from chapter 4, 
we might say that both technology and social forms have assumed a 
shape which escapes the control of the individuals. Both craft 
technology and transparent social relations (like families, 
guilds, towns) had dimensions which could be grasped by the indi­
viduals. Modern technologies are not at the disposal of individual 
craft workers; likewise, social life cannot be conceived as a fa­
mily writ large.377 3oth stages of development display a sharp
3 7 8qualitative leap which any social theory has to recognise.
Marx pointed to both phenomena: individuals under conditions of 
modern industry are reduced to "living accessories" who experience 
the (technical) world rather as "fate" than as a product of their 
conscious control. As he said, "in comparison with capitalist 
society, these old social organisms of production are far more 
simple and transparent." (Capital 1 :83) Surely, science may reveal
377 Teubner rightly notes that some socialist and corporatist 
theories wrongly equate functional subsystems of societies 
with big corporations, capable of action. (Teubner 1989b: 
103). The same holds true with respect to some recent 
communitarian criticisms of liberalism (see also above, fn 
368).
378 Adorno, in an article called "Fortschritt", clearly sees
that Hegel and Marx were aware of this autonomisation of 
supra-individual entities. He also sees the mythical element 
in this process: "Innerweltlicher Fortschritt hat sein
mythisches Moment daran, daß er, wie Hegel und Marx erkannt­
en, über die Köpfe der Subjekte hinweg sich zuträgt und 
diese nach seinem Ebenbild formt..." (Adorno 1977:631-2).
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more and more secrets and solve more and more puzzles - this is
also the route which Marx embarks on in order to foster his
historical optimism. However, his optimism goes as far as to
assume that in principle there can, and will be, a state of
affairs which would make social science superfluous. In other
words, Marx seems to presuppose that communism will create social
relations which are entirely transparent to their members. As
Cohen put it:
"Marx says that relations between human beings 
under socialism are 'transparent' and 'intel­
ligible'. Economic agents whose actions are 
integrated by a democratically formulated plan 
understand what they are doing... [Social
science] has no function in a world which has
abolished the discrepancy between the surface 
of things and their true character." (Cohen 
1978:336-7) "When social science is necessary, 
men do not understand themselves. A society in 
which men do not understand themselves is a 
defective society." (Cohen 1978:338)
This interpretation is in line with my emphasis that what counted 
most for Marx in the final analysis was the construction of a 
rational world. Cohen gives a - to my view - excellent interpre­
tation of the eleventh thesis on Feuerbach. Marx says there: "The
philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the 
point is to change it." Cohen rightly suggests interpreting this 
phrase not in the sense that Marx was (in contrast to Feuerbach) 
interested in practical questions. Rather, as Cohen suggests, we 
understand the meaning of the eleventh thesis best by adding "to 
change it so that interpretation of it is no longer necessary."
379(Cohen 1978:339, my emphasis)
379 See the Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy 
of Law where Marx speaks about an "inverted wo r l d ” ; see 
CW : 3 :175.
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This points to the essential equal concern of Feuerbach and Marx 
i.e. to suppress illusion, and it is "Marx’s complaint... that 
theory alone will not do so. The goal with respect to which 'the 
chief thing still remains to be done' [4th thesis on Feuerbach, 
R.G.] is to secure intelligibility." (Cohen 1978:340). In other 
words: social reality must be such that it provides the conditions 
of intelligibility which initiate harmony between reality and 
thought. Fetishism, which gives rise to "false consciousness", 
does not mean that people are in principle unable to conceive 
reality. Rather, reality presents itself in the way in which it is 
represented by consciousness. It is up to science to "dissipate
380the mist" and provide explanations. Cohen rightly connects this 
topic to the topic of alienation (and, I may add, he should have 
connected it to the topic of fetishism as well) and agrees with
Marx's claim that the need for social theoretical explanation
reflects an alienated state of affairs and he supports Marx's 
intention to overcome this situation in a future society (cf. 
Cohen 1978:343). However, Cohen notes that there are inherent 
limits for doing so. Even granted that the market, one of the main 
causes of social opacity, will have disappeared, there will
probably remain other causes. According to my own view, these 
causes lie in the fact that social reality is functionally
differentiated and complex. Social science is therefore needed 
more than ever before.
380 This "realist" epistemology comes out very clearly in M a r x ’s 
letter to Kugelmann of July 11, 1868: "Since the thought
process itself grows out of conditions, is itself a natural 
process, thinking that really comprehends must always be the 
same, and can vary only gradually, according to the maturity 
of development, including the development of the organ by 
which the thinking is done." (SW 2 :419).
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